Addressing Ecological Uncertainty and Nature Conservation Conflicts: Adaptive Management Models for English Nature Conservation Law and Policy and Practice:







































English	 nature	 conservation	 law	 and	 policy	 to	 support	 the	 adaptation	 of	






it	 ill-equipped	 to	 respond	 to	 these	 manifestations	 of	 social-ecological	
complexity.	 	 Adaptive	management	 is	 proposed	 in	 this	 thesis	 as	 capable	 of	








within	designated	areas,	 the	approach	 taken	 is	one	of	 ‘regulated	 flexibility’.	
Wide	administrative	discretion,	underpinned	by	judicial	deference,	allows	for	
variable	 implementation,	nevertheless	against	a	set	of	 firm	rules	 to	prevent	
abuse	by	all	parties	involved.	
Within	this	framework,	it	lies	with	the	administration	to	set	thresholds	
of	 flexibility	 and	 choose	 which	 of	 an	 array	 of	 available	 instruments	 to	





Finally,	 the	 thesis	 proposes	 that	 amendments	 such	 as	 a	 statutory	










































































































































































































































































































mechanism	 to	 address	 the	 socio-ecological	 complexity	 that	 makes	 the	
conservation	 of	 biodiversity	 a	 highly	 challenging	 task.	 	 Although	 there	 is	 a	
large	body	of	scientific	literature	on	adaptive	management	as	a	model	for	inter	
alia	management	aiming	to	promote	the	interests	of	biodiversity,	there	is	less	
literature	 for	 its	 interaction	 with	 the	 legal	 system	 within	 which	 it	 will	
ultimately	 operate.	 Additionally,	 the	 majority	 of	 the	 literature	 on	 adaptive	
management	is	to	be	found	within	US	scholarship.	The	term	is	not	as	widely	
used	 in	 Europe,	 although	 this	 does	 not	 necessarily	 imply	 that	 it	 is	 not	
implemented	in	practice.		
Building	on	the	existing	literature,	this	thesis	argues	that	two	different	
but	 intertwined	 models	 of	 adaptive	 management,	 one	 as	 a	 science-driven	
process	 based	 on	 experimentation	 and	 iterative	 decision-making	 and	 one	
based	on	collaboration,	can	provide	us	with	a	management	logic	that	is	able	to	
address	 two	 major	 impediments	 to	 effective	 nature	 conservation	





And	finally,	when	 looking	at	 the	actual	management	that	 takes	place	on	the	
ground,	 the	 day	 to	 day	 decision	 making	 how	 adaptive	 the	 day-to-day	









and	 the	 introduction	 of	 hunting	 regulations. 1 	Since	 then	 and	 following	
increasing	 concerns	 over	 the	 alarming	 loss	 of	 biodiversity,	 a	 significant	
amount	of	legislation	has	been	enacted	in	national,	European	and	international	
level,	 usually	 preceded	 by	 broad	 declarations	 of	 ambitious	 goals	 and	 far	
reaching	targets	included	in	biodiversity	policies	and	strategies.2		
A	 careful	 consideration	 of	 the	 development	 and	 evolution	 of	 nature	
conservation	law	and	policy	frameworks	in	England	reveals	that	neither	the	
European	nor	 the	English	 legislator	has	been	 remote	and	 indifferent	 to	 the	




have	 seen	 an	 evolution	 in	 the	 legal	 approaches	 employed	 to	 provide	 for	
biodiversity	that	correspond	to	the	different	needs	and	different	perceptions	
of	nature	over	the	years.	These	approaches	range	 from	merely	voluntary	to	






















underlined	by	 strong	 reliance	on	partnership	and	cooperation	between	 the	
state	and	private	interests;5	from	the	indirect	use	of	common	law	and	property	
rights	 to	 statutory	 intervention 6 	complemented	 by	 market	 based	
mechanisms7	and	 contractual	 agreements;8	from	 preventive	 measures	 and	
species	 focused	 legislation	 to	 sophisticated	 schemes	 of	 natural	 networks,	
positive	 management	 and	 the	 integration	 of	 nature	 conservation	
considerations	and	objectives	within	a	considerable	number	of	policies	and	
procedures.	The	result	is	a	constantly	growing,	complex	system	of	laws.	Nature	
conservation	 in	 the	 21st	 century	 is	 grounded	 on	 a	 patchwork	 of	 legal	
provisions,	 schemes	 and	 plans,	 directly	 or	 indirectly	 seeking	 to	 ‘protect’,	






























legislation	 was	 deeply	 anthropocentric	 in	 nature,	 aiming	 to	 regulate	 the	
exploitation	of	biodiversity	on	the	one	hand	and	protect	rights	associated	with	




emerged	 issues	of	 animal	 cruelty	and	over-exploitation,	 the	 idea	of	wildlife	






on	 behalf	 of	 societies,	 organisations	 and	 individuals	 to	 promote	 nature	
conservation	 and	 raise	 public	 awareness,	 which	 in	 turn,	 prompted	 public	
pressures	 for	 better	 consideration	 of	 nature	 conservation	 related	 issues	
within	political	agendas.	
Hence,	from	the	mid-20th	century	onwards,	the	conservation	of	nature	
has	 become	 increasingly	 important	 and	 has	 found	 its	 place	 within	 policy	
statements	 and	 proclamations	 in	 national	 and	 international	 level.	 Nature	
conservation	 is	 now	 a	 desirable	 –	 but	 not	 necessarily	 non-controversial	 -	
policy	and	a	legitimate	state	concern	that	entails	legislative	intervention.	The	
rationale	behind	 the	need	 for	 conservation	varies	 from	moral	 and	 religious	
justifications	 to	 merely	 anthropocentric	 arguments	 and	 much	 of	 the	
discussion	 and	 even	 decision	 making	 will	 always	 revolve	 around	 and	 be	
influenced	by	the	crucial	issue	of	‘why	we	protect	nature?’	and	how	we	intend	







ethics	 and	 far	 beyond	 the	 scope	 of	 this	 thesis. 13 	In	 the	 context	 of	 this	
discussion,	it	suffices	to	say	that	modern	nature	conservation	policy	sits	at	the	
intersection	 of	 anthropocentric	 and	 an	 ecocentric	 approaches. 14 	Modern	
nature	conservation	law	reflects	the	ecocentric	and	anthropocentric	ideas	that	
have	 influenced	 and	 shaped	 its	 development.	 Within	 the	 Convention	 of	
Biological	Diversity,15	the	former	are	evident	when	the	CBD	acknowledges	‘the	
intrinsic	value	of	biodiversity’16	and	the	latter	when	it	continues	to	refer	to	the	
‘social,	 economic,	 educational,	 cultural,	 recreational	 and	 aesthetic	 values	 of	
biodiversity	and	 its	components,’17	all	of	which	are	closely	 interwoven	with	
human	existence.	 In	 terms	of	national	legislation,	ecocentric	 ideas	underpin	
the	duty	to	designate	sites	on	the	basis	of	scientific	criteria;18	anthropocentric	
ideas	are	on	the	other	hand,	the	basis	for	the	introduction	of	exemptions	that	
allow	damage	 on	 designated	 sites	when	mandated	 by	 social	 and	 economic	
needs.19	Whichever	 the	 justification,	 the	 fact	 remains	 that	 issues	 relating	 to	














18	Reid	 (n1)	 52;	 Both	European	 sites	 and	 the	 domestic	 Sites	 of	 Special	 Scientific	 Interests	
(SSSIs)	are	designated	on	the	basis	of	purely	scientific	criteria	see	discussion	in	s.4.2.1.	
19	ibid;	European	legislation	lays	down	a	tiered	decision-making	process	to	approve	damaging	
activities	 on	 designated	 sites	 in	 cases	 of	 overriding	 public	 interest.	 In	 terms	 of	 domestic	
designations,	planning	authorities	although	they	have	a	duty	to	have	regard	to	biodiversity	
conservation,	they	can	nevertheless	consent	to	damaging	activities.		










(SSSIs)	 which	 together	 with	 NNRs	 came	 to	 form	 the	 backbone	 of	 wildlife	
designations	in	England.	In	the	30	years	that	followed,	a	number	of	sites	were	
designated.	 However,	 the	 original	 provisions	were	 weak,	 unable	 to	 secure	
adequate	protection	or	proper	management.26	On	the	other	hand	there	was	no	
systematic	 designation	 to	 the	 extent	 that	 it	 was	 often	 unbeknown	 to	
landowners	and	managers.27	The	 lax	 legislation,	 combined	with	the	gradual	
intensification	 of	 agriculture,	 resulted	 in	 many	 of	 these	 sites	 being	 lost	 or	
severely	 damaged.28 	Hence,	 in	 1981	 a	 new	 system	 was	 introduced	 by	 the	
Wildlife	and	Countryside	Act	(WCA)	1981	which	strengthened	the	SSSI	regime	
by	 laying	 down	 a	 notification	 system	 and	 provisions	 to	 prevent	 damage.29	
Nevertheless,	adequate	protection	was	still	to	be	secured	and	deterioration	of	
SSSIs	continued.	There	were	many	reports	of	landowners	circumventing	and	
abusing	 the	 voluntary	 system	 largely	 established	 by	 the	 original	 1981	 Act,	
ruining	 valuable	 sites.30 	Additionally,	 the	 provisions	 of	 the	 1981	 Act	 were	
aimed	 to	 address	 impacts	 from	 positive	 agricultural	 activities,	 which	were	

























Conservation	 respectively	with	 significantly	 stricter	 controls	 than	 the	WCA	
1981	SSSIs,	applying	therein.	 	 In	2000,	 in	order	to	rectify	 these	weaknesses	
and	at	the	same	time	align	the	SSSI	regime	with	EC	legislation	and	the	stronger,	
stricter	 protection	 it	 conferred	 on	 European	 habitats,	 the	 Countryside	 and	
Rights	 of	 Way	 Act	 (CROWA)	 2000	 was	 introduced.	 CROWA	 2000	 brought	
fundamental	changes	to	the	operation	of	the	SSSI	system	and	dealt	a	blow	to	
the	 voluntary	 principle	 by	 introducing	 legislation	 to	 prevent	 damage	 and	
promote	or	even	enforce	proper	management.35	In	 this	sense,	 the	2000	Act	
shifted	 the	 protectionist	 philosophy	 of	 the	 previous	 regime	 to	 one	 of	
encouraging	 positive	 management	 for	 the	 enhancement	 and	 restoration	 of	
SSSIs.	Since	then,	SSSIs	have	seen	a	significant	 improvement	–	 from	50%	to	
93%	favourable	or	recovering	condition	–	as	a	result	of	intensive	government	




and	 plants,	 the	 earliest	 and	 most	 traditional	 form	 of	 protection.	 Wildlife	
















approach	 and	 identified	 four	 coexisting	 principal	 strands	 that	 currently	
comprise	the	complex	set	of	 legal	provisions:	Hence,	 there	are	stricto	sensu	
nature	conservation	statutes	such	the	Part	I	of	WCA	1981,	provisions	of	the	
Birds39	and	 Habitats40	directives	 and	 some	 pieces	 of	 legislation	 conferring	







The	 proliferation	 of	 legislation	 is	 not	 necessarily	 effective.	 Without	
overlooking	 or	 undervaluing	 the	 positive	 impacts,45	scientific	 data	 seem	 to	
confirm	 the	 qualms	 of	 those	 criticizing	 nature	 conservation	 regimes.46	The	



















Biological	 Diversity,	 Global	 Biodiversity	 Outlook	 3	 (2010)	 available	 at	 	 <	
http://www.cbd.int/gbo3/>		accessed	November	2016.	





Despite	 the	 abundance	 of	 legislation,	 there	 is	 a	 general	 feeling	 that	 our	
otherwise	worthy	efforts	often	go	astray.		
Thence,	 the	 question	 that	 emerges	 is	 this:	 why	 despite	 our	 devoted	
efforts,	does	the	problem	of	biodiversity	loss	persist?	What	is	so	special	about	
nature	 conservation	 that	 law,	 which	 is	 traditionally	 employed	 to	 address	
problems	emerging	in	human	societies,	fails	to	rise	to	the	challenge?	To	begin	
with,	nature	conservation	legislation	has	been	faced	with	issues	common	to	all	
legal	 frameworks,	 such	 as	 lack	 of	 appropriate	 implementation	 and	
enforcement.48	These	have	been	acknowledged	and	over	the	years	major	steps	
have	been	taken	to	strengthen	the	regime	and	secure	compliance.49		





are	 unlikely	 to	 be	 able	 to	 address	 complex,	 multi-faceted	 environmental	
problems	 such	 as	 biodiversity	 loss.51 	Until	 recently,	 the	 primary	 tools	 for	
nature	 conservation	 followed	 the	 traditional	 reactive	 way	 in	 which	 states	





by	 the	 2000	 Countryside	 and	 Rights	 of	 Way	 Act.	 The	 latter	 fundamentally	 changed	 and	
strengthened	 the	original	 ‘toothless	 regime’	governing	habitats	conservation.	 (Lord	Mustill	

















traditional	 conservation	 law	 is	 built	 around	 the	 twin	 approach	 of	 listing	
endangered	species	and	designating	habitats	(protected	sites)	within	which	
certain	activities	are	banned	or	restricted.53	
However,	 addressing	biodiversity	decline	 is	 a	multi-dimensional	 and	
hence	much	more	 complex	 issue.54		 Biodiversity	 loss	 is	 not	merely	 a	 social	
problem:	it	sits	at	the	interface	of	two	worlds,	the	human	and	the	natural;	it	
occurs	within	what	Berkes	and	Folke		refer	to	as	‘social-ecological	systems’.55	
Berkes	and	Folke	 introduced	 the	 term	 ‘social-ecological’	system	 in	order	 to	
emphasize	‘the	integrated	concept	of	humans	in	nature	and	to	stress	that	the	
delineation	 between	 the	 social	 and	 ecological	 systems	 is	 artificial	 and	
arbitrary’;56	Berkes’	 and	 Folkes’	 concept	 is	 adding	 social	 complexity	 to	 the	
theories	of	scientific	literature	that	already	recognized	ecosystems	as	complex,	




wastes	 in	 landfills;	 See	 also	 Richard	 B.	 Stewart,	 ‘A	 New	 Generation	 of	 Environmental	
Regulation?’	(2001-2002)	29	Cap	U	L	Rev	21	discussing	the	shortcoming	of	traditional	top-
down	regulation	in	the	context	of	US	environmental	legislation.	
53	This	 is	the	primary	approach	taken	in	the	1981	Act	(see	discussion	above).	 	However,	 it	
needs	to	be	noted	and	especially	when	compared	to	other	legal	systems,	English	legislation	
following	 the	CROWA	2000	amendments	does	go	a	 step	 further	seeking	 to	secure	positive	
management	of	wildlife	sites	to	address	the	problem	of	neglect.		
54 	Bradley	 C.	 Karkkainen,	 ‘Collaborative	 Ecosystem	 Governance:	 Scale,	 Complexity,	 and	
Dynamism’	(2002-2003)	21	Va	Envtl	LJ	189.	











social-ecological	 systems,	 characterized	 by	 nonlinearity,	 uncertainty,	
emergence,	and	reciprocal	feedbacks.58		 	
As	 a	 result,	 calls	 for	 implementing	 effective	 nature	 conservation	
management	 fall	 foul	 inter	 alia	 on	 two	 substantial	 obstacles,	 which	 are	
manifestations	 of	 ecological	 and	 social	 complexity	 respectively:	 ecological	
uncertainty	and	conservation	conflicts.		Such	problems	cannot	be	overcome	
by	traditional	management	practices	and	legal	approaches.	More	specifically,	
on	 the	 one	 hand,	 linear	 models	 of	 reactive	 legislation	 like	 the	 one	 briefly	
described	 above,	 are	 incompatible,	 and	 thus	 ineffective	 for	 addressing	
ecological	 complexity: 59 	ecological	 complexity	 leads	 to	 ecological	








management	 was	 developed	 in	 USA	 scientific	 literature. 62 	Adaptive	
management	 traces	 its	 origins	 to	 C.S.	 Holling’	 s	 seminal	 work,	 Adaptive	
Environmental	 Assessment	 and	 Management 63 	and	 stems	 from	 the	
recognition	that	knowledge	of	ecological	systems	is	not	only	incomplete	also	
																																																								














but	 elusive.64		 So,	 it	 is	 essential	 that	we	 ‘learn’	 about	 the	 system.	 Adaptive	
management	 theory	 views	 natural	 resources	 management	 as	 an	 iterative	




Defining	 adaptive	 management	 is	 no	 easy	 task.	 The	 plethora	 of	
definitions	in	the	literature	leads	one	to	conclude	that	adaptive	management	
means	different	things	to	different	people.67	Over	the	years	it	has	been	defined	
in	 a	 variety	 of	 different	 ways	 that	 range	 from	 highly	 detailed	 to	 rather	
vacuous.68	However	there	seems	to	be	a	consensus	within	the	literature	on	a	
basic	 general	 level	 that	 recognises	 the	 need	 for	 continuous	 monitoring,	
assessment	and	readjustment	of	original	decisions:69	
Adaptive	Management	consists	of	managing	according	to	a	plan	by	which	
decisions	 are	made	 and	modified	 as	 a	 function	 of	what	 is	 known	 and	






Resources:	 Theory	 Concepts	 and	 Management	 Institutions	 (Gen	 Tech	 Rep	 PNW-GTR-654	








R.	Martin,	 ‘Adaptive	Management	 of	 Forest	 Ecosystems:	 Did	 Some	 Rubber	 Hit	 the	 Road?’	
(2007)	57	BioScience	186,	187	‘agreement	on	a	common	definition	of	adaptive	management	





70 	Ana	 M.	 Parma,	 ‘What	 can	 adaptive	 management	 do	 for	 our	 fish,	 forests,	 food,	 and	








In	 this	 respect,	 a	 major	 influence	 was	 Kai	 Lee’s	 Compass	 and	 Gyroscope:	
Integrating	 Science	 and	 Politics	 for	 the	 Environment. 71 	Lee	 takes	 natural	
resources	management	beyond	the	realm	of	science-based	public	policy	and	
explores	the	social	element	of	nature	conservation:	
I	 am	 writing	 as	 a	 social	 scientist	 and	 erstwhile	 decision-maker	 who	
sought	 to	use	adaptive	management;	 I	 am	an	outsider	 to	 the	 technical	
practice,	and	my	observations	are	meant	to	complement	those	of	Walters	
and	 Holling	 (1990)	 by	 emphasizing	 the	 organization	 and	 human	
dimensions	of	learning	while	doing.72	
This	 expanded	 model	 of	 adaptive	 management	 emerges	 in	 literature	 as	




can	 be	 adapted	 not	 only	 to	 changing	 ecological	 conditions	 and	 the	
unpredictable	responses	of	nature	but	also	to	the	changing	social	conditions	
that	 interfere	with	 ecosystem	dynamics,	 as	well	 as	 the	 different	 needs	 and	

















Report,	 the	 Natural	 Environment	 White	 Paper	 and	 the	 Nature	
Improvement	Areas	Scheme	
Law	 and	 policy	makers	 in	England	 did	 not	 remain	 indifferent	 to	 the	
shortcomings	of	conservation	legislation,	or	to	changes	in	the	understanding	
of	 how	 ecosystems	 function.	 In	 2010,	 the	 Secretary	 of	 Environment	
commissioned	 Sir	 John	 Lawton,	 a	 biology	 professor,	 to	 carry	 out	 an	
independent	review	of	the	England’s	statutory	and	non-statutory	wildlife	sites	
and	 assess	 whether	 they	 are	 capable	 of	 responding	 and	 adapting	 to	 the	
growing	challenges	of	climate	change	and	other	demands	on	English	 land.75	
Lawton’s	 evaluation	 was	 carried	 out	 on	 the	 premise	 that	 resiliency	 and	
adaptability	were	directly	 linked	to	the	wildlife	sites	 in	England	collectively	
representing	a	coherent	and	resilient	network.76		
The	 report	 of	 Professor	 Lawton	 and	 his	 team	 was	 published	 in	
September	 2010	 and	 concluded	 that	 despite	 the	 important	 contribution	
designated	areas	have	made,	English	wildlife	sites	comprise	do	not	collectively	
comprise	a	coherent	and	resilient	ecological	network;77	on	the	contrary,	they	
are	 rather	 too	 small	 and	 isolated,	 leading	 to	 declines	 in	many	 of	 England’s	
characteristic	 species. 78 	In	 his	 report,	 Professor	 Lawton	 referred	 to	 the	
concepts	 discussed	 and	 which	 triggered	 the	 development	 of	 theories	 of	
adaptive	 (co-)management:	 that	 of	 complexity,	 dynamics	 of	 ecosystem	
processes,79	but	 also	 social	 pressures	 and	 conflicting	 demands	 on	 land-use	
which	 place	 considerable	 and	 increasing	 pressure	 on	 biodiversity. 80 	He	















in	conservation	and	 laid	down	 ‘a	 long-term	strategy,	 a	desired	“direction	of	
travel”,	and	a	set	of	general	principles	‘to	guide	conservation	action	in	England	
over	the	next	40	years’.84	
In	 2011	 and	 in	 response	 to	 the	 Lawton	 Report,	 the	 Government	
published	the	Natural	Environment	White	Paper	(NEWP),	The	Natural	Choice:	
Securing	the	Value	of	Nature	ensuring	its	commitment	to	implement	Lawton’s	

































provides	 a	 framework	 for	management	 that	will	 benefit	wildlife	 as	well	 as	










benefits	 that	nature	provides	 such	as	 recreation,	 flood	protection,	
clean	water,	carbon	storage		
	
• Unite	 local	 communities,	 land	 managers	 and	 business	 through	 a	
shared	vision	for	better	future	for	people	and	wildlife.	The	hope	is	
















they	 could	 apply.	 The	 Government	 expected	 potential	 NIAs	 to	 be	 places	
where:92	
● Opportunities	 to	deliver	ecological	networks,	both	 in	 terms	of	 large	
area	 and	 scale	 and	 valuable	 benefits	 to	wildlife	 and	 people,	 where	
particularly	high;		



















The	 NIA	 programme	 was	 not	 the	 first-time	 landscape	 conservation	





Landscapes, 93 	the	 RSPB	 Futurescapes 94 	are	 large-scale	 conservation	
management	 programmes	 that	 extent	 beyond	 statutory	 protected	 areas	
and/or	 nature	 reserves	 to	 the	wider	 countryside.	 Moreover,	 since	 the	 late	
1990’s	 there	 have	 been	 efforts	 to	 divide	 English	 land	 into	 areas	 based	 on	
natural	rather	than	administrative	 features.	Such	areas,	currently	known	as	
National	 Character	 Areas	 are	 defined	 by	 combined	 features	 of	 landscape,	
biodiversity,	 geodiversity	and	cultural	 and	economic	activity.95	However,	 in	
contrast	to	the	NIAs	scheme,	the	NCAs	was	not	a	delivery	programme.	Their	
purpose	 was	 nevertheless	 more	 informative;	 the	 NCA	 profiles,	 constantly	
updated,	 provide	 with	 the	 best	 available	 information	 to	 guide	 policy	 and	
decision-making	on	land	use	development	and	management.		
There	are	several	reasons	that	make	the	NIA	programme	a	distinctive	
approach	 to	 conservation	 management,	 including	 but	 not	 limited	 to	 the	
following:96	
1. Although	 non-statutory,	 NIAs	 are	 officially	 acknowledged	 as	 land	
designation	in	the	2012	White	Paper.	





plan	 that	 sets	out	 certain	 aims	 and	objectives	 against	which	 success	
would	be	evaluated.	
																																																								
93 	For	 the	 Wildlife	 Trusts’	 Living	 Landscapes	 programme	 see	 at	
<http://www.wildlifetrusts.org/living-landscape/our-vision>	accessed	January	2018.	
94 	For	 the	 RSPC	 Futurescapes	 programme	 see	 at	 <	 https://www.rspb.org.uk/our-
work/conservation/landscape-scale-conservation/futurescapes/>	accessed	January	2018	















and	 restoration	 intended	 to	 ‘trial	 and	 test	 innovative,	 integrated	and	
coordinated	 approaches	 to	 provide	 better	 places	 for	 wildlife,	 to	
improve	 the	 natural	 environment	 for	 people,	 and	 to	 unite	 local	
communities,	land	managers	and	businesses	through	a	shared	vision’.97	
The	need	to	test	different	approaches	at	programme	level	also	is	behind	




to	wider	 land	management	 based	 on	 partnership	 and	 collaboration.	 It	 also	







The	 overarching	 aim	 of	 this	 research	 is	 to	 contribute	 to	 the	
understanding	of	 the	complexity	of	nature	conservation	within	a	regulatory	
context,	 specifically,	whether	English	nature	 conservation	 law	and	policy	 is	
resilient	enough	to	allow	for	decision-making	to	adapt	to	constantly	changing	
ecological	 and	 social	 conditions	 and	 to	 competing	 biodiversity,	 social	 and	
																																																								
97	Collingwood	Environmental	Planning,	Monitoring	and	Evaluation	of	Nature	Improvement	















policy,	 as	 shaped	 by	 EU	nature	 conservation	 schemes	 in	 the	 context	 of	
adaptive	 ecosystem	 management.	 The	 thesis	 suggests	 that	 when	







model	 of	 adaptive	 management,	 which	 is	 conceived	 through	 two	
interlocking	 theoretical	 lenses	 corresponding	 to	 different	 sources	 of	
complexity:	adaptive	management	as	a	scientific	process	and	adaptive	co-	
management	 as	 a	 framework	 for	 conflict	 resolution.	 The	 thesis	 then	










a. What	 are	 the	 challenges	 that	 policy	 makers	 face	 when	 drafting	
regulation	to	reverse	the	continue	loss	of	biodiversity?	
b. What	are	the	current	approaches	used	by	nature	conservation	regimes	
in	 England,	 as	 part	 of	 EU	 nature	 conservation	 schemes,	 and	 how	
effective	have	they	been	in	reaching	their	objectives?	





e. To	 what	 extent	 does	 the	 practical	 implementation	 of	 nature	
conservation	 objectives	 through	 innovative	 large-scale	 ecosystem	
management	 reflect	 the	 elements	 identified	 as	 primary	 drivers	 of	
Adaptive	Management	models?	
f. How	could	existing	legal	and	institutional	frameworks	be	amended	to	




This	 thesis	 combines	 qualitative	 doctrinal99	and	 socio-legal	 research	
and	 uses	 a	 synthesis	 of	 secondary	 and	 primary	 qualitative	 data.	 More	
specifically,	 the	 thesis	 is	 divided	 into	 three	 parts	 and	 uses	 literature-based	
analysis,	study	of	primary	and	secondary	legal	sources	and	original	empirical	
data	acquired	from	a	case	study	of	the	Humberhead	Levels	NIA,	one	of	the	12	


















b. Analyse	 the	 dynamics	 between	 ecosystem	 complexity,	 scientific	
uncertainty	and	nature	conservation	law	and	policy.	
c. Evaluate	 how	 effective	 current	methods	 have	 been	 both	 in	 terms	 of	
reaching	 their	 set	 objectives	 and	 addressing	 challenges	 surrounding	
nature	conservation.	






An	 analysis	 and	 evaluation	of	 policy	documents,	 strategies	 and	 legal	
framework	 and	 the	 identification	 of	 their	 links	 and	 relevance	 to	 adaptive	
ecosystem	management	 is	 of	 course	 of	 the	 greatest	 importance.	 However,	
nature	conservation	occurs	on	a	practical	level.	The	various	components	of	the	
ecosystems	 do	 not	 interact	 on	 paper	 but	 in	 the	 field	 and	 often,	 theoretical	
aspects	 and	 aspirations	 are	 lost	 in	 the	 translation	 from	 theory	 to	 practice.	
Therefore,	 I	 consider	 it	 necessary	 to	 test	 the	 relevance	 and	 application	 of	









overlaps	 and	 divergences	 of	 between	 the	 conceptualised	 models	 of	









The	 first	 two	 parts	 of	 this	 thesis	 use	 doctrinal	 and	 literature-based	





derived	 from	 law	 itself’. 102 	For	 the	 purposes	 of	 this	 research,	 a	 doctrinal	
approach	 is	 essential	 in	 order	 to	 identify	 the	 relevant	 legislation	 and	 legal	
principles	governing	nature	conservation	in	England,	together	with	any	legal	
issues	that	may	arise	from	their	application.		Combined	with	a	literature-base	















primary	 and	 secondary	 legal	 sources	 including	 laws,	 orders,	 regulations,	
decisions	 and	 domestic	 and	 European	 court	 judgements;	 legal	 scholarship	
publications	but	also	government	policy	documents	and	reports		
A	 literature	 search	 was	 carried	 out	 mainly	 through	 Westlaw	 and	
Heinonline	 databases	 and	 key	 natural	 science	 journals	 such	 as	 Nature	 and	
Conservation	 Biology.	 Book	 publications	 were	 found	 mainly	 through	
researching	 the	 online	 library	 catalogue	WorldCat.org.	Domestic	 legislation	
sources	were	found	at	legislation.gov.uk.	Research	was	also	carried	out	into	
the	 Houses	 of	 Parliament	 Hansard	 Archives,	 the	 House	 of	 Commons	
Committees	Website,	the	Law	Commission	Website	as	well	as	the	websites	of	





Part	 I	 (chapter	 2)	 is	 based	 on	 the	 literature	 analysis	 and	 seeks	 to	
provide	 the	 background	 against	 which	 this	 research	 has	 been	 conducted.		
Chapter	2	introduces	the	idea	of	adaptive	management	and	how	it	relates	to	
nature	 conservation.	 In	 doing	 so,	 it	 explores	 how	 different	 perceptions	 of	
nature	 have	 guided	 nature	 conservation	 decision	 making	 over	 the	 years,	







identify	 elements	 of	 adaptive	 ecosystem	 management	 within	 nature	
conservation	law	and	policy	in	England,	in	order	to	support	the	argument	that	
by	 looking	 into	 nature	 conservation	 regimes,	 we	 can	 detect	 practices	
Introduction									34	
	
consistent	 with	 the	 adaptive	 approach.	 These	 practices	 fall	 within	 two	














scientific	 input	 to	 guide	 decision	 making,	 viewing	 biodiversity	 loss	 as	
primarily	 scientific	problem.	However,	 the	purpose	of	 the	 chapter	 is	not	 to	
construct	a	model	of	a	well-articulated	and	structured	form	of	experimental	
planning	but	 rather	 to	 identify	 constituent	elements	or	basic	 themes	of	 the	
science-driven	 adaptive	 management	 logic	 that	 are	 later	 used	 to	 trace	 the	
philosophy	of	adaptive	management	within	English	nature	conservation	law.	
In	 this	respect,	by	drawing	elements	 from	academic	 literature	and	adaptive	
management	practices	in	other	jurisdictions,	where	adaptive	management	has	
been	well	 structured	 and	 institutionalised,	 I	 have	 been	 able	 to	 identify	 the	
following	 essential	 properties	 of	 science-based	 adaptive	 management:	 a)	




model	 of	 scientific	 adaptive	 management	 against	 the	 nature	 conservation	






patterns	 of	 such	 a	 conceptualisation	 –	 that	 is	 the	 features	 identified	 in	 the	
previous	 chapter	 -	 therein.	Hence,	 it	 seeks	 to	assess	 the	weight	of	scientific	
judgments	 in	shaping	decisions	 related	 to	biodiversity	management	against	








often	 found	 in	 the	 literature	 as	 adaptive	 collaborative	 or	 co-management,	
views	 nature	 conservation	 in	 its	 social	 context	 and	 highlights	 the	 need	 for	
collaboration.	In	particular,	this	chapter	argues	that	by	providing	a	platform	
for	collaboration	among	stakeholders,	 this	version	of	adaptive	management	





actors	 within	 the	 nature	 conservation	 legal	 and	 regulatory	 framework.	
Similarly	 to	 Chapter	 4,	 it	 uses	 a	 combined	 literature	 based	 and	 doctrinal	
analysis	 and	 attempts	 to	 assess	 the	 extent	 to	 which	 the	 English	 nature	
conservation	legislative	and	regulatory	framework	is	flexible	enough	to	foster	
collaborative,	 bottom	 up	 decision-making	 as	 way	 to	 balance	 competing	
interests	towards	the	shared	common	objective	of	nature	conservation.		
Before	 continuing	 to	 Part	 III,	 I	 would	 like	 to	 highlight	 a	 few	 salient	
points.	It	is	particularly	important	to	understand	that	the	distinction	between	
the	 two	 models	 is	 to	 some	 extent	 artificial	 and	 is	 used	 here	 for	 analysis	




by-case	 basis.	 They	 can	 be	 seen	 as	 equal	 stand-alone	management	models	
serving	 different	management	 objectives	 (e.g	 science-driven	 objectives	 and	
socially-driven	objectives-	the	latter	in	cases	when	resolving	conflict	and/or	
bringing	 interests	 together	 is	 for	 instance	 primary	 objective).	 It	 is	 often,	
however,	 the	 case,	 that	 the	 collaboration-based	 management	 is	 put	 into	
practice	 in	 order	 to	 resolve	 conflicts	 that	 ignite	 because	 of	 the	 need	 to	
implement	science	driven	models	of	management.	In	these	cases,	adaptive	co-	










theory	to	practice.	 	Hence,	 as	 its	critics	have	pointed	out,	a	purely	doctrinal	
approach	 will	 be	 too	 narrow	 in	 its	 scope	 to	 consider	 ‘non-law	 solutions,	
including	 political	 and	 social	 re-arrangement	 […]	 [that]	 may	 indeed	 be	
preferred’.103		
Therefore,	 a	 social-legal	 approach	 is	 needed	 to	 complement	 the	
doctrinal	research	within	this	thesis.	A	legal	tradition	that	emerged	in	the	late	
1960’s,	 this	 non-doctrinal	 approach	 seeks	 to	 examine	 ‘law	 in	 context’.	 The	

















	The	 final	 part	 of	 this	 thesis	 tests	 and	 compares	 the	 adaptive	
management	 models	 against	 data	 acquired	 though	 the	 case	 study.	 Part	 III	
constitutes	 the	 last	 part	 of	 a	 modular	 insight	 into	 nature	 conservation	
management	in	England	and	the	end	of	adaptive	management’s	‘journey’	from	
literature,	to	law,	to	practice.	Hence,	the	thesis	will	have	tested	the	extent	to	
which	 the	 concept	 of	 adaptive	management	 as	 conceived	 in	 literature	 is	 in	









an	 empirical	 inquiry	 that	 investigates	 a	 contemporary	phenomenon	 in	
depth	 and	within	 its	 real-life	 context	 especially	 when	 the	 boundaries	
between	the	phenomenon	and	the	context	are	not	clearly	evident	105	
Additionally,	 a	 case	 study	 is	 most	 suitable	 in	 situations	 where	 the	
researcher	 has	 little	 control	 over	 the	 events	 and	where	 there	 is	 a	 need	 to	





management	 is	 representative	 of	 such	 a	 situation.	 	 As	will	 be	 discussed	 in	
detail	 throughout	 the	 thesis,	 nature	 conservation	 is	 a	 multi-dimensional	
problem	that	exhibits	a	high	degree	of	complexity,	driven	by	conflicting	values.	
Nature	conservation	management	is	a	real-life	event.	It	happens	every	day	on	
the	 ground	 and	 involves	 an	 array	 of	 different	 actors.	 Legal	 provisions	 and	
policy	documents	have	a	crucial	role	to	play	in	setting	the	framework	within	
which	 this	 management	 takes	 place.	 For	 instance,	 the	 EC	 Birds	 Directive	
establishes	a	protective	framework	for	birds.	It	provides	for	the	protection	of	
birds	 but	 also	 for	 the	 protection	 of	 their	 habitats.	 However,	 as	 this	 thesis	
argues,	merely	enlisting	species	and	prohibiting	persecution	is	not	sufficient	
to	 secure	 their	 survival.	 Nature	 conservation	 needs	 active	 management	 in	
addition	 to	 negative	 regulation.	 The	 EC	 directive	 is	 silent	 on	 the	 specific	
management	measures	 that	need	 to	be	 taken,	which	are	 to	be	 found	 in	 the	
management	 plans	 that	 are	 implemented	 in	 practice	 through	 day-to-day	
decisions	of	 the	competent	authorities;	or	 they	can	 include	simple	practices	
that	are	not	part	of	any	formal	process	e.g	a	landowner	putting	up	a	bird	feeder	
on	his	land	voluntarily.		
Had	 this	 thesis	 been	 about	 exploring	 nature	 conservation	 from	 a	
scientific	perspective,	seeking	for	instance	to	identify	the	most	effective	way	
to	increase	the	population	number	of	a	threatened	species,	then	it	is	likely	that	
it	would	have	 involved	some	 form	of	 experimentation	manipulating	 certain	
variables	 to	 reach	 to	 a	 conclusion.	 This	 thesis	 however	 examines	 nature	
conservation	in	its	socio-legal	context	through	direct	observation	of	how	it	is	












which	makes	 it	 an	 ideal	 case	 study	 to	 test	 the	 findings	of	 the	doctrinal	 and	
literature-based	part	of	the	study.	
More	specifically,	much	 like	the	theory	of	adaptive	management	that	
was	 developed	 in	 response	 to	 the	 inadequacies	 of	 traditional	 forms	 of	




challenge	 of	 climate	 change	 and	 other	 pressures	 to	 biodiversity.	 Professor	
Lawton	argued	that	we	need	to	rebuild	nature’;107	that	there	needs	to	be	a	shift	
from	 traditional	 site-based	 conservation	 to	 landscape	 integrated	
management,	habitats	restoration	and	recreation;	a	step-change	from	‘trying	
to	hang-on	 to	what	we	have’	 to	 the	establishment	of	Ecological	Restoration	
Zones	 (ERZs).108 	The	 ERZs	 –	 renamed	 ‘Nature	 Improvement	 Areas’	 in	 the	
NEWP	-	would	 ‘operat[e]	over	 large,	discrete	areas	within	which	significant	
enhancement	of	ecological	networks	is	achieved	by	enhancing	existing	wildlife	
sites,	 improving	 ecological	 connections	 and	 restoring	 ecological	 processes’.		
More,	bigger,	better	and	joined	became	the	guiding	mantra	of	Making	Space	
for	Nature.109	
The	 large-scale	 ecosystem	 management	 that	 Lawton	 advocates	 is	
however	 bound	 to	 be	 much	 more	 complex	 than	 managing	 a	 small	 nature	
reserve.	As	the	 focus	broadens	over	larger	geographical	areas,	management	
becomes	more	challenging	with	more	variables	to	consider:	greater	variety	in	
habitats	 and	 species,	 a	 number	 of	 different,	 often	 overlapping	 designations	
together	with	a	multitude	of	rules	and	regulations	extending	beyond	stricto	
sensu	 nature	 conservation	 legislation,	 a	 larger	 number	 of	 ongoing	 local	














‘consortia	 of	 the	 willing’	 where	 local	 authorities	 and	 communities,	 land-







I	 have	 already	mentioned,	 it	 exemplifies	 a	 complex	 ecosystem	where	 both	
models	of	adaptive	management	fit	neatly.	The	area	is	part	of	the	vast	flatlands	
straddling	 the	 borders	 of	 Yorkshire,	 Lincolnshire	 and	 Nottinghamshire,	
therefore	it	finds	itself	under	the	administrative	jurisdiction	of	three	different	
local	 authorities.	 	The	aim	of	 the	HHL	NIA	was	 ‘to	 create	an	 internationally	









110 	John	 Lawton,	 ‘Making	 Even	 More	 Space	 for	 Nature’	 (GWCT	 &	 NE	 Farmer	 Clusters	








farming	community.	The	approach	 taken	was	one	of	 cooperation	with	 local	
farmers	and	stakeholders	 through	 locally	 led	projects.	The	 idea	was	 to	 find	
ways	to	bridge	the	interests	of	biodiversity	and	the	agriculture	industry112	-	
and	 as	 this	 thesis	 will	 show,	 sometimes	 with	 good	 communication,	 trust	
relationship	and	good	negotiation	skills,	these	interests	were	easier	to	bridge	
than	originally	imagined.		
On	 the	 one	 hand,	 its	 diverse	 landscape,	 need	 for	 hydrological	
connectivity,	multiple	administration	and	strong	private	 interests,	make	the	
Humberhead	Levels	a	complex	socio-ecological	system	and	fertile	ground	for	
the	 application	 of	 adaptive	management.	 On	 the	 other,	 the	NIA	 framework	
originating	 in	 the	 Lawton	 Report	 –	 a	 heavily	 scientific	 report	 -	 calls	 for	


























and	 corroboration	 of	 the	 information	 acquired,	 which	 in	 turn	 led	 to	more	




Part	 III	 comprises	 of	 Chapters	 7-9	 and	 is	 the	 last	 part	 of	 the	 thesis.	
These	 chapters	 trace	 and	 discuss	 the	 interaction	 of	 the	 two	 theoretical	
adaptive	 management	 models	 used	 in	 the	 Humberhead	 Levels	 NIA	 over	 a	
three-year	period.	In	doing	so	and	similarly	to	Chapters	4	and	6,	they	seek	to	
trace	 the	 core	elements	that	 characterise	 the	adaptive	management	models	
extracted	earlier	in	the	thesis.	The	structure	of	Part	III	is	as	follows:	
Chapter	7	provides	the	background	to	the	Nature	Improvement	Areas	
scheme	 and	 Humberhead	 Levels	 area.	 It	 gives	 information	 on	 the	
characteristic	 features	of	 the	Humberhead	Levels	 landscape	and	follows	the	




the	 specific	 ecological,	 social	 and	 economic	 features	 of	 each	 NCA,	
environmental	 opportunities	 and	 land	 uses	 and	 in	 general	 all	 pertinent	
information	 for	 the	 development	 of	 management	 plans.	 The	 chapter	 also	




Chapter	 8	 continues	 with	 a	 detailed	 analysis	 that	 heads	 from	 the	





guidance	 documents,	 which	 state	 the	 vision	 and	 set	 the	 objectives	 of	 the	










will	 again	 revolve	 around	 the	 themes	 identified	 as	 running	 through	 the	
adaptive	 management	 models.	 In	 this	 context,	 the	 chapter	 examines	 how	
ecological	 and/or	 social	 considerations	 guide	management	 at	 the	 different	
stages	from	designation	through	to	final	application.		
Particular	 attention	 is	 paid	 to	 a	 large-scale	 project	 seeking	 to	 link	
wildlife	sites	scattered	across	arable	 land.	The	project	provides	a	very	good	
example	of	how	the	two	models	of	adaptive	management	interact,	as	well	as	
how	 collaboration	 and	 landowner	 engagement	 allow	 for	 the	 seamless	
implementation	of	 science-driven	management	decisions.	The	 chapter	ends	
with	 a	 discussion	 on	 the	 role	 of	 law	 and	 administrative	 decision-making	
seeking	 to	 confirm	 the	 conclusions	 of	 previous	 chapters	 in	 relation	 to	 the	
flexibility	of	the	legal	and	regulatory	regime.	Differences	between	theory	and	
practice	 are	 explored	 when	 it	 comes	 to	 the	 implementation	 of	 adaptive	
management	mechanisms,	 for	 example,	 broad	 collaboration	 in	 all	 stages	 of	
management,	and	the	chapter	also	makes	some	suggestions	on	how	to	provide	











First,	 there	 are	 some	 conceptual	 limitations;	 the	 theoretical	
underpinnings	 of	 adaptive	 management	 and	 that	 of	 adaptive	 collaborative	
management	combined	with	a	lack	of	consensus	in	the	literature	on	the	exact	
definition	 of	 the	 terms,	 give	 rise	 to	 different	 models	 of	 adaptive	
management.114	Hence,	adaptive	collaborative	management	could	also	be	seen	
as	 a	 model	 for	 public	 participation	 seeking	 to	 increase	 the	 democratic	
legitimacy	of	an	inherently	science-driven	policy	field.	Alternatively,	it	can	be	
seen	as	a	model	to	bring	together	different	sources	of	knowledge	e.g.	local	and	
traditional.	 Arguably,	 it	 can	 also	 be	 and	 in	 many	 cases	 works	 best	 as	 a	
combination	of	all	three.	However,	due	to	time	and	length	restrictions	I	chose	
to	 focus	 on	 a	 scientific	 model	 to	 address	 ecological	 uncertainty	 and	 a	
stakeholder	 collaboration	 model	 to	 seek	 conflict	 resolution	 or	 better	
management	 since	 these	 are	 two	 of	 the	 biggest	 challenges	 that	 decision-
makers	face	when	implementing	nature	conservation	law	and	policy.	
Second,	 there	 are	 geographical	 limitations.	 The	 spatial	 scope	 of	 the	
thesis	 is	 England	 within	 the	 legal	 jurisdiction	 of	 England	 and	 Wales.	














whose	 structure	 and	management	 approaches	 vary.115 	Hence,	 it	 has	 to	 be	
acknowledged	 that	 had	 the	 focus	 been	 on,	 for	 example,	 the	 farmer-led	
Marlborough	Downs	NIA	the	dynamic	interaction	between	science-driven	and	
collaborative	decision	making	and	 the	 respective	management	models	 they	
give	rise	to	are	likely	to	have	been	slightly	different.	Nevertheless,	given	that	
all	 NIAs	 operate	 within	 the	 same	 legal	 framework	 and	 the	 same	 scheme	
framework,	I	consider	that	the	conclusion	drawn	with	regard	to	the	flexibility	
of	 the	 legal	 and	 regulatory	 framework	 in	 relation	 to	 models	 of	 adaptive	
management	would	not	change	substantially.116			
Third,	 writing	 about	 nature	 conservation	 law	 I	 am	 faced	 with	 the	
problem	 of	 defying	 nature	 conservation	 law.	 As	 Rodgers	 stresses	 ‘the	
parameters	 of	 “nature	 conservation	 law”	 are	 potentially	 very	 wide	 and	
inherently	 difficult	 to	 define	 with	 precision.	 117 	Having	 said	 that,	 unless	
otherwise	 stated,	 ‘nature	 conservation	 law’	 in	 this	 thesis	 is	used	 to	 refer	 to	
legal	 instruments	whose	primary	–	 if	not	sole	 -	 focus	 is	 the	conservation	of	
species	and	habitats.	The	focus	will	mainly	lie	on	the	Wildlife	and	Countryside	
Act	 1981, 118 	the	 statute	 including	 the	 majority	 of	 domestic	 nature	
conservation	 primary	 legislation	 providing	 for	 species	 protection	 and	 site	
designation,	 the	 Birds119 	and	 Habitats	 Directives120 	and	 the	 implementing	
Habitats	 Regulations	 2010,	 as	well	 as	 agri-environment	 agreements121	that	
																																																								






118	The	discussion	 is	nevertheless	focused	primarily	on	 the	 implementation	of	 laws	on	site	






121 	Regulation	 (EU)	 No	 1305/2013	 of	 the	 European	 Parliament	 and	 of	 the	 Council	 of	 17	
December	 2013	on	 support	 for	 rural	 development	 by	 the	European	Agricultural	 Fund	 for	






is	 more	 than	 what	 is	 laid	 down	 in	 one	 or	 two	 statutes. 122 	As	 with	 the	
components	 of	 ecosystems	 themselves,	 there	 is	 much	 interaction	 between	
laws	and	regulations	targeting	the	various	biotic	and	abiotic	elements	of	the	
natural	environment.		
In	 addition,	 laws	 having	 implications	 for	 the	 conservation	 of	
biodiversity	extend	beyond	those	classified	as	‘environmental	law’,	a	typical	
example	 being	 the	 town	 and	 country	 planning	 system	 that	 controls	
development,	which	could	have	significant	effects	on	the	conservation	value	of	
an	 area.	 On	 the	 other	 hand,	 how	 nature	 conservation	 decision-making	 is	
carried	 out	 and	 applied	 will	 depend	 on	 the	 interpretation	 of	 ‘nature	
conservation	law’	beyond	a	strict	definition	of	‘law’	as	primary	and	delegated	
legislation	 to	 include	 the	 range	 of	 non-binding	 materials	 such	 as	 guidance	
notes,	policy	documents	and	codes	of	practice	that	define	how	sensu	stricto	
nature	conservation	law	operates	at	ground	level.	Therefore,	the	wider	term	
nature	conservation	 framework	 is	often	used	to	refer	 to	 the	 full	set	of	laws,	













This	 chapter	 introduces	 the	 concept	 of	 adaptive	 management	 as	 a	
mechanism	 capable	 of	 addressing	 two	 major	 challenges	 faced	 by	 those	
involved	with	nature	conservation	during	management	design,	as	well	as	day-
to-day	 management	 implementation:	 these	 are	 ecological	 uncertainty	 and	
conflict,	both	manifestations	of	social-ecological	complexity.		
The	 chapter	 starts	 by	 introducing	 the	 idea	 of	 social-ecological	
complexity	as	an	inherent	feature	of	ecosystems.	Then,	it	explores	ecological	




outdated	 ideas	 of	 static	 ecosystems	 and	 therefore	 a	mismatch	 to	 changing	
dynamic	systems	and	for	that	reason	somewhat	ineffective.	In	response	to	the	
shortcomings	of	 traditional	 approaches	 to	nature	 conservation,	 the	 chapter	
introduces	the	notion	of	adaptive	management	as	a	technocratic	mechanism	
capable	 of	 addressing	 the	 ecological	 complexity,	 uncertainty	 and	
unpredictability	of	constantly	evolving	natural	systems.	
The	 chapter	 continues	 by	 discussing	 conservation	 conflicts	 as	 an	
expression	of	social	complexity.	It	presents	the	different	types	of	conflict	that	
arise	along	the	different	stages	of	implementation	of	conservation	policies	and	
blight	 decision-making.	 In	 response,	 the	 chapter	 introduces	 the	 concept	 of	








be	 ‘left	 alone’	 and	 undisturbed	 by	 external	 influences,	 gave	 way	 to	 the	
equilibrium	 paradigm	 which	 stressed	 that	 change,	 instability	 and	
unpredictability	are	inherent	characteristics	of	ecosystems.123	Ecosystems	are	
now	 seen	 as	 complex,	 dynamic	 entities	 that	 are	 constantly	 changing	 and	
evolving. 124 	This	 ecological	 complexity	 invigorates	 the	 scientific	
indeterminacy	that	is	found	inherent	in	any	science-driven	process.125		
	Furthermore,	 the	 ‘New	 Ecology’	 abandons	 older	 romantic	 views	 of	
‘nature	undisturbed’	and	assertions	of	a	sharp	distinction	between	the	human	






University	 Press	 1990);	 Botkin’s	 work	 is	 considered	 a	 landmark	 towards	 this	 direction.	
Tarlock	in	A.	Dan	Tarlock,	‘Nonequilibrium	Paradigm	in	Ecology	and	the	Partial	Unravelling	of	
Environmental	 Law’	 (1993-1994)	 27	 Loy	 L	 A	 L	 Rev	 1121,	 1129	 notes	 in	 that	 ‘in	 a	 path-




125	P.R.	 Ehrlich	 and	A.H.	 Ehrlich,	 Betrayal	 of	Science	 and	Reason:	How	Anti-Environmental	
Rhetoric	 Threatens	 Our	 Future	 (Island	 Press	 1998)	 27;	 Richard	 A.	 Carpenter,	 ‘Ecology	 in	
Court,	and	Other	Disappointments	of	Environmental	Science	and	Environmental	Law’	(1983)	
15	 Natural	 Resources	 Lawyer	 573	 considers	 ecology	 to	 be	 the	most	 uncertain	 among	 all	
natural	sciences	(see	infra	section	2.2.3).	












artificial	 and	 arbitrary’; 131 	social-ecological	 systems	 are	 conceptualised	 as	
‘linked	 and	 co-evolutionary	 systems	 of	 society	 and	 nature’. 132 	The	 social	
dimension	of	ecosystems	adds	the	social	and	institutional	complexity	that	is	
present	 in	 human	 societies	 to	 the	 already	 complex	 task	 of	 ecosystem	








that	 this	 separation	 is	 artificial	 and	 serves	 the	 analysis.	 The	 term	 ‘social-
ecological	 complexity’	 was	 introduced	 precisely	 to	 convey	 the	 multi-level	





creation	 and	 application	 of	 laws	 and	 regulations.	 At	 the	 back-end	 of	 the	
process,	 nature	 conservation	 management	 is	 essentially	 about	 managing	
																																																								
130	Berkes	and	Folke	(n55)	9;	see	in	general	F.	Berkes,	C.	Folke	and	J.	Colding	(eds),	Linking	
















choosing	 to	 take	 this	 approach	 would	 also	 be	 a	 human	 decision.	 Hence,	






Having	 its	origins	deep	 in	ancient	 times,	our	history,	 civilisation	and	





























of	 returning	 if	 disturbed	 by	 outside	 forces.139 		 Human	 interventions	 were	
considered	disturbances	in	response	to	which	nature	deviated	from	its	perfect	
stable	 state.	 Hence,	 to	 preserve	 its	 ideal	 condition	 humans	 should	 be	 kept	
away.140	
The	idea	of	an	ordered	and	steady	state	ecosystem	‘runs	throughout	the	
western	 history’ 141 	and	 despite	 arguments	 against	 it	 (e.g.	 Lucretius, 142	
Elton143),	 the	 theory	 of	 ecosystem	 equilibrium	was	 widely	 advocated	 and	
accepted144	by	 the	great	ecologists	 and	conservationists	of	 the	20th	 century	
																																																								
1974,	 The	 Hague:	 Structure,	 functioning	 and	 management	 of	 ecosystems	 (Centre	 for	
Agricultural	 Publishing	 and	 Documentation);	 C.S	 Holling	 and	W.C	 Clark	 ‘Notes	 towards	 a	
science	of	ecological	management’	247-251	in	Dobben	and	McConnell	(eds),	id;	C.S	Holling,	
‘Engineering	 resilience	 versus	 ecological	 resilience’	 31-44	 in	 National	 Academy	 of	







140 	Tabatha	 J.	 Wallington,	 Richard	 J.	 Hobbs	 and	 Susan	 A.	 	 Moore,	 ‘Implications	 of	 current	
ecological	 thinking	 for	biodiversity	conservation:	a	 review	of	 the	salient	 issues’	 (2005)	10	
Ecology	and	Society	15	4;	Timothy	H.	Profeta,	‘Managing	without	a	Balance:	Environmental	
Regulation	 in	 Light	 of	 Ecological	 Advances	 First	 Annual	 Cummings	 Colloquium	 on	
Environmental	 Law:	 Beyond	 the	 Balance	 of	 Nature:	 Environmental	 Law	 Faces	 the	 New	
Ecology’	 (1996)	 7	 Duke	 Envtl	 L	 &	 Pol'y	 F	 71,	 72;	 	 See	 also,	 	 Julie	 Thrower,	 ‘Adaptive	















state	 ecological	 system’;	Meyer	 (n124)	 875	 argues	 that	 ‘the	 classical	 paradigm	 in	 ecology	
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who	 shared	 a	 belief	 in	 a	 general	 equilibrium	 at	 different	 levels	 of	
organisation.145		The	assertion	derived	from	ecology	and	subsequently	used	by	
legislators,	 resource	 managers	 and	 policy	 makers	 was	 ‘Let	 Nature	 Be.’ 146	
Nature	 undisturbed	 by	 human	 intervention	 was	 the	 desirable	 outcome	 of	
environmental	regulation;147	ecosystems	left	undisturbed	would	continue	to	
perpetuate	themselves	over	time.148		
However,	 management	 efforts	 based	 on	 the	 idea	 of	 ecosystem	
equilibrium	proved	 fruitless.149	In	 the	1950’s	and	1960’s	scientific	 evidence	
pointed	 to	 a	 different	 direction;	 animal	 populations	 were	 not	 in	 a	 static	
																																																								
conceives	 of	 an	 ideal	 ecosystem	 that	 is	 either	 in	 equilibrium,	 stable	 or	 moving	 toward	
stability’.	
145	See	Stephen	Alfred	Forbes,	The	lake	as	a	microcosm	(Urbana,	III	1925)	who	wrote	that	‘no	






















25	 describing	 unsuccessful	 attempts	 to	manage	 living	 resources	 (elephant	 populations	 in	
Tsavo	and	management	of	fisheries)	based	on	‘nature	undisturbed’;	Also	ibid	68-70	referring	
to	 the	 case	 of	 Kirtland’s	warbler	 a	 small	 bird	whose	 population	was	 reducing	 due	 to	 the	
twentieth	century	practice	of	fire	suppression;		also	I.	Scoones,	‘New	Ecology	and	the	Social	







The	 new	 paradigm	 rejects	 the	 traditional	 ideas	 of	 a	 world	 in	
equilibrium	and	recognizes	change	and	evolution	as	inherent	characteristics	
























673-675;	 	Meyer	 (n124)	 877	who	 suggests	 a	 new	 term	 to	 replace	 that	 of	 the	 ‘Balance	 of	
















in	 different	 spatial	 scales 162 	and	 knows	 no	 human-made	 boundaries,	
jurisdictional	 or	 ownership	 based. 163 	Even	 the	 so-called	 well-bounded	











160		 Botkin,	 Discordant	 harmonies:	 a	 new	 ecology	 for	 the	 twenty-first	 century	 (n123)	 75;	
Wallington,	Hobbs	and	Moore	(n140)	5.	
161	ibid.	
162	As	a	 result,	an	ecosystem	could	 include	anything	 from	 ‘the	microbes	in	a	single	drop	of	
water	to	the	entire	solar	system’,	both	of	them	falling	within	the	definition	of	the	ecosystem	as	
‘a	community	of	mutually	interdependent	species	and	the	physical	environment	with	which	





landmine	 for	 uniting	 geomorphology	 and	 ecology’	 [2007]	 89	 Geomorphology	 111,	 115	
stressing	 that	 	 well-bounded	 are	 the	 systems	 ‘where	 strong	 associations	 occur	 among	
resource	flow,	community	membership	and	physical	boundaries,	which	is	common	for	lakes	












energy,	 which	 makes	 it	 really	 difficult,	 if	 not	 impossible,	 to	 predict	 the	
consequences	 of	 any	 action. 167 	Ecosystems	 are	 non-linear	 systems. 168	
Therefore	 the	 effects	 of	 intentional	 or	 unintentional	 interventions	 are	
discontinuous	 both	 in	 time	 and	 space	 and	 are	 often	 unpredictable. 169 		 As	
Karkkainen	rightly	points	out,	the	complexity	of	ecosystems	prevents	us	from	
fully	understanding	how	an	entire	system	functions	and	predicting	the	results	
of	 any	 particular	 intervention,	 	 even	 if	we	 have	 complete	 understanding	 of	
their	components.170		
Even	if	we	had	a	relatively	sophisticated	scientific	understanding	of	each	
of	 the	 components,	 there	 is	 likely	 to	 remain	 a	 residuum	 of	 inherent	
uncertainty	and	unpredictability	with	respect	to	the	consequences	of	any	
particular	 input-including	 any	 adjustments	 we	 might	 make	 through	






































upon	 to	 address,	 as	 they	 revolve	 around	 ‘facts’	 and	 physical	 phenomena	
occurring	in	the	natural	world:	
whereas	social	problems	typically	draw	much	of	their	rhetorical	power	
from	moral	 discourse	 (e.g.,	 `should	women	 get	 the	 same	 pay	 as	men?	
Should	the	homeless	sleep	in	the	park?),	environmental	problems	turn	
much	 more	 on	 arguments	 about	 “facts”.	 Problems	 such	 as	 global	
warming,	 while	 morally	 charged,	 tend	 to	 be	 more	 directly	 tied	 to	
scientific	 findings	and	 claims.	Although	 they	 are	generally	 traceable	 to	




has	 the	 expertise	 to	 determine	 when	 an	 ecosystem	 is	 deteriorating,	 the	
reasons	 behind	 such	deterioration	 or	 right	ways	 to	 address	 and	 reverse	 it.	
Finding	 solutions	 to	 some	 of	 the	 most	 intricate	 challenges	 set	 by	 the	
																																																								
172	Botkin,	‘Adjusting	Law	to	Nature's	Discordant	Harmonies’	(n135)	30.	













complexity	 of	 natural	 systems	 requires	 lawyers	 and	 policy	 and	 decision	
makers	to	work	closely	and	in	partnership	with	scientists	from	a	wide	array	of	
disciplines,	 who	 will	 be	 able	 to	 study	 the	 problem	 and	 provide	 different	
options	in	order	to	address	it.176	
However,	 and	 despite	 law’s	 expectations	 and	 continuous	 appeals	 to	
science	 for	 accurate	 predictions, 177 	the	 inductively	 acquired	 scientific	
knowledge	is	uncertain	since	scientific	statements	are	in	fact	far	from	being	
capable	 of	 absolute	 verification. 178 	The	 scientific	 community	 is	 now	
acknowledging	 the	 limitations	 of	 science	 in	 providing	 certain	 answers	 and	
prefers	 to	 refrain	 from	 making	 definite	 assertions. 179 	Science	 is	 not	
omnipotent;	it	is	flexible	and	constantly	evolving,	an	enterprise	that	as	Nicolas	
de	 Sadeleer	 notes	 ‘seeks	 to	 apprehend	 the	 greatest	 uncertainty	 -	 that	 is,	



























Furthermore,	 science	 is	 not	 as	 neutral	 and	 objective	 as	 often	




inherently	 value-laden.	 Objective	 criteria	 are	 set	 by	 people	 and	 objective	
assessments,	as	long	as	they	are	made	by	people,	are	not	possible.185	Scientific	
knowledge	 is	 not	 about	 objective	 determinations	 but	 subjective	
interpretations.	 Chemist	 and	Nobel	 Prize	winner	 John	Polanyi	 for	 instance,	
argued	that	personal	judgments	were	what	scientific	progress	depended	on:	
‘science	is	done	by	scientists,	and	since	scientists	are	people,	the	progress	of	
science	 depends	 more	 on	 scientific	 judgments	 than	 on	 scientific	
instruments’.186	
																																																								
181	Fischer	 (n175)	 8;	Doremus,	 ‘Listing	Decisions	Under	 the	Endangered	Species	Act:	Why	
Better	Science	Isn't	Always	Better	Policy’	(n174)	1065-1069.	




Law	Review	471,	473,	 stresses	 that	 ‘scholars	have	criticized	agencies,	 interest	groups,	and	
scientists	for	pursuing	a	science	“charade”	in	which	policy	conclusions	and	value	choices	are	
hidden	 in	 complicated,	 technical	 models	 and	 analyses,	 primarily	 via	 assumptions	 and	















Human	 factors 187 	and	 the	 socio-legal	 context	 of	 scientific	 research	
influence	 scientists’	 judgement-based-processes. 188 	Scientific	 ‘neutrality’	 is	
severely	 compromised	 by	 scientific	 and	 political	 interests,	 social	 needs,	
professional	 or	 economic	 competitions	 between	 scientists	 and	 research	
institutions,	available	funding,	legislation	that	may	set	limitations	on	research	




lack	 of	 objectivity	 increases	 the	 already	 striking	 problem	 of	 scientific	
indeterminacy.	Does	 this	mean	 that	we	should	dismiss	science	as	a	 reliable	
source	 of	 knowledge?	 Certainly,	 not;	what	 is	needed	 is	 to	 acknowledge	 the	
relativity	and	subjectivity	of	scientific	knowledge.		
To	 return	 to	 nature	 conservation	 and	 ecosystem	 management,	 the	
inherent	limitations	of	science	to	provide	with	definite	answers	and	flawless	
objective	advice	are	further	intensified	by	ecological	complexity.	Although	no	
science	 can	 provide	 100%	 certainty,	 there	 are	 differences	 in	 reliability,	
predictive	 capacity	and	 the	 influence	of	 subjective	values	among	 ‘hard’	 and	
‘soft’	sciences.191	In	this	regard,	Carpenter	lists	a	number	of	disciplines	along	a	
spectrum	of	decreasing	certainty.192	At	the	high	reliability	end	of	the	spectrum	
we	 find	 physics,	 astronomy	 and	 chemistry.	 These	 are	 capable	 of	 providing	



















with	 relatively	 simple,	 uniform	 systems	 susceptible	 to	 strong	 experimental	
control	 [that	 in	 turn]	 permits	 highly	 accurate	 measurements	 and	 highly	
reliable	predictions’.194	Thus,	for	instance,	the	chemical	reaction	between	two	
substances	 can	 be	 tested,	 re-tested	 and	 measured	 within	 a	 controlled	 lab	
environment	and	produce	reliable	evidence	to	become	a	firm	base	for	a	theory	







notes,	 ‘individual	 organisms	 and	 communities	 vary	 substantially	 from	 one	




Ecology	 is	 at	 the	 intermediate	 point	of	 the	 spectrum,	 just	 above	 the	
social	 sciences	 but	 below	 economics;	 it	 is	 the	 ‘organizing	 and	 integrating	
discipline	 for	 other	 sciences	 of	 the	 natural	 environment’195 	and	 the	 most	













into	 play,	 to	 fill	 in	 the	 gaps	 or	 join	 the	 dots.	 And	 ultimately,	 to	 translate	
imperfect	knowledge	into	policy	decisions.	









marine	 ecosystems	 might	 affect	 populations	 of	 migratory	 fish. 200 	‘The	
concepts	 of	 complexity	 theory	 and	 chaos	 may	 have	 manifestations	 in	
ecosystem	behavior	that	allow	explanation	of	deterministic	relationships	but	
not	prediction’.201	
	The	 second	 type	 of	 uncertainty	 arises	 from	 ‘the	 lack	 of	 ecological	




and	 replication	 is	often	 impractical;204	additionally,	 the	non-linear,	multiple	
temporal	 and	 spatial	 scales	 that	 ecosystem	 operate	 make	 transferring	 any	
results	 very	 difficult.205	In	 contrast,	 the	 third	 type	 of	 uncertainty	 resulting	
																																																								
197 	Christensen	 and	 others	 (n155)	 676;	 Richard	 A.	 Carpenter,	 ‘Uncertainty	 in	 Managing	













through	 high	 quality	 research	 and	 good	 cooperation	 among	 scientists	 and	
managers	to	determine	acceptable	level	of	decision	errors.	207		
The	 pervasive	 uncertainty	 that	 challenges	 ecosystem	 management	
does	not	mean	we	should	refrain	from	trying	to	predict	or	explain	ecosystem	
responses	 to	 management	 interventions.	 However,	 it	 needs	 to	 be	
acknowledged	 that	 any	 decision	made	will	 be	 subject	 to	 inherent	 scientific	
uncertainty	and	shortage	of	information.	Hence,	decisions	need	to	account	for	







approaches	 to	 nature	 conservation	 were	 developed	 while	 the	 equilibrium	
paradigm	was	the	dominant	theory	in	ecology	and	as	a	result,	are	based	on	the	
model	of	a	static,	linear	view	of	nature	(first	mismatch).208	Second,	and	related	
to	 the	 first,	 the	 inner	 workings	 of	 nature	 and	 that	 of	 the	 legal	 system	 are	
profoundly	different:	ecosystem	complexity	and	uncertainty	deliver	a	blow	to	

















at	nature	 conservation,	 the	 influence	of	 the	equilibrium	paradigm	has	been	





approach	 endorsing	 the	 ‘let	 nature	 be’	 axiom;	 this	 is	 where	 ‘pristine’	





it	 as	areas	 ‘where	 the	earth	and	 its	 community	of	 life	 are	untrammelled	by	




be	 preserved.	 But	 even	 the	 so	 called	 ‘pristine’	 ecosystems	 are	 affected	 by	
phenomena	such	as	 climate	 change	or	ozone	 layer	 loss.216	As	Botkin	 states,	
																																																								
210 	Ruhl,	 ‘Regulation	 by	 Adaptive	 Management	 -	 Is	 It	 Possible’	 (n51);	 Holly	 Doremus,	
‘Endangered	 Species	 Act:	 Static	 Law	 Meets	 Dynamic	 World,	 The	 New	 Directions	 in	
Environmental	Law’	(2010)	32	Wash	U	J	L	&	Pol'y	175;	Doremus,	‘Listing	Decisions	Under	the	










216 	Christensen	 and	 others	 (n155)	 679;	 Colin	 T.	 Reid,	 ‘The	 Privatisation	 of	 Biodiversity?	







there	 is	 almost	 no	 part	 of	 England	 that	 is	 even	 close	 to	 the	 definition	 of	
‘wilderness’.	 The	 new	 paradigm	 in	 ecology	 teaches	 that	 ecosystems	 are	
complex,	 dynamic	 systems	 subject	 to	 human	 and	 non-human	 (e.g	 invasive	
species)	influence.	A	balance	cannot	be	preserved,	simply	because	there	is	no	
balance	to	preserve.	218	
Furthermore,	 approaches	 such	 as	 twin	 species/habitats	 protection	
regimes	 have	 been	 criticised	 for	 being	 static,	 linear,	 reductionist	 and	










Environmental	Law	203,	220	stating	 in	n103	 that	 ‘virtually	no	 land	 in	 the	UK	 is	 in	a	 truly	
































and/or	 habitats	 they	 seek	 to	 protect	 but	 do	 not	 take	 into	 account	 the	
interaction	 with	 other	 ecosystem	 biotic	 and	 abiotic	 components.	 Hence,	
decision	making	is	guided	by	the	needs	of	specific	species	and	habitats.	As	J.B	





of	 whether	 a	 listed	 species	 is	 found	 therein	 –	 the	 fact	 remains	 that	 such	
approaches,	although	significant	steps	towards	the	protection	of	 the	 ‘crown	
jewels	 of	 English	 natural	 heritage’,	 have	 led	 to	 a	 fragmented	 landscape	 of	



















think	outside	the	 ‘box’	of	protected	areas.	As	Ruhl	suggests,	 ‘each	species	 is	
part	 of	 a	 dynamic	 co-adaptive	 assemblage	 of	 species	 dependent	 on	 and	
interacting	with	their	surrounding	habitat.	It	is	that	total	package	that	must	be	
managed	not	just	some	of	the	bits	and	pieces.’230	
Finally,	 although	 in	 recent	 years	 scientific	 determinism	 in	 law	 has	
gradually	decreased,231	there	remains	an	assumption	that	science	is	capable	of	
providing	 objective	 reliable	 data	 and	 predicting	 the	 fate	 of	 species	 and	 the	
impact	 of	 positive	 and	 negative	 activities	 on	 nature. 232 		 Returning	 to	 the	



























threat,	 vulnerability,	 rarity	 or	 endemism.’ 234 	Drafting	 lists	 of	 endangered	
species	 and	 designating	 protected	 sites	 is	 hampered	 by	 the	 well-known	
problem	 of	 incomplete	 knowledge	 and	 inevitable	 bias. 235 	The	 quality	 of	
research,	 the	availability	of	 information	and	choice	of	methodologies	might	
lead	to	differences	in	species	classification	and	site	designation.236	
At	 the	 same	 time,	 the	 law	 asks	 scientists	 to	 predict	 ‘the	 occurrence,	
magnitude	 and	 impacts	 of	 natural	 and	 human	 induced	 phenomena’, 237 	to	
predict	the	positive	or	negative	impact	of	a	certain	policy	or	decision.	Decision	
makers	 need	 scientists	 to	 provide	 them	with	 a	 firm	 basis	 for	 reliable	 and	
justified	decision	making.	Hence,	scientists	are	required	to	predict	the	fate	of	
species,238	or	the	impact	of	management	decisions.239	
	Prediction	 is	also	central	 to	 legally	mandated	 impact	assessments	of	
																																																								












236 See	 for	 instance,	 	 R(Western	 Power	 Distribution	 Investments	 Limited)	 v	 Countryside	
Council	for	Wales	[2007]	EWHC	50	(Admin);	[2007]	Env	L	R	25,	where	the	methodology	used	
to	identify	a	site	as	qualifying	for	SSSI	designation	was	challenged	by	the	claimants;	See	also	












human	activities	on	 the	natural	 environment.240	The	anticipatory	 control	of	
environmental	 assessment	 is	 indeed	 markedly	 different	 from	 the	 reactive	
approach	of	species	protection	regimes.	However,	and	although	triggered	by	
the	 recognition	 of	 uncertainty, 241 	environmental	 assessment	 is	 itself	 a	
procedure	‘problematic	in	evidential	terms’242	whereby	experts	are	required	
to	predict	the	likelihood	of	significant	environmental	harm.	Legislation	such	




As	 mentioned	 above,	 accurate,	 objective	 predictions	 of	 activities	 on	
























problematic	 that	 scientists	 disagree	 on	 scientific	 matters?	 Not	 for	 science	
itself;	however,	when	science	is	placed	at	the	service	of	law,	policy	and	decision	
making,	 then,	 scientific	 uncertainty	 –	 especially	 when	 not	 recognised	 and	
embraced	-	245	it	does	indeed	become	problematic.	
This	is	because	law	seeks	to	eliminate	any	trace	of	uncertainty	in	favour	
of	 stability	 in	 social	 relationships;	 to	 establish	 legal	 relationships	 and	 legal	
rights	and	reassure	the	regulated	that	legal	conditions	will	not	change	 from	
one	 day	 to	 another.	 The	 principle	 of	 legal	 certainty	 is	 enriched	 in	 legal	
regimes246	as	a	sine	qua	non	to	the	rule	of	law	and	requires	rules	to	be	clear	
and	precise	so	that	individuals	may	ascertain	unequivocally	what	their	rights	
and	 obligations	 are	 and	 take	 steps	 accordingly 247 .	 The	 principle	 of	 non-
retroactivity,	 the	 protection	 of	 legitimate	 expectations,	 the	 principle	 of	 res	
judicata,248		all	derive	from	the	general	principle	of	legal	certainty.		
At	the	same	time,	law	likes	order.	Law	has	a	preference	for	hierarchical	
systems	 where	 all	 rules	 fit	 neatly	 into	 boxes	 and	 which	 can	 be	 easily	
enforceable. 249 	It	 likes	 cause	 and	 effect	 relationships	 and	 jurisdictional	
boundaries;	 clear	 lines	of	 authority	and	divisions	 for	responsibility.250	Such	
preference	may	explain	to	an	extent	why	environmental	law	is	so	fragmented.	
Having	 laws	 for	 the	 different	media	 administered	 by	 different	 agencies	 fits	
better	with	the	way	law	is	used	to	operating	in.	251	
But	as	demonstrated	above,	this	is	not	how	nature	operates.	The	whole	
is	 substantially	 different	 from	 a	 mere	 collection	 of	 its	 parts.	 Ecosystems	











Bounded	Pragmatism’	 (n74)	 946	 arguing	 that	 ‘conventional	 environmental	 regulation	and	










The	 notion	 of	 adaptive	 management	 emerged	 in	 US	 literature	 as	 a	
response	 to	 ecological	 complexity,	 uncertainty	 and	 the	 limitations	 of	
knowledge.252	It	 traces	 its	origins	to	 the	seminal	works	of	C.S	Holling253	and	
C.Walters254 	who	 developed	 a	 flexible	 	 management	 model	 tailored	 to	 the	
needs	 of	 complex,	 dynamic	 systems	 as	 a	 way	 ‘for	 resource	 managers	 to	
integrate	 scientific	 understanding	 with	 the	 management	 of	 	 natural	
resources’. 255 		 Since	 then,	 Holling’s	 and	 Walter’s	 ideas	 have	 gained	 wide	
support	among	US	literature	and	are	accepted	with	overwhelming	enthusiasm	
by	ecologists,256	management	practitioners257	and	lawyers.258	
Essentially,	 theirs	 is	 a	 science-driven	 approach	 to	 natural	 resources	
management	that	views	policy	decisions	as	provisional	and	subject	to	change	
in	 light	 of	 scientific	 developments	 and	 information	 gathered	 through	
continuous	 monitoring. 259 	This	 iterative	 process	 of	 decision-making	 is	
however	 the	 only	 common	 denominator	 among	 a	 diverse	 range	 of	
understandings	of	‘adaptive	management’.	From	a	simple	‘learning	by	doing’	













Choice)’	 (2009)	 39	 Envtl	 L	 Rep	 10920,	 one	 of	 the	 most	 ardent	 proponents	 of	 adaptive	
management	goes	as	far	as	to	suggest	that	it	is	our	only	choice.	




management	 ultimately	 becomes	 a	 buzz	 word,	 an	 umbrella	 term	 that	
encompasses	the	different	things	it	means	for	different	people.260		
Ecologists	 tend	 to	 adhere	 to	 its	 original	 conception	 by	 Holling	 as	 a	
scientific,	 experimental	 learning	 process,	 whereby	 one	 or	 more	 uncertain	
hypotheses	are	 implemented	and	monitored	 for	a	provisional	period	under	
carefully	delimited	 conditions.261	The	 results	 are	analysed	and	measured	 to	
inform	subsequent	decision-making.	In	natural	resources	and	policy	circles	on	
the	other	hand,	adaptive	management	is	more	loosely	defined	to	include	‘any	
adaptive	 approach	 that	 seeks	 to	 respond	 to	 changing	 conditions	 or	
subsequently	acquired	knowledge’.262	
According	to	J.B	Ruhl,	the	leading	proponent	of	adaptive	management	
among	 legal	 scholars,	 an	 adaptive	 management	 approach	 to	 ecosystem	
conservation:	
‘relies	 on	 expert	 agencies	 to	 implement	 ecosystem	 management	 by	
exercising	professional	 judgment	 through	an	 iterative	decision-making	
process	 emphasizing	 definition	 of	 goals,	 description	 of	 policy	 decision	
models,	 active	 experimentation	 with	 monitoring	 of	 conditions,	 and	
adjustment	 of	 implementation	 decisions	 as	 suggested	 by	 performance	
results.’263	
Adaptive	 management	 is	 not	 a	 legal	 conception.	 It	 is	 a	 scientific	
construct,	a	method,	a	management	logic	that	in	order	to	leave	the	realm	of	
literature	and	be	implemented	in	the	real	world,	requires	a	legal	framework	to	
support	and	underpin	 it	or	at	 least	 to	allow	and	not	 impede	 its	application.	
Following	the	conception	and	development	of	adaptive	management	theory,	
efforts	 were	 made	 to	 implement	 adaptive	 management	 across	 a	 range	 of	
																																																								
260 	Barry	 L.	 Johnson,	 ‘The	 Role	 of	 Adaptive	 Management	 as	 an	 Operational	 Approach	 for	
Resource	Management	Agencies’	(1999)	3	Conservation	Ecology	Art.8,	1.	
261 	Karkkainen,	 ‘Collaborative	 Ecosystem	 Governance:	 Scale,	 Complexity,	 and	 Dynamism’	
(n54)	 202;	 Karkkainen	 draws	 a	 distinction	 between	 his	 conceptualisation	 of	 adaptive	
management	and	that	of	ecologists;	See	in	that	respect	Holling	(n62);	Walters(n62);	Walters	
and	Holling	(n64).	







The	 majority	 of	 constraints	 were	 legal	 and	 institutional. 265 	By	
introducing	flexible	decision-making	procedures,	adaptive	management	seeks	
to	address	the	 first	 category	of	mismatches	between	 law	and	nature.	Doing	
that	 however,	 brings	 to	 the	 fore	 the	 second	 mismatch:	 interim	 decision-
making	is	not	entirely	compatible	with	the	principle	of	legal	certainty,	which	
allows	those	subject	to	legal	rules	a	high	degree	of	confidence	that	these	rules	
will	 be	 interpreted	 consistently	 by	 those	 applying	 them	 and	 protects	 them	
from	the	arbitrary	use	of	power	from	the	state.	
Hence,	adaptive	management	advocators	express	their	concerns	over	
its	 proper	 implementation;	 this	 scepticism	 is	 mostly	 focused	 on	 whether	
current	legal	and	institutional	frameworks	can	accommodate	such	a	flexible	
and	 often	 experimental	 approach,	 concluding	 that	 although	 integration	 is	
possible	to	a	certain	extent,	it	might	be	the	case	that	a	legal	and	institutional	
reform	is	necessary	in	order	to	realise	its	full	potential.266		
As	with	most	of	 the	adaptive	management	 literature,	 the	majority	of	














11-33	 arguing	 that	 that	 ‘adaptive	 management	 is	 not	 possible	 under	 the	 conventional	
administrative	 law	 of	 natural	 resources,	 and	 that	 many	 of	 the	 shortcomings	 of	 adaptive	








management.	 Human	 relationships	 and	 relationships	 between	 humans	 and	
nature	are	also	complex.	The	paradigm	of	New	Ecology	wiped	away	the	idea	of	
watertight	 social	 and	 natural	 systems.	 Instead,	 man	 and	 nature	 interact	
dialectically	within	complex	adaptive	social-ecological	systems	characterized	
by	 nonlinearity,	 uncertainty,	 emergence,	 and	 reciprocal	 feedbacks. 267	
Decisions	on	nature	conservation	taken	by	humans	and	directed	to	humans	
also	have	a	social	dimension.	
Social-ecological	 complexity	 has	 two	 interrelated	 implications	 for	
nature	conservation	law	and	decision-making	relating	to	the	‘means’	and	the	
‘ends’	 of	 the	 process.	 The	 first	 implication	 is	 that	 the	 social	 dimension	 of	
ecosystems	 adds	 further	 variables	 that	 increase	 uncertainty	 of	 what	





social	 interactions	 and	 human/nature	 interaction	 together	 with	 associated	
and	 poorly	 understood	 social	 pressures,	 then	 uncertainty	 is	 further	

















where	 agreement	 exists	 on	 both	 causation	 and	 preferred	 outcomes,	 hence,	
decision-making	 is	 less	 challenging	 and	 heavily	 routinized.	 It	 is	 as	 Kai	 Lee	
suggests	 ‘the	 realm	of	bureaucracy’.273	In	 situations	 like	 these,	 there	are	no	
arguments	about	preferred	outcomes,	there	is	agreement	on	what	causes	the	
problem	and	how	it	can	be	addressed,	and	an	organisation	is	set	up	to	apply	








As	 Stankey	 discusses,	 ‘because	 of	 differences	 in	 problem	 perception	 and	
interpretations	of	 scientific	 evidence,	 the	 collective	wisdom	of	 the	 decision	
unit	needs	to	be	brought	to	bear	the	problem’.277		Organisations	must	rely	on	
that	 collective	wisdom	 of	 experts	 to	 guide	 the	 decision-making	 process.278		
However,	even	the	collective	wisdom	of	experts	will	not	suffice	to	address	the	
magnitude	 of	 ecological	 uncertainty.	 Therefore,	 scientific	 research	must	 be	
continuous	 and	 the	management	 adaptive.	 This	 approach	 corresponds	 to	 a	
















but	 disagreement	 on	 the	 overall	 goals	 of	 decision-making.	 Within	 human	
societies,	different	societal	groups	share	different	values	and	perspectives	that	
are	 often	 contradictory,	 therefore	 a	 common	 understanding	 of	 preference	





Finally,	 there	are	the	situations	 falling	 into	Cell	D.	The	hardest	of	all,	
these	are	situations	characterised	by	high	degree	of	uncertainty	and	conflict,	
where	 there	 is	 no	 agreement	 on	 causation	 or	 preferred	 outcomes.	 Nature	
conservation	 decision	 making	 falls	 exactly	 within	 this	 category.	 Ecological	
complexity,	scientific	uncertainty	and	bias,	coupled	with	social	pressures	that	
affect	 the	 application	 of	 science	 to	 conservation	 problems,	 create	 a	 very	













against	 an	 ecological	 but	 also	 a	 socio-economic	 backdrop,	 conflicts	 become	








Defined	as	 ‘a	 serious	 incompatibility	between	two	or	more	opinions,	
principles	or	interests’284	or	‘expressed	disagreements	among	people	who	see	
incompatible	goals	and	potential	interference	in	achieving	these	goals’285	the	






282	Juliette	C.	Young	 and	 others,	 ‘The	 emergence	 of	 biodiversity	conflicts	 from	biodiversity	
impacts:	characteristics	and	management	strategies’	(2010)	19	Biodiversity	and	Conservation	
3973.	
283 	See	 Stephen	 Mark	 Redpath,	 Saloni	 Bhatia	 and	 Juliette	 Young,	 ‘Tilting	 at	 wildlife:	











wildlife	 has	 an	 adverse	 effect	 on	 the	 other’. 288 	Hence,	 conflicts	 appear	 to	
revolve	 around	 the	 impact	 of	 wildlife	 on	 human	 activities	 or	 alternatively	
when	human	activities	impact	negatively	on	biodiversity.289	










stronger	 protection. 293 	Therefore	 Redpath	 et	 al	 propose	 an	 alternative	
definition	 for	 conflict,	 as	what	 occurs	 when	 ‘parties	 clash	 over	 differences	
about	 conservation	 objectives	 and	 when	 one	 party	 asserts,	 or	 at	 least	 is	
perceived	to	assert,	its	interests	at	the	expense	of	another’.294	 	 	
Recognising	the	social	dimension	of	conservation	conflict	is	central	in	
identifying	ways	 to	 resolve	 it.	 One	major	 implication	 of	 seeing	 conflicts	 as	
occurring	 between	 humans	 and	 wildlife	 is	 the	 heavy	 reliance	 on	 technical	
solutions.295	While	there	will	be	certain	occasions	when	science	can	assist	in	
																																																								
288	Michael	 R.	 Conover,	 Resolving	 human-wildlife	 conflicts:	 the	 science	 of	wildlife	 damage	
management	(Lewis	Publishers	2002)	4.	
289Young	 and	 others	 (n282)	 3974	 refer	 to	 a	 current	 misunderstanding	 in	 the	 literature	
regarding	the	issue	of	biodiversity	conflicts:	many	papers	interpret	biodiversity	impacts	as	














reducing	 conflict	 -	 by	 finding	ways	 to	 reduce	 the	 impact	 of	 one	 competing	
interest	over	the	other	-296	it	will	not	be	able	to	eliminate	conflicts.	As	Redpath	
et	al	suggest,	under	the	surface	of	conflicts	 is	 ‘a	complex	 layering	of	diverse	
issues	related	to	different	world	views,	issues	of	trust,	power	imbalances	or	





‘the	 central	 role	 of	 people	 in	 conflicts,	 conveys	 the	 need	 to	understand	 the	
socio-economic	 and	 political	 context	 of	 conflicts,	 rather	 than	 restricting	
consideration	 to	 ecological	 context	 solely’. 299 	Conservation	 conflicts	 are	
complex	 and	 messy,	 involving	 human	 politics	 and	 enriched	 with	 human	
values.	 Without	 underestimating	 the	 contribution	 of	 scientific	 evidence,	
technical	solutions	alone	are	unlikely	to	be	able	to	address	this.	Hence,	despite	
strong	 scientific	 evidence,	 conservationists	 in	 South	 Africa	 struggle	 to	
convince	people	and	authorities	about	 the	value	of	sharks.300	Therefore,	 the	




There	 are	 six	 broad,	 interrelated	 and	 overlapping	 categories	 of	
conservation	conflict	that	have	been	identified	in	the	literature.301			
a. Conflicts	 of	 interest:	 when	 two	 or	 more	 different	 groups	 want	












instance,	 the	 timber	 industry	 against	 those	 wishing	 to	 preserve	




often	 underlie	 conflicts	 of	 interest.	 Such	 conflicts	 exist	 when	
different	groups	of	people	have	‘on-going	differences	of	view	about	





Dower	 distinguishes	 value	 conflicts	 from	 conflicts	 of	 interests,	
stressing	that	‘they	are	not	just	conflicts	between	different	people	
with	different	private	interests’	but	‘ethical	conflicts	insofar	as	the	
reasons	 given	 for	 different	 practical	 responses	 involve	 different	
general	 values	 as	 goals	 -	 economic	well-being,	 long-term	 human	
interests,	the	flourishing	of	nature’.304	
	
c. Conflicts	 over	 processes:	 Conflicts	 in	 relation	 to	 different	
approaches	 to	 decision	 making	 and	 problem	 solving	 taken	 by	
different	groups	of	people,	agencies	or	organisation.	This	is	the	case	
for	 example	 in	 top-down	 command	 and	 control	 approaches	 as	














stakeholders’. 305 	This	 is	 often	 the	 situation	 in	 conflicts	 between	







conflicts	 involving	 inequalities	 and	 power	 distribution	 between	
parties,	which	surface	when	conflicts	of	 interest	 are	brought	 into	
the	forefront.		
	
f. Interpersonal	 Conflicts:	 These	 arise	 because	 of	 personality	













307 	Eilidh	 Johnston	 and	 Chris	 Soulsby,	 ‘The	 role	 of	 science	 in	 environmental	 policy:	 an	
examination	of	the	local	context’	(2006)	23	Land	Use	Policy	161,161;	Also	ibid,	166	citing	the	
response	of	a	crofter	from	Sunderland	demonstrating	the	resistance	of	local	stakeholders	to	












and/or	 recognized	 and	 are,	 where	 necessary,	 enforced	 through	
penalties309		
	
Law	 shapes	 human	 societies	 and	 regulates	 human	 behaviour.	 It	
indicates	what	 is	 permitted	 and	what	 is	 not	 and	 in	 case	 of	wrong	 conduct,	
provides	 the	 citizens	 the	possibility	 to	 seek	 compliance	by	others.310	Law	 is	
also	 used	 as	 means	 to	 achieve	 a	 set	 of	 policy	 objectives,	 including	 nature	
conservation.	 It	 also	 provides	 a	means	 ‘for	 avoiding,	mitigating	 and	setting	
conflicts	in	society’.	
Hence,	law	can	be	instrumental	in	resolving	or	avoiding	some	types	of	




listing	species	whose	conservation	–	at	 least	 in	principle	 -	overrides	human	
interests.	By	implication	it	can	be	argued	that	in	non-designated	areas	or	with	
regard	 to	 non-listed	 species	 other	 interests	 take	 precedence	 over	
conservation.		
As	with	all	adversarial	methods	of	dispute	resolution,	one	party	wins	















and	 genuine	 conflict	 resolution.	 He	 notes	 that	 the	 judicial	 settlement	 of	 a	





all	 human	 values	 is	 unlikely	 given	 human	 diversity,	 deep-seated	 cultural	
norms,	and	the	variation	of	human	needs	and	desires’.314	Therefore	the	‘right-	





would	 be	 no	 need	 for	 nature	 conservation	 if	 some	 people	 did	 not	 value	
nature.317	But	there	are	different	reasons	for	which	people	value	nature	that	


















in	 turn	 will	 formulate	 policies	 that	 will	 ultimately	 lead	 to	 the	 adoption	 of	





measured	 in	monetary	 terms	 is	worthy	 of	 protection;	 if	 the	 justification	 is	
recreational	or	aesthetic	reasons,	then	only	places	of	natural	beauty	and	what	
known	 as	 ‘charismatic	 species’	will	 enjoy	 protection	 under	 the	 umbrella	of	
nature	conservation	law;	on	the	other	hand,	an	entirely	scientific	justification	
would	 require	 protection	 only	 of	 those	 species	 deemed	 to	 be	 of	 ‘biological	
interest’;	 finally,	 moving	 towards	 an	 entirely	 biocentric	 approach	 and	










319 	This	 is	 the	 main	 reason	 why	 until	 recently	 in	 England	 there	 had	 been	 two	 different	
agencies:	English	Nature	administering	nature	conservation	(SSSIs	and	NNRs	designated	on	
the	basis	of	scientific	criteria)	on	the	one	hand	and	the	Countryside	Commission	administering	












be	 framed	 in	a	 technical	manner.322	Therefore,	while	 science	 is	 an	essential	
tool	to	help	us	‘describe,	understand	and	manage	wildlife,’323	it	is	just	one	of	
the	many	ways	in	which	humanity	can	express	values	and	preferences	and	this	




how	 far	we	are	willing	to	go	 to	achieve	 its	protection.	Conflicts	over	values	
relate	not	just	to	competing	justifications	of	nature	conservation	but	also	to	
conflicts	between	nature	conservation	and	other	interests.325		So,	how	do	we	
decide	 what	 is	 acceptable	 or	 unacceptable?	 Who	 is	 to	 decide	 on	 that	 and	
according	 to	what	 criteria?	326	The	answer	as	with	most	questions	 that	give	
rise	to	environmental	debates	is	not	straightforward.	But	given	the	fact	that	
legislation	 in	 democratic	 societies	 expresses	 societal	 values,	 choices	 will	
eventually	revolve	around	the	question,	how	much	damage	is	society	willing	















325 	Stephen	 M.	 Redpath	 and	 others	 (eds),	 Conflicts	 in	 Conservation:	 Navigating	 Towards	
Solutions	(Cambridge	University	Press	2015),	6;	This	issue	is	the	focus	of	the	next	chapter.	
326Van	Houtan	 (n184)	 1369	uses	a	 pastor	metaphor	 and	asks	 the	 question	 ‘if	 biodiversity	
conservation	is	a	sheep,	maybe	an	important	question	to	ask	is:	who	plays	the	shepherd?’	
327 	Judith	 S.	 Weiss,	 ‘Scientific	 Uncertainty	 and	 Environmental	 Policy:	 Four	 Pollution	 Case	




sacrifice	 commercial	 development	 over	 some	 newts?328 	Or	 even	 historical	
culture	and	worship	over	bats?329		
A	scientific	approach	to	nature	conservation	assigns	a	scientific	value	
to	 nature	 and	 this	 scientific	 value	 is	 then	 given	 precedence	 over	 other	
interests.	But	are	 these	questions,	 the	answers	 to	which	are	 to	become	 the	
touchstone	of	policy	making,	 for	scientists	alone	to	answer	or	 for	 the	entire	
society	to	come	up	with?	 It	 is	at	 least	arguable	that	as	scientists	are	part	of	
society,	they	can	participate	in	the	debate	and	enlighten	their	citizens	or	even	
‘extend	our	realm	of	moral	concern’330	but	this	should	not	directly	imply	that	
science	 ‘mandates	 a	 particular	 choice’. 331 	Science	 can	 certainly	 assist	 in	
implementing	 these	 choices	 providing	 knowledge,	 independent	 of	 these	
choices;	providing	the	means	to	either	protect	or	exploit	nature.	For	example,	
science	 can	 assist	 in	 providing	 relevant	 information	 on	 how	 to	 conserve	 a	






topic.	 It	 nevertheless	 demonstrates	 how	 difficult	 resolving	 value-laden	
conflicts	 can	 be	 and	 that	 a	 science-driven	 ‘right	 answer’	 approach	 to	



















nature	 conservation	which	 lead	 to	 the	 tensions	 among	 interests	 remaining	













the	 traditional	 model	 of	 environmental	 legislation:	 they	 confer	 direct	
protection	 to	 rare	 or	 endangered	 species 334 	and	 create	 a	 framework	 for	
administrative	action	by	 the	 competent	 regulatory	authorities,	 laying	down	
criteria	 to	 be	 applied	 for	 the	 designation	 of	 protected	 sites	 within	 which	
certain	activities	are	 restricted.335	In	 short,	 they	set	 a	 framework	 for	action	
where	the	state	has	a	direct	role	within	the	different	stages	of	implementation	
of	 a	 nature	 conservation	 regime:	 listing,	 designating,	 enforcing,	 granting	
licenses	to	lift	restrictions	or	negotiate	management	agreements.	
One	 only	 has	 to	 look	 at	 the	 contentious	 passage	 of	 the	Wildlife	 and	
Countryside	 Act	 1981	 or	 the	 Countryside	 and	 Rights	 of	Ways	 Act	 2000	 to	
																																																								
333 	Philip	 Lowe,	 Countryside	 conflicts:	 the	 politics	 of	 farming,	 forestry	 and	 conservation	
(Gower/Maurice	Temple	Smith	1986)	ch.6;	See	also	a	detailed	insight	on	the	Bill’s	passing	and	
the	fierce	debate	that	took	place	behind	the	scenes	in	Westminster	in	W.M.	Adams,	Nature's	







led	 to	 long	 debates	 in	 both	 Houses	 and	 several	 amendments	 before	 the	
legislation	 was	 approved.	 Following	 the	 familiar	 binary	 approach,	 such	
legislation	 ‘adjudicates’	 in	 favour	 of	 science	 and	 the	 natural	 environment.	
However,	in	practice	this	tends	to	inflame	conflict	because	of	the	perception	
that	 nature	 conservation	 designation	 obstructs	 development	 and	 hinders	
economic	activities.336	Indeed,	at	this	stage,		conflict	is	perhaps	more	the	result	
of	 these	 misconceptions,	 unexpressed	 mistrust	 and	 stereotypes	 of	 nature	
conservation	 legislation	 than	 it	 is	 the	 enactment	 of	 legislation	 itself,	 which	
does	not	usually	directly	affect	business	interests.337	Affected	individuals	are	
sceptical	 and	 suspicious	 of	 legislation	 setting	 up	 frameworks	 for	 site	
designation;	in	their	mind	the	potential	designation	of	their	land	would	mean	
expropriation	or	major	interference	with	their	economic	activities.		
At	 the	 other	 end	 of	 the	 discourse,	 the	 lack	 of	 legislation	 restricting	
damaging	development	implies	that	the	legal	system	favours	such	activities.	
























stage	will	 set	 the	 scene	 for	 further	discussions	and	conflicts,	which	 tend	 to	
come	to	a	head	during	the	subsequent	process	of	management	formulation.338			
However,	 potential	 restrictions	 are	 not	 the	 sole	 source	 of	 conflict	
during	the	designation	process.	The	results	of	a	European	Workshop	on	how	
to	deal	with	conflicts	within	the	Natura	2000	network	reveal	several	sources	
of	 tension,	relating	to	 the	process	as	well	as	 the	criteria	applied	during	site	
selection	and	designation.339	With	respect	 to	 the	process,	sources	of	conflict	
identified	 include	 inadequate	 consultation	 and	 the	 exclusion	 of	 concerned	
stakeholders	from	the	designation	process	as	a	result	of	a	primarily	science-
driven,	top-down	approach.340	A	further	reason	was	the	lack	of	information	on	
the	 effects	 of	 site	 designation	 to	 those	 involved. 341 	Stakeholders	 have	
prejudices	 against	 conservation	 designation	 due	 to	 misconceptions	 about	
what	it	entails.342	Poor	communication	between	stakeholders	and	regulatory	
agencies	 further	 intensifies	 uncertainties	 and	mistrusts.343	Additionally	 the	
extensive	 use	 of	 scientific	 jargon,	 inaccessible	 to	 most	 stakeholders,	 is	
perceived	 as	 an	 ‘inflexible	 object’	 or	 ‘weapon’	 against	which	 a	 layperson	 is	











344 	ibid	 20;	 B.	 Wynne,	 ‘May	 the	 sheep	 safely	 graze?	 A	 reflexive	 view	 of	 the	 expert-lay	
knowledge	 divide’	 in	 S.	 Lash,	 B.	 Szerszynski	 and	 B	Wynne	 (eds),	 Risk,	 Environment	 and	
Modernity—Towards	a	New	Ecology	(Sage,	London	1996);	See	also	in	this	respect	Johnston	





Disagreement	 also	 exists	 over	 the	 scientific	 evidence	 on	 which	
designations	are	based.	Stakeholders	question	the	quality	of	scientific	data	e.g	
arguing	that	site	designation	took	place	based	on	species	and	habitats	that	do	
not	 occur. 345 	The	 decisive	 role	 of	 science	 during	 the	 designation	 process	
strengthens	laypeople’s	perceptions	about	the	differences	between	local	and	
scientific	 knowledge,	 paving	 the	 way	 for	 further	 conflicts	 over	 preferred	
management	 techniques	 and	 fuelling	 the	 ‘belief	 that	 conservationists	were	
detached	 from	 local	 realities’.346	Conflicts	may	also	arise	when	 the	 relevant	






Conflict	 tends	 to	 intensify	when	 it	 comes	 to	management	 decisions,	
whether	they	refer	to	particular	species	or	to	land	management.	Conflicts	over	
land	management	practices	are	not	limited	to	designated	areas	but	given	the	
gradual	 expansion	of	 environmental	management	 to	 the	wider	 countryside,	
they	are	likely	to	arise	in	areas	outside	of	designated	sites.		
Non-equilibrium	 concepts	 of	 ecological	 complexity	 and	 interaction	
have	 finally	 begun	 to	 influence	 and	 become	 embedded	 into	 conservation	
strategies.	It	is	now	widely	acknowledged	that	a	focus	shift	from	the	‘crown	
jewels’	to	larger	areas	is	needed	to	promote	ecological	resilience	and	conserve	
biodiversity	 conservation,	 through	 the	 implementation	of	 a	mixture	of	 site-
related	and	wider	countryside	conservation	measures.348	But	expanding	the	











group	 of	 affected	 stakeholders,	 which	 in	 turn	 leads	 to	 more	 conservation	
conflicts.			
Conflicts	usually	emerge	in	response	to	decisions	on	appropriate	land	
management	 practices	 and/or	 development.	 As	 to	 the	 former,	 tensions	 in	
general	 arise	 due	 to	 the	 different	management	 practices	 required	 to	 purse	





landowners	 feel	 that	 the	 regulatory	 authorities	 are	 interfering	 with	 their	
sovereignty	over	their	land	and	their	right	to	decide	on	its	use.	Conflicts	can	
also	 arise	 as	 a	 result	 of	 species	management,	 which	 can	 be	 threatening	 to	
livestock	 and	 in	 extreme	 cases	 to	 human	 life	 (e.g.	 practices	 related	 to	 the	
reintroduction	of	large	carnivores).	350	









outdoors	activities,	 then	 the	 latter	 interest	 group	 is	 likely	 to	be	 less	happy.	
Similarly,	the	residents	of	the	area	might	be	divided	between	those	who	see	
the	airport	as	a	transport	link	or	job	creator	and	those	who	see	it	as	depriving	








the	 convoluted	web	 of	 diverse	 and	 overlapping	 interests	 -	 which,	 to	make	
things	even	more	complicated,	are	often	directly	linked	to	legally	safeguarded	





be	 prioritised	 and	 according	 to	which	 criteria?	 In	 the	 example	 cited	 above,	
applying	a	binary	approach	to	conflict	resolution	means	that	only	one	of	the	
interests	would	be	satisfied.	Hence,	if	either	the	area	or	the	species	concerned	
fall	under	 legal	protection,	 conservation	 interest	prevails	over	 the	 interests	
favoured	by	development.	The	‘right	answer’	approach	restricts	development	




we	 might	 need	 to	 look	 beyond	 conventional	 legal	 processes	 such	 as	
adjudication,	 which	 cannot	 fully	 satisfy	 nature’s	 or	 humanity’s	 needs	 and	






of	 uncertainty,	 one	 that	 allows	 for	 decisions	 to	 be	made	 in	 the	 absence	 of	
complete	 knowledge	 and	 understanding,	 and	which	 can	 be	 combined	with	








This	 thesis	 will	 explore	 the	 potential	 of	 adaptive	 collaborative	
management,	 a	 concept	 born	 out	 of	 the	 amalgamation	 of	 adaptive	
management	and	co-management	theory.353	The	proposition	is	that	both	the	
adaptive	 and	 the	 collaborative	 elements	 of	 adaptive	 co-management	 allow	
nature	conservation	decision	making	to	‘adapt’,	not	only	to	evolving	science	
and	unpredictable	ecosystem	responses	but	also	to	the	ever-changing	values,	
interests	 and	 perceptions	 that	 underlie	 conservation	 conflicts.	 The	 two	
elements	provide	a	platform	for	all	those	affected	or	who	might	affect	decision	




and	 decision-makers.	 Good	 communication	 and	 relationships	 of	 trust	 are	
instrumental	in	overcoming	these	issues.	Additionally,	as	well	as	extending	the	




Does	 this	 mean,	 that	 there	 is	 no	 place	 for	 traditional	 legislation	 in	
conservation	decision-making?	Certainly	not.	This	thesis	argues	that	flexible	
bottom-up	 approaches	 need	 to	 be	 employed	 in	 combination	 and	
complementary	to	conventional	legislation.	Hence,	the	thesis	does	not	suggest	
















The	 original	 science-driven	model	of	 adaptive	management	 seeks	 to	
underpin	decision-making	in	the	face	of	incomplete	scientific	knowledge,	the	
complexities	 and	 the	 stochastic	 behaviour	 of	 ecosystems. 354 	Adaptive	
management	 seeks	 to	 enhance	 scientific	 knowledge	 to	 address	 the	
uncertainties	 and	 incomplete	 knowledge	 that	plague	 natural	 resources	 and	
ecosystem	 management. 355 	It	 is	 a	 model	 that	 looks	 into	 Thompson’s	 and	
Tuden’s	 	 ‘causation’356	and	 focuses	 on	 the	 question	of	 ‘how’	 	 to	manage	 	 in	
order	to	realise	set	goals	and		aims.357	




1970s, 358 	before	 the	 term’s	 further	 elaboration,	 amendment	 and	 growing	












Under	 an	 adaptive	 approach,	 natural	 resources	 management	 takes	
place	within	an	 iterative	process	of	decision-making	where	policy	decisions	
are	 adjusted	 in	 order	 to	 reflect	 the	 new	 understanding.360 	Essentially,	 the	
theory	 of	 adaptive	 management	 extends	 the	 practices	 of	 the	 scientific	
community	 to	 conservation	 management. 361 	Accordingly,	 and	 as	 its	 name	
suggests,	within	the	context	of	this	thesis	I	identify	two	primary	characteristics	
of	scientific	adaptive	management:	science	as	the	primary	use	of	knowledge	
and	 decision	 driver;	 and	 adaptability	 to	 new	 information	 and	 changing	
circumstances	modelled	on	scientific	experimentation.		
Integrating	science	into	nature	conservation	decision-making	is	neither	
a	 novel	 idea	 nor	 limited	 to	 adaptive	management.	 In	 this	 respect,	 scientific	
adaptive	 management	 is	 consistent	 with	 the	 expert-driven	 approaches	 to	
decision-making	that	became	prominent	in	the	20th	century.	However,	there	is	




perception	 of	 both	 the	 nature	 of	 ecosystems	 and	 the	 capacity	 of	 scientific	
knowledge	is	one	of	the	main	reasons	limiting	the	capacity	of	legal	frameworks	
to	address	continuing	biodiversity	loss.364		
In	 scientific	 adaptive	management,	 however,	 adaptability	 is	 the	 key:	
nature	 changes	 and	 science	 progresses	 and	management	 needs	 to	 adapt	 to	
																																																								
360J.B.	Ruhl	in	Ruhl,	‘Regulation	by	Adaptive	Management	-	Is	It	Possible’	2005	(n51)	defines	
















both.	 Adaptive	 management	 develops	 on	 the	 basis	 of	 the	 assertion	 of	 the	
elusiveness	of	scientific	knowledge	and	the	recognition	of	nature’s	dynamic	
character.	A	scientific	construct,	conceived	by	scientists	as	a	way	to	integrate	
scientific	 understanding	 with	 natural	 resources	 management, 365 	adaptive	
management	accepts	and	seeks	to	address	scientific	indeterminacy	and	reduce	
the	 level	 of	 uncertainty	 surrounding	 nature	 conservation.	 Contrary	 to	
conventional	 linear	approaches,	 the	cyclical,	 iterative	adaptive	management	
model,	enshrines	a	post-positivist	perception	of	science	being	founded	on	the	
premise	that	our	knowledge	of	natural	systems	is	always	incomplete,	elusive	




as	 a	 conceptual	 approach,	 adaptive	 management	 sets	 a	 scientifically	
sound	course	that	does	not	make	action	dependent	on	extensive	studies.	
As	 a	 strategy	 of	 implementation,	 adaptive	 management	 provides	 a	





















observes,	 ‘in	 theory,	 adaptive	 management	 recapitulates	 the	 promise	 that	
Francis	 Bacon	 articulated	 four	 centuries	 ago:	 to	 control	 nature	 one	 must	
understand	her’.372		
Learning	 through	 experience	 is	 no	 novelty	 either;	 it	 has	 been	 an	
important	 concern	 for	 philosophers	 throughout	 the	 years.	 But	 even	 in	 the	
context	of	managing	natural	resources,	the	idea	is	not	entirely	new.	Falanruw	
discusses	how	the	Yap	people	of	Micronesia	address	resource	scarcity	through	
adaptive	 methods	 of	 management	 for	 years. 373 	In	 England,	 the	 adaptive	
approach	 towards	 conservation	 land	management	 (in	 nature	 reserves)	 has	
been	 applied	 since	 the	 1960’s	 without	 the	 concept	 being	 formalised	 or	
formally	 recognised. 374 	As	 Alexander	 notes	 ‘it	 was	 just	 the	 way	 in	 which	
conservation	managers	managed	their	sites’.375	
However	 during	 the	 last	 35	 years	 adaptive	 management	 became	 a	
recognised	process	with	methods	defined,	explored,	tested	and	refined.376		It	
is	 not	 simply	 ‘trial	 and	 error’,	 but	 well	 informed	 management	 that	
incorporates	and	produces	scientific	knowledge	through	the	use	of	scientific	








373	M.V.C	Falanruw,	 ‘People	Pressure	and	Management	of	Limited	Resources	on	Yap’	 in	 J.A	
McNeely	and	K.	R	Miller	(eds),	National	Parks	Conservation,	and	Development:	The	Role	of	

















itself	 as	 a	 learning	 process	with	 political	 and	 scientific	 implications.	 It	 has	
political	 implications	 in	 the	 sense	 that	 it	 allows	 for	 decisions	 to	 be	 made	








As	 its	 name	 suggests,	 in	 a	 scientific	 adaptive	 management	 model,	
science	 has	 a	 decisive	 role	 in	 natural	 resources	 management	 decision-
making.381	The	name	of	the	model	also	indicates	a	closed	circle	of	participants,	
which	makes	 this	model	 less	participatory	 than	other	 conceptualizations	of	











381 	Stankey,	 Clark	 and	 Bormann	 (n65)	 33	 stating	 that	 ‘the	 concept	 of	 scientific	 adaptive	







	What	 defines	 adaptive	management	 and	 distinguishes	 it	 from	other	
forms	of	technocratic	decision-making	though,	is	that	it	adopts	the	scientific	
method	 as	 its	modus	 operandi;	 it	 is	 the	 element	 of	 experimentation	 that	 is	
deeply	embedded	in	some	form	or	degree	into	the	model	of	scientific	adaptive	
management,	 intended	 to	 enhance	 learning	 and	 acquire	 a	 better	
understanding	of	the	system.384	
Hence,	in	its	classic	form	adaptive	management,	is	seen	as	more	than	














biological,	 ecological,	 economic	 and	 social	 systems	 (…). 389 	A	 number	 of	



















more	 elaborate	 with	 a	 greater	 number	 steps	 and	 multiple	 loops	 at	 each	
stage. 390 	The	 most	 prevalent	 in	 the	 literature	 (and	 the	 skeleton	 for	 more	








research	 and	 neither	 does	 it	
consider	 science	 as	 a	 distinct	
process. 393 	The	 novelty	 of	 the	




the	 adaptive	 management	 cycle	
(e.g	 hypothesis	 formulation,	
modelling,	 monitoring,	 evaluation).	 As	 many	 authors	 agree,	 adaptive	
																																																								
390	See	i.a:	ibid	211	for	a	simple	four-step	process;	Stankey,	Clark	and	Bormann	(n65)	for	an	
expanded	 four-step	 process;	 	 Williams,	 Szaro	 and	 Shapiro	 (n257)	 4	 for	 a	 linear	 six-step	
process;	 Glenys	 Jones,	 ‘The	 adaptive	 management	 system	 for	 the	 Tasmanian	 Wilderness	
World	 Heritage	 Area	 –	 linking	 management	 planning	 with	 effectiveness	 evaluation’	 in	
Catherine	 Allan	 and	 George	 H	 Stankey	 (eds),	 Adaptive	 Environmental	 Management	 A	
Practitioners	Guide	(Springer	2009)	237;	Hannah	Birgé	and	others,	Adaptive	management	for	
soil	 ecosystem	 services,	 vol	 183	 (2016)	 6	 for	 a	 more	 elaborate	 outline	 of	 adaptive	
management.		
391	Dennis	D.	Murphy	and	Paul	S.	Weiland,	‘Science	and	structured	decision	making:	fulfilling	








management	 ‘blurs	 the	 distinction	 between	 science	 and	management’	 that	
together	become	‘part	of	a	more	holistic	model	of	management’.395	
Common	 to	 all	 versions	 of	 adaptive	 management	 is	 continuous	
monitoring.396 	Often	 a	 source	 of	 confusion	 itself, 397 	effective	 monitoring	 is	
critical	to	the	completion	of	the	adaptive	management	circle,	as	it	provides	the	



































management	 approach	 should	 be. 401 	Along	 an	 increasing	 continuum	 of	
scientific	 rigor	 for	 experimentation	 and	 hypothesis	 testing,	 a	 distinction	 is	
made	between	three	types	of	adaptive	management	with	varying	emphasis	on	
learning	and	differences	in	the	ways	they	treat	uncertainties402:	evolutionary,	




respond	 to	 unexpected	 changes;	 to	 a	 more	 formal	 process	 involving	
modelling	of	potential	impacts	of	alternative	policies,	experiments	to	test	
these	 predictions	 and	 obtain	 knew	 knowledge	 and	 application	 of	 this	




In	 general,	 the	 more	
experimental	 and	
structured	the	design,	the	
more	 learning	 it	 will	
generate.	 It	 becomes	 a	
little	bit	more	science	and	














406 	See	Walters,	 ‘Challenges	 in	 adaptive	 management	 of	 riparian	 and	 coastal	 ecosystems’	
(n264)	2	arguing	that	in	adaptive	management	learning	becomes	a	process	of	direct	selection:	




active	 adaptive	 management,	 407		 others	would	 be	 willing	 to	 accept	 a	 mere	
‘learning	 by	 doing	 approach’	 to	 adaptive	 management	 as	 being	 preferable	
option	to	‘doing	nothing’.408	What	follows	is	a	brief	discussion	on	the	different	




At	 one	 end	 of	 the	 continuum	 we	 find	 evolutionary	 adaptive	
management. 409 	Contrary	 to	 what	 was	 said	 about	 the	 purposefulness	 of	
adaptive	management	implementation,	evolutionary	adaptive	management	is	
neither	a	process	carefully	planned	and	designed,	nor	one	directed	to	learning.	
Instead,	 in	 evolutionary	 adaptive	 management	 choices	 become	 a	 reactive	
approach	to	learning.	410	In	reactive	learning,	there	is	no	explicit	monitoring	or	
evaluation	 mechanisms	 to	 review	 past	 actions	 and	 inform	 future	 ones. 411	




Hence,	 the	 interrelationship	 between	 adaptive	 management	 and	 policy	 is	





407 	R.	 Gregory,	 D.	 Ohlson	 and	 J.	 Arvai,	 ‘Deconstructing	 Adaptive	 Management:	 Criteria	 for	
Applications	 to	 Environmental	Management’	 [Ecological	 Society	 of	America]	 16	Ecological	















this	 approach	 entails	 incremental	 learning	 but	 should	 not	 be	 considered	
genuine	 adaptive	management.	 Indeed,	 some	 authors	 dismiss	 evolutionary	













the	 decision	 choice	 is	 based	 on	 assuming	 this	model	 is	 correct’.419	A	 “best	
guess”	 hypothesis	 is	 developed,420	usually	 based	on	 policies	 already	 having	
some	degree	of	successful	implementation.421	The	results	are	then	monitored,	
reviewed,	evaluated	and	if	necessary	the	original	hypothesis	and	subsequent	








417 	Doremus,	 ‘Adaptive	 Management,	 the	 Endangered	 Species	 Act,	 and	 the	 Institutional	
Challenges	of	New	Age	Environmental	Protection’	(n68)	53;	Alexander	(n316)	76.	
418	Indeed,	 scientists	 tend	 to	prefer	active	adaptive	management	as	a	way	 to	acquire	more	
information	 in	 less	 time.	 However,	 as	 failed	 attempts	 have	 shown,	 the	 practical	









and	 reactive	 but	 as	 Gregory	 et	 al	 argue	 that	 due	 to	 the	 limited	 extent	 of	
intervention,	 it	makes	 good	sense	when	 there	 is	 a	 degree	 of	 confidence	 on	
ecosystems	 responses. 423 	In	 these	 cases	 the	 outcomes	 of	 the	 monitoring-
evaluation	phases	are	used	by	managers	to	refine	parameter	estimates,	not	to	
identify	 entirely	 new	 techniques.424 	Brommann	 refers	 to	 passive	 adaptive	
management	 as	 ‘sequential	 learning’	 since	 management	 policies	 and	
techniques	 are	 applied	 and	 compared	 sequentially,	 not	 concurrently. 425	
Passive	 adaptive	 management	 is	 more	 formal	 and	 structured	 than	
evolutionary	 adaptive	 management	 but	 contrary	 to	 active	 adaptive	




how	 learning	 through	management	 could	 reduce	 ecological	 uncertainty.427	
Hence,	 learning	 is	useful	 and	well	 appreciated	but	not	 the	primary	 focus	 in	
passive	adaptive	management.	Williams	refers	to	it	as	a	‘useful	but	unintended	
by-product’. 428 	Scientists	 eager	 to	 learn,	 experiment	 and	 acquire	 new	
knowledge	 do	 not	 always	 greet	 passive	 adaptive	 management	 with	 great	
enthusiasm.429	Due	to	the	sequential	application	of	policy	actions,	learning	can	
be	 a	 very	 slow	 process	 with	 questionable	 results	 in	 terms	 of	 advancing	




[...]	 Second,	 passive	 policies	 may	 fail	 to	 detect	 opportunities	 for	























At	 the	 other	 end	 of	 the	 experimentation	 spectrum,	 we	 find	 active	
adaptive	 management.	 Active	 adaptive	 management	 is	 the	 approach	 that	
identifies	more	with	the	methods	of	scientific	investigation.	In	active	adaptive	
management,	 management	 interventions	 deliberately	 aim	 directly	 at	 the	
reduction	 of	 uncertainty	 and	 the	 enhancement	 of	 learning.433	A	 number	 of	
competing	hypotheses	are	constructed	and	then	tested	through	well-designed	
management	 experiments, 434 	which	 are	 subsequently	 monitored	 and	
evaluated.	
Walters	 and	 Holling	 define	 active	 adaptive	 management	 as	 the	
approach	where:	
data	available	at	each	time	are	used	to	structure	a	range	of	alternative	
response	 models,	 and	 a	 policy	 choice	 is	 made	 that	 reflects	 some	
computed	balance	between	expected	short-term	performance	and	long-
term	value	of	knowing	which	alternative	model	(if	any)	is	correct’.435	
























results,	 the	 learning	 that	 occurred	 makes	 management	 at	 least	 partially	
successful,	 since	 the	 feedback	 loop	 that	 follows	 allows	 future	management	
decisions	 to	 begin	 from	 an	 improved	 level	of	understanding.441	This	 is	 also	
true	for	passive	adaptive	management	but	is	even	more	relevant	to	the	active	
approach;	 contrary	 to	 the	 passive	 approach	 where	 the	 management	 cycle	
begins	with	a	‘best	guess’	hypothesis	and	wishful	thinking	that	it	will	indeed	
deliver	 the	anticipated	positive	 results,	 in	active	adaptive	management	 it	 is	




be	 solved. 443 	It	 is	 true	 that	 active	 adaptive	 management,	 through	 the	
simultaneous	 application	 of	 alternative	 hypotheses,	 can	 deliver	 more	
information	 in	 a	 shorter	 time	 than	 passive	 adaptive	management444	and	 is	













practice’.445	However,	 as	will	be	discussed	 in	 the	 following	 section,	 the	high	
degree	of	experimentation	added	to	its	already	technocratic	character	further	
distances	 it	 from	 the	 realm	of	 law	and	policy.	Active	adaptive	management	
finds	it	hard	to	operate	within	regulatory	frameworks.446	On	the	other	hand,	
active	 adaptive	management	 involves	 risks,	which	 in	 the	 context	 of	 nature	
conservation	might	even	entail	endangering	certain	species,	which	leads	us	to	
the	legitimate	question,	why	use	adaptive	management	if	instead	of	benefiting	
biodiversity	 we	 might	 actually	 threaten	 it	 even	 further?	 Active	 adaptive	
management	might	reduce	the	uncertainty	of	the	system	as	a	whole	but	at	the	
expense	of	some	species.447	In	this	respect,	tensions	are	likely	to	arise	between	
adaptive	 management	 and	 substantive	 nature	 conservation	 legislation.	
Indeed,	in	the	United	States	where	adaptive	management	has	been	a	popular	
approach,	 the	 Endangered	 Species	 Act	 has	 often	 been	 an	 insurmountable	
barrier	to	the	implementation	of	adaptive	management.448	On	a	different	note,	
but	in	practice	equally	important,	the	human	and	financial	resources	required	







realm	 of	 law	 and	 policy	 creates	 a	 series	 of	 challenges	 and	 problems	 that	
jeopardize	its	successful	application.	The	following	paragraphs	discuss	some	
of	 the	 reasons	 why	 it	 might	 be	 difficult	 to	 fit	 a	 purely	 scientific	 model	 of	










‘mismatch’	 stems	 both	 from	 the	 ‘scientific’	 and	 the	 ‘adaptive’	 nature	 of	
scientific	adaptive	management.		
	As	 to	 the	 former	 (the	 scientific	 part),	 there	 are	 concerns	 similar	 to	
those	 associated	 with	 technocratic	 decision	 making.	 449 	Scientific	 adaptive	
management	 is	 ill-suited	 to	 address	 conflicts	 of	 values	 and	 interests.450	As	
mentioned	 before,	 nature	 conservation	 decision-making	 is	 about	 choices;	
choices	 of	 what	 to	 conserve	 and	 how	 to	 conserve.	 Scientific	 adaptive	











Many	 environmental	 philosophers	 (Katz,	 1987;	 Elliot,	 1992;	
McShane,2007)	 would	 hold	 that	 to	 reduce	 the	 conservation	 interest,	
merely,	 to	 the	 interests	 of	 conservationists	 would	 be	 at	 best	 to	
undervalue	nature	 and	at	worst	a	 grievous	 travesty.	The	 conservation	
interest	can	only	represent	nature,	they	say,	if	it	views	nature	as,	in	some	
sense,	 having	 a	 value	 in	 its	 own	 right,	 a	 value	 that	 transcends	 the	








the	 special	 relationship	 between	 environmental	 problems	 and	 science,	 the	 debate	 is	 even	
more	relevant	to	the	field	of	environmental	law	and	policy,	hence	the	voluminous	literature	
on	the	subject.	See	i.a	Moritz	Schlick	and	others,	Philosophical	papers.	,	vol	II:	(1925-1936)	






may	well	coincide	with	 the	 ‘conservation	 interests’	but	could	never	be	
identified	with	it.	(…)	As	Katz	(…)	puts	it	‘an	environmental	ethic	cannot	
be	 based	 on	 human	 interests	 because	 of	 the	 contingent	 relationship	
between	human	interests	and	the	welfare	of	the	natural	environment’	451	
That	 the	 interests	 of	 science	 may	 often	 coincide	 with	 but	 are	 not	










on	 it	 had	 been	 published	 at	 the	 time	 the	 site	 was	 threatened	 by	 the	






























the	 law	 to	 adjudicate	 in	 favour	 of	 the	 science.	 But	 as	 mentioned	 in	 the	
previous	chapter,	the	law’s	adversarial	approach	to	conflict	resolution	often	
inflames	conflict	 instead	of	resolving	 it.459	Nevertheless,	 these	concerns	are	






for	 science	 to	 lead	 the	 law	 and	 policy	 of	 nature	 conservation,	 a	 number	 of	
issues	 and	 problems	 arise	 as	 a	 result	 of	 the	 flexibility	 that	 adaptive	
management	 introduces	 to	 environmental	 law	 and	 policy.460	The	 flexibility	
and	 extent	 of	 experimentation	 that	 adaptive	 management	 demands	 is	 not	
exactly	on	the	 ‘best	of	terms’	with	law	and	policy,	either	from	a	practical	or	









and	cons	of	adaptive	management	 in	 relation	 to	environmental	 law	by	Biber	 in	Eric	Biber,	
‘Adaptive	Management	 and	 the	Future	 of	 Environmental	 Law’	 46	Akron	 Law	Review	933.	
Biber,	 ibid	 933,	 in	 line	 with	 Doremus	 argues	 that	 the	 question	 of	 whether	 adaptive	
management	should	adapt	to	environmental	law	or	vice	versa	has	not	been	explored	in	depth	


















In	 order	 to	 effectively	 integrate	 science	 and	 management,	 it	 is	
reasonable	to	expect	that	an	adaptive	management	plan	matches	the	temporal	
scale	 or	 scales	 at	 which	 ecological	 processes	 operate,	 or	 the	 scale	 of	 the	









461	Carl	Brush,	 ‘Adaptive	Water	Management:	Strengthening	Laws	and	 Institutions	 to	Cope	













scales	 involved:	 while	 certain	 natural	 processes	 operate	 in	 timeframes	
spanning	 over	 years,	 even	 decades,	 political	 and	 budgetary	 timeframes	 are	
typically	short-	term.466			
On	the	one	hand,	a	management	plan	will	most	likely	include	multiple	
cycles	 before	 providing	 substantive	 information	 that	 can	 be	 used	 to	 guide	
policy	decisions.467	However,	the	culture	of	political	systems	to	date	dictates	a	
much	shorter	 time	scale	and	short-term	goals	and	objectives.468	As	a	result,	
adaptive	 management	 cycles	 will	 unfold	 over	 the	 5-15	 years	 of	 a	 policy	














the	 South	 Island	 Tussock	 Grasslands	 of	 New	 Zealand.’	 in	 Catherine	 Allan	 and	 George	 H.	
Stankey	 (eds),	 Adaptive	 Environmental	 Management	 :	 A	 Practitioner's	 Guide	 (Springer	
Science	 &	 Business	 Media	 2009)	 96;	 See	 also	 Doremus,	 ‘Adaptive	 Management,	 the	
Endangered	 Species	 Act,	 and	 the	 Institutional	 Challenges	 of	 New	 Age	 Environmental	
Protection’	(n68)	67,		citing	Volkam	and	McConnaha,	two	insiders		at	the	Northwest	Power	
Planning	Council,	 arguing	 that	 robust	experimentation	 is	 i.a.	hindered	by	 the	 fact	 that	 ‘the	
political	system	operates	on	a	much	shorter	time	scale	than	that	needed	to	generate	firm	data’.	
























Lastly,	 there	 are	 those	 which	 have	 been	 ‘artificially	 squeezed	 into	 shorter	
frames’; 477 	on	 paper	 they	 are	 successful	 since	 all	 the	 steps	 of	 adaptive	





literature	 as	 a	 form	 of	 management	 where	 results	 are	 monitored,	 and	
adjustments	made	to	decisions	to	reflect	new	information.	As	a	result,	in	order	
to	take	full	advantage	of	its	promise	and	make	effective	use	of	any	updates	in	





















adaptive	 management, 480 	which	 entails	 delegation	 of	 power	 to	 the	
administration	 and	 very	 broad	 discretion	 coupled	 with	 judicial	 deference	
regarding	both	procedural	and	substantive	legal	requirements.		
More	specifically,	the	incredibly	strict	legislation	on	species	protection	
places	 significant	 constraints	 on	 experimental	 adaptive	 management	
practices. 481 	On	 the	 other	 hand,	 procedural	 requirements	 such	 as	 impact	
assessments	 before	 the	 modification	 of	 every	 decision, 482 	as	 well	 as	
requirements	 for	public	participation,	slow	down	the	procedure	and	hinder	
the	 implementation	 of	 adaptive	management	 –	 at	 least	 in	 its	 experimental	
form.483			
Hence,	 in	 order	 to	 operate,	 adaptive	 management	 needs	 a	 non-
prescriptive,	 flexible	 legislative	 and	 regulatory	 framework	 as	well	 as	 some	
degree	of	judicial	deference.	There	are	two	sources	of	concern	in	relation	to	










479 	Doremus,	 ‘Adaptive	 Management,	 the	 Endangered	 Species	 Act,	 and	 the	 Institutional	
Challenges	of	New	Age	Environmental	Protection’	(n68)	86.	
480	Thrower	(n140)	887.	
481	Bryant	 (n463);	 Doremus,	 ‘Adaptive	Management,	 the	Endangered	 Species	 Act,	 and	 the	
Institutional	Challenges	of	New	Age	Environmental	Protection’	(n68)	78.	
482	Melinda	Harm	Benson	and	Courtney	Schultz,	‘Adaptive	Management	and	Law’	in	C.R.	Allen	










quickly.’485	However,	 some	 environmental	 problems	 are	more	 pressing	 and	











legal	 regimes	 can	 be	 reformed	 to	 accommodate	 flexibility	 and	 account	 for	




need	 to	 be	 reviewed	 after	 a	 given	 period	 of	 time, 491 	or	 in	 fix-termed	












contribution	 of	 point	 source	 to	 the	Gulf	 of	Mexico,	 requires	 existing	 discharge	 permits	 to	
include	monitoring	and	reporting	requirements.	Imposing	however	this	new	condition	would	






sections	on	 a	mismatch	 between	 ecological	 and	 political	 timescales,	 having	
fixed	renewal	periods	(e.g	every	five	years)	can	be	excessively	problematic	in	
cases	where	 the	 implementation	 of	 a	 plan	would	 require	 imposing	 new	or	
amending	 existing	 conditions	 on	 permits	 still	 valid	 at	 the	 time	 of	






appropriate	 option	 for	 rare	 ecosystems	 where	 a	 potential	 failure	 of	
management	 will	 have	 dire	 and	 highly	 irreversible	 impacts’.493	In	 cases	 of	
decisions	with	severe	and	irreversible	impacts	(for	instance,	deforestation	of	
large	 area	 or	 decisions	 that	 involve	 the	 last	 remaining	 examples	 of	 an	
endangered	 species494)	 the	 suitability	 of	 scientific	 adaptive	management	 is	




much	more	 flexible	 and	 thus,	more	 ‘adaptive	management	 friendly’.	 	 The	 ‘Environmental	





or	 other	 relevant	 issues’.	 See	 Food	 and	 Rural	 Affairs	 Department	 of	 Environment,	













Likewise,	 the	 use	 of	 incremental	 decision-making	 in	 cases	 of	
irreversible	investment	decisions	is	questionable.496	In	these	cases	a	degree	of	



















down	 versions	 of	 adaptive	 management	 such	 as	 the	 introduction	 of	 ‘pre-






496 	Doremus,	 ‘Adaptive	 Management,	 the	 Endangered	 Species	 Act,	 and	 the	 Institutional	
Challenges	of	New	Age	Environmental	Protection’	(n68)	87.	
497	Biber,	‘Adaptive	Management	and	the	Future	of	Environmental	Law’	(n460)	942.	
498 	Doremus,	 ‘Adaptive	 Management,	 the	 Endangered	 Species	 Act,	 and	 the	 Institutional	
Challenges	of	New	Age	Environmental	Protection’	(n68)	85.	








Without	 the	 safeguards	 of	 judicial	 review,	 adaptive	 management	
methods	challenge	the	rule	of	law,	a	fundamental	principle	of	the	legal	system	
that	mitigates	against	arbitrary	decision-making.	As	Karkkainen	observes:	
It	 displaces	 fragmentary	 fixed	 rules	 with	 integrative	 science	 and	
management	predicated	on	a	continuous	process	of	experimentation	and	
mutually	informed	readjustment	of	both	goals	and	means.	This	process	







discretionary	 powers	 that	 render	 administrative	 decisions	 non-reviewable,	
but	it	also	raises	questions	of	accountability	and	conformity	with	the	rule	of	
law.	502	Wide	 discretion	 and	 flexible	 decision-making	 making,	 if	 not	 wisely	
exercised	 by	 the	 administration,	 render	 decisions	 susceptible	 to	 political	
influence	 and	 adaptive	 management	 becomes,	 as	 Doremus	 calls	 it,	 a	




















Perhaps	 the	 strongest	 element	 of	 adaptive	 management	 is	 its	
underpinning	 philosophy:	 that	 ecosystems	 are	 complex,	 and	 science	 is	
uncertain;	and	these	two	statements	should	guide	decision-making.	Adaptive	
management	as	large-scale	management	experiments,	although	they	would	be	
much	 appreciated	 by	 the	 scientific	 community,	 will	 be	 very	 difficult	 to	
implement	in	practice	-	at	least	not	in	the	technocratic	form	discussed	above	-	
due	 to	 a	 combination	 of	 legal,	 institutional	 and	 practical	 factors.	 Without	















non-equilibrium	 paradigm	 c)	 research,	 learning	 and	 experimentation	 d)	
flexibility	and	iterative	decision	making.	
The	 following	 chapter	 seeks	 to	 trace	 these	 elements	 in	 the	 nature	



















of	 adaptive	 management	 within	 nature	 conservation	 law	 and	 policy	 in	
England.	The	analysis	takes	place	against	the	four	general,	but	integral	themes	
identified	 in	 the	 previous	 chapter,	which	 reflect	 both	 the	 scientific	 and	 the	
adaptive	end	of	adaptive	management:		a)	adherence	to	science	as	a	primary	
driver	 of	 nature	 conservation	 decision-making	 b)	 adherence	 to	 the	 non-
equilibrium	paradigm	c)	a	focus	on	learning	and	experimentation	d)	flexibility	
and	 iterative	decision	making.	The	extent	 to	which	these	elements	occur	or	
may	 occur	within	 the	 English	 conservation	 regime	 is	 directly	 linked	 to	 the	
extent	to	which	adaptive	management	occurs	(or	has	the	potential	to	occur)	
regardless	of	whether	there	are	explicit	references	to	the	term.				
An	 essential	 prerequisite	 for	 the	 implementation	 of	 adaptive	
management	 is	 that	 science	 has	 a	 central	 role	 within	 the	 decision-making	
process	and	decisions	are	the	ultimate	outcome	of	a	dialectical	relationship	
between	scientists	and	decision-makers.	Science	can	acquire	a	decisive	role	in	
management	 in	 various	 ways	 inter	 alia:	 a)	 through	 legislation	 b)	 as	 the	
outcome	 of	 an	 agreement	 between	 decision-makers	 and	 representatives	 of	
other	interests505	c)	land	acquisition	by	conservation	NGOs,	Natural	England	
or	anyone	willing	to	manage	according	to	science-based	recommendations.		
This	 section	 argues	 that	 English	 nature	 conservation	 law	 and	 policy	
framework	is	indeed	permeated	by	science,	scientific	knowledge	and	technical	
expertise.	 	 Among	 the	 competing	 values	 and	 interests,	 the	 legislator	 has	
chosen	to	give	science	and	subsequently	scientists,	a	decisive	and	critical	role.	
Science	 is	 being	 used	 both	 as	 a	 basis	 for	 justifying	 and	 legitimizing	 nature	
conservation	 (guiding	 decisions	 on	 what	 to	 conserve)	 and	 as	 means	 of	
protection	(advising	on	how	to	protect	it).		
																																																								





	The	 first	 section	 of	 the	 chapter	 traces	 how	 science	 has	 shaped	 and	
continues	 to	 shape	 nature	 conservation	 decision-making.	More	 specifically,	
the	analysis	reveals	three	different	types	of	administrative	decision-making,	
entirely	 or	 largely	 driven	 by	 science	 a)	 protected	 site	 designation	 and	
management506	b)	 design	 of	 agri-environment	management	 options	 and	 c)	
impact	assessments507	that	are	to	be	found	at	different	stages	of	management:		
Site	designation	(or	non-designation)	relates	to	the	question	of	‘what’	





heavily	 scientific	but	 contrary	 to	 the	management	of	designated	 sites,	 their	
implementation	 depends	 on	 being	 accepted	 rather	 than	 enforced	 to	 the	
regulated.508	
	Impact	 assessments	 are	 multi-tiered	well-structured	 processes	 that	
differ	 greatly	 depending	 on	 whether	 the	 land	 in	 question	 is	 a	 European	
Designation	or	not:	these	are	the	Environmental	Impact	Assessment	(EIA),509	
the	 Strategic	 Environmental	 Assessment	 (SEA) 510 	and	 the	 Appropriate	
																																																								




of	 the	 interaction	of	 scientific	and	collaborative	management.	Science	shapes	management	
























Having	 established	 a	 scientific	 approach	 to	 nature	 conservation,	
Chapter	4	continues	to	trace	the	adaptive	capacity	of	the	legal	and	regulatory	
framework.		The	aim	of	this	exploration	is	not	to	examine	the	existence,	or	lack	
thereof,	 of	 well-structured	management	 experiments	 but	 rather	 to	 identify	
elements	 reflecting	the	basic	principles	of	 adaptive	management	within	 the	
legal	and	regulatory	framework.	As	Bruch	stresses:	
	the	 conceptual	 framework	 for	 adaptive	 management	 is	 fairly	 basic,	
whether	 articulated	 in	 legal	 frameworks,	 institutional	 mandates	 or	
management	practices.	Within	a	particular	context	or	problem,	the	initial	
response	is	developed;	this	may	be	a	law,	regulation	permit	and	so	on.	
This	 response	 is	 understood	 to	 be	 provisional,	 due	 to	 the	 limited	
information	that	is	available.512			
Before	 going	 into	 the	 specifics,	 I	would	 like	 to	 introduce	 some	basic	
features	 and	 background	 characteristics	 of	 English	 regulatory	 landscape	 -	




both	 models	 of	 adaptive	 management, 513 	since	 it	 conveys	 the	 general	
																																																								














D.	Vogel	describes	 the	 ‘British	government’s	distinctive	approach’	 to	





enforcement	 strategy,	 considerable	 administrative	 discretion,	
decentralized	 implementation,	 close	 co-operation	 between	 regulators	











The	 administration	 of	 environmental	 law	 in	 England	 draws	 upon	
elements	 from	 the	 centralisation	 and	 decentralisation	 models	 of	
administration.515	Although	in	recent	years	there	has	been	a	tendency	towards	









administration	 is	 for	 the	most	part	decentralised.	Several	regulatory	bodies	
(Natural	England,	the	Environment	Agency,	the	Forest	Commission,	Internal	
Drainage	Boards,	National	 Park	 authorities	 etc)	 and	 local	 authorities517	are	
entrusted	 with	 the	 task	 of	 administering	 environmental	 law	 and	 policy	 in	
England.		
Additionally,	 non-governmental	 organisations,	 that	 surely	 do	 not	
possess	 decision	 making	 authority,	 have	 a	 crucial	 and	 substantial	 role	 in	
securing	environmental	protection:	besides	their	historical	contribution	to	the	
rise	 of	 nature	 conservation	 movement, 518 	the	 lobbying	 of	 government	
departments,	 their	 campaigning	 towards	 new	 legislation	 and	 the	 practical	
implementation	 of	 conservation	 management	 through	 their	 extensive	
network	 of	 privately	 owned	 nature	 reserves	 and	 of	 volunteers,	 specialised	




main	 arguments	 in	 favour	 of	 decentralisation.520	The	 distribution	 of	 power	
and	 the	 sharing	of	 responsibilities	 among	 the	 different	 actors	 of	 public	 life	
																																																								
517	For	 instance,	 local	 authorities	 are	 responsible	 for	 town	 planning	 under	 the	 Town	 and	
Country	Planning	Act	1990	2	and	the	designation	and	management	of	Local	Nature	Reserves	
under	s.21	of	the	NPCA	1949.	
























conservation	 management.	 Also,	 it	 allows	 for	 better	 representation	 of	 the	











The	 argument	 for	 decentralization	 is	 even	 more	 relevant	 to	 nature	
conservation	than	it	is	to	other	policies,	especially	since	management	needs	to	
address	 ecological	 complexity,	 resolve	 conflict	 and	 build	 consensus.	Nature	
conservation	 policy	 is	 implemented	 in	 a	 particular	 geographical	 area	 with	
specific,	often	unique,	and	with	complex	ecological	and	social	characteristics:	

















central	 administration,	 officials	working	 at	 the	 local	 level	 are	 familiar	with	










rather	be	an	 indication	of	 an	 endeavour	 to	adjust	 regulation	 to	 the	 specific	
circumstances	of	a	problem.	 In	this	context,	diversity	differs	markedly	 from	
the	 fragmentation	and	proliferation	of	 legislation	 in	 the	 sense	 that	 it	 is	not	
about	 ten	different	 statutes	aimed	 at	 species	 protection,	or	 the	adoption	of	
several	 different	 policies	 on	 water,	 air	 or	 biodiversity.	 It	 is	 about	 a	
diversification	 of	 regulatory	 instruments	 available	 to	 the	 legislator	 and	 the	
competent	authorities.		
	The	 wide	 array	 of	 available	 methods	 reflects	 what	 reflexive	 legal	






524UKELA,	 King’s	 College	 London	 and	 Cardiff	 University,	 The	 State	 of	 UK	 Environmental	













and	 coercion,	 adopted	 at	 the	 beginning	 of	 the	 20th	 century	 to	 tackle	 air	












as	 charges,	 subsidies,	 grants	 and	 linked	 payments,	 trading	 schemes	 and	
deposit	and	refund	schemes.531	
																																																								






political?	 -a	Scandinavian	 case	 (Lyngby,	Denmark:	Working	Paper,	Technical	University	 of	
Denmark,	1996)	cited	in	N.	Gunningham,	‘Environmental	Regulation	and	Non-State	Law:	the	
future	 public	 policy	 agenda’	 in	 Hanneke	 Van	 Schooten	 and	 Jonathan	 Verschuuren	 (eds),	






Bell	et	al	 (n515)	262,	 fall	within	self-regulatory	mechanism.	Likewise,	certain	 instruments	









can	 be	 tailored	 to	 specific	 policy	 goals	 and	 as	 reflexive	 theory	 suggests,	
provides	a	source	of	alternative	legal	strategies	depending	on	the	nature	of	the	
issue	 in	 question.	 Accordingly,	 biodiversity	 conservation	 objectives	 can	 be	
realized	through	a	combination	of	tools	that	address	different	aspects	of	the	
problem	but	also	the	different	needs	of	those	involved	and	sharing	a	common	
objective:	 the	 conservation	 of	 nature.	 The	 building	 materials	 for	 the	











physiographic	 features’.533	As	will	be	discussed	 further	on,	 these	provisions	
exemplify	 administrative,	 prescriptive	 and	 highly	 technocratic	 legislation.	
However,	 more	 careful	 examination	 suggests	 that	 there	 are	 several	
characteristics	 of	 environmental	 law	 strongly	 indicating	 that	 the	 English	
regime	 is	 not	 so	 cumbersome	 but	 instead,	 capable	 of	 encouraging	 flexible	












standards	 and	 quality	 standards	 -	 UK	 law	 opts	 for	 the	 latter. 534 	Pollution	
control	 is	 a	 classic	 example	 of	 direct	 state	 intervention	 through	 standards	
setting.	 The	 British	 approach	 shows	 a	 preference	 of	 quality-oriented	 rules	
over	 emission	 standards	 that	 allow	 for	 considerable	 flexibility	 -	 within	 the	
limitations	of	command	and	control	regulation.535		
I	do	not	intend	to	explore	the	long-term	discourse	on	emission	v	quality	
standards;	 this	debate	has	been	 very	well	documented	and	analysed	 in	 the	













prescribes	 the	 ‘end’	 -	 adequate	 environmental	 quality	 -	 rather	 than	 the	
‘means’. 538 	The	 goals	 set	 outline	 the	 framework	 for	 administrative	 action.	
Hence,	although	a	legally	binding	objective	is	set,	it	allows	for	flexibility	-	and	
perhaps	 adaptive	 experimentation	 -	 regarding	 ‘how’	 these	 objectives	 are	
reached.	 By	 focusing	 on	 the	 ‘end’,	 quality	 standards	 are	 able	 to	 ‘deal	 with	
inputs	 to	 the	 environment	 from	 all	 sources	 and	 via	 all	 potential	 pathways	
																																																								
534	G.	Lübbe-Wolff,	‘Efficient	environmental	legislation	-	on	different	philosophies	of	pollution	










(and)	 cater	 for	 potentially	 harmful	 combinations	 of	 substances	 on	 the	
environment’ 539 	and	 are	 therefore	 arguably	 better	 suited	 to	 account	 for	
ecosystem	complexity.		Quality	standards	setting	further	allows	for	decisions	
to	be	tailored	to	local	conditions.	The	standards	themselves	may	also	vary	by	
being,	 for	 example,	 stricter	 in	 biodiversity	 opportunity	 areas. 540 	Ecology	
teaches	us	that	no	two	ecosystems	are	alike,	thus,	it	is	very	important	to	have	




Substantive	 flexibility	 is	 further	 reflected	 in	 the	 use	 of	 intentionally	
open-ended	and	vague	definitions.541	Concepts	such	as	‘best	practical	means’,	
‘best	 available	 techniques’,	 ‘good	 water	 status’,	 ‘significant	 effects’,	
‘environmental	damage’	are	not	precisely	defined	in	legislation,	leaving	their	
interpretation	 at	 the	 discretion	 of	 administrative	 authorities.	 Often	 the	
discretion	given	to	decision-makers	is	restricted	by	guidance	documents	and	
circulars	 published	 in	 order	 to	 clarify	 and	 articulate	 open-ended	 concepts.	
Although,	 in	 theory	 these	documents	 lack	any	 legally	binding	 force	and	are	




and	 promote	 uniformity	 in	 the	 implementation	 of	 the	 EU	 law	 among	 the	
Member	States.542	
Nevertheless,	 the	 administration’s	 discretion	 in	 relation	 to	 the	




541Maria	 Lee,	 EU	 environmental	 law:	 challenges,	 change	 and	 decision-making	 	 (Hart	 Pub.	
2005)	86;	Bell,	McGillivray	and	Pedersen	(n515)	97.	






of	 the	 ECJ/CJEU	 case	 law,	 English	 courts	 engaged	 themselves	 with	 further	
definition	of	open-ended	concepts,544	they	have	reiterated	many	times	that	the	




A	 notable	 characteristic	 of	 the	 UK	 approach	 to	 environmental	
legislation	 is	 the	 wide	 discretionary	 powers	 that	 are	 afforded	 the	
administration	 through	 the	 use	 of	 legislative	 delegation, 546 	the	 lack	 of	
extensively	prescriptive	 legislation547	coupled	with	 judicial	deference.	Given	
the	highly	technical	nature	of	environmental	regulation,	the	parliament	lacks	
the	 knowledge	 and	 expertise	 required	 to	 formulate	 specific	 rules	 and	
























The	 importance	 of	 delegated	 legislation	 and	 wide	 administrative	
discretion	is	enormous	for	adaptive	management	and	I	will	return	to	it	several	
times	 in	 the	 discussion.	 The	 practice	 of	 non-prescriptive	 rules	 allows	 for	
efficient	 regulatory	 updates,	without	 the	 need	 to	 initiate	 full	 parliamentary	
procedures	 every	 time	 new	 data	 emerge.	 Additionally,	 the	wide	 discretion	




off’	 approach	to	decisions	 challenged	 in	 judicial	 review;	 courts	 traditionally	
refrain	from	substituting	their	judgement	for	that	of	the	decision-maker	unless	
the	principle	of	Wednesbury	unreasonableness	applies.550	However,	 judicial	
deference	 can	 be	 a	 double-edged	 sword	 for	 flexible	 decision	 making.	
Depending	 on	 how	 the	 administration	 exercises	 its	 discretionary	 powers,	
judicial	 deference	 may	 underpin	 flexibility-	 as	 it	 allows	 for	 tailor-made	
decision-making	 procedures	 -	 or	 reinforce	 the	 technocratic	 character	 of	
administrative	 environmental	 decision-making.	 That	 would	 be	 the	 case	 of	
horizontal,	inflexible	decision	making	on	behalf	of	the	administration,	which	
without	judicial	scrutiny	carries	the	risk	of	abuse	of	executive	power	
This	 section	 discussed	 certain	 characteristics	 of	 the	 UK	 approach	 to	
environmental	law	that	are	relevant	to	adaptive	management,	as	they	create	
conditions	conducive	to	its	implementation	by	attaching	flexibility	to	decision-

















plays	 a	 decisive	 role	 in	 nature	 conservation	 decision	making.	 As	 explained	




Any	approach	 that	 emphasizes	 science	 could	 find	 its	way	 into	English	
nature	 conservation	 law	 and	 policy,	 which	 is	 not	 unfamiliar	 to	 the	 idea	 of	
placing	 science	at	 the	heart	of	nature	 conservation.	 Science	has	a	 twin	 role	
within	 the	 English	 legal	 framework	 for	 nature	 conservation:	 scientific	
information	is	used	to	justify	what	is	worthy	of	the	law’s	protection,	to	justify	
and	 legitimise	 the	 imposition	 of	 restrictions	 to	 human	 activities;	 scientific	
information	is	also	used	to	guide	and	support	management	activities.	Rodgers	
comments	on	the	relationship	between	science	and	nature	conservation	law:		
the	 law	 also	 sits	 (perhaps	 uncomfortably)	 at	 the	 interface	 between	
conservation	science	and	 environmental	 management.	 The	 content	 of	
biodiversity	 action	 plans,	 the	 site	 management	 requirements	 for	
protected	areas,	and	the	assessment	of	the	vulnerability	or	otherwise	of	
endangered	species,	are	all	matters	for	the	environmental	scientist,	not	
the	 lawyer.	 Once	 appropriate	 strategies	 have	 been	 devised,	 based	 on	
sound	scientific	evaluation	of	the	needs	and	requirements	of	ecosystems	
and	 species,	 however,	 it	 is	 for	 the	 law	 to	 clothe	 them	 in	 legal	
enforceability	in	order	to	ensure	that	wildlife	is	appropriately	protected,	
and	biodiversity	promoted.551		
An	 idea	 that	 runs	 through	 this	 thesis	 is	 that	 even	 within	 statutory	
protected	sites,	the	influence	of	scientific	expertise	weakens	towards	the	later	












If	 there	 is	one	 procedure	within	 nature	 conservation	 law	 and	 policy	
that	is	inherently	and	entirely	technocratic,	sealed	from	the	influences	of	other	




nature.	 As	 such,	 it	 provides	 justification	 for	 legislation	 to	 prioritise,	 within	
these	 areas,	 the	 interests	 of	 conservation	 as	 opposed	 to	 private	 or	 social	
interests.555			
4.2.1.1 Sites	of	Special	Scientific	Interest	
Sites	 of	 Special	 Scientific	 Interest	 (SSSI)	 are	 the	 primary	 domestic	
statutory	nature	conservation	designation	in	England.556	The	SSSIs	represent	






the	Past’	 (1997)	40	 Journal	of	Environmental	Planning	and	Management	81	 for	a	detailed	
review	of	land	designations.	The	authors	discuss	the	complex	mosaic	of	UK	land	designations	
under	 a	 broad	 understanding	 as	 ‘an	 area	 of	 land	 and/or	 sea	 especially	 dedicated	 to	 the	
protection	and	management	of	scenic,	wildlife,	heritage	and/or	other	environmental	value’.	









are	 subject	 to	 several	 restrictions	 imposed	 by	 Natural	 England	 as	 result	 of	 their	 legal	
designation.	 (WCA	1981,	 s.28E);	 The	 discussion	 focuses	 on	 SSSIs	 for	 two	 reasons:	a)	 that	
almost	all	NNRs	are	also	designated	SSSIs	(see	infra	n561)	b)	since	SSSIs	remain	under	their	
owner’s	 control,	 conservation	 interests	 co-exist	 with	 other	 land	 uses,	 mainly	 agriculture,	
which	makes	the	discussion	relevant	to	collaborative	models	of	adaptive	management.	
557	95%	of	National	Nature	Reserves	are	also	designated	as	SSSIs.	Natural	England,	Natural	







the	diversity	 and	geographic	 range	of	 habitats,	 species,	 and	geological	
and	 physiographical	 features,	 including	 the	 full	 range	 of	 natural	 and	
semi-	 natural	 ecosystems	 and	 of	 important	 geological	 and	
physiographical	 phenomena	 throughout	 England.	 The	 sites	 included	
within	the	series	of	SSSIs	are	intended	collectively	to	comprise	the	full	
range	 of	 natural	 and	 semi-natural	 habitats	 and	 the	 most	 important	
geological	 and	 physiographic	 sites.	 The	 SSSI	 series	 should	 therefore	
include	all	of	our	most	valuable	nature	conservation	and	earth	heritage	
sites,	 selected	 on	 the	 basis	 of	 well-established	 and	 publicly	 available	
scientific	criteria.558		
As	their	name	and	the	purpose	statement	suggest,	selection	is	made	on	




Where	 Natural	 England	 are	 of	 the	 opinion	 that	 any	 area	 of	 land	 is	 of	





The	 original	 notification	 is	 followed	 by	 its	 confirmation.	 Following	
representations	 and	 objections,	 Natural	 England	 is	 required	 to	 either	
withdraw	 the	 notification	 or	 confirm	 it	 within	 9	 months,	 with	 or	 without	
modifications.	560	
																																																								
Protection	 SSSIs	 Areas	 and	 Special	 Areas	 of	 Conservation	 under	 the	 Birds	 and	 Habitats	
Directive	 respectively	 and	Ramsar	 Sites	are	also	 designated	as	 SSSIs	 See	Natural	 England,	
Protecting	England's	Natural	Treasures:	Sites	of	Special	Scientific	Interest	(2011).	










Biological	 SSSI	 is	 the	 product	 of	 long-term	 continuous	 scientific	 research	
having	 its	 origins	 as	 early	 as	 the	 beginning	 of	 the	 20th	 century. 562 		 The	
Guidelines	do	not	bind	Natural	England	which,	in	line	with	what	was	discussed	
in	the	previous	section,	is	afforded	wide	discretion	in	assessing	the	scientific	
value	 of	 the	 site	 when	 exercising	 its	 duty	 of	 notification. 563 	Science	 does	
underpin	 the	 designation	process;	 but	 it	 is	 not	 a	 positivist	 science.	Natural	
England	staff:	




What	 is	a	distinctive	 feature	of	 the	notification	procedure,	 is	 the	 fact	
that	it	establishes	a	‘duty’	for	Natural	England	to	notify,	thereby	limiting	the	
agency’s	 discretion.	 As	 a	 result,	whereas	 Natural	 England	 has	 considerable	
discretion	 in	 assessing	 the	 scientific	 value	 of	 a	 site,	 if	 it	 feels	 the	 scientific	
criteria	have	been	met	 it	must	notify.565	This	has	been	 the	 court’s	 ruling	 in	
Fisher	v.	English	Nature	in	which	Lightman	J	held	that:	‘Section	28(1)	affords	
scope	 for	 judgment:	 it	 affords	 no	 scope	 for	 discretion’.566	As	 to	 the	 body’s	
discretion	 in	 relation	 to	 confirmation,	 Lightman	 J	 stresses	 that	 if	 Natural	
England	continues	to	be	of	the	opinion	that	the	criteria	for	designating	the	site	



























the	 basis	 of	 other	 considerations	 such	 as	more	 effective	 protection	 or	 less	
interference	 with	 property	 rights,	 the	 conclusion	 of	 voluntary	 agreements	
with	landowners	or	by	classification	of	the	area	as	a	SPA.568		
The	 discretion	 given	 to	 Natural	 England	 in	 exercising	 its	 scientific	
Judgement,	 coupled	with	 the	 courts’	 reluctance	 to	 rule	 on	 technical	 issues,	
means	 that	 upholding	 a	 challenge	 against	 a	 notification	 decision	 is	 rather	
unlikely.	The	courts	have	repeatedly	stressed	and	recognised	the	conservation	
body’s	expertise	on	technical	issues:	In	Aggregate	v.	English	Nature	Forbes	J	
stresses	 that	 the	 notification	 of	 a	 SSSI	 is	 a	 technical	 undertaking	 a	 task	 for	
which	English	Nature	is	better	qualified	than	the	court.569		In	Boyd	v.	English	
Nature	the	court	held	that	the	claimants	grounds	were	a	challenge	to	English	
Nature’s	 finding	 of	 ‘fact,	 degree	 and	 expert	 judgement’	 for	 which	 the	
















expert	 advice. 570 	In	 Western	 Power	 Distribution,	 when	 presented	 with	
conflicting	 scientific	 evidence	 the	 court	 abstained	 from	 entering	 into	 the	
scientific	issues	and	deciding	which	evidence	is	better.	The	court	held	that	as	
experts	on	technical	matters,	the	conservation	body	is	entitled	to	trust	its	own	
scientific	 evidence	 and	 conclusions	 over	 external	 scientific	 information	
presented	before	it,	unless	obviously	ridiculous.571	














Special	 Protection	 Areas	 (SPAs)	 and	 Special	 Areas	 of	 Conservation	
(SACs)	 are	 land	 designations	 made	 under	 the	 Wild	 Birds 573 	and	 Habitats	



















importance.576 	The	 regime	 is	 more	 prescriptive	 than	 the	 one	 on	 domestic	
designations	given	the	attachment	of	Annexes	laying	down	habitats	types	and	





More	 specifically,	under	 the	Birds	Directive,	Member	States	are	 required	 to	
designate	 the	 most	 suitable	 territories	 in	 number	 and	 in	 size	 as	 Special	
Protection	 Areas	 for	 rare	 and	 vulnerable	 birds	 as	 listed	 in	 Annex	 I	 of	 the	





territories’,	 both	 in	 number	 and	 surface	 area,	 are	 designated.580	In	 several	
occasions	the	Court	has	emphasized	that	designation	is	to	be	carried	out	on	
the	 basis	 of	 ornithological	 criteria	 and	 any	 economic	 	 and	 recreational	


















Following	 this	 strict	 approach	 the	 Court	 has	 considered	 as	 irrelevant,	
considerations	 such	 as	 the	 practice	 of	 other	 Member	 States, 582 	urban	
development583	and	administrative	boundaries,584	that	areas	in	other	Member	
States	would	be	more	appropriate	for	conservation	of	the	same	species.585	The	
Court	has	also	held	 that	 the	existence	of	other	 conservation	measures	does	




date	scientific	 information.587	The	 	 Inventory	of	 Important	Bird	Areas	in	 the	
European	 Community	 (IBA) 588 	is	 a	 1989	 study	 that	 contains	 scientific	
evidence	to	be	used	as	a	reference	in	order	to	assess	whether	a	Member	State	
has	complied	with	its	obligation	to	classify	as	special	protection	areas	the	most	


















Continental	 Section.,	 Important	 bird	 areas	 in	 Europe	 (International	 Council	 for	 Bird	
Preservation	1989);	The	first	European	Inventory	was	drawn	in	1989	by	Birdlife	International	
and	a	second	was	published	in	2000.	Alongside	the	regional	publications	a	number	of	national	
inventories	 have	 been	 produced	 and	 published	 by	 national	 Birdlife	 Partners	 under	 the	
auspices	of	the	latter.		Failure	to	consider	the	evidence	by	either	the	most	up-to-date	IBA	2000	
or	the	national	inventories	revising	the	IBA	89	by	Member	States	has	been	a	source	of	conflict	





species. 589 	However,	 the	 Inventory	 is	 not	 legally	 binding	 neither	 does	 it	






A	 striking	 difference	 between	 the	 two	 European	 designations	 is	 the	
Commission’s	decisive	role,	it	being	the	one	which	composes	the	final	list	of	
Sites	 of	 Community	 Importance	 (SCIs)	 from	 a	 list	 with	 proposed	 sites	
submitted	by	Members	States,	in	agreement	with	the	latter.592	Like	its	sister	
SPA	 designation,	 that	 of	 SACs	 is	 also	 a	 scientific	 exercise	 based	 on	 the	
ecological	criteria	laid	down	in	ANNEX	III	of	the	Habitats	Directive.593		
The	 Commission’s	 key	 role	 in	 the	 process	 is	 essential	 for	 achieving	 an	
ambitious	and	cutting	edge	–	especially	at	the	time	of	adoption	-	objective	that	
reflects	the	ideas	of	the	non-equilibrium	paradigm	discussed	in	Chapter	2	on	




species	 listed	 in	 Annex	 II.	 	 That	 network	 shall	 enable	 these	 habitats	 to	 be	
maintained	 or,	 where	 appropriate,	 restored	 at	 a	 favourable	 conservation	
status	 in	 their	 natural	 range.594		 The	 objective	 of	 creating	 the	Natura	 2000	
network	underlies	the	designation	procedure.		
More	 specifically,	 during	 the	 first	 stage	 of	 the	 process,	 Member	 States	
																																																								



















Member	 State,	 with	 a	 view	 to	 ensuring	 the	 coherence	 and	






the	natural	habitat	 types	 listed	 in	Annex	I	and	all	 the	species'	
habitats	 listed	 in	 Annex	 II	 to	 the	 Directive	which	 exist	 on	 its	
territory.	
The	 CJEU	 in	multiple	 occasions	 has	 stressed	 that	 the	 nomination	 of	
candidate	 SACs	 should	 only	 be	 made	 on	 scientific	 grounds	 and	 art.2(3)	




596	Case	C-67/99	Commission	of	 the	European	Communities	v	 Ireland	 [2001]	ECR	I-05757	
[29];	 C-71/99	 Commission	 of	 the	 European	 Communities	 v	 Federal	 Republic	 of	 Germany	














the	 Commission	 and/or	when	defining	 the	 boundaries	 of	 such	 sites.598	The	
reasoning	 of	 the	 Court	 had	 been	 that	 to	 realise	 the	 art.3(1)	 objective	 of	 a	
coherent	 European	 ecological	 network	 of	 SACs,	 the	 Commission	must	 have	
available	 an	 exhaustive	 list	 of	 all	 eligible	 sites. 599 	Given	 the	 art.3(1)	




contribute	 to	 the	 establishment	 of	 the	 Natura	 2000	 network.601 		 Member	
States	given	that	they	lack	information	about	other	Member	States’	territories,	
are	not	well-equipped	to	make	such	determinations,	hence	the	Commission’s	
central	 role	 in	 the	 process. 602 	Thus,	 by	 not	 including	 eligible	 sites	 in	 the	








status	 etc.	 This	 requirement	 might	 indicate	 that	 economic	 considerations	 are	 likely	 to	




























































assessment,	 the	 Commission	 is	 assisted	 by	 the	 European	 Topic	 Centre	 on	
Biological	Diversity	(ETC/BD),	a	multidisciplinary	consortium	that	works	with	
the	 European	 Environment	 Agency.614 	The	 ETC/BD	 assesses	 the	 proposed	
sites	by	reference	on	the	Annex	III	criteria	and	further	guidance	prepared	by	
ETC/NC615	to	facilitate	their	application.616	Following	the	technical	analysis	of	
the	 ETC/BD	 and	 before	 the	 agreement	 between	 the	 Commission	 and	 the	
Member	 State,	 the	 results	 are	 discussed	 in	 a	 special	 forum	 called	
Biogeographical	 Seminar.617 	They	 are	 held	 separately	 for	 each	 of	 the	 nine	
biogeographical	 regions.	 They	 are	 a	 prominent	 feature	 of	 the	 designation	
process	that	allows	for	the	exchange	of	views	and	scientific	information.	The	
seminars	 are	 attended	 by	 the	 European	 Commission,	 the	 ETC/BD	Member	





background,	 they	 form	 part	 of	 the	 debate.	 	 Hence,	 the	 Commission	 is	 not	




















The	 final	 list	 of	 SCIs	 is	 agreed	 between	 the	 Member	 State	 and	 the	
European	Commission	following	a	bilateral	meeting	between	the	two.		At	this	
stage	some	flexibility	is	introduced	by	art.4(2)(2)	that	is	likely	to	allow	socio-
economic	 considerations	 to	 ‘infiltrate’	 the	 technical	 exercise	 of	 SACs	
designation.	According	to	art.4(2)(2):	
Member	States	whose	sites	hosting	one	or	more	priority	natural	habitat	
types	 and	 priority	 species	 represent	more	 than	 5	%	 of	 their	 national	




Special	 Area	 of	 Conservation	 ‘as	 soon	 as	 possible	 and	 within	 6	 years	 at	









The	 second	 function	 of	 science	 within	 nature	 conservation	 law	 and	
policy	relates	to	the	‘how’	question.	On	several	occasions,	science	is	the	one	to	
tell	 decision-makers	 how	 to	 protect.	 This	 function	 of	 science	 relates	 to	 the	
management	 stage	 of	 decision-making.	 In	 exploring	 the	 role	 of	 science	 in	
management	decisions,	I	draw	a	distinction	between	management	design	and	








varies	 in	 between	 the	 two	 phases,	 as	 the	 latter	 allows	 for	 non-scientific	
considerations	to	shape	the	final	decision.	









traditional	 do/do	 not	 way.	 The	 discussion	 covers	 management	 design	 in	
designated	and	non-designated	areas.	 Science	has	a	primary	 role	 to	play	 in	
both	 but	 there	 is	 a	 critical	 difference	 in	 relation	 to	 the	way	 science-driven	
management	 serving	 conservation	 interests	 takes	 precedence	 over	 other	
considerations.	
In	 relation	 to	 designated	 sites,	 science	 derives	 its	 legitimacy	 from	
legislation.	Law	and	science	are	found	in	a	complementary	circular	dialectic	
interaction:	 science	 provides	 a	 justification	 for	 conservation	 to	 legislation,	






it	 doesn’t	 draw	 its	 power	 from	 statutory	 legislation.	 By	 contrast,	 scientific	
management	 is	 implemented	 through	 contractual	 agreements	 between	 NE	
and	 landowners	 opting	 to	 enter	 the	 schemes.	 However,	 voluntary	
participation	in	the	scheme	only	goes	as	far	as	the	choice	to	enter.	After	that,	
private	 individuals	 are	 given	 limited	 discretion;	 they	 do	 choose	what	 they	
want	to	do,	but	from	a	list	of	pre-set	management	options	and	they	are	bound	




schemes	 reflect	 how	 science-driven,	 top-down	 regulation	 interacts	 with	
collaborative	 management.	 	 This	 model	 of	 management	 is	 scientific	 in	 its	
design	but	collaborative	in	its	implementation.	
The	 second	 process	 of	 decision-making	 relates	 to	 the	 application	 of	







implementation,	 which	 influence	 the	 way	 public	 authorities	 exercise	 their	
discretion	when	they	attempt	to	manage	areas	of	land,	especially	those	under	




2006	 introduces	 a	 statutory	 duty	 for	 Natural	 England	 to	 ensure	 that	 ‘the	
natural	environment	is	conserved,	enhanced	and	managed	for	the	benefit	of	




compared	 to	 its	predecessor	English	Nature,	 its	 sole	 commitment	 to	nature	
conservation	and	the	strong	scientific	character	of	 its	predecessor	has	been	



















reasonable	 steps,	 consistent	 with	 the	 proper	 exercise	 of	 the	 authority’s	

































measures	 but	 to	 take	 effective	 measures	 that	 will	 maintain	 the	 favourable	
conservation	status	and	prevent	further	deterioration.632	These	measures	may	




art.	 2(2)	 provides	 that	 ‘measures	 taken	 pursuant	 to	 this	 directive	 shall	 be	
designed	 to	 maintain	 or	 restore	 at	 favourable	 conservation	 status	 natural	
habitats	and	species	of	wild	fauna	and	flora	of	Community	interest’.		
Given	 the	 fact	 that	 a	 large	 percentage	 of	 both	 habitats	 and	 species	
across	Europe	are	assessed	as	unfavourable,633	restoration	measures	become	
a	 legal	requirement.	However,	as	already	discussed	 in	the	previous	chapter,	
mere	 designation	 and	 restriction	 of	 human	 activities	 does	 not	 suffice.	
Favourable	 conservation	 status	 cannot	 be	 achieved	 simply	 by	 imposing	
restrictions	to	prevent	further	deterioration	of	habitats	that	are	already	in	an	
unfavourable	condition.	Positive	action	is	also	necessary	and	in	line	with	this	
idea,	 the	 obligation	 to	 avoid	 deterioration	 has	 been	 interpreted	 by	 CJEU	 as	
being	inclusive	of	the	obligation	to	take	restoration	measures	if	necessary:	in	
Commission	v	Ireland,	the	Court	ruled	that	as	the	Irish	authorities	themselves	
recognised,	 they	had	 to	 ‘not	only	 take	measures	 to	 stabilise	 the	problem	of	







the	 conservation	 status	 for	 the	 species	 involved.	 But	 even	demonstrating	 this	 decrease	 in	
population	or	the	bad	conservation	status	may	also	be	a	more	complex	issue	to	prove	than	it	
appears	at	first	sight’.	
633	European	 Environment	 Agency,	 The	 State	 of	Nature	 in	 the	 EU:	 Results	 from	 reporting	
under	the	nature	directives	2007–2012	(EEA,	2015).	
634	Case	C-117/00	Commission	v	Ireland	[2002]	ECR	I-5445	[31];	See	also	the	Opinion	of	AG	






















and	 deliberative	 damage	 or	 the	 indirect	 result	 of	 neglect	 and	 poor	
management. 637 	As	 mentioned,	 the	 obligation	 to	 avoid	 deterioration	 also	























with	 restricted	 operations	 likely	 to	damage	 the	 integrity	 of	 a	 SSS)	 but	 also	
positive	 measures	 to	 encourage	 active	 management	 therefore	 avoiding	
neglect	and	helping	a	site	to	recover.	
As	will	be	discussed	 in	 the	 following	paragraphs	and	 in	Chapter	Six,	
these	measures	can	vary	from	direct	regulation	to	more	flexible	mechanisms.	
The	Habitats	Directive	requires	Members	States	to	take	‘appropriate	statutory,	






operations	 that	 are	 likely	 to	 damage	 the	 integrity	 of	 the	 site	 and	which	 in	
principle	are	not	allowed.640	It	makes	provision	for	contractual	management	
agreements	with	landowners641	and	also	provides	Natural	England	with	two	
powerful	 tools	 that	 allow	 for	 positive	 management	 as	 well	 as	 secure	 the	
management	 scheme 642 	and	 management	 notice. 643 	At	 its	 most	 extreme,	
effective	conservation	management	could	be	achieved	through	the	acquisition	
of	all	 land	of	special	conservation	 interests	by	the	State	 though	compulsory	
purchase.644 	How	 flexible	 the	 regime	 is	 and	 how	 much	 space	 there	 is	 for	
adaptive	management	will	depend	on	how	Natural	England,	given	 the	wide	
discretion	granted	to	it	by	both	the	1981	Act	and	the	Habitats	Regulations,	opts	

























	 	 In	 light	 of	 the	 above	 discussion,	 the	 designation	 of	 an	 area	 for	
conservation	 purposes	 would	 be	 meaningless	 unless	 it	 had	 further	
implications	for	the	management	and	use	of	the	land.	To	an	extent,	the	legal	
framework	 for	 nature	 conservation	 represents	 a	 command	 and	 control	
approach	in	the	sense	that	it	provides	for	regulation	and	control	of	managing	
activities	 within	 protected	 areas. 645 	Nevertheless,	 as	 will	 be	 discussed	 in	
Chapter	 Six,	 the	 legal	 provisions	 relating	 to	 the	 post-notification	 stage	 are	
considerably	more	 flexible	 than	 those	 governing	 designation	 and	 allow	 for	
more	‘negotiated’	management.	
	 	 Although	 there	 is	 no	 legal	 duty	 for	 the	 development	 of	 coherent	
management	plans,	neither	for	the	national	nor	the	European	designations,	the	
1981	Act	requires	Natural	England	to	include	in	the	notification	of	the	SSSI	a	


















The	OLDs	 feature	 is	 the	primary	 regulatory	mechanism	of	SSSIs	and	
exemplifies	 technocratic,	 top-down	 regulation.	 In	 essence,	 the	 list	 with	
operations	that	require	consent	imposes	negative	obligations	on	landowners,	
who	 face	 criminal	 charges	 if	 found	 carrying	 out	 such	 operations,	 unless	
consent	 is	given	by	 the	Conservation	Body	 (or	a	management	agreement	 is	
concluded)	or	one	of	the	defences	laid	down	in	s.28P(4)	applies.	650	Effectively,	
the	1981	Act	imposes	considerable	restrictions	on	the	use	of	land	and	thus,	the	
full	 enjoyment	 and	 exercise	 of	 the	 landowner’s	 property	 rights.651	Rodgers,	
through	the	prism	of	a	resource	allocation	model	of	property	rights,652	views	
the	OLDs	mechanism	as	 ‘[transferring]	property	 from	 the	 landowner	 to	 the	
																																																								
647 	See	 for	 instance	 the	 English	 Nature	 VAM	 statement	 on	 Hatfield	 Moors	 Site	 of	 Special	





649	WCA	1981	 (n29)	 s.28,	 28E;	 See	 for	 instance	 the	OLDs	 for	 the	 aforementioned	Hatfield	







Aggregate	 Industries'	 civil	 rights	and	 obligations	 in	 relation	 to	 its	 land	 and	which	 did	 not	
merely	affect	those	rights	and	obligations	in	a	remote	or	tenuous	fashion’.	Forbes	J	continued	

























likely	 to	 be	 attributed	 to	Natural	England’s	preference	 towards	 negotiation	
and	consensus	building	rather	than	strict	imposition	of	rules.659	This	is	largely	
true	given	that	there	are	currently	more	than	4.000	designated	SSSIs	and	only	
a	 handful	 of	 cases	 have	 been	 tried	 before	 the	 courts	 in	 relation	 to	 SSSI	
notifications.		
Recognising	 the	 need	 to	 adapt	 regulation	 to	 the	 individual	
characteristics	of	each	the	site,	the	list	is	unique	to	each	SSSI.	Operations	are	





















or	 ponds.660	In	 fact,	 it	 has	 been	 the	 Court’s	 view	 that	 an	 ‘operation’	 can	 be	






The	 interpretation	was	 necessary	 to	 be	wider	 since	 the	 point	was	 to	 cover	
activities	 that	 would	 escape	 the	 normal	 regulatory	 controls	 (primarily	
agricultural	activities).665	Schiemann	J,	considered	‘operations’	in	the	context	





general	 duty	 that	 binds	 Natural	 England	 to	 further	 the	 conservation	 and	
enhancement	 of	 the	 features	 that	 justified	 the	 SSSI	 notification, 667 	the	
omission	 of	 operations	on	 grounds	 other	 than	 scientific	might	give	 rise	 for	
judicial	review.	























with	the	voluntarism	approach	dominant	at	 the	time	and	 it	 is	unlikely	 for	a	
number	of	reasons	to	be	followed	today.670	First,	since	the	adoption	of	CROWA	
2000	 the	 law	 has	 moved	 away	 from	 voluntarism	 as	 the	 favoured	 policy	
approach.	 Second,	 under	 the	 EU	 law	precautionary	 principle	 that	 has	 been	
widely	applied	by	the	Court	of	Justice,	any	operation	having	the	potential	to	








Notwithstanding	 its	 wide	 interpretation,	 the	 ‘operation’	 definition	
cannot	 stretch	 inasmuch	as	 to	 include	 ‘doing	nothing’.673	Although,	positive	
management	 of	 designated	 areas	 is	 critical	 for	 securing	 their	 favourable	





670 	Bell,	 McGillivray	 and	 Pedersen	 (n515)	 731;	 Rodgers	 The	 law	 of	 nature	 conservation	 :	
property,	environment	and	the	limits	of	the	law	(n6)	89.	


















public	 bodies	 to	 further	 conservation	 within	 the	 SSSIs	 2)	 art.2(1)	 of	 the	
Habitats	 Directive	 that	 requires	 Member	 States	 to	 contribute	 towards	
ensuring	 bio-diversity	 through	 the	 conservation	 of	 natural	 habitat.	 Hence,	
given	 that	 active	 management	 is	 indeed	 paramount	 in	 maintaining	 and	
restoring	natural	habitats	at	a	favourable	conservation	status,	it	can	be	argued	
that	securing	positive	management	is	in	fact	a	legal	requirement.	
Nevertheless,	 no	 statutory	 requirement	 exists	 for	 designing	
management	 plans.	 The	 Habitats	 Directive	 suggests	 drafting	 management	
plans	 but	 does	 not	make	 it	 compulsory	 for	Member	 States.674	However,	 as	
mentioned,	the	WCA	1981	places	an	obligation	to	Natural	England	to	include	
with	 a	 SSSI	 notification	 a	 statement	 with	 their	 views	 about	 the	
management.675 	However,	 this	 is	 merely	 Natural	 England’s	 views	 ‘with	 no	







about	 the	 management	 of	 their	 SSSIs.	 The	 VAM	 places	 no	 additional	
obligation	on	 the	owner	or	occupier	of	a	SSSI	nor	do	 they	replace	any	
more	 detailed	 management	 advice	 which	 Natural	 England	 may	 have	
already	given.	
																																																								
674	However,	 some	Member	 States	 -	 the	UK	not	 among	 them	 -	 have	 opted	 for	making	 the	
drafting	of	management	plans	for	European	Sites	mandatory	and	the	plans	themselves	legally	










It	 follows	 that	 the	VAM	 statement,	 similarly	 the	more	 elaborated	 and	
structured	 management	 plans	 that	 are	 often	 drafted	 and	 implemented	 by	
Natural	 England,	 local	 authorities	 and	 conservation	 organisations	 are	 not	
legally	 binding	 and	 cannot	 be	 legally	 enforced.	 The	 lack	 of	 a	 statutory	
requirement	for	management	plans	has	considerable	implications	for	adaptive	
management,	 especially	with	 regard	 to	 the	 collaborative	model	 explored	 in	
Chapter	Six.	 I	will	return	to	it	 later.	677The	need	for	positive	management	 is	
bound	to	create	tensions	between	the	nature	conservation	 interest	of	a	site	
and	the	landowner’s	intended	use	of	land.	Compulsory	purchase	by	the	state	
(or	 nature	 conservation	 bodies)	 would	 enable	 conservationists	 to	 actively	
manage	the	land	in	favour	of	biodiversity.	But	by	now	it	has	been	made	clear	
that	given	the	percentage	of	designated	land	under	private	ownership,	such	an	
approach	 would	 be	 Natural	 England’s	 last	 resort.	 Instead,	 the	 preferred	
approach	has	been	to	engage	landowners	in	managing	land	already	managed	
for	 agricultural	 and	 other	 purposes,	 in	 accordance	 with	 the	 nature	
conservation	 interest	 of	 the	 site. 678 	To	 do	 so,	 the	 legal	 framework	 has	
empowered	 Natural	 England	 to	 enter	 into	 management	 agreements	 with	
landowners.679	Management	agreements	are	voluntary,	albeit	legally	binding,	




CROWA	2000	 amendments	management	 agreements	were	 the	 only	way	 to	
secure	 nature	 conservation	 interests,	 with	 the	 SSSI	 legal	 provisions	 on	
restricted	operations	being	just	a	delay	mechanism	so	that	the	conservation	
body	 could	 negotiate	 an	 agreement	 with	 the	 landowner	 who	 intended	 to	
																																																								
677	See	infra	ch.	6.	
678 	The	 preference	 of	 management	 agreements	 over	 more	 intrusive	 mechanisms	 such	 as	











above,	 CROWA	2000	made	 provisions	 for	 reactive	 enforcement	 though	 the	
notification	of	OLDs	and	the	threat	of	criminal	proceedings	against	offenders.		
Nevertheless,	what	is	perhaps	the	greatest	contribution	of	the	CROWA	
2000	 amendments	 is	 that	 it	 enables	 the	 implementation	 of	 proactive	
regulation;	because	merely	prosecuting	someone	for	damages	or	carrying	out	




the	measures	 necessary	 for	 conserving	 or,	where	 practicable,	 restoring	 the	
features	of	the	land	which	make	it	an	SSSI.’682	Landowners	are	consulted	but	
given	the	 fact	 that	 this	 is	a	regulatory	rather	than	a	contractual	measure,	 it	
would	 be	 expected	 that	 any	 terms	 and	 conditions	 would	 be	 largely	 non-
negotiable.	
What	 has	 great	 relevance	 for	 designing	 and	 implementing	 adaptive	
management	 plan	 is	 that,	 in	 principle,	 Natural	 England	 may	 formulate	 a	
management	 scheme	 at	 any	 given	 time	 it	 thinks	 it	 is	 appropriate	 to	 do	 so.	
Failure	to	reach	a	management	agreement	is	not	set	as	a	statutory	requirement	
for	 operating	 a	 management	 scheme,	 as	 it	 is	 for	 instance	 for	 compulsory	
purchase.	However,	being	firmly	committed	to	its	preference	for	co-operation	




682 	DEFRA,	 Sites	 of	 Special	 Scientific	 Interest:	 Encouraging	 positive	 partnerships.	 Code	 of	
guidance	(n558)	para.30.	
683	According	to	DEFRA’s	guidance,	ibid:	‘In	some	cases	however,	and	particularly	where	it	is	
not	 possible	 to	 reach	 a	 voluntary	 agreement	 on	 management,	 English	 Nature	 may	 seek	
agreement	on	a	management	scheme.	(An	owner	or	occupier	may	also	decide	to	ask	that	a	
scheme	be	prepared;	but	 in	 these	cases,	 it	 is	more	 likely	 that	 it	will	be	possible	 to	 reach	a	
voluntary	 agreement	 on	 management)’	 This	 statement	 reflects	 the	 understanding	 of	
management	 scheme	 as	 a	 coercive	 means	 that	 should	 be	 employed	 only	 in	 cases	 where	
management	agreements	fail	to	be	concluded	or	complied	with.	Interestingly	enough,	by	2008	




The	 legal	 consequences	 of	 a	 management	 scheme	 are	 that	 Natural	
England	is	granted	the	discretion	of	a	management	notice.684	Section	28K	gives	
English	Nature	power	to	issue	a	management	notice,	if	it	has	been	unable	to	
conclude,	 on	 reasonable	 terms,	 arrangements	 for	 implementing	 a	















becomes	 wider,	 exceeding	 targeted	 areas	 and	 encompassing	 the	 wider	
countryside.		
Hence,	in	line	with	scientists’	assertions	on	open,	dynamic	ecosystems,	
effective	 management	 is	 secured	 through	 the	 individual	 or	 combined	
implementation	 of	 cross-compliance	 requirements685	and	 agri-environment	
																																																								
England's	role	in	improving	sites	of	special	scientific	interest	(HC	2007-2008,	1051)	21.	
684	WCA	 1981	 (n29)	 s.28K;	 The	 legislator’s	 predilection	 to	 amicable	 conflict	 resolution	 is	
reflected	 on	 the	 fact	 that	 WCA	 1981	 will	 allow	 a	 management	 notice	 to	 enforce	 active	
management	practices	only	when	a	management	scheme	has	been	put	in	place.	It	is	also	the	
Government’s	 expectation	 that	 management	 notices	 would	 only	 be	 used	 in	 exceptional	
circumstances.	 See	 DEFRA	 Sites	 of	 Special	 Scientific	 Interest:	 Encouraging	 positive	
partnerships.	Code	of	guidance	(n558)7.	
685	Cross	 compliance	 refers	 to	 the	 requirement	 for	 farmers	 to	 comply	with	 a	 set	 of	 SMRs	






schemes	 (AES).	 Detailed	 analysis	 of	 the	 cross-compliance	 and	 AES	
mechanisms	will	follow	in	Chapter	Six	given	that	entering	any	of	the	schemes	
is	voluntary	rather	than	legally	prescribed.	However,	I	am	briefly	considering	
them	 in	 this	 chapter,	 since	 they	 in	 fact	 reflect	 science-driven	management.		
Both	 comprise	 of	 science-driven	 management	 prescriptions	 that	 become	
binding	when	 landowners	decide	 to	either	 claim	payments	under	 the	Basic	
Payment	Scheme	(cross-compliance)	or	to	enter	into	AES	agreements.	
More	 specifically,	 although	 neither	 are	 typical	 of	 a	 command	 and	
control	approach,	but	rather	incentive-based	mechanisms,	they	do	rely	on	the	
imposition	 of	 technical	 prescriptive	 requirements	 on	 landowners.	 Cross-






The	 difference	 between	 designated	 and	 non-designated	 areas	
management,	 is	 that	 within	 the	 latter,	 science	 is	 given	 a	 prominent	 role	
through	mutual	 agreement	 rather	 than	 legislation.	 Hence,	 the	 leverage	 for	
compliance	is	not	the	threat	of	criminal	sanctions	and/or	administrative	fines	
but	 the	 receiving	 of	 payments.	 Any	 landowner,	 can	 circumvent	 cross-
compliance	 requirements	 by	 not	 applying	 for	 the	BPS.	However,	 given	 that	















compliance	 requirements.	 Those	 claiming	 BPS	 payments	 must	 abide	 to	 all	
requirements	pre-set	by	the	government,689	whereas	those	entering	an	agri-	
environment	 scheme	are	given	 the	option	 to	 choose	 from	a	pre-set	 list,	 the	










with	 changes	 in	 legislation	 or	 under	 exceptional	 circumstances;	 hence,	 in	

























measures,	 science	 has	 a	 central	 role	 within	 a	 second	 process	 with	 direct	
implications	 for	nature	 conservation:	 the	environmental	 assessment.	Under	
the	 influence	 of	 the	 preventive	 and	 precautionary	 principles,	 several	
provisions	 are	 triggered	 under	 different	 circumstances	 to	 undertake	
assessments	in	relation	to	impacts	of	activities	on	the	natural	environmental.	
Given	the	general	biodiversity	duty	that	binds	all	public	authorities	 to	have	
regard	 to	 biodiversity	 while	 exercising	 their	 functions,	 some	 sort	 of	
assessment	should	normally	take	place	before	making	any	decisions.	However,	




Impact	 Assessment	 (EIA)	 Directive,	 694 	transposed	 by	 the	 EIA	
Regulations	2011695	
	
● The	 strategic	 environmental	 assessment	 made	 under	 the	 Strategic	
Environmental	 Assessment	 (SEA)	 Directive, 696 	transposed	 by	 The	



















significance’.699 	It	 was	 exactly	 these	 inherent	 limitations	 of	 environmental	
assessment	 that	 triggered	 the	 development	 of	 the	 adaptive	 management	







To	 begin	 with,	 the	 EIA	 and	 SEA	 are	 applied	 in	 relation	 to	 certain	
projects	 (EIA)	 or	 plans	 and	 programmes	 (SEA)	 regardless	 of	 where	 the	




In	 this	 respect,	 an	AA	might	 be	 initiated	 by	 the	 Environment	Agency	when	
granting	 permits,	 the	 Local	 Planning	 Authorities	 when	 granting	 planning	
permissions,	Natural	England	when	granting	OLDs	consents	etc.	
Second,	the	focus	of	the	EIA	and	SEA	is	much	wider701	than	that	of	the	
AA	 focus	on	 the	ecological	 features	 for	which	the	 site	has	been	designated.	
Third,	 the	EIA	has	a	 formal	screening	stage	to	determine	whether	a	project	
should	 be	 considered	 an	 EIA	 development	 project; 702 	according	 to	 the	
Supreme	Court’s	ruling	in	Champion	there	is	no	such	as	formality	in	the	AA.703	
																																																								
699 	ibid	 94;	 See	 also	 in	Waddenzee	 (n671)	 Opinion	 of	 AG	 Kokott	 [107]	 encapsulates	 the	
subjectivity	of	the	concept	of	‘certainty’,	infra	n737.	
700	Habitats	Directive	(n34)	art.6(3);	However,	the	assessment	is	not	restricted	to	plans	and	



















The	 aim	 of	 the	 procedure	 is	 for	 the	 competent	 authority	 to	 reach	 to	well-
informed	decisions;	to	ensure	that	planning	decisions	are	made	under	the	light	
of	 as	 much	 information	 as	 possible.	 Science	 is	 essential	 to	 environmental	
assessments	 but	 is	 not	 the	 driver	 of	 the	 final	 decision-making	 and	
environmental	 impacts	 will	 be	 just	 one	 among	 a	 set	 of	 considerations	 the	
decision-makers	 will	 take	 into	 account.706 	Ost	 refers	 to	 the	 environmental	
assessment	as		‘the	integration	of	technical	and	scientific	information	on	the	
effects	of	development	in	what	are	essentially	political	processes’.707	Although	
the	 EIA/SEA	 are	 largely	 procedural	 mechanisms,	 whose	 outcome	 is	
informative	rather	than	decisive,	 they	are	very	well	structured	and	defined,	
imposing	 strict	 procedural	 requirements	 including	 public	 participation	 and	
review,	 thereby	 allowing	 the	 decision-making	 authority	 to	 reach	 out	 to	 a	
number	of	information	sources.	
On	 the	 other	 hand,	 art.6(3)	 of	 the	 Habitats	 Directive	 introduces	
substantial	 requirements.	 The	 competent	 authority	 shall	 approve	 the	 plan	
only	after	having	ascertained	that	it	will	not	adversely	affect	the	integrity	of	






WLR	420	Lord	Hoffmann	holding	 that	 ‘the	Directive	 requires	not	merely	 that	 the	planning	
authority	should	have	the	necessary	information,	but	that	 it	should	have	been	obtained	by	
means	of	a	particular	procedure,	namely	that	of	an	EIA’	
706 	Holder	 (n226)	 107	 ‘the	 evaluation	 is	 fed	 into	 decision-making	 but	 does	 not	 lead	 to	 a	
particular	substantive	outcome’	
707 	F	 Ost,	 ‘A	 Game	 Without	 Rules?	 The	 Ecological	 Self-Organisation	 of	 Firms’	 in	 Gunther	










of	wild	 fauna	and	 flora.	 In	 this	respect,	decision-making	 is	based	on	nature	
conservation	 interests	 alone;	 the	 final	 decision	 is	 of	 a	more	 technical	 than	
political	nature,	although	socio-economic	considerations	might	override	the	






In	 cases	 where	 a	 proposed	 development	 is	 likely	 to	 affect	 a	 site	
designated	 under	 the	 Habitats	 and	 Birds	 Directives	 a	 high	 standard	 of	
protection	 is	 afforded	by	Article	6(3)	and	 (4)	that	 lay	down	an	assessment	
requirement	 for	 plans	 and	 projects	 likely	 to	 have	 significant	 effects	 on	 a	
European	site	either	individually	or	in	combination	with	other	projects:		
Any	 plan	 or	 project	 not	 directly	 connected	 with	 or	 necessary	 to	 the	
management	 of	 the	 site	 but	 likely	 to	 have	 a	 significant	 effect	 thereon,	
either	individually	or	in	combination	with	other	plans	or	projects,	shall	
be	 subject	 to	 appropriate	 assessment	of	 its	 implications	 for	 the	 site	 in	
view	of	the	site’s	conservation	objectives710		
	Although	 both	 the	 EIA	 and	 AA	 are	 based	 on	 scientific	 information	 and	
methods	 to	 predict	 the	 impact	 of	 activities	 to	 the	 environment,	 there	 is	 a	





















or	necessary	 to	 the	management	of	 the	site	but	
likely	to	have	a	significant	effect	thereon,	either	
individually	or	 in	 combination	with	other	plans	










authority	 ‘to	 agree	 to	 the	 plan	 or	 project	 only	
after	having	ascertained	that	it	will	not	adversely	




711 	R.	 (on	 the	 application	 of	 Devon	Wildlife	 Trust)	 v	 Teignbridge	 DC	 [2015]	 EWHC	 2159	












The	Directive	 is	silent	both	as	 to	what	 ‘appropriate’	means	and	as	 to	
what	the	format	of	the	AA	should	be.712	Advocate	General	Kokott	stressed	in	
Commission	v	Netherlands	that	it	would	appear	that	this	term	should	also	be	
understood	 in	the	sense	of	 ‘proper’	or	 ‘expedient’.713	Thus,	an	assessment	 is	
not	merely	a	formal	procedural	act,	but	rather	it	has	to	achieve	its	aims.	The	
aim	of	the	assessment	is	to	establish	whether	a	plan	or	project	is	compatible	







plans	 or	 projects,	 affect	 the	 site’s	 conservation	 objectives	 must	 be	
identified	in	the	light	of	the	best	scientific	knowledge	in	the	field.	715	
The	 assessment	 ‘cannot	 be	 regarded	 as	 appropriate	 if	 it	 contains	 gaps	 and	
lacks	 complete,	 precise	 and	 definitive	 findings	 and	 conclusions	 capable	 of	






















‘open’	 AA,	 an	 opportunity	 is	 lost	 for	 valuable,	 multiple	 source	 information	
input	to	be	included	in	the	assessment.	This,	however,	undermines	the	‘best	
scientific	 knowledge’	 requirement	 in	 the	 Waddenzee	 ruling 718 	and	 hardly	











‘significant’	 and	 when	 we	 do,	 how	 do	 we	 determine	 whether	 ‘damage’	 is	
significant	or	not?	
The	ECJ	is	Waddenzee	held:		
Where	 such	 a	 plan	 or	 project	 is	 likely	 to	 undermine	 the	 conservation	
objectives	of	the	site	concerned,	it	must	necessarily	be	considered	likely	
to	 have	 a	 significant	 effect	 on	 the	 site.	 As	 the	 Commission	 in	 essence	
maintains,	 in	 assessing	 the	 potential	 effects	 of	 a	plan	 or	 project,	 their	
significance	 must	 be	 established	 in	 the	 light,	 inter	 alia,	 of	 the	






719		 In	 this	 context,	 the	EIA	Directive	mandating	a	well-designed	and	structured	procedure	
aimed	 at	 the	 collection	 of	 information	 from	multiple	 sources,	 is	 better	 suited	 to	 address	
uncertainty,	especially	when	it	derives	from	a	lack	of	or	bad	quality	data.	
720	Eve	Truilé-Marengo,	‘How	to	cope	with	the	unknown’	in	C.H.	Born	and	others	(eds),	The	






















































However,	 the	 decision	 was	 overturned	 in	 the	 Court	 of	 Appeals. 728		
Sullivan	 LJ	 held	 that	 there	 is	 a	 precondition	 that	 the	 nature	 of	 the	 risk	 in	
Waddenzee	 is	 a	 “real”	 rather	 than	 a	 “hypothetical”	 risk	 before	 the	 AA	 is	



























respect	 that,	 ‘by	 constructing	a	distinction	between	 ‘hypothetical’	 and	 ‘real’	
risk,	Sullivan	LJ	effectively	reduced	the	level	of	confidence	which	any	decision-
maker	 was	 required	 to	 obtain	 in	 order	 to	 conclude	 that	 no	 appropriate	
assessment	was	required’.731		





considered	during	the	 ‘screening	stage’	as	 to	 the	 ‘likelihood’	of	effects.732	As	
rightly	 Richards	 J	 points	 out	 in	 Champion	 the	 imposition	 of	 conditions	 to	







reaching	 to	 a	 point	 of	 an	 almost	 ‘no	 risk’	 requirement.	 The	 ruling	 in	




731 	Peter	 Scott,	 ‘Appropriate	 Assessment:	 A	 Paper	 Tiger?’	 in	 Gregory	 QC	 Jones	 (ed),	 The	
Habitat's	Directive	A	Developer's	Obstacle	Course?	(Hart	Publishing	2012)	109.	










adversely	 affect	 the	 integrity	 of	 that	 site’	 set	 the	 required	 threshold	 of	
confidence	to	‘where	no	reasonable	scientific	doubt	remains	as	to	the	absence	
of	 such	 effects’. 734 	Scott	 argues	 that	 this	 carries	 an	 implication	 that	 there	
should	be	no	reasonable	doubt	within	the	scientific	community	as	whole.735	
However,	 he	 further	 continues	 that	 ‘it	 is	 plain	 simply	 by	 a	 first	 reading	 of	
paragraph	 61	 of	 the	 Waddenzee	 that,	 where	 there	 are	 two	 reputable	
inconsistent	 scientific	 views	amongst	 leading	scientists	 as	 to	whether	 there	
was	a	likelihood	of	significant	adverse	effect	on	the	Special	Protection	Areas	
(SPA)	 integrity,	 the	decision-maker	would	be	 bound	 to	 conclude	 that	 there	
was	a	reasonable	scientific	doubt’		
Scott’s	 observation	 is	 definitely	 aligned	 with	 addressing	 ecological	
complexity	and	uncertainty	on	the	basis	of	a	strict	precautionary	approach	but	
given	 the	 discretion	 granted	 to	 administrative	 authorities	 and	 judicial	
deference	 on	 technical	matters,	 this	 is	 also	 rather	 unlikely.736		 However,	 it	
should	and	has	been	accepted	by	the	courts	 that	a	 ‘zero	risk’	approach	and	
absolute	objective	certainty	is	not	possible.	As	discussed	in	the	first	chapter,	
although	 lawyers	 show	 preference	 for	 definite	 judgements,	 certainty	 and	
scientific	judgements	cannot	be	bound	together.	Hence	the	text	of	the	Directive	























assessment.	 The	 conclusion	 of	 this	 assessment	 is,	 of	 necessity,	
subjective	in	nature.	Therefore,	the	competent	authorities	can,	from	
their	point	 of	 view,	be	 certain	 that	 there	will	 be	no	 adverse	 effects	





certain	 authorities	 to	 undertake	 the	AA	 assessment.	 The	 rulings	 of	 the	 ECJ	
courts	have	established	that	high	quality	information	is	needed	to	remove	all	
scientific	doubt.738	However,	as	mentioned,	neither	the	Habitats	Directive	nor	
CHSRs	 lay	 down	 procedural	 requirements	 for	 the	 assessment	 that	 would	
ensure	 that	 the	 best	 available	 information	 reaches	 the	 decision-making	



























objective	 information	–	and	even	 if	 it	didn’t	 it	would	be	difficult	 to	see	how	
biased	 information	could	be	deemed	 ‘best	scientific	knowledge	 in	the	 field’.	
However,	given	the	fact	that	a)	all	but	one	(Natural	England)	of	the	authorities	
that	 might	 be	 required	 to	 undertake	 an	 AA,	 raison	 d’etre	 is	 not	 nature	





interest	 prevails	 in	 cases	 of	 competent	 authorities	 with	 double	 natures	 as	
regulators	and	potential	beneficiaries	of	the	approval	permit.	740	
Second,	 unless	 the	 competent	 authority	 decides	 to	 allow	 the	




to	 include	 the	 public,	 they	 will	 miss	 the	 opportunity	 to	 consult	 with	
independent	 researchers	 and	 most	 importantly	 nature	 conservation	 NGOs	
who	have	great	knowledge	and	long-term	experience	in	nature	conservation.	









against	 the	 one	 submitted	 by	 Natural	 England	 and	 concluded	 that	 there	 was	 no	 doubt	
remaining	as	to	adverse	effects	on	the	SPA	and	SAC	in	question	Owen	J	hold	that	the	lack	of	a	
reasoned	decision	to	satisfy	that	NE’s	advice	had	indeed	been	given	the	weight	it	deserved	





that	 the	 lack	of	knowledge,	 skills	 and	capacity	of	 those	undertaking	 the	AA	
often	 lead	 to	poor	quality	AA	reports.741	Alternatively,	 the	 reports	might	be	
adequate,	 but	 the	 competent	 authorities	 lack	 the	 capacity	 or	 training	 to	













a	 database	 with	 up-to-date	 information	 on	 each	 site	 should	 be	 available.	
Otherwise,	 it	 will	 be	 extremely	 difficult	 for	 the	 competent	 authority	 to	
undertake	an	assessment	that	conforms	with	the	rulings	of	the	ECJ.	In	addition,	
aligning	the	AA	procedure	with	that	of	the	EIA	by	making	public	consultation	











744 	Art.	 6(4)	 Habitats	 Directive	 (n34)	 allows	 a	 project	 to	 proceed	 despite	 a	 negative	









England	 allows	 and	may	 support	 adaptive	 decision	making.	 The	 remaining	
major	 overlapping	 themes	 emerging	 from	 the	 adaptive	 management	
literature,	 against	which	 I	 test	 English	 nature	 conservation	 law	 and	 policy,	
correspond	 to	 the	 adaptive	 capacity	 of	 adaptive	 management	 and	 are	 b)	




The	 first	 step	 towards	 a	 solution	 to	 a	 problem	 is	 to	 accept	 and	
acknowledge	the	problem.	If	we	are	oblivious	to	it,	then	we	will	not	feel	the	
need	to	try	to	find	ways	to	address	it.	Adaptive	management	stems	from	the	
recognition	 of	 the	 dynamic	 and	 complex	 character	 of	 ecosystems	 and	 the	
limitations	 of	 scientific	 knowledge.	 It	 was	 developed	 as	 an	 alternative	
decision-making	approach	to	those	grounded	on	earlier	ecological	theories,	to	
address	the	problems	that	plague	nature	conservation	law	and	policy.		
The	 English	 nature	 conservation	 framework	 has	matured	 enough	 to	
recognise	and	embrace	ecological	complexity.	Despite	being	largely	science-




list.	 The	 idea	 is	 to	 reveal	 the	 general	 philosophy	 that	 underpins	 nature	
conservation	policy	rather	than	how	science	is,	for	instance,	perceived	by	the	
JNCC	SSSI	Selection	guidelines	or	the	Habitats	Directive.		
To	 begin	 with,	 looking	 at	 Natural	 England’s	 Notification	 Strategy	 it	








● should	 comprise	 the	 full	 diversity	 and	 range	 of	 habitats,	 species	
(including	the	full	range	of	natural	and	semi-natural	ecosystems)	
● should	 contain	our	most	valuable	 nature	 conservation	 sites.	Value	 is	
considered	 as	 both	 intrinsic	 (conservation	 needs	 (of	 habitats	 and	
species)	 and	 instrumental	 (value	 of	 ecosystems	 services	 to	 human	
societies)		










Indeed,	 the	 influence	 of	 the	 non-equilibrium	 paradigm	 is	 pervasive	




an	 area	 can	 be	 of	 special	 interest	 and	 as	 such	 be	 notified	 as	 a	 SSSI	 if	 it	
constitutes	 part	 of	 a	 single	 environment	 for	 the	 species,	 the	 protection	 of	
which	is	sought	by	the	site	notification.747		The		Countryside	and	Rights	of	Way	
Act	 2000	 acknowledging	 the	 dynamics	 of	 natural	 systems	 introduced	
flexibility	into	the	notification	to	match	changing	SSSI	conditions	by	allowing	
Natural	 England	 to	 amend	 existing	 notifications,	 either	 by	 varying	 interest	
																																																								






























our	 dynamic	 environment,	 changing	 natural	 heritage	 values	 and	





















positive	management.	 It	 is	 true	that	compared	to	other	 jurisdictions,	nature	
conservation	 in	 England	 was	 never	 ‘preservation’	 based	 for	 a	 number	 of	
reasons:	 first,	England	as	has	been	mentioned	before	 is	a	heavily	populated	
area,	with	no	places	sealed	off	 from	 the	 influences	of	 civilisation.	Excluding	





fragmented	 ownership, 757 	a	 great	 part	 of	 it	 managed	 for	 agricultural	
purposes.758	Designating	areas	restricted	to	human	access	and/or	take	large	
parts	 of	 it	 out	 of	 production	would	 have	major	 implications	 for	 the	 lawful	
exercise	of	property	rights759	but	also	undermine	domestic	food	production.		
	 	 Nevertheless,	 until	 the	 CROWA	2000	 amendments,	 the	 Conservation	
Body	could	only	impose	negative	obligations	on	the	land	in	the	form	of	OLDs.	
But	 as	we	 saw	 above,760	any	 landowner	 could	 lawfully	 proceed	 after	 three	
months	had	passed	from	having	given	notice	to	the	Conservation	Body	of	his	




757	40%	 of	 SSSI	 is	 on	 land	 owned	 by	 private	 owners,	 11%	 by	 Forest	 Enterprise/Forestry	
Commission,	9%	by	the	Ministry	of	Defence,	8%	by	Natural	England,	8%	by	National	Trust,	
6%	by	Water	Companies,	4%	by	Local	Authorities,	4%	by	Wildlife	Trusts,	4%	by	the	RSPB	and	














not	 the	 case	 anymore.	 Landowners	 are	 threatened	with	 criminal	 charges	 if	
they	unlawfully	 carry	out	OLDs.	Thus,	payments	are	now	only	provided	 for	
positive	 management. 761 	Additionally,	 Natural	 England	 has	 the	 powers	 to	
enforce	 positive	 management	 of	 a	 SSSI	 through	 the	 management	
scheme/management	notice	mechanism.	As	to	the	European	designations,	the	
‘result	 obligation’ 762 	put	 forward	 in	 art.2(1)	 of	 the	 Habitats	 Directive,	 ‘to	
contribute	towards	ensuring	biodiversity	through	the	conservation	of	natural	
habitats	 and	wild	 fauna	 and	 flora’,	 leaves	 no	 room	 for	 anything	other	 than	
active	management	of	the	sites.763		
	 	 At	the	same	time	the	concept	of	‘conservation’	takes	a	wider	and	more	
dynamic	meaning	 that	 goes	 beyond	merely	maintaining	 the	 ‘status	 quo’.	 In	
Boggis	 v	 Natural	 England	 in	 the	 absence	 of	 a	 statutory	 definition	 of	
conservation,	 Sullivan	 LJ	 interpreted	 the	 term	 in	 the	 context	 of	 nature	




beyond	maintaining	 things	 the	way	 they	 are.	 ‘Conservation’	 is	 defined	 as	 a	
series	of	measures	required	to	maintain	or	restore	the	natural	habitats	and	the	
populations	of	species	of	wild	fauna	and	flora	at	a	favourable	status’.765	
















gradual	 shift	 to	 ecosystem-based	management	 and	 ecological	 coherence.766		
The	 creation	 of	 an	 ecological	 network	 is	 the	 ambitious	 aim	of	 the	Habitats	
Directive.	 As	 discussed	 above,	 the	 prescribed	 designation	 procedure	 that	
requires	 the	 active	 involvement	 of	 the	 European	 Commission	 has	 been	
established	 to	ensure	 the	 coherence	of	 the	network.767	Despite	 the	 fact	 that	
SSSI	 notifications	 have	 largely	 progressed	 on	 an	 ad	 hoc	 basis,	 it	 is	 now	
accepted	 that	 a	 more	 strategic	 approach	 to	 SSSI	 is	 required.768 		 The	 JNCC	
Selection	 guidelines	 stress	 the	 need	 for	 ecological	 coherence	 and	 a	 gradual	
shift	of	focus	from	the	‘jewels	of	the	crown’	to	the	wider	countryside,	with	the	
‘jewels’	being	a	central	components	of	a	wider,	coherent	ecological	network:	
SSSIs	 are	 an	 important	 component	of	 the	protection	of	 important	 and	














767 	See	 however	 Jonathan	 Verschuuren,	 ‘Connectivity:	 is	 Natura	 2000	 only	 an	 ecological	
network	 on	 paper?’	 in	 C.H.	 Born	 and	 others	 (eds),	 The	 Habitats	 Directive	 in	 Its	 EU	
Environmental	 Law	 Context:	 European	 Nature’s	 Best	 Hope?	 (Taylor	 &	 Francis	 2014)	
questioning	Natura	2000	connectivity;	A	typical	example	of	an	ecosystem-based	approach	to	
natural	 resources	 management	 is	 the	 European	 Parliament	 and	 of	 the	 Council	 Directive	
2000/60/EC	 establishing	 a	 framework	 for	 Community	 action	 in	 the	 field	 of	 water	 policy	
[2000]	 OJ	 L	 327/1	 which,	 although	 not	 being	 per	 se	 nature	 conservation	 legislation,	
introduced	 provisions	 of	 great	 relevance	 to	 the	 conservation	 of	 species	 and	 habitats	
depending	on	the	water.	





of	 scales.	 [..]SSSIs	 need	 to	 be	 seen	 within	 a	 wider	 context,	 as	 one	
component	 of	 a	 site-based	 approach	 to	 nature	 conservation,	 which	 is	
then	 integrated	 with	 and	 complements	 the	 developing	 wider	
environment	approach	[..].	
However,	 the	 WCA	 1981	 remains	 species	 and	 habitats	 rather	 than	
ecosystem	 oriented.	 However,	 this	 does	 not	 mean	 that	 the	 interpretation	
cannot	be	shifted	towards	a	more	ecosystem-based	approach.	The	WCA	1981	
does	not	lay	down	specific	habitats	to	be	designated	as	SSSIs	neither	does	it	
directly	 link	 land	designations	to	whether	they	host	endangered	species.	 	 It	
rather	 refers	 to	 ‘special	 interest	 by	 reason	 of	 any	 of	 its	 flora,	 fauna,	 or	
geological	or	physiographic	features.’769	Given	the	gradual	recognition	of	the	
importance	 of	 ecological	 networks	 in	 policy	 documents	 such	 as	 the	 JNCC	
Guidelines,	 the	 wide	 discretion	 given	 to	 Natural	 England	 and	 judicial	
deference,	 it	 remains	 to	see	whether	 the	 interpretation	of	 ‘special	 scientific	
interest’	can	be	stressed	to	include	sites	that	are	‘interesting’	on	the	basis	of	








plans	 that	 if	 assessed	 individually	 would	 escape	 art.6(3)	 AA	 but	 in	
combination	 with	 other	 projects	 may	 have	 significant	 effects.	 Arguably,	
art.6(3)	takes	a	wider	approach	in	order	to	ensure	that	‘effects	of	incremental	











Other	 aspects	 of	 nature	 conservation	 law	 and	 policy	 reflecting	 non-
equilibrium	 thinking	 include	 the	 continuous	 integration	 of	 biodiversity	





either	 certainty	 or	 objectivity	 and	 AG	 Kokott;s	 observation	 in	 Waddenzee	
clearly	 reflects	 this. 773 	That	 the	 JNCC	 Guidelines	 recognises	 that	 special	
scientific	interest	is	a	matter	of	informed	expert	judgement	rather	than	simply	






as	a	 trigger	and	outcome	of	 adaptive	management.	Decision-making	 should	
take	place	in	the	light	of	the	most	up-to-date	information.	A	static	approach	
where	 data	 are	 very	 old	 or	 non-existent	 cannot	 be	 considered	 adaptive.	
Looking	at	nature	conservation	in	England	and	its	historically	strong	links	to	
scientific	 research	 (not	 merely	 science)	 it	 is	 evident	 that	 learning	 and	
knowledge	 enhancement	 are	 central	 to	 the	 English	 culture	 of	 nature	
conservation.	
First,	 as	 a	general	observation,	 conservation	research	on	 the	English	
landscape	and	natural	environment	has	been	building	up	for	centuries.	It	was	



















It	was	 just	after	 the	end	of	WWII	 that	a	group	of	scientists,	members	of	 the	
Wild	Life	Conservation	Special	Committee	(WLCSC)	under	the	chairmanship	
of	Dr	J.	Huxley,	mapped	a	nature	conservation	policy	framework	and	laid	down	
the	 foundations	 of	 UK	 Nature	 Conservation	 Policy	 to	 date.779 	In	 1947	 the	
Committee	published	a	detailed	report,	The	Report	on	Conservation	of	Nature	
in	 England	 and	 Wales,	 considered	 the	 selection	 process	 of	 protected	 sites	
together	with	their	administration.780	Hawksworth	notes	that	‘the	WLCSC	was	





proposed	 nature	 reserves	 where	 wildlife	 would	 be	 studied	 and	



















ecology,	 and	 the	 setting	 up	 of	 an	 official	 biological	 service	 to	










advice	 on	 the	 conservation	 and	 control	 of	 the	 natural	 flora	
and	 fauna	 of	 Great	 Britain;	 establishing,	 maintaining	 and	
managing	 nature	 reserves	 in	 Great	 Britain,	 including	 the	
maintenance	of	physical	features	of	scientific	interest;	and	to	





was	 subsequently	 constituted	 by	 Act	 of	 Parliament.	 It	 was	 a	 positive	
development	 for	 nature	 conservation	 since	 the	 new	 Council	 was	 afforded	
																																																								
783 	Administrative/biographical	 background	 of	 Nature	 Conservancy	 as	 seen	 in	 ‘Records	
created	or	inherited	by	the	Nature	Conservancy,	the	Nature	Conservancy	Council	and	English	
Nature’	at<	http://discovery.nationalarchives.gov.uk/details/r/C134>.		
784Evans(n1)	 7;	 See	 also	 in	 Hawksworth	 (n4)	 3	 ‘the	 Huxley	 Report	 called	 for	 a	 national	
biological	 service	 with	 five	 main	 purposes	 conservation,	 biological	 survey	 and	 research,	
education	and	amenity	“for	the	peaceful	contemplation	of	nature”’.	
785 	Administrative/biographical	 background	 of	 Nature	 Conservancy	 as	 seen	 in	 ‘Records	
created	or	inherited	by	the	Nature	Conservancy,	the	Nature	Conservancy	Council	and	English	
Nature’	at	<http://discovery.nationalarchives.gov.uk/details/r/C134>.	












foundations	 was	 gradually	 evolved	 into	 a	 multi-focus	 agency	 (Natural	
England)	with	a	wide	remit.	
Following	its	tradition	of	advancing	scientific	research,	UK	today	hosts	
a	 number	 of	 organisations	 committed	 to	 the	 development	 of	 conservation	
science	 including	 research	 centres	 and	 institutions	 and	 several	 university	
departments, 790 	which	 are	 jointly	 funded	 by	 the	 UK	 government	 and	 the	
European	Union	and	capable	of	providing	high	quality	scientific	research	to	
support	 all	 stages	 of	 decision	 making,	 from	 designation	 to	 day	 to	 day	
management	and	assessments.	Natural	England,	 although	not	 the	 research-
based	 institution	 Nature	 Conservancy	 once	 was,	 continues	 to	 undertake	
quality	 research,	 either	 themselves	 or	 commissioned	 to	 external	




the	 aim	 of	 legal	 initiatives	 such	 as	 the	 EIA	 Directive.	 Although	 entirely	
procedural,	the	EIA	provides	an	opportunity	for	extensive	research	and	quality	














decision-making. 792 		 Quality	 information	 is	 also	 the	 aim	 of	 the	 wide	
consultations	all	levels	of	administration	usually	undertake	before	reaching	a	
decision	 with	 regard	 to	 policy	 changes,	 site	 designations,	 etc.	 As	 for	 SSSI,	
Natural	 England	 has	 issued	 a	 Monitoring	 Standard	 that	 will	 contribute	 to	
building	 up	 a	 baseline	 and	 constantly	 growing	 databases	 to	 inform	
management	decisions	and	the	condition	of	SSSI	as	a	whole.	793	
Finally,	 experimentation	 is	 not	 an	 alien	 concept	 to	 English	 nature	
conservation	 legislation.	 Section	 8	 of	 the	 Natural	 Environment	 and	 Rural	
Communities	act	affords	Natural	England	the	discretion	to	run	experimental	
schemes	 that	 (a)	 involve	 the	 development	 or	 application	 of	 new	methods,	
concepts	or	techniques,	or	(b)	the	testing	or	further	development	of	existing	
methods,	 concepts	 or	 techniques.	 	 Administrative	 agencies	 have	 initiated	 a	
number	of	pilot	programmes	to	test	the	effectiveness	of	certain	instruments	














793 	Natural	 England,	 Natural	 England	 Standard	 SSSI	 Monitoring	 and	 Reporting	 (Natural	
England	2013).	
794	J	Baker	and	others,	Defra	project	code:	WC	1051.Evaluation	of	the	Biodiversity	Offsetting	
Pilot	 Programme.	 Final	 Report	 Volume	 1:	 (Collingwood	 Environmental	 Planning	 Limited,	
2014).	









The	 following	 paragraphs	 explore	 the	 extent	 to	 which	 the	 legal	
framework	for	nature	conservation	can	foster	adaptation	of	decision	making.	
I	 am	 focusing	 my	 analysis	 on	 a)	 the	 potential	 for	 a	 combination	 of	 front-
end/back-end	 decision	making	 that	 can	 establish	 a	monitoring-adjustment,	





Reviews	 are	 a	 very	 common	 theme	 in	 nature	 conservation	 law	 and	
policy	 at	 national	 and	 European	 level.	 From	 management	 schemes	 to	 the	
entire	Habitats	Directive,798	reviewing	legal	and	regulatory	approaches	plays	
a	 central	 role	 in	 decision	 making.	 Below	 I	 have	 explored	 monitoring	 and	











carried	 out	 to	 show	 the	 extent	 of	 compliance	 with	 a	 formulated	 standard	 or	 degree	 of	
deviation	 from	 an	 expected	 norm’,	 <	 http://jncc.defra.gov.uk/page-2268>	 accessed	
November	 2016	 is	 more	 dynamic	 than	 ‘review’	 that	 refers	 to	 a	 formal	 assessment	 of	
something	with	 the	 intention	 of	 instituting	 change	 if	 necessary,	 Oxford	 Online	 Dictionary.	
However,	both	can	establish	the	‘loop’	for	adaptive	decision	making.	
798	See		http://ec.europa.eu/environment/nature/legislation/fitness_check/index_en.htm	for	


















	The	 Habitats	 Directive	 lays	 down	 ‘surveillance’	 requirements	 with	
regard	to	the	conservation	status	of	species	and	habitats.802	It	also	introduces	
a	‘loop’	by	providing	for	measures	to	be	taken	if	deemed	necessary	in	the	light	
of	 the	 assessment. 803 	Surveillance	 should	 be	 continued	 during	 the	
implementation	of	the	measures.804	The	Directive	also	requires	that	Member	
States	to	submit	six-yearly	reports	on	the	implementation	of	measures	taken	









than	 one	 time.	 See	 DEFRA	 and	 the	 Welsh	 Government,	 Summary	 of	 Responses	 to	 the	

























Directive	provide	 for	mandatory	monitoring	of	 the	 impacts	of	 the	approved	
project.	Especially	with	regard	to	the	Habitats	Directive,	effective	monitoring	
should	be	considered	best	practice	in	particular	when	the	derogation	of	6(4)	






809 Natural	 England,	 Natural	 England	 Standard	 SSSI	 Monitoring	 and	 Reporting;	 Natural	























The	 adaptive	 ‘loop’	 is	 completed	 with	 the	 adjustment	 of	 original	
decisions,	 or	 in	 case	 of	 legislation	 by	 the	 amendment	 of	 their	 provisions	
through	 democratic	 parliamentary	 procedures,	 and	 in	 the	 case	 of	 EU	
legislation	by	the	procedure	provided	in	the	 legal	 instrument	 in	question.	 It	
follows	 that	 rules	 established	 in	 primary	 legislation	 are	 less	 flexible	 than	
regulations	and	decisions	made	by	the	administration.			
The	 English	 system	 of	 nature	 conservation	 administration	 is	
characterised	 by	 de-centralisation,	 considerable	 delegation	 to	 nature	
conservation	 bodies	 and	 local	 authorities,	 wide	 discretion	 and	 judicial	
deference.812	Perhaps	ironically,	for	science	driven,	adaptive	decision-making	
to	happen,	what	is	needed	is	a	combination	of	flexibility	–	so	that	the	authority	
is	 allowed	 to	 amend	 the	 decision	 -	 	 and	 ‘command	 and	 control’	 types	 of	
legislation	 to	 impose	 its	 implementation.	 To	 illustrate,	 let’s	 assume	 that	
Natural	England	seeks	to	change	a	SSSI	OLD;	it	needs	the	support	of	statutory	
legislation	in	order	to	be	able	to	impose	the	new	obligations.	Hence,	science-
driven	 adaptive	 decision-making	 is	 possible	 only	within	 procedures	where	
science	is	the	only	consideration	(so	that	the	administrative	authority	is	not	
bound	 to	 take	 into	 account	 other	 considerations)	 or	 one	 among	 multiple	
considerations	but	the	administrative	authority	has	the	discretion	to	only	give	











As	mentioned	 above,	with	 the	 introduction	of	 CROWA	2000	Natural	
England	was	afforded	powers	to	notify	additional	land,	enlarge	or	denotify	a	
SSSI.813	As	with	the	original	notification	any	amendment	is	at	the	discretion	of	






to	 any	 owner	 or	 occupier	 of	 the	 land	 who	 suffers	 loss	 because	 of	 the	







application	 made	 under	 this	 Part,	 the	 authority	 may	 by	 order	
revoke	or	modify	 the	permission	to	such	extent	as	 they	consider	
expedient.817	
From	 the	 wording,	 the	 section	 appears	 to	 afford	 the	 planning	 authority	
considerable	 freedom	 to	 modify	 or	 revoke	 a	 planning	 permission.	 This	
freedom	is	nevertheless	restricted	by	s.97(3):	
3)	The	power	conferred	by	this	section	may	be	exercised—		




















considerations,	 it	 appears	 to	 a	 local	 planning	 authority	 that	 it	 is	













with	 the	 power	 given	 to	 the	 local	 authority	 to	 impose	 conditions	 (e.g	
monitoring	 conditions) 818 	the	 planning	 regime	 can	 arguably	 be	 used	 to	



















Implementing	 adaptive	 management	 through	 management	
agreements	 creates	 certain	 difficulties	 that	 relate	 to	 the	 somewhat	
prescriptive	nature	of	the	scheme	discussed	above	in	s.1.2.2.1.2.	
First,	 only	 SSSI	 agreements	 can	 be	 individually	 negotiated	 and	 thus,	
tailor-	made	 to	 local	 conditions	 and	 the	 needs	 of	 local	 biodiversity.820	AES	
agreements	 are	 agreements	 on	 pre-determined	 management	 options	 and	
cannot	be	tailored	to	the	needs	of	 the	 land,	neither	can	they	be	modified	to	
support	 experimental	 management	 (e.g	 to	 apply	 different	 management	
practices	on	different	pieces	of	land).	
Second	 these	 are	 fixed	 duration	 agreements.	 Older	 agreements	
schemes	used	to	have	a	duration	of	ten	years;	current	schemes	provide	for	five	
year	 agreements.	 Only	 after	 this	 can	 Natural	 England	 amend	 the	 terms	 to	
account	 for	 ecological	 changes	 or	 new	 information. 821 	Additionally,	
continuation	of	management	depend	on	the	willingness	of	the	landowner	to	
enter	 into	 a	 new	 agreement.	 Provided	 this	 is	not	 the	 case,	 there	 can	 be	 no	
opportunity	either	for	management	or	adaptation.	
Third,	there	are	very	limited	–	if	any	options	-	to	enter	into	multilateral	





820	However,	 it	 has	 been	 quite	 some	 time	 since	 SSSIs	 agreements	 started	 to	 be	made	 and	













Nevertheless,	 this	 does	not	mean	 that	management	 agreements	 as	 a	
conservation	 instrument	are	 inherently	 inflexible.	The	management	options	
and	terms	of	agreements	albeit	pre-set	and	pre-determined	by	administration,	
can	be	modified	by	the	latter,	who	has	the	power	to	make	it	less	prescriptive	




In	 the	 light	 of	 all	 the	 foregoing,	 it	 can	 be	 argued	 that	 the	 English	
framework	 for	nature	 conservation	 is	not	an	alien,	hostile	 environment	 for	
science-driven	adaptive	management.	Both	the	‘scientific’	and	‘adaptive’	part	
of	this	management	approach	can	find	-	although	certainly	not	without	some	
limitations	 -	 space	 to	 operate.	 As	 mentioned	 above,	 in	 order	 for	 scientific	
adaptive	management	 to	happen	a)	 science	must	be	 the	only	 consideration	
driving	the	decision-making	or	one	of	many	and	the	decision-maker	willing	to	




nature	 conservation	 law	 and	 policy	 by	 being	 the	 primary	 driver	 of	 nature	
conservation	decision-making	in	several	procedures.	At	the	top,	we	find	site	
designation,	which	must	take	place	exclusively	on	scientific	grounds;	no	other	
considerations	 are	 allowed	 to	 influence	 decision	 making.	 What	 should	 be	
placed	under	legal	protection	remains	a	scientific	matter	and	not	a	matter	of	








However,	 there	 are	 certain	 disadvantages	 which	 have	 practical	





or	 habitats,	 could	 nevertheless	 contribute	 to	 the	 creation	 of	 ecological	
networks,	reduced	fragmentation	and	better	management	and	restoration	of	
ecosystems.823		
	 As	 to	 the	 second,	 the	 discussion	 revealed	 that	 legislation	gives	wide	
discretion	 to	 administration	 and	 at	 the	 same	 time	 power	 to	 enforce	 its	
decisions.	 Delegation	 of	 decision-making	 coupled	with	wide	 discretion	 and	
underpinned	 by	 judicial	 deference	 means	 that	 administration	 can	 tailor	
decision-making	as	it	deems	appropriate.	Had	the	administration	been	bound	
by	primary	legislation	to	certain	action,	there	would	be	no	room	for	trying	out	
different	management	 approaches.	 	 At	 the	 same	 time,	 the	 regime	 is	 rather	
technocratic,	adopting	a	top-down	approach	where	decisions	made	by	experts	
agencies	 are	 imposed	 either	 through	 the	 threat	 of	 prosecution	 or	 through	








amendment	 of	 environmental	 permits.826	The	 use	 of	 quality	 standards	 and	
																																																								
823	Natural	England,	Natural	England	Designations	Strategy	(July	2012)	13	
824 	I	 am	 referring	 to	 AES	 agreements,	 since	 SSSI	 agreements	 can	 be	 negotiated	 between	
Natural	England	and	the	landowners.	
825	See	ch.	3,	s.3.3.1.1	on	the	mismatch	of	political	and	ecological	timescales.	













their	 condition	 or	 not.	 Without	 monitoring	 however,	 any	 adjusting	








management	 is	 very	 much	 at	 the	 discretion	 of	 administration.	 Policy	
documents	 such	 the	 JNCC	 SSSI	 Selection	 Guidelines,	 making	 references	 to	
‘informed	 judgement’,	 the	SSSI	 notification	 strategy	 documents	 referring	 to	





adaptive	 management	 will	 be	 more	 challenging.	 Even	 though	 introducing	
																																																								
permit	 review.	According	 to	 the	 guidance	 issued	by	DEFRA,	 the	Environment	Agency	will	
determine	when	to	carry	out	reviews,	with	regard	to	its	experience	of	regulating	the	various	








collaborative	 elements	 to	 substitute	 for	 legislation	 so	 as	 to	 allow	 for	
conservation	 management	 of	 the	 wider	 countryside,	 as	 discussed,	 AES	
agreements,	although	contractual	are	somewhat	rigid	and	horizontal.	At	the	
same	 time,	 the	multitude	of	 regulations	 that	relate	 -	 even	 remotely	 -	 to	 the	
implementation	of	an	adaptive	management	plan	adds	an	additional	barrier	to	
the	 implementation	 of	 large-scale	 adaptive	 management.	 Here,	
decentralisation,	 despite	 usually	 being	 associated	 with	 flexibility,	 becomes	
somewhat	problematic.	More	specifically,	the	implementation	of	a	large-scale	












of	 ecosystems	 as	 complex,	 dynamic,	 ever	 changing	 systems.	 	 However,	 as	
became	clear	in	the	first	chapter	of	this	thesis,	ecological	change,	complexity	
and	 inconclusive	 knowledge	 are	 not	 the	 only	 challenges	 in	 designing	 and	
implementing	 effective	management	 plans	 for	 nature	 conservation.	 Human	
relationships	and	relationships	between	humans	and	the	ecosystems	are	also	







been	 in	 constant	 interaction	on	 this	densely	populated	 island,	 so	 that	most	
English	semi-natural	rather	than	natural	habitats	have	been	modified	 if	not	
created	 by	 humans.	 828 		 This	 close	 interaction	 between	 man	 and	 nature	
essentially	means	that	biodiversity	conservation	management	will	necessarily	

















traditional	 legal	 instruments,	 which	 tend	 to	 prioritise	 one	 or	 the	 other	 of	
competing	 interests.	 The	 degree	 of	 complexity	 characterising	 social	 and	
natural	processes	allows	little	room	for	a	‘right	answer	approach’.830	Adaptive	
management	can	be	seen	as	supporting	trade-offs	and	compromises	within	a	




falls	 within	 the	 wider	 range	 of	 governance	 models	 that	 developed	 as	 a	
response	 to	 criticisms	 over	 the	 traditional	 top-down	 administrative	 law-
making	for	being	too	‘rigid,	too	hierarchical	and	too	contentious	to	achieve	its	





In	 this	 chapter,	 adaptive	management	 is	 viewed	 as	 a	mechanism	 to	
address	 social	 complexity	 by	 enabling	 private	 actors	 to	 get	 involved	 with	
processes	 traditionally	 belonging	 to	 the	public	 sphere	of	 bureaucracy.833	In	









834F.	 Berkes,	 ‘Adaptive	 Co-Management	 and	 Complexity.	 Exploring	 the	Many	 Faces	 of	 Co-
Management’	 in	D.	Armitage,	F.	Berkes	and	N.	Doubleday	(eds),	Adaptive	Co-Management:	
Collaboration,	Learning,	and	Multi-Level	Governance	(UBC	Press,	2010);	Christo	Fabricius	and	
Bianca	 Currie,	 ‘Adaptive	 Co-Management’	 in	 C.R.	 Allen	 and	 A.	 Garmestani	 (eds),	 Adaptive	
Management	 of	 Social-Ecological	 Systems	 (Springer	 2015);	 Plummer	 and	 others	 (n114);	
P.Olsson	,	C.	Folke		and	F.	Berkes	,	‘Adaptive	co-management	for	building	resilience	in	social-
ecological	 systems’	 (2004)	 34	 Environ	 Manage	 75;	 Lynn	 Scarlett,	 ‘Collaborative	 Adaptive	
Management:	Challenges	and	Opportunities’	(2013)	18	Ecology	and	Society	art.26;		However,	










The	 first	 experiences	 with	 adaptive	 management	 implementation	
revealed	the	incompetence	of	a	technocratic,	‘experts	know	best’	management	
approach835	to	 handling	 social	 complexity.836	For	 instance,	McLain	 and	 Lee	
assert	 ‘the	 scientific	 adaptive	 management	 approach	 has	 failed	 to	 provide	
adequate	 forums	 for	 the	 creation	 of	 shared	 understanding	 among	
stakeholders’. 837 	A	 science-based	 process	 like	 adaptive	 management	 could	
address	 ecological	 uncertainty	more	 efficiently	 than	 it	 could	 address	 social	




having	 the	 potential	 to	 ‘deal	 with	 the	 complexity	 of	 independent	 social-
ecological	 systems	 (SES)	 and	 enhance	 the	 fit	 between	 ecosystem	dynamics	
and	governance	systems’.840	
The	 new	 approach	 is	 known	 as	 adaptive	 co-management	 or	 adaptive	
collaborative	management.	Adaptive	 co-management	bridge	and	blends	 the	
																																																								








840 	P.	 Olsson,	 Ö	 Bodin	 and	 C.	 Folke,	 ‘Building	 transformative	 capacity	 for	 ecosystem	








medium	 to	 long	 term	 through	 cycles	 of	 learning	 and	 adaptation,	 and	
concentrates	 on	 the	 relationships,	 requirements,	 and	 capacity	 of	
managers.	Co-management	establishes	vertical	institutional	links,	tends	
to	 produce	 snapshots	with	 short	 to	medium	 timeframes,	 bridges	 local	
level	 and	 government	 level(s),	 and	 is	 concerned	with	 the	 capacity	 of	
resource	users	and	communities.	Adaptive	co-management	thus	 forges	






collaboration	 and	 partnership	 theories	 and	 of	 co-management	 towards	
complexity	science	and	resilience	thinking.843	Given	the	fact	that	the	scientific,	
experimental	model	of	adaptive	management	 is	a	response	to	scientific	and	
ecological	 uncertainty	 and	 the	 collaborative	 model	 a	 response	 to	 social	
complexity,	the	amalgam	of	adaptive	collaborative	management	can	be	seen	
as	a	bridge	that	connects	social	 institutions	and	biophysical	systems,844	and	
therein	 as	 a	 process	 to	 address	 both	 facets	 of	 social-ecological	 complexity.	
Within	 this	 context,	 learning	 is	 still	 crucial,	 but	 it	 differs	 qualitatively	 from	
learning	 within	 scientific	 adaptive	 management.	 It	 is	 the	 social	 and	
collaborative	learning	approaches	that	prevail.845	By	broadening	the	scope	of	
knowledge	 contributions,	 the	 technocratic	 character	 of	 scientific	 adaptive	











its	 utilisation. 847 	Hence,	 largely	 undermined	 forms	 of	 knowledge,	 such	 as	
traditional	 and	 local,	 and	 new	 variables	 such	 as	 local	 needs,	 interests	 and	
circumstances,	find	their	way	into	biodiversity	conservation	management.	
Plummer	 and	 FitzGibbon	 understand	 co-management	 ‘to	 include	
learning	 by	 doing,	 integrate	 multiple	 knowledge	 systems,	 emphasizing	
flexibility	 on	management	 structures,	 and	 advancing	 collaboration	 through	
power	 sharing	 at	 multiple	 scales’. 848 	Under	 this	 interpretation	 adaptive	
management	 can	 be	 seen	 as	 a	 mechanism	 that	 can	 accommodate	 conflict	
resolution	 techniques	 for	 resolving	 or	 perhaps	 more	 accurately	 reducing	
conflict	that	first	and	foremost	require	active	stakeholder	engagement.849	This	
chapter	focuses	on	the	collaborative	part	of	adaptive	management	in	a	conflict	





		 Plummer’s	 et	 al	 systematic	 review	 and	 analysis	 of	 adaptive	 co-
management	 literature,	 revealed	 ‘imprecision,	 inconsistency,	 and	 confusion	
with	 the	 concept. 850 	The	 analysis,	 revealed	 discrepancies	 in	 definition.	
Bridging	 the	 learning	 component	 of	 adaptive	management	 and	 the	 linking	
function	of	collaboration	has	been	found	to	be	the	most	cited	purpose.851	An	
equally	 recurrent	 theme	 was	 adaptive	 co-management	 as	 ‘encompassing	














knowledge,	 resilience,	 enhanced	 management	 etc. 853 	Several	 adaptive	 co-
management	 components	 emerge	 in	 the	 literature	 together	 with	 a	 large	
number	of	actual	and	potential	outcomes.854	Knowledge	and	learning	are	the	
two	 primary	 themes	 in	 the	 adaptive	 co-management	 literature	 but	 as	
indicated	above	not	in	their	narrow	technocratic	sense.	855		
Although	 not	 among	 the	most	 commonly	 cited	 purposes	 of	 adaptive	
management,	conflict	resolution	is	a	frequently	emerging	theme	in	literature	
on	 the	 collaborative	 adaptive	 management	 model. 856 	Conflict	 and	 conflict	
resolution	 have	 a	multi-faceted	 relationship	with	 adaptive	 co-management.	
Balancing	 interests	 and	 resolving	 conflicts	 can	 be	 seen	 as	 a	 purpose,	 a	
desirable	 outcome	 or	 a	 factor	 contributing	 to	 the	 success	 of	 adaptive	 co-
management.857	From	the	policy	maker’s	perspective,	adaptive	management	
is	 a	 means	 for	 designing	 effective	 policy	 frameworks.	 Therefore,	 dispute	
resolution	 is	 not	 the	 overall	 purpose	 of	 adaptive	management	 in	 the	 same	
sense	 it	 is	 the	 primary	 objective	 of	 other	 processes	 such	 as	 litigation.	 Like	




The	 collaborative	 component	 of	 adaptive	 co-management	 is	 the	 one	
more	 relevant	 to	 the	 resolution	 or	 reduction	 of	 conflict.	 Collaboration	 is	
defined	 as	 	‘the	situation	of	 two	 or	 more	people	working	together	
to	create	or	achieve	the	 same	 thing’.858	In	 this	 case,	 the	 common	objective	 is	






















stakeholders	 to	 work	 together	 and	 reach	 mutually	 agreeable	 solutions.	
Adaptive	 co-management	 provides	 a	 context	 for	 ongoing	 dialogue,	 among	
scientists,	public	authorities	and	private	interests,860	facilitates	the	building	of	
trust-based	 relationships 861 	and	 allows	 bargaining	 processes	 such	 as	
negotiation	 and	 mediation	 to	 enter	 the	 field	 of	 policy	 making. 862 	How	
collaboration	is	structured	and	who	collaborates	with	whom	depends	on	the	
desirable	 outcome	 of	 the	 process.	Hence,	 seeing	 collaborative	management	
through	 a	 knowledge	 generation	 lens	 is	 different	 to	 adaptive	 collaborative	
management	as	a	conflict	resolution	process.		
																																																								














agent	 possesses	 all	 relevant	 knowledge.	 Rather	 many	 different	 actors	 have	 specialised	
knowledge	bases	which	need	to	be	brought	together’.	Ibid,	18	
860	Scarlett	(n834)	5.	












management	 decisions	 are	 not	 only	 adapted	 to	 the	 evolving	 scientific	
knowledge	but	also	to	social	changes	and	priorities	and	constantly	changing	
interests	 that	may	 form	potential	 sources	 of	 conflict.	 In	 relation	 to	 conflict	
resolution,	 adaptation	 and	 collaboration	 have	 an	 intertwined	 dynamic	
relationship	with	the	processes	of	creating	knowledge	that	feed	the	iterative	
learning	 process	 of	 adaptive	 management,	 which	 is	 likely	 to	 result	 in	 the	






1. An	 enabling	 environment	 through	 institutional	 arrangement	 (norms	
and	rule),	leaderships,	policies	and	legislation	(e.g.	incentives)	
2. Learning	 through	 experimentation,	 monitoring	 and	 evaluation	 in	 a	
real-world	setting	














the	 lens	 of	 conflict	 resolution.	 Although	 the	 general	 principles	 underlie	 all	
aspects	of	adaptive	management,	the	objectives	and	desirable	outcomes	from	
its	implementation,	as	one	would	suspect,	dictate	the	way	it	is	structured	and	




As	 with	 many	 of	 the	 concept	 used	 in	 this	 thesis,	 there	 is	 no	 single	
definition	of	collaborative	management.866	Common	ground	to	all	definitions	
is	 some	 degree	 of	 interaction	 and	 collaboration	 among	 various	
stakeholders.867	What	is	of	interest	is	that	although	collaborative	management	
is	part	of	the	wider	body	of	literature	on	environmental	governance868	and	a	
general	 trend	 to	 move	 away	 from	 conventional	 forms	 that	 emphasize	 the	
traditional	 distinction	 between	 the	 state	 and	 the	 regulated,	 this	 implicit	
dichotomy	nevertheless	underlies	the	typical	definition	of	co-management	as	
some	kind	of	‘power	sharing	arrangement	between	the	State	and	community	













868	In	 the	 literature	adaptive	co-management	 is	 frequently	understood	as	a	mechanism	 i.e.	
model,	approach,	strategy,	method,	system,	tool	for	making	governance	operational.	See,	Ryan	
Plummer	 and	 others,	 ‘Adaptive	 Comanagement	 and	 Its	 Relationship	 to	 Environmental	
Governance’	(2013)	18(1)	Ecology	and	Society	art21,	4.	





number	 of	 agencies,	 authorities	 and	 institutions	 belonging	 to	 the	 public	
sphere,	often	with	conflicting	mandates,	fall	within	the	notion	of	 ‘State’,	 in	a	
similar	way	a	number	of	diverse	interests	fall	within	the	notion	of	 ‘resource		
users’.871	Therefore,	 a	mere	dichotomy	between	 the	 ‘State’	on	 the	one	hand	
and	the	‘resource	users’	on	the	other	is	somewhat	simplistic	representation	of	
the	degree	of	complexity	of	interlinking	interests.872	
Borrini-Feyerabend	 and	Buchan	 refer	 to	 partnership	 formation	with	
state	actors	having	a	leadership	role,	sharing	the	management	functions	but	
retaining	the	decision-making	power:		
The	 term	 “collaborative	 management”	 (also	 referred	 to	 as	 co-
management,	 participatory	 management,	 joint	 management,	 shared	
management,	multi-stakeholder	management	or	round-table	agreement)	
is	 used	 to	 describe	 a	 situation	 in	 which	 some	 or	 all	 of	 the	 relevant	




residents	 and	 resource	 users)	 which	 specifies	 and	 guarantees	 their	
respective	functions,	rights	and	responsibilities	with	regard	to	the	PA.873	
Definitions	 such	 as	 those	 of	 the	 World	 Bank	 and	 the	 World	 Conservation	
Congress	 view	 co-management	 as	 a	 collaborative	 process	 where	 all	




	the	 sharing	 of	 responsibilities,	 rights	 and	 duties	 between	 primary	
stakeholders,	 in	 particular,	 local	 communities	 and	 the	 nation	 state;	 a	
																																																								
871	For	instance,	local	planning	authorities	and	nature	conservation	bodies	when	the	former	is	
















The	key	element	of	 all	depictions	of	 co-management	 is	 collaboration	
among	 diverse	 stakeholders.	 Theories	 of	 participatory	 involvement	 in	
decision-making	are	introduced	into	natural	resources	management.	Several	
scholars	 have	 identified	 different	 types	 and	 degrees	 of	 stakeholder	
engagement	and	ultimately	power-sharing	with	state	actors.876	Over	the	years	
several	participation	typologies	have	been	developed	in	the	literature	based	
on	 the	 degree	 of	 involvement	 and	 the	 nature	 of	 engagement,	 on	 their	
theoretical	basis	and	on	the	objective	for	which	participation	is	used.877		 	
One	of	the	most	prominent	works	has	been	that	of	Arnstein’s	‘ladder	of	
citizenship	 participation’878 	within	 which,	 as	 the	 title	 suggests,	 the	 author	
depicts	the	different	levels	of	participation	as	ladder	rungs.	The	two	bottom	
rungs,	referred	to	as	“manipulation”	and	“therapy”,	 ‘describe	 levels	of	"non-
participation"	 that	 have	 been	 contrived	 by	 some	 to	 substitute	 for	 genuine	
participation’	 and	 are	 associated	 with	 participants’	 education	 by	
“powerholders”.879	The	three	middle	tiers	are	“informing”,	“consultation”	and	
“placation”	and	allow	participants	to	be	heard	but	decision-making	authority	






Institute	 of	 Planners	 216;	 Jules	N.	 Pretty	 and	 International	 Institute	 for	 Environment	 and	
Development.	 Sustainable	 Agriculture	 Programme.,	 A	 trainer's	 guide	 for	 participatory	










Rowe	 and	 Frewer	 distil	 participation	 on	 the	 basis	 of	 the	 direction	 that	







Arnstein’s	 “ladder”	 in	 the	 sense	 that	 they	 both	 start	 from	 a	 passive	
dissemination	of	information	towards	increasing	stakeholder	engagement	and	
increasing	 information	 flow.	 The	 two	 are	 closely	 related	 since	 active	
stakeholder	 engagement	 cannot	 happen	without	 information	 exchange	 and	
two-way	 information	 flow	 cannot	 happen	 without	 some	 form	 of	 active	
stakeholder	engagement.		
As	 Reed	 notes,	 other	 typologies	 focus	 on	 the	 theoretical	 basis	 and	
distinguish	 between:	 “normative	 participation”	 which	 ‘focuses	 on	 process,	
suggesting	that	people	have	a	democratic	right	to	participate	in	environmental	
decision-making	and	“pragmatic	participation”	which	looks	at	participation	as	





management	 ladder	 with	 levels	 of	 collaboration	 based	 on	 stakeholders’	









Moving	 towards	 the	upper	 rungs	of	 the	 ladder,	decision-making	 transitions	




and	 regulations,	 schedules	 and	 changes.	 At	 this	 stage,	
response	of	users	may	be	sought	and	facilitated	but	more	












environmental	 knowledge	 and	 of	 native	 research	
assistants	falls	into	this	stage.	But	typically,	the	research	
being	carried	out	follows	the	government	agenda.	Locals	
are	 involved	 at	 a	 low	 level	 as	 assistants	 or	 guides.	
Nevertheless,	 the	mere	 fact	 of	 cooperating	 on	 a	 project	
means	 that	 there	 is	 a	 softening	 of	 attitudes.	 Mutual	
disrespect	that	often	characterizes	the	lower	rungs	gives	
way	 to	 some	 appreciation	 of	 the	 abilities	 of	 the	 other	
party.		
Communication	
This	 stage	 marks	 the	 start	 of	 two-way	 information	




to	 aid	 research	 but	 also	 to	 respond	 to	 community	











resource	management	 impasse.	 At	 this	 stage,	 there	 is	 a	
















Joint	 decision-making	 is	 institutionalized	 and	 there	 is	 a	
partnership	of	equals.	In	situations	in	which	resources	are	
manageable	locally	(e.g.	beaver),	most	or	all	management	
power	 is	 delegated	 to	 the	 community.	 With	 such	 local	
resources,	there	is	full	community	control	which	is	legally	
legitimized	by	central	government.	In	other	situations,	in	
which	 resources	 cannot	 be	 managed	 locally,	 as	 for	
example	 with	 migratory	 species,	 resource	 users	
participate	in	decision-making	as	equal	partners.	This	last	
stage	in	the	co-management	ladder	follows	the	principle:	
"as	 much	 local-level	 management	 as	 possible;	 only	 so	
much	government	regulation	as	necessary".		
Table	1,	Ladder	of	Co-Management,	(from	Berkes	et	al)884	
While	 Berkes	 et	 al	 consider	 mere	 information	 as	 the	 first	 level	 of	
collaborative	 management,	 for	 other	 authors	 collaborative	 management	

















practice.	 	 It	 is	rather	unlikely	 to	come	across	the	same	social	and	ecological	




Having	 said	 that,	 what	 follows	 below	 is	 a	 discussion	 on	 an	 adaptive	 co-
management	 model	 as	 a	 conflict	 resolution	 process.	 The	 discussion	 takes	
places	against	three	elements:	a)	the	actors	involved	in	the	process	b)	the	level	
and	 nature	 of	 stakeholder	 engagement	 and	 c)	 legislative	 and	 regulatory	
arrangements.	Before	however	looking	into	the	specifics,	I	seek	to	answer	the	
‘why’	 question:	 why	 adaptive	 management	 is	 better	 suited	 to	 address	
conservation	conflict	than	traditional	adjudication;	what	makes	this	approach	




Being	 complex,	social-ecological	problems,	 conservation	 conflicts	 are	
not	 always	 straightforward	 but	 rather	 polycentric	multi-partied	 and	multi-
issued	disputes.887	Additionally,	the	need	to	develop	an	ecosystem	approach	
																																																								











management,	 which	 essentially	 means	 that	 more	 parties,	 thereby	 more	
interests,	are	likely	to	be	affected.	Against	this	background,	top-down	binary,	
conflict	 resolution	 approaches	 that	 seek	 to	 identify	 and	 impose	 the	 ‘right	
answer’	 –	 such	 as	 conservation	 laws	 and	 regulations	 -	 fall	 sort	 of	 their	
expectations888	and	it	is	often	the	case	that	they	aggravate	rather	than	reduce	
existing	 conflict.889	Combing	 the	 iterative	 learning	 and	 knowledge	 creation	
with	power	sharing	and	collaboration,	adaptive	co-management	can	be	seen	
as	a	means	to	address	conservation	disputes.		
To	 begin	 with,	 adaptive	 collaborative	 management	 underpins	 the	
participatory	 bottom-up	 approaches	 that	 are	 increasingly	 seen	 as	 more	
suitable	to	‘avoid,	cope	with	or	resolve	conflicts’.	890	It	provides	a	context	for	
ongoing	dialogues	among	all	those	with	a	potential	interest	such	as	scientists,	
regulatory	 agencies	 and	 public	 authorities,	 the	 private	 sector,	 local	
communities	and	conservation	NGOs.	An	opportunity	arises	for	those	involved	




















Carlsson	 and	 Berkes	 write	 with	 respect	 to	 the	 ‘network’	 version	 of	 co-
management	illustrated	in	the	figure	above:	
[..]different	types	of	management	tasks	are	illustrated	by	the	labels	A–D.	
For	 example,	 one	 state	 authority	 is	 involved	 in	one	 type	of	 task	while	
another	might	be	related	to	a	different	one.	The	dotted	lines	indicate	that	
relations	between	actors	might	be	dissimilar,	both	 in	 terms	of	 content	
and	intensity.	For	example,	within	the	same	community	of	resource	users,	
private	 companies	 might	 be	 involved	 in	 the	 planning	 of	 harvesting	
(perhaps	the	community	has	bought	this	service	from	company)	at	the	
same	 time	 as	 State	 authorities	 have	 an	 important	 say	 on	 how	 the	
activities	should	be	performed.	[…]	these	sets	of	relations	are	illustrated	
by	the	differently	dotted	lines	to	the	same	task,	e.g.	‘F’.	This	is	how	many	
social	 networks	 work.	 The	 network	 approach	 to	 co-management	
appreciates	 that	 it	 is	 the	 totality	 of	 such	 relations	 that	 make	 up	 the	
system,	the	co-management	network.894		
Carlsson	 and	 Berkes	 diagramme	 of	 a	 commangement	 network	manages	 to	
depict,	 the	diverse	range	of	multi-level	 interactions	and	the	web	of	relation	
among	resource	users	and	the	heterogeneity	of	users	perceived	to	be	a	unity	
e.g	 the	 State	 –	 which	 however	 might	 include	 central	 government,	 local	











latter	 might	 require	 measures	 with	 negative	 impacts	 to	 the	 nature	
environment.	
Accordingly,	adaptive	co-management	provides	a	format	within	which	
a	genuine	 reflexive	 relationship	between	 the	 regulator	and	 the	 regulated	 is	
allowed	 to	 flourish.	 Contrary	 to	 laws	 and	 regulations,	 adaptive	 co-
management	 does	 not	 seek	 to	 clearly	 prioritise	 certain	 aspects	 of	 the	
controversy	but	rather	to	develop	mutually	agreeable	solutions.	It	does	so	by	
setting	out	a	framework	for	collaborative	and	problem-solving	processes	like	
negotiation	 and	 mediation	 rather	 than	 adversarial	 and	 competitive	




More	 specifically,	 to	 begin	 with,	 as	 with	 all	 participatory	 processes,	
adaptive	co-management	allows	stakeholders	to	get	involved	throughout	all	
management	 stages	 from	 planning	 to	 implementation,	 monitoring	 and	
evaluation. 896 	When	 aimed	 at	 conflict	 resolution,	 interested	 stakeholders	
should	be	 identified	and	participate	very	early	 in	 the	process,	 ideally	at	 the	
planning	stage.	In	this	way,	all	interested	parties	will	be	given	the	opportunity	
to	express	their	interests,	needs,	priorities	and	views	on	the	issue	in	question.	
Thus,	 participants	 can	 come	 to	 a	 realisation	 as	 to	 the	 extent	 which	 their	
interests	may	converge,	or	entirely	diverge,	and	potential	sources	of	conflict	
can	 be	 identified.	 	What	 is	 important	 is	 that	 at	 this	 stage	 conflicts	 are	 still	


















likely	 to	 destroy	 natural	 habitats	 are	 often	 incompatible	 with	 nature	
conservation	 objectives.	 In	 this	 case,	 adaptive	 co-management	 becomes	 a	





adaptive	 co-management	 has	 the	 capacity	 to	 build	 relationships	 of	 trust	
among	 those	 involved	 as	 well	 as	 align	 stakeholders’	 perceptions	 and	
perspectives	 that	 are	 often	 only	 superficially	 contradictory.	 Oftentimes,	
conflicts	 arise	 as	 a	 result	 of	 subjective	 and	 personal	 perceptions,	
misinformation	 and	misunderstandings	 rather	 than	 actual	 discrepancies.897	
Engaging	 in	 constructive	 dialogues	 enables	 participants	 to	 listen	 with	 less	
prejudice	 to	 other	 perspectives,	 acknowledge	 the	 legitimacy	 of	 other	
participants’	 interests	 and	 re-evaluate	 their	 own	 assumptions	 and	
positions.898 		 Adaptive	 co-management	 allows	 for	 well-informed,	 educated	
																																																								




management	 workshops	 manage	 to	 shift	 the	 attention	 	 from	 positions	 that	 ‘express	 no	
negotiable	 commitments	 about	 how	 the	 position-taking	 party	 will	 behave,	 and/or	
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A	 dispute-free,	 smooth	 implementation	 means	 greater	 conservation	
benefit	but	also	fewer	delays	to	development	projects	and	obstacles	to	socio-
economic	 interests.	 For	 instance,	 following	 the	 development	 of	 a	 mutually	
accepted	management	plan,	all	those	involved	are	aware	of	the	limitations	and	
expectations	 they	 may	 have	 when	 the	 time	 comes	 for	 its	 implementation.	
Knowing	for	instance	that	the	exclusion	of	certain	activities	or	land	uses	from	
a	certain	area	has	been	agreed,	will	discourage	 individuals	or	organisations	
from	 applying	 for	 approval	 of	 such	 an	 activity;	 and	 vice	 versa	 when	 for	
instance	certain	areas	have	been	allocated	for	house	developing	as	part	of	a	
management	 plan,	 relevant	 planning	 permissions	 should	 be	 expected	 to	 be	
granted	and	in	even	shorter	timetables	since	many	of	the	procedures	that	are	















technical	 and	 science-based	 means.	 A	 technical	 approach	 is	 necessary	 to	
address	 what	 Niemela	 et	 al	 refer	 to	 as	 the	 ‘substance’	 dimension	 of	 the	





scientific	 knowledge	 as	 the	 basis	 for	 natural	 resources	 management.	 In	
relation	 to	 conflict,	 scientific	 research	 can	 lead	 to	 technical	 solutions	 that	
reduce	the	impact	of	human	activities	to	conservation	and	vice	versa.		
At	 the	 same	 time,	 adaptive	 co-management	 provides	 a	 platform	 for	





The	 interaction	 between	 scientists	 and	 resource	 users	 also	 provides	 an	
opportunity	 to	 integrate	 formal	 science	 and	 traditional	 knowledge	 towards	
even	 more	 effective	 technical	 solutions.	 Collaborative	 interactions	 among	
stakeholders	are	not	fixed	in	time	but	taking	place	within	an	iterative	circle	of	




dimensions	 respectively	 and	 are	 better	 dealt	 through	 collaboration,	 communication	 and	























included	 in	 the	 collaborative	process	of	 adaptive	 co-management.904	This	 is	
true	of	all	models	of	adaptive	co-management,	but	even	more	relevant	for	a	
conflict	resolution;	failure	to	include	stakeholders	likely	to	affect	or	be	affected	
by	 conservation	 decisions	 makes	 it	 extremely	 difficult,	 if	 not	 downright	
impossible	to	effectively	address	conflict.905	As	to	when	participation	should	
take	place,	 the	 literature	and	practice	 indicate	 that	 it	 can	occur	at	different	
stages	 of	 implementation.906		 Reed	 refers	 to	 identifying	 stakeholders	 as	 an	
‘iterative	process,	where	stakeholders	are	added		as	the	analysis	continues’.907		
However,	 for	 optimal	 decision-making	 stakeholders	 should	 be	 actively	
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becomes	an	 issue	 it	 is	 crucial	 that	 stakeholders	are	 identified	 and	 involved	
from	the	outset.	If	stakeholders	are	only	involved	at	later	stages,	as	is	often	the	
case,	the	capacity	of	adaptive	co-management	to	resolve	conflict	weakens,	as	





identify	 affected	 or	 influential	 individuals	 and	 groups,	 to	 prioritise	 these	
individuals	 for	 involvement	 in	 the	decision-making	process,	 to	differentiate	
and	 categorising	 stakeholders	 and	 investigate	 relationships	 between	
stakeholders. 910 	Identification	 methods	 include	 i.a.	 focus	 groups,	 semi-
structured	 interviews,	 snowball	 sampling	 each	 with	 its	 own	 strengths	 and	
weaknesses.911	Chevalier	and	Buckles	provide	a	list	of	other	ways	to	identify	









for	natural	 resource	management’	 (2009)	90	 Journal	of	Environmental	Management	1933,	
1937.	





















be	very	enlightening	given	the	 fact	 that	 tension	tends	to	arise	when	certain	
interests	are	affected.			
As	 regards	 nature	 conservation	 management,	 the	 usual	 ‘checklist’	
includes	representatives	 from	the	private	sector,	conservation	NGOs,	public	
authorities	 and	 scientists. 918 		 They	 all	 have	 different	 motivations	 for	
participating:	for	instance,	public	authorities	seek	to	fulfil	their	legal	mandate,	
the	private	sector	(landowners/managers,	resource	users	and	developers)	are	
motivated	 by	 economic	 profits	 (e.g	 financial	 incentives	 for	 conservation	
management)	or	the	need	to	maintain	a	positive	public	profile	or	deterrence	
of	direct	regulation.	Local	communities	are	also	identified	as	a	stakeholder.919	
McNeely	 refers	 to	 the	 private	 sector,	 NGOs,	 research	 institutions	 and	 local	














Stakeholder Analysis Use in a Case Study: Socio-Environmental Influences on Algal Blooms in the Western Lake 
Erie Basin  
In the classroom, and depending on the amount of time available to cover the case study, a stakeholder analysis 
can be performed using a combination of the approaches outlined by Reed et al. For instance, Berardo teaches 
an Environmental an  Natural Resource  Policy class every semester at the School of Environment and Natural 
Resources (The Ohio State University), and as part of this class, the students spend 4 weeks applying a social-
environmental synthesis approach to the study of yearly harmful algal blooms (HAB) in Lake Erie. Two of the 8 
class periods are spend in creating a stakeholders analysis, with the first class period focusing on identification of 
stakeholders and the second one on relationships of potential conflict and cooperation among them. To identify 
stakeholders and their positi ns on the topic of HABs, students use a Rainbow Diagram (Chevalier and Buckles, 
2008), as illustrated in Figure 1.   
 
Figure 1. Rai bow Diagram (Chevalier and buckles 2008) 
The rainbow diagram is a relat vely s mple way of identifying stakeholders and how they are aff c ed by 
environmental problems. In the case of HABs, for example, students are given a set of articles about the blooms 
and asked to read them and identify the different stakeholders that are mentioned in the article. Then they are 
asked to place them in the rainbow diagram and discuss their placing decisions. In general, students identify a 
wide variety of stakeholders, including citizens concerned with water quality in the lake, farmers whose farming 
practices may affect water quality, state and local elected and appointed officials with the power to regulate 
water use practices, etc. Decisions on where to place actors tend to be more or less homogeneous. For instance, 
students tend to place citizens living along the shores of Lake Erie in the “least influence/most affected” cell, 
while farmers (who apply the fertilizer in their fields that may trigger algal blooms in the lake) tend to be placed 
in the “most influence/least affected”, most of all because of the powerful lobbying actors that represent their 
interests. These categorizations re not completely homogen ous, of course. For instance, while some students 
place farmers in the “most influence” sector, others might consider them to have only “moderate influence” if 
they fail to notice the strong representation of farmers’ interests by the local Farm Bureau. In any case, these 
disagreements spark class discussion about the capacity and interests of myriad stakeholders  
because students can be asked to defend their choices (or modify them based on the discussions they have). 
Discussions of historical/cultural contexts in which th  t k holders operat  are also relevant.   Not all 
stakeholders enter the negotiations on an even footing. Some come with historically generated disadvantages 






























924Walkerden	 (n829)	 9	 argues	 in	 this	 respect:	 ‘[adaptive	management	 processes]	 depend	
upon	intensive	discussion	amongst	a	relatively	small	number	of	people,	i.e	30	or	40	people	at	
the	most,	 and	 that	entails	 some	 limitations.	 If	many	more	people	need	 to	be	 involved,	 the	
negotiation	processes	can	be	used,	and	adaptive	management	planning	can	play	a	supporting	
role’.	
925	Literature	 refers	 to	 these	 stakeholders	as	 ‘key	 players’	 and	 they	are	 ‘stakeholders	who	










As	 mentioned	 above,	 the	 level	 of	 participation	 in	 collaborative	
management	in	the	literature	varies	from	the	communication	of	information	
to	 joint-decision	 making	 through	 partnership. 926 	A	 ‘best	 practice’	 conflict	
resolution	 adaptive	management	would	 normally	 be	 seen	 operating	 at	 the	
higher	levels	of	Arnstein’s	ladder.	Bargaining	procedures	such	as	negotiation,	
mediation	 and	 resulting	 agreements	 and	 trade-offs	 require	 a	 dynamic	




understanding,	 reduce	 hostilities	 and	 foster	 dispute	 settlements	 and	
ultimately	lead	to	conflict	resolution	or	management,	and	ideally	prevention.	
This	 is	 what	 the	 literature	 refers	 to	 as	 the	 ‘service	 contract’	 view	 of	
participation,	which	emphasizes	empowerment,	equity,	trust	and	learning.927	















Therefore,	 the	 ‘information’	 rung	 of	 the	 ladder	 should	 not	 be	
considered	 either	 adaptive	 or	 collaborative	 since	 those	 to	 whom	 the	




genuine	 collaboration	since	 there	are	no	opportunities	 to	establish	ongoing	
dialogues	 among	 all	 interested	 parties.	 Even	 in	 cases	 where	 interactive	
activities	such	as	workshops	and	other	joint	events	take	place,	these	are	more	
‘informative’	 than	 ‘decisive’	 in	 nature.	 In	 the	 end	 it	 will	 be	 the	 policy/rule	
makers	that	will	return	to	their	workplace	and	make	decisions.	But	even	at	its	
best	 the	 consultation	 procedure	 is	 a	 two-way	 process	 with	 information	
flowing	between	the	public	authority	and	each	of	the	respondents.	As	such,	it	





Accordingly,	 adaptive	 co-management	 should	 operate	 at	 the	 higher	
levels	of	participation	to	foster	genuine	collaboration	and	continuous	dialogue	
and	 ultimately	 shared-decision	making.	 Building	 partnerships	 among	 state	
actors,	 private	 individuals,	NGOs,	 research	 institutions	 is	 central	 to	 conflict	
resolution	management.		Partnerships	do	not	have	to	be	formally	established	
																																																								
929 	Borrini-Feyerabend	 and	 Buchan	 (n873)	 154-155;	 The	 unwillingness	 of	 opposing	
stakeholders	to	compromise	was	the	main	reason	for	the	failure	to	resolve	the	Red	Grouse	







To	 begin	 with,	 all	 social,	 economic	 and	 scientific	 data	 should	 be	
available	to	all	participants	to	acquire	a	comprehensive	understanding	of	the	
problems	and	of	other	stakeholders’	perspectives.	This	is	where	the	learning	
component	 and	 collaborative	 components	 of	 adaptive	 co-management	
interlink.	 	 Highly	 technical	 discussions	 are	 a	 barrier	 for	 meaningful	
participation	 of	 non-experts’	 stakeholders. 932 	The	 role	 of	 scientists	 is	
instrumental	 in	 this	 respect;	 they	 have	 to	 convey	 information	 that	 is	 of	
relevance	to	each	group	of	participants	in	a	clear,	understandable	way	without	
using	scientific	jargon	that	will	make	lay	stakeholder	feel	excluded	from	the	
process.	 Alternatively,	 stakeholders’	 training	 and	 education	 on	 certain	
technical	aspects	might	prove	valuable	to	the	process.		Training	can	take	place	
through	organised	workshops	and	training	events,	which	are	more	likely	run	
or	 attended	 by	 the	 scientific	 staff	 of	 conservation	 NGOs	 than	 research	
institutions.933		
Setting	 clear	 objectives	 is	 paramount	 for	 any	management	 planning	
procedure.	When	additionally	seeking	to	resolve	conflicts,	it	is	very	important	





Pre-determined	and	defined	criteria	 to	classify	 interests	and	 identify	
roles	will	not	always	be	possible.	Adaptive	management	 is	a	 flexible,	 tailor-
																																																								
931 	Robert	 J.	 Fisher,	 ‘Collaborative	 Management	 of	 Protected	 Areas:	 An	 International	
Perspective’	 in	 Louise	 E.	 Buck	 and	 others	 (eds),	 Biological	 Diversity:	 Balancing	 Interests	
Through	Adaptive	Collaborative	Management	(CRC	Press	2001),	84.	
932	Reed	(n859)	2422.	
933 	Traditionally	 in	 England,	 NGOs	 scientists	 are	 working	 in	 partnership	 with	 local	
communities	and	individuals	from	the	private	sector	applying	their	scientific	expertise	at	the	







lines	 can	 be	 drawn;	 for	 instance,	 the	 private	 sector	 prioritises	 economic	
interest	and	conservation	NGOs	prioritise	nature	conservation.	However,	for	




adaptive	 co-management	 initiative	 comprise	 of	 Natural	 England	 whose	
primary	interest	and	objective	is	nature	conservation,935	but	also	bodies	such	
as	the	Forestry	Commission,	the	Environment	Agency,	Drainage	Boards	as	well	






interest,	 values	 and	 priorities,	 they	 might	 disagree	 on	 methods	 and	
approaches.	Methods	disagreements	might	arise	both	as	a	result	of	scientific	
ambiguity	 (disagreement	 among	 scientists	 on	 which	 is	 the	 more	 effective	




outside	 of	 protected	 areas.	 See	 George	 Monbiot	writing	 in	 The	 Guardian	 on	 how	 Natural	
England’s	adherence	to	nature	conservation	is	weakened	due	to	commitments	on	countryside	




submitted	 a	 formal	 complaint	 to	 the	 European	 Commission	 seeking	 to	 overturn	 Natural	
England’s	decision	over	the	management	and	protection	of	the	part	of	the	South	Pennine	Moor	
SAC	 that	 led	 to	 	 the	 Commission	 instigating	 legal	 action	 against	 the	 UK	 Government.	
https://www.rspb.org.uk/our-work/our-positions-and-campaigns/campaigning-for-
nature/casework/details.aspx?id=tcm:9-326701	accessed	January	2018.	
936	Other	 authorities	 (public	 or	 private	 statutory	 undertakers)	 that	might	 affect	 decisions	







Similarly,	 often	 stakeholders	 may	 enter	 the	 negotiation	 table	 under	
multiple	capacities.	For	instance,	NGOs	are	stakeholders,	experts	and	in	many	




a	 set	 of	 stakeholders	 or	 the	 competent	 authority	 (for	 instance,	 within	 a	
protected	area	Natural	England	has	increased	powers).	Moreover,	there	might	




definitions	 of	 co-management.	 One	 approach	 implied	 the	 classic	 dichotomy	
between	the	state	and	the	regulated,	the	other	regarded	the	State	as	only	one	
among	 a	 set	 of	 stakeholders.	 Genuinely	 equal	 participation	 among	
administrative	 authorities	 and	 private	 interests	 is	 rather	 unlikely.	 The	
ultimate	 implementation	 will	 be	 effectuated	 by	 administrative	 decision–
making	 (e.g	 the	 approval	 of	 a	 planning	 application).	 Therefore,	 unless	 the	
outcome	 of	 the	 planning	 stage	 is	 binding	 for	 all	 participants	 including	 the	
decision	 makers,	 there	 is	 de	 facto	 superiority	 of	 public	 authorities.	
Nevertheless,	 adaptive	 co-management	 under	 the	 second	 understanding	
might	be	possible.	It	would	require	the	formal	establishment	of	a	Partnership	
and	 the	 subsequent	 delegation	 of	 decision-making	 authority.	 But	 issues	 of	
accountability	and	legitimacy	are	likely	to	arise	by	delegating	decision-making	
power	 to	 a	 body	 comprising	 inter	 alia	 by	 non-elected	 private	 profitable	













These	 complex	 interrelationships	among	participants	 reflect	 and	are	
the	 direct	 result	 of	 increased	 socio-ecological	 but	 also	 administrative	
complexity.940 	The	 part	 played	 by	 each	 of	 the	 participants	 cannot	 be	 pre-
determined	as	it	will	vary	considerably	from	place	to	place.	However,	it	should	
be	made	clear	to	all	stakeholders	at	the	start	of	each	process.	There	is	much	
literature	 on	 how	 to	 design	 and	 facilitate	 consensus	 building	 focusing	 on	
stakeholder	 empowerment,	 the	 value	 of	 design	 and	 of	 well-trained	
facilitators/mediators	who	can	 significantly	 influence	 the	outcome.941	Given	
the	complexity	of	conservation	problems,	adaptive	co-management	although	





‘are	 vulnerable	 to	 legal	 challenge	 as	 ultra	 vires’	 and	 continues	 	 ‘If	 local	 groups	 had	 the	
authority	 to	 bind	 federal	 and	 state	 governments	 to	 place-based	 solutions	 to	 specific	
implementation	plans,	 it	would	raise	serious	separation	of	power	and	due	process	 issues’;			
George	Cameron	Coggins,	‘Of	Californicators,	Quislings	and	Crazies:	Some	Perils	of	Devolved	
Collaboration’	 in	P.	Brick,	D.	 Snow	and	 S.	 van	 de	Wetering	 (eds),	 Across	 the	Great	Divide:	
Explorations	In	Collaborative	Conservation	And	The	American	West	(Island	Press	2001)	169-
171	 being	 very	 critical	 of	 collaborative	 decision-making,	 questions	 decision-making	
delegation	to	‘unappointed,	unelected	citizens	at	large	or	interested	economic	entities’	raising	
issues	of	constitutional	representative	democracy	and	separation	of	powers.	
940 	The	 number	 of	 laws,	 regulations	 and	 administrative	 authorities	 involved	 further	




M.	 Redpath	 and	 others	 (eds),	 Conflicts	 in	 Conservation	 Navigating	 Towards	 Solutions	
(Cambridge	 University	 Press	 2015);	 Borrini-Feyerabend	 and	 Buchan	 (n47)152-156;	 Reed	
and	Sidoli	Del	Ceno,	 (n60)	232;	The	Sustainable	Uplands	 	project	mediation	approach	 to	a	

















chapter,	 which	 traces	 the	 flexibility	 of	 the	 English	 legal	 framework	 and	











abandoning	 the	 uplands,	 we	 are	 focused	 on	 forging	 the	 day-to-day	 partnerships	 that	 can	
achieve	 practical	 results.	 We	 are	 reviewing	 our	 uplands	 evidence	 and	 reinvigorating	 the	
uplands	 burning	 group	 to	 share	 evidence	 and	 develop	 best	 practice.	We	 have	 an	 uplands	
director	in	place	to	coordinate	and	lead	on	our	uplands	work.	Only	agreed,	co-ordinated	action	




944 	Jody	 Freeman,	 ‘Collaborative	 Governance	 in	 the	 Administrative	 State’	 (45)	 UCLA	 Law	







Adaptive	 management	 and	 adaptive	 co-management	 theories	 were	
developed	 as	 a	 response	 to	 traditional	 forms	 of	 legislation	 and	 regulatory	
decision	 making.	 Neither	 the	 adaptive	 nor	 the	 collaborative	 component	 of	
adaptive	management	 are	 compatible	 and	 certainly	 cannot	 thrive	within	 a	
highly	 prescriptive	 legislative	 framework. 945 	As	 explained	 in	 this	 chapter,	











‘rule	 of	 law’. 947 	Collaborative	 management	 operates	 within	 a	 framework	
where:	
	lines	of	authority	and	divisions	of	responsibility	are	often	neither	formal	
nor	 transparent;	 institutional	 boundaries	 are	 fluid	 and	 permeable,	 if	
institutions	can	be	discerned	at	all;	and	roles,	identities,	and	allegiances	
are	 blurred	 in	 a	 jumble	 of	 hybrid	 public-	 private,	 national-and-local	
arrangements.948		
As	 such,	 it	 is	 in	 stark	 contrast	 with	 legal	 traditions	 that	 draw	 sharp	 lines	
																																																								





L	Rev	237,	256	suggests	 that	collaborative	governance	albeit	achieving	better	 results	 runs	
counter	to	the	rule	of	law.	





of	 powers	 and	 take	 a	 conservative	 approach	 towards	 administrative	
discretion.	As	Karkkainen	puts	it:	
is	 hard	 to	 see	 where	 accountability	 comes	 from	 when	 the	 lines	 of	
authority	become	so	blurred	that	no	single	party	can	be	identified	as	the	
authoritative	decision-maker.	It	violates	our	deep-	seated	sense	of	order,	
and	 it	may	even	appear	 incompatible	with	"the	rule	of	 law	as	a	 law	of	
rules,"	to	borrow	Justice	Scalia's	phrase.949	
Introducing,	 adaptive	 co-management	 requires	 breaking	 through	





Legal	 and	 institutional	 arrangements	 that	 would	 facilitate	 the	
implementation	of	collaborative	decision-making	would	normally	display	the	










dictate	 specific	 management	 activities	 and	 criteria	 (e.g	 scientific)	 against	
which	decisions	are	to	be	made	binding	the	administration,	decision-makers	













to	 be	 able	 to	 implement	 the	 outcomes	 of	 agreement	 and	 compromises;	 for	




only	 between	 one	 regulator	 and	 one	 regulated	 but	 between	 multiple	
regulators	and	multiple	regulated.	Going	back	to	the	Carlsson's	network,	what	
is	 needed	 are	 flexible	 legal	 instruments	 such	 as	 multi-lateral	 contractual	
agreements,	 to	account	 for	 the	horizontal	and	vertical	 links	between	actors.	
Furthermore,	collaborative	processes	for	large	scale	management	will	benefit	
from	 legislation	 introducing	 binding	 procedural	 rules	 for	 management	
planning	 -	 if	 not	 for	 collaborative	 management	 planning.	 If	 planning	
authorities	are	under	a	statutory	duty	to	prepare	management	plans	(this	will	
also	entail	some	form	of	statutory	or	non-statutory	designation	of	a	specific	
unit	 of	 land),	 adaptive	 collaborative	 management	 is	 more	 likely	 to	 occur.	
Without	 undermining	 the	 importance	 of	 adaptive	 collaborative	 procedures	





sound	 contradictory,	 but	 adaptive	 co-management	 needs	 traditional	
legislation	 and	 regulation	 to	 become	 the	 ‘watchdog’	 of	 the	 process.	 The	








Karkkainen	 draws	 from	 contract	 theory	 and	 introduces	 the	 notion	 of	
‘regulatory	 penalty	 default’	 which	 he	 sees	 as	 a	 compatible	 and	 necessary	
precondition	to	adaptive	collaborative	management.950			
A	 regulatory	 penalty	 default	 is	 a	 harsh	 or	 quasi-punitive	 regulatory	
requirement	 that	 applies	 as	 the	 default	 rule	 if	 parties	 fail	 to	 reach	 a	
satisfactory	 alternative951(...)	 the	 regulatory	 rule	 is	 applied	 only	 as	 a	
presumptively	 undesirable	 “penalty	 default”	 position,	 against	 which	
superior	cooperative	solutions	are	sought.952		
Regulatory	 impositions	 lurking	 at	 the	 side-lines	 provide	 strong	
incentives	for	parties	to	bargain	towards	less	harsh	alternatives	but	are	also	
seen	 as	 capable	 of	 addressing	 some	major	 concerns	of	 the	 legal	world	 that	
adaptive	 and	 adaptive	 collaborative	 management	 processes	 are	 in	 tension	
with,	such	as	fundamental	rule	of	law	precepts.	These	concerns	relate	to	issues	












952 	Karkkainen,	 ‘Collaborative	 Ecosystem	 Governance:	 Scale,	 Complexity,	 and	 Dynamism’	
(n54)	231.	
953	See	supra	n939;	See	also	Jody	Freeman,	‘The	Contracting	State’	(2000)	28	Fla	St	U	L	Rev	







as	 a	 backdrop	 to	 underpin	 and	 bolster	 the	 credibility	 of	 more	 flexible	




Within	 a	 context	 of	 socio-ecological	 complexity,	 flexibility	 is	 adaptive	
management’s	 greatest	 strength;	 from	 a	 legal	 perspective,	 it	 is	 its	 greatest	
weakness.	 Arguably,	 this	 is	 the	 reason	why	 the	 legal	 framework	 remained	
adherent	 to	 earlier	 depictions	 of	 nature	 even	 when	 ecology	 was	 strongly	
indicating	otherwise;	 they	both	 share	 the	 same	underpinnings	of	 structure,	
hierarchy,	cause	and	effect	relationships	and	certainty.	Adaptive	management	
philosophy	 matches	 socio-ecological	 complexity	 but	 creates	 tensions	 with	
long-established	 legal	 precepts.	 However,	 like	 every	 flexible	 responsive	
system,	as	soon	as	it	starts	to	become	formalised	it	is	not	as	flexible;	but	on	the	
other	hand,	if	it	is	not	formalised	flexibility	can	be	dangerous.	Early	experience	




Notwithstanding	 the	 challenges,	 the	promise	of	 adaptive	 collaborative	
management	 to	 address	 both	 social	 and	 ecological	 complexity	 cannot	 go	
unnoticed	especially	in	relation	to	large	scale	management	that	goes	beyond	
designated	areas	and	protected	species.	Therefore,	we	need	to	make	it	work	
by	 finding	 the	 right	balance	and	provide	a	 firm	 framework	 for	 flexibility	 to	

























resolve	 such	conflicts	by	prioritizing	 interests	on	 the	adversarial	basis	 that	







focused	 conservation	 system	 that	 still	 remains	 central	 to	 conservation	
approaches. 959 		 On	 the	 other	 hand,	 where	 these	 rights	 remain	 largely	
unaffected,	nature’s	 interests	 subside	and	conflicts,	 latent	or	otherwise,	 are	
resolved	in	favour	of	human	interests		
As	mentioned	in	Chapter	Two,	nature	conservation	legislation,	as	with	
most	 initiatives	 seeking	 to	 alter	 the	 status	 quo,	 became	 itself	 the	 source	 of	
conflict.	 Additionally,	 the	 resolution	 of	 legal	 dispute	 does	 not	 essentially	
resolve	conflict.	Following	the	law’s	adversarial	attempt	to	resolve	conflicts,	










960 	Nevertheless,	 it	 has	 to	 be	 noticed	 that	 looking	 at	 legislation	 collectively,	 even	 non-
designated	 areas	 are	 not	 subject	 to	 uncontrolled	 use	 and	 development.	 A	 combination	 of	




must	 be	 included	 on	 the	 list.	 	 On	 the	 other	 hand,	 from	 the	 landowners,	
developers’	and	even	society’s	point	of	view,	one	crested	newt	seems	like	an	
enemy	 to	 development;	 hence	 protective	 species	 earn	 themselves	 the	
reputation	of	derailing	house	development	and	public	infrastructure.961	
As	 an	 alternative,	 the	 previous	 discussion	 introduced	 the	 idea	 of	
adaptive	management	as	a	mechanism	to	resolve	conflict	or	 to	significantly	
reduce	it,	since	as	long	as	different	groups	of	people	share	different	priorities	
a	 complete	 elimination	 is	 rather	 unrealistic. 962 		 Such	 an	 approach	 places	
negotiation	 and	 consensus	 building	 at	 the	 heart	 of	 the	 decision-making	
process	and	shifts	 from	a	top-town	administrative	procedure	to	bottom-up,	
based	on	partnership	and	co-operation.	Adaptive	management	breaks	through	






making;	 by	 bringing	 together	 all	 interested	 parties,	 it	widens	 the	 scope	 for	






relate	 to	 the	 various	 aspects	 of	 its	 practical	 implementation,	 such	 as	
																																																								
961 	Alan	 Law,	 ‘Planning	 a	 brighter	 future	 for	 the	 great	 crested	 newt’	
(https://naturalengland.blog.gov.uk/2016/05/25/planning-a-brighter-future-for-the-great-
crested-newt/,	25	May	2016)	accessed	15	November	2017.	Great	Crested	Newts	have	caused	












one	 of	 the	 primary	 reasons	 behind	 the	 failure	 of	 large	 scale	 adaptive	 co-
management	initiatives.963	
This	discussion	focuses	on	the	normative	aspects	of	such	a	model.	The	
previous	 chapters	 argued	 that	 adaptive	 and	 collaborative	 decision-making	
requires	 a	 flexible	 legal	 framework	 where	 statutory	 provisions	 do	 not	
mandate	a	particular	course	of	action	by	the	regulator.	The	1981	Wildlife	and	
Countryside	Act	provisions	on	SSSI	designation	 fall	 into	 the	 latter	 category.	
The	law	lays	down	specific	obligations	and	binding	duties:	Natural	England	is	
bound	to	notify	and	subsequently	confirm	as	an	SSSI	any	area	of	land	that	is	of	





the	 English	 administrative	 tradition	 set	 up	 a	 framework	 for	 adaptive	
management	to	thrive.	Admittedly	not	all	aspects	of	adaptive	management	fit	
easily	 and	 neatly	 within	 the	 current	 framework.	 Both	 conservation	 and	
conservation	 related	 laws	 and	 regulations	 remain	 heavily	 attached	 to	 the	
notion	of	private	ownership	and	administrative	boundaries,	and	as	such	they	
might	be	unable	to	foster	and	promote	join	decision-making	
Finally,	 it	must	be	pointed	out	 that	 an	adaptive	approach	 in	no	 case	
undermines	 the	 significance	 of	 statutory	 binding	 legislation.	 Statutory	
legislation	sets	an	overarching	framework	that	draws	the	limits	for	action.	As	
contradictory	 as	 it	 might	 seem,	 a	 flexible	 decision-making	 model	 must	 be	
clearly	structured	as	it	carries	the	inherent	danger	of	being	abused.	The	UK’s	
experience	with	an	entirely	voluntary	approach	until	the	amendments	of	the	










looking	 for	 legal	 prescriptions	 explicitly	mandating	 the	 use	 of	 adaptive	 co-
management.	Similarly	to	the	analysis	on	the	scientific	adaptive	management,	
I	 am	 seeking	 to	 identify	 opportunities	 for	 negotiation	 towards	 amicable	
conflict	resolution	within	conservation	legislation.	
	I	 will	 first	 set	 out	 some	 general	 characteristics	 of	 the	 English	 legal	
tradition	 that	 shaped	 and	 strongly	 influenced	 the	 development	 of	
conservation	 laws	 and	 provide	 a	 backdrop	 against	 which	 the	 balancing	 of	
interest	is	taking	place;	there	is	a	traditional	adherence	to	voluntarism	and	co-
operation,	which	is	strongly	connected	to	the	historically	central	position	of	
the	 notion	 of	 property	 has	within	 English	 law,	 together	with	 the	 powerful	
lobbies	of	 landowners	and	 farmers	who	saw	nature	 conservation	 laws	as	a	
threat	 to	 their	 interests.	 This	 discussion	 complements	 the	 discussion	 in	
Chapter	4,	s.4.1.966				
Then,	I	will	refer	to	specific	legal	provisions	and	instruments	that	allow	

























of	environmental	 law	and	one	reason	why	direct	regulation	 is	not	 the	most	
suitable	approach.967	Instead,	 a	 system	based	on	cooperation	and	voluntary	
action	 was	 developed.	 Even	 after	 the	 amendments	 of	 CROWA	 2000	 that	
strengthened	 the	 regime	 of	 nature	 conservation,	 the	 administrative	
authorities	 will	 initially	 take	 the	 least	 onerous	 course	 of	 action,	 for	 the	









and	enjoys	 absolute	powers	of	 enjoyment	use	 and	management	of	 his	



















regarding	elements	of	 the	natural	 environment:	The	development	of	 a	 land	
tenure	system,	where	a	plot	of	land	together	with	any	plants	growing	in	the	
ground	 belong	 to	 their	 owner,	 is	 very	much	 in	 line	with	 this	 thought.	 Also	








aimed	 at	 regulating	 the	 exploitation	 of	 biodiversity	 and	 protect	 rights	




the	 right	 to	 property	 is	 enriched	 in	 Art.17	 of	 the	 Universal	 Declaration	 of	
																																																								
970 	Montuschi,	 Eleonora	 (2010)	 Order	 of	 man,	 order	 of	 nature:	 Francis	 Bacon’s	 idea	 of	 a	













Human	 Rights974	and	 is	 guaranteed	 in	 Art.1	 of	 Protocol	 1	 of	 the	 European	
Convention	 on	 Human	 Rights	 (ECHR). 975 	According	 to	 A.M	 Honoré	 the	







ownership. 977 	The	 interference	 may	 arise	 directly	 by	 negative	 control	
measures	established	in	legislation,	when	for	instance	legislation	forbids	the	
killing	 of	 birds	 and	 animals	 and	 thereby	 restricts	 the	 exercise	 of	 property	
rights	 of	 their	 potential	 captors	 or	 forbids	 the	 taking	 of	 plant	 species,	
restricting	the	rights	of	landowner	to	‘nurture	or	destroy	the	plant	as	he	thinks	
fit’. 978 	Interference	 may	 also	 occur	 by	 measures	 requiring	 landowners	 to	
refrain,	tolerate	or	adhere	to	certain	management	practices	that	significantly	
restrict	 their	 right	 to	 determine	 what	 happens	 to	 their	 land. 979 	But		
interference	with	 the	enjoyment	of	property	rights	does	not	sit	well	within	
English	 law.	 Christopher	 Jesser,	 retired	 solicitor,	 stressed	 during	 the	 oral	
evidence	 session	 held	 by	 the	 HoC	 Justice	 Select	 Committee	 on	 an	 inquiry	



























approach	 by	 the	 English	 legislator.	 Additionally,	 and	 beyond	 normative	
justifications	and	legal	traditions,	considering	the	long-term	management	of	
English	 land	 and	 the	 increased	 power	 of	 the	 farming	 lobbying,	 a	 direct	
confrontation	with	 landowners	 and	 land	 tenants’	 interests	would	 not	 have	
been	a	politically	wise	move.	Thus,	nature	 conservation	 law	 in	England	has	
until	recently	been	entirely	reliant	on	the	voluntary	principle,	the	good	will	of	
landowners	 and	 the	 amount	 of	 financial	 resources	 available	 to	 statutory	





















The	argument	of	 this	chapter	 is	 that	 the	primary	 features	of	what	 in	
literature	is	referred	to	as	‘adaptive	collaborative	management’	or	‘adaptive	
co-management’	 can	 be	 traced	 or	 easily	 integrated	 within	 a	 nature	
conservation	 framework,	 within	 a	 conflict	 resolution	 context.	 In	 fact,	 basic	
tenets	of	adaptive	co-management,	balancing	interests	and	resolving	conflicts	
through	 partnership,	 cooperation	 and	 negotiation	 underpinned	 nature	
conservation	 practice	 before	 the	 introduction	 of	 statutory	 legislation.	 The	
legal	framework	of	nature	conservation	in	England	was	built	on	the	tenets	of	
partnership	and	co-operation;	 in	 fact,	adaptive	management	mechanisms	 in	
























988	The	 aim	was	 to	 bring	 together	 all	 interested	parties	 through	 a	 series	 of	
conferences	 and	meetings	 in	 order	 ‘to	 promote	mutual	 understanding	 and	
cooperation’ 989 	on	 the	 basis	 of	 a	 compromise	 approach. 990 	A	 network	 of	
FWAGs	was	subsequently	 created	whose	goal	was	 to	 involve	as	many	 local	
farmers	 and	 landowners	 as	 possible,	 and	 to	 encourage	 them	 to	 adopt	
themselves	conservation	practices	in	their	farming.	991Central	to	the	work	of	
FWAGs	 was	 the	 idea	 that	 agriculture	 and	 conservation	 interests	 were	 not	







and	 the	 ‘farm	walk’,	was	 central	 to	 the	 initiative.	 There	were	 also	 practical	
demonstrations	in	an	attempt	to	show	farmers	that	the	needs	of	conservation	
and	modern	(at	the	time)	farming	could	be	reconciled.993	
FWAG	 would	 also	 organise	 ‘exercises’	 which	 were	 essentially	
management	plans	with	set	objectives,	much	scientific	input	and	an	element	
of	 experimentation. 994 	One	 of	 these	 ‘exercises’,	 a	 chalkland	 exercise	 in	
Wiltshire	in	1973,	brought	to	the	surface	some	of	the	conflicting	viewpoints	of	






















an	 emphasis	 on	 the	 paramount	 need	 to	 retain	 their	 goodwill	 and	




the	 land	 for	 years	 and	 are	 the	 people	 who	 ‘know	 the	 land’.	 Even	 from	 a	
practical	perspective,	financial	and	human	resources	restraints	would	never	
allow	 regulatory	 agencies	 to	 manage	 all	 sites	 using	 their	 own	 means.	
Successful	 conservation	 management	 requires	 meaningful	 active	
management,	 a	 genuine	 understanding	 of	 the	 objective	 being	 pursued,	 not	
mere	 compliance	 with	 the	 letter	 of	 the	 law	 under	 the	 constant	 threat	 of	
coercion.	 Besides,	 adequate	 compliance	 monitoring	 and	 enforcement	 are	





FWAG	 realised,	 proper	 training	 education	 of	 those	 involved	 is	 vital	 to	








can	promote	nature	 conservation	even	without	major	 impairments	of	 their	
other	interests.	999	
However,	the	advantages	of	voluntarism	were	not	the	only	reason	why	
the	 voluntary	 principle	 was	 deeply	 enriched	 in	 the	 1981	 Wildlife	 and	
Countryside	Act.	The	strong	interference	with	property	rights,	socio-economic	
–	agriculture	holds	a	great	share	of	English	economy	-	and	political	–	NFU	and	
CLA	 are	 powerful	 lobbies	 -	 were	 among	 the	 reasons	 why	 establishing	
enforceable	 legislation	did	not	seem	like	an	appealing	choice.	As	one	would	























‘a	 change	 in	 land	management	had	been	obstructed	by	Site	notification	 ‘.	 See	Alexander	S.	
Mather,	‘Protected	areas	in	the	periphery:	Conservation	and	controversy	in	northern	Scotland’	
(1993)	9	Journal	of	Rural	Studies	371.	
1001 	Reid,	 Nature	 conservation	 law	 (n1)	 181;	 See	 also	 the	 ‘net	 profits	 foregone	 approach	




The	 extensive	 destruction	 of	 designated	 areas	 throughout	 the	 firsts	
years	 of	 implementation	 of	 the	 original	 1981	 Act	 confirms	 Gunnigham’s	
argument	 on	 the	 ‘lack	 of	 dependability’	 of	 voluntary	 approaches. 1002	
Voluntarism	 as	 a	 sole	 basis	 for	 conservation	 proved	 insufficient	 to	 prevent	
further	 loss	 caused	 by	 damaging	 activities,	 let	 alone	 supporting	 positive	
management. 1003 	The	 destruction	 of	 valuable	 wildlife	 areas	 boosted	
awareness	 of	 nature	 conservation. 1004 	At	 the	 same	 time	 and	 as	 noted	 in	





were	 given	 the	 power	 to	 indefinitely	 halt	 damaging	 operations. 1006 	The	
CROWA	 2000	 strengthened	 the	 nature	 conservation	 regime	 and	 moved	 it	
further	into	the	sphere	of	command	and	control	legislation.	At	the	same	time,	
nature	conservation	was	largely	favoured	by	amendments	to	the	agricultural	
policy	 as	 a	 result	 of	 the	 EU	 Common	 Agricultural	 Policy	 (CAP)	 reform,1007	
especially	the	introduction	of	cross-compliance	and	changes	in	the	way	that	
payments	 under	 management	 agreements	 were	 made.	 The	 underpinning	
philosophy	of	the	current	system	of	payments	for	management	agreements	is	
that	 public	 expenditure	 should	 focus	 on	 positive	 management. 1008 	The	

















and	 enforceable	 regimes.	 This	 fact	 alone	 is	 a	win	 for	 nature	 conservation,	
especially	 considering	 how	 sharply	 it	 contrasts	 to	 long	 established	 British	
traditions	on	land	management.	Nevertheless,	precisely	because	the	voluntary	
principle	 is	 deeply	 embedded	 within	 the	 nature	 conservation	 culture,	 it	 is	
difficult	 to	 entirely	 overcome.	While	 significantly	 weakened,	 the	 voluntary	
principle	remains	in	the	background	of	nature	conservation	and	continues	to	
influence	 the	 implementation	of	 the	 legal	 provisions.	 Although	 the	 ‘laissez-
faire’	approach	that	dominated	the	nature	conservation	regime	prior	 to	 the	
CROWA	2000	amendments	has	been	abandoned,	the	approach	is	not	one	of	
command	 and	 control	 either.	 The	 nature	 conservation	 legal	 landscape	
comprises	of	a	mix	of	instruments	that	apply	in	a	complementary	or	sequential	
way.	Voluntary	measures	are	still	favoured	but	the	regulators	know	that	they	







the	 preceded	 section,	 drew	 attention	 to	 some	 general	 features	 of	





This	 ‘British	 approach’	 to	 environmental	 regulation,	 although	 it	 does	 not	









Hence,	 as	 mentioned	 in	 Chapter	 One,	 decentralised	 administration	
allows	 for	 the	 representation	 of	 a	wider	 array	 of	 interests	 given	 that	 even	
interests	 that	 can	 be	 named	 ‘environmental’	 are	 often	 non-compatible.1012	
This	 was	 realised	 during	 the	 review	 of	 Environment	 Agency	 and	 Natural	
England	and	prevented	 the	merging	of	 latter	–	 the	agency	 bound	 to	nature	
conservation	objectives	-	with	the	more	powerful	Environment	Agency.1013	
	Additionally,	 the	 variety	 of	 instruments	 available	 at	 the	
administration’s	disposal	coupled	with	a	wide	margin	of	discretion,	allows	for	
adaptive	 co-management	 mechanisms	 such	 as	 collaboration	 among	
stakeholders,	 trade-offs	 and	 compromises	 towards	 consensus	 building	 and	
balancing	conflicting	interests.			
This	 flexible	exercising	of	 judgment	and	decision	making	enables	 the	
administration	 to	 employ	 any	 technique	 they	 deem	 suitable,	 from	 direct	
regulation	 to	 flexible	management	 schemes.	 Legislation	 does	 not	 prescribe	
particular	 means	 to	 achieve	 the	 objective	 of	 e.g.	 ‘favourable	 conservation	
status’	of	SSSIs.	Hence,	they	can	choose	to	place	emphasis	not	on	coercion	but	













1014 	Lutz-Christian	 Wolff	 discussing	 law	 and	 flexibility	 in	 Lutz-Christian	 Wolff,	 ‘Law	 and	
Flexibility:	Rule	of	Law	Limits	on	a	Rhetorical	Silver	Bullet’	[2011]	J	JURIS	549,	550	refers	to	
four	different	perceptions	of	flexibility	in	relation	to	law.	One	regards	flexibility	‘as	an	attribute	
of	 the	 application	 of	 the	 law…from	 this	 perspective,	 it	would	 not	 be	 the	 law	 itself	 that	 is	
flexible,	 but	 how	 the	 law	 is	 applied	 in	 practice’.	 Although	 at	 it	 becomes	 clear	 in	 p.563,	












site	 designation	 and	 species	 listing 1015 	to	 the	 less	 rigorous,	 management	
regime.	 This	 is	 where	 administrative	 authorities	 -	 Natural	 England	 to	 land	
management	or	 local	planning	authorities	 in	relation	to	 land	development	-	
are	given	discretion	to	allow	activities	 that	are	 in	principle	 forbidden,	 in	an	
effort	 to	strike	a	balance	between	the	 interests	 in	play.	This	combination	of	
rigidity	and	flexibility	allows	for	a	regulated	adaptive	management	model	to	






changes	 the	 balance	 between	 the	 various	 interests;	 statutory	 protection	
changes	the	dynamics	between	competitive	parties	with	nature	conservation	
interests	(and	 those	who	represent	 them)	being	placed	 in	an	advantageous	
position.	In	the	wider	countryside,	on	the	other	hand,	private	rights	prevail.1016	
This	 is	 because,	 despite	 the	 absence	 of	 ad	 hoc	 provisions,	 property	 and	 all	
related	rights	remain	unaffected	and	thereby	unrestricted	–	at	least	in	relation	




in	 line	with	 the	 regulatory	dichotomy	between	operations	 falling	under	 the	
																																																								
1015	See	discussion	in		ch.4.	




‘development’	 under	 the	 planning	 legislation	 and	 operations	 concerning	
multiple	 land	 uses	 outside	 the	 ‘development’	 concept.	 The	 reason	 for	 this	




mechanisms	 are	 different.	 Likewise,	 operations	 falling	 under	 ‘plans	 or	
projects’	within	the	meaning	of	art.6	of	 the	Habitats	Directive	are	examined	







By	 introducing	 legal	 classifications	 of	 land,	 the	 law	 seeks	 to	 resolve	








preference	 for	 voluntary	 co-operation,	 the	 second	 stage	 of	 implementing	
conservation	measure	is	not	one	of	a	strict	‘command	and	control’	system	of	










measures’	 where	 direct	 regulation	 is	 limited	 ‘to	 the	 basics’. 1018 	To	 resolve	
tensions,	 landowners	 and	 land	 users	 are	 ideally	 actively	 involved	 in	
management	 planning	 and	management	 itself.	 The	 aim	 is	 to	 ‘acknowledge	
their	shared	responsibilities	by	setting	clear	objectives	for	conservation,	but	
ensure	 flexibility	 in	 agreed	 management	 measures’. 1019 	This	 partnership	
focused	approach	is	underpinned	by	the	statutory	legislation	and	is	put	into	
practical	implementation	through	the	way	the	regulatory	agencies	opt	to	fulfil	
their	 statutory	 duties:	 it	 is	 a	 model	 of	 decision	 making	 very	 close	 to	 the	
philosophy	 of	 adaptive	 management,	 one	 that	 ‘endorses	 the	 constructive	








all	human	activities	are	excluded,	 and	 focus	 is	only	set	on	 conservation.1022	





1020	DEFRA,	 Sites	 of	 Special	 Scientific	 Interest:	 Encouraging	 positive	 partnerships.	 Code	 of	
guidance	(n558).	
1021	Bouwma	and	others	(n998)	6.	









1023 	Ludwig	 Krämer,	 EU	 environmental	 law	 (7th	 edition.	 edn,	 Sweet	 &	 Maxwell	 2012)	




not	unrealistic,	but	also	not	appropriate	 for	several	reasons:	 first,	 removing	
people	from	their	land	would	amount	to	a	major	interference	with	property	
rights	 and	 as	 such	 it	 would	 require	 large	 amounts	 of	 funding	 for	
compensation.1024	In	 a	 country	 like	 the	UK	with	 the	majority	of	 land	 under	
private	ownership	this	seems	unrealistic.	In	fact,	in	England	40%	of	the	SSSI	
are	under	private	ownership	and	 from	 the	 remaining	percentage	only	16%	
belongs	 to	 organisations	 managing	 the	 land	 exclusively	 for	 nature	
conservation	interests;1025	around	75%	of	forest	land	in	Great	Britain	is	also	
privately	owned.1026		
Furthermore,	 even	 if	 this	was	 somewhat	possible,	 entirely	excluding	
socio-ecological	interests	would	require	either	a	small	number	of	designated	
sites	or	halting	economic	and	social	development.	Let’s	consider	farming	for	
instance:	 farming	 uses	more	 than	 70%	of	 the	 country's	 land	 area,	 employs	
almost	 1.5%	 of	 its	 workforce	 and	 contributes	 0.61%	 of	 its	 gross	 value	
added. 1027 	At	 the	 same	 time	 the	 UK	 produces	 only	 53%	 of	 the	 food	 it	
consumes.1028 	Imposing	 strict	 restrictions	 on	 designated	 land	 would	 mean	











RSPB;	 England,	 Protecting	 England's	Natural	 Treasures:	 Sites	 of	 Special	 Scientific	 Interest	
(n557).	








biodiversity	 value	 in	 order	 to	 have	 it	 exclusively	 managed	 for	 nature	
conservation	purposes.		
Finally,	also	acknowledged	in	the	preamble	of	the	Habitats	Directive	is	
that	 the	 maintenance	 of	 biodiversity	 may	 in	 certain	 cases	 require	 the	
maintenance	or	indeed	the	encouragement	of	human	activities.1030	Grazing	is	
an	example	of	such	an	activity.	 In	 the	case	that	Natural	England	owned	and	
managed	all	 the	designated	areas,	 they	themselves	would	have	to	 introduce	










charges	 anyone	 who	 contravenes	 this	 provision. 1033 	However,	 despite	
stepping	 away	 from	 the	 previous	 purely	 voluntary	 approach,	 the	 regime	
																																																								
1030Habitats	 Directive	 (n34)	 preamble,	 recital	 3;	 Often	 it	 is	 the	 abandonment	 of	 human	










drainage	 operations	which	would	 change	 the	 level	 of	 the	 water,	 the	 owner	 could	 not	 be	
required	 to	 resume	pumping.	This	case	illustrates	 the	weakness	of	 the	 regime	prior	 to	 the	









Hence,	 s.28E	 of	WCA	1981	 introduces	 the	 conditions	 under	which	 a	
landowner	may	 proceed	with	 restricted	 operations:	 first,	 the	 landowner	or	
occupier	has	to	give	notice	to	Natural	England	of	his	intention	to	carry	out	an	










certain	 times	of	 the	year,	or	 in	a	 certain	way	 that	will	not	 compromise	 the	
integrity	of	the	site,	in	order	to	issue	a	consent;1036	or	explore	any	alternative	
solutions	that	would	enable	Natural	England	to	issue	a	consent.	
		In	 line	 with	 the	 more	 flexible	 character	 of	 the	 post-designation	
provisions	of	the	WCA	1981,	s.28F	provides	for	an	appeal	to	the	Secretary	of	
State	 in	cases	where	the	 landowner	 is	not	satisfied	with	the	outcome	of	 the	
Natural	 England’s	 decision, 1037 	but	 which	 are	 not	 however	 available	 for	
notification	decisions.	The	Secretary	of	State	 is	granted	discretion	to	decide	
himself,	hold	a	wholly	or	partly	private	hearing	or	a	local	inquiry.1038		
The	 WCA	 1981	 does	 not	 lay	 down	 specific	 criteria	 to	 bind	 Natural	













stricter	 provisions	 of	 the	 Conservation	 Regulations	 2010	 apply.	 So,	 when	
Natural	 England	 receives	 an	 application	 for	 consent	 that	 relates	 to	 an	
operation	which	 is	or	 forms	part	of	a	plan	or	project	 that	 is	likely	 to	have	a	
significant	effect	on	a	European	site	(either	alone	or	in	combination	with	other	
plans	 or	 projects),	 and	 is	 not	 directly	 connected	 with	 or	 necessary	 to	 the	
management	 of	 the	 site,	 they	must	make	 an	 appropriate	 assessment	of	 the	
implications	for	the	site	in	view	of	the	site’s	conservation	objectives.1039	In	the	
light	 of	 the	 assessment,	 they	may	 give	 consent	 for	 the	 operation	 only	 after	
having	 ascertained	 that	 the	 plan	 or	 project	 will	 not	 adversely	 affect	 the	
integrity	of	the	site.1040	




imperils	 its	 statutory	 purpose	 might	 give	 ground	 for	 a	 judicial	 review.1041	
Hence,	there	should	be	cases	where	private	interests	would	give	way	to	that	of	
nature	if	all	alternatives	for	compromising	solutions	have	been	exhausted.	
Arguably,	 the	 changes	 in	 relation	 to	OLDs	 brought	 about	 by	 CROWA	2000,	
significantly	 compromised	 the	 voluntary	 (albeit	 not	 the	 co-operative)	
character	of	the	previous	regime.	However,	the	Act	went	further	than	merely	










local	 authorities	 and	 statutory	 undertakers	 (e.g.	 the	 Environment	 Agency,	 the	 Forestry	








is	 asked	 to	 assent	 to	 the	 operation.	 As	 with	 the	 s.28E	 consent	 procedure,	
Natural	England	may	assent	with	or	without	conditions	or	refuse	to	assent.1045	
Similarly	 to	 the	 conditional	 consent	 to	 private	 landowners,	 the	 s.28H	 (2)	
conditional	 assent	 allows	 room	 for	 negotiation	 into	 finding	 some	 common	
ground	between	the	authorities.		
There	is,	however,	a	major	difference	that	shifts	the	balance	between	



























this	 advice	 was	 taken	 into	 account,	 ensures	 that	 matters	 relating	 to	 the	
biodiversity	 interest	 of	 the	 site	 are	 given	 considerable	 attention	 during	
authorization	procedures.	There	are	no	specific	requirements	on	the	contents	
of	the	statements	but,	given	the	general	biodiversity	duty	that	binds	all	public	










authority	acting	under	 s.28I.	 Likewise,	 the	 carrying	out	of	 an	OLD	 is	 lawful	
provided	it	was	authorised	by	a	planning	permission	granted	on	an	application	
under	 Part	 III	 of	 the	 Town	 and	 Country	 Planning	 Act	 1990.	 The	 different	
treatment	of	public	bodies	and	especially	the	defences	laid	down	in	WCA	1981	






follows1049	reveals	 that	 the	regime	 is	rather	 loaded	 in	 favour	of	private	and	










preventing	 	 	 damage	 but	 also	 ameliorating	 the	 condition	 of	 the	 natural	
environment.	However,	this	might	also	create	tensions	with	landowners	as	it	
is	 likely	 that	 they	have	other	plans	 in	mind	for	 their	 land	than	carrying	out	
conservation	 management.	 As	 mentioned, 1050 	the	 law	 empowers	 Natural	
England	 to	 issue	 a	 management	 scheme 1051 	that	 set	 outs	 the	 measures	
necessary	to	conserve	or	restore	the	features	of	the	SSSI	and	which,	in	case	of	
non-compliance	 -	 can	 be	 enforced	 -	 through	 the	 subsequent	 issue	 of	 a	
management	 notice. 1052 	However,	 this	 would	 only	 apply	 in	 exceptional	
circumstances;	Natural	England’s	practice	is	to	take	enforcement	action	when	




Management	 agreements	 are	 voluntary,	 albeit	 legally	 binding,	
individually	negotiated	contractual	agreements	that	provide	for	the	positive	
management	 of	 designated	 land. 1055 	They	 provide	 a	 flexible	 approach	 to	
reducing	tensions	arising	in	SSSI	post-notification	as	a	result	of	the	restrictions	
imposed	 to	 certain	operations.	 	They	 can	 also	 be	 used	 to	 address	 potential	








1054	Explanatory	Memorandum,	 Sites	 of	 Special	 Scientific	 Interest	 (Appeals)	 (Amendment)	
Regulations	2010	para.7.3.	
1055 	Countryside	 Act	 1968	 s.15(2)	 amended	 by	 Countryside	 and	 Rights	 of	 Way	 Act	 2000	









There	 are	 no	 legal	 requirements	 in	 relation	 to	 the	 specifics	 of	 the	
agreement;	hence,	in	principle	the	conservation	body	and	the	landowner	may	
agree	 on	 anything.	 That	 includes	 activities	 that	 could	 be	 subject	 of	 the	
s.28E(3)(a)	 consent.1057	Hence,	 Natural	 England	 can	 theoretically	make	 an	
assessment	and	agree	on	carrying	out	certain	OLDs	in	return	for	activities	that	
would	 benefit	 biodiversity	 and	 even	 compensate	 for	 any	 damage	 the	 OLD	
causes	to	the	site;	if	provided	in	the	agreement,	the	condition	of	s.	28E(3)(b)	
is	 satisfied	 and	 the	 landowner	 will	 be	 able	 to	 carry	 out	 the	 potentially	
damaging	 operation. 1058 	Going	 back	 to	 Arnstein’s	 ‘ladder	 of	 citizenship	
participation’1059	management	agreement	seems	to	falling	within	partnership”	
-	found	at	the	upper	tier	but	not	upper	rung	of	the	ladder	-	since	they	enable	
citizens	(landowners)	 to	negotiate	and	engage	 in	 trade-offs	with	traditional	
power	 holders	 (Natural	 England).1060	They	 also	 sit	 somewhere	 in	 between	
cooperation	 and	 communication	of	 Berkes	 et	 al	 co-management	 ladder.1061	





Contrary	 to	 the	 management	 agreements,	 management	 schemes	 are	
regulatory	 measures	 that	 are	 designed	 and	 capable	 of	 being	 enforced,	
unilaterally,	 by	 the	 conservation	 body	 through	 issuing	 a	 management	
																																																								
1056	DEFRA,	 Sites	 of	 Special	 Scientific	 Interest:	 Encouraging	 positive	 partnerships.	 Code	 of	











notice. 1063 	However,	 the	 legislator’s	 predilection	 to	 amicable	 conflict	

















facilitate	 their	 positive	 management…Ministers	 are	 not	 prepared	 for	
public	money	 to	 be	paid	 out	 simply	 to	 prevent	 new	 operations	which	
could	destroy	or	damage	these	national	assets.1070		
At	 this	 point	 I	 need	 to	make	 an	 observation.	 Until	 the	 Environmental	









1068See	DETR	Guidelines	 on	Management	Agreement	 Payments	 and	Other	Related	Matters	
(n761)	para.1.2.	
1069	The	‘Guidelines’	document	has	a	statutory	effect	by	virtue	of	s.50(1)	of	the	WCA	1981,	







at	 the	 specific	 requirements	 of	 the	 various	 SSSIs.	 They	 also	 exemplified	 a	
collaboration-based	 model	 of	 designated	 land	 management	 ‘by	 combining	
Natural	 England’s	 knowledge	 of	 wildlife	 management	 with	 the	 owner	 or	
occupier’s	skills	and	knowledge	of	 the	 land’.1072	Operating	through	schemes	
like	WES,	management	agreement	could	 fulfil	 its	 full	potential	 for	balancing	
interests	and	resolve	tensions.	During	the	negotiation	procedure,	both	parties	
would	 lay	 down	 their	 particular	 needs	 and	 problems	 and	 aspirations	 to	 be	
taken	 into	account	 in	 the	 final	 agreement.	They	were	also	normally	 for	 five	
years	with	a	possibility	of	renewal.		
However,	 negotiating	 individual	 agreements	was	 a	 costly	 process	 and	
this	 led	 to	 the	 transfer	 and	 incorporation	 of	 SSSI	 agreements	 to	 the	 Rural	
Development	Programme	for	England	jointly	under	Pillar	2	of	the	EU	Common	
Agricultural	Policy.	Hence	SSSI	agreements	became	part	of	 the	Higher-Level	
Stewardship.1073	The	 implications	were	 significant	 for	 the	 flexibility	of	 SSSI	
agreements.	 AES	 agreements	 as	 mentioned	 in	 Chapter	 Four	 are	 focused	
schemes	 that	 offer	 standard	 payments	 for	 standard	 management	
requirements.1074	As	 a	 result,	 besides	 being	 unable	 to	 deliver	management	












Entry	 Level	 Stewardship.	 See	 Natural	 England,	 Entry	 Level	 Stewardship.	 Environmental	









nature	 conservation	 regime	underwent	 two	 transitions:	 a.	 towards	positive	
management,	enhancement	and	restoration	of	the	natural	environment	rather	
mere	 prevention	 of	 further	 degradation	 through	 the	 more	 traditional	
approach	 of	 restricting	 damaging	 activities.	 and	 b.	 from	 voluntarism	 to	 a	
regulated	consensus	building.	The	available	tools	have	remained	the	same1076	




for	 securing	 effective	 conservation	 management,	 the	 flagship	 of	 nature	




However,	 following	 the	 amendments	 under	 the	 CROWA	 2000,	
negotiations	 take	 place	 against	 a	 substantially	 different	 background,	 with	
Natural	England	having	a	markedly	strengthened	bargaining	superiority:	the	
amended	 version	 of	 the	 WCA	 1981	 sets	 a	 coherent	 framework	 for	
management	agreements,	which	are	now	negotiated	against	the	threat	of	the	
regulatory	lever.	Natural	England	may	refuse	to	consent	to	an	OLD	indefinitely	
or	 exercise	 its	 powers	 to	 issue	 and	 enforce	 a	 management	 scheme.	 The	


















The	 protective	 regime	 established	 by	 the	WCA	 1981	 is	 significantly	
relaxed	as	regards	development	operations,	as	neither	the	WCA	1981	nor	the	




are	 reversed.	 Planning	 permission	 is	 a	 matter	 for	 planning	 authorities	





























Although	 unable	 to	 provide	 a	 high	 level	 of	 protection,	 these	
arrangements	do	ensure	that	nature	conservation	interests	will	be	considered.	
The	 consultation	 process	 has	 a	 purpose	 similar	 to	 the	 EIA:	 they	 are	 both	
procedural	 requirements	 that	 provide	 the	 decision-maker	 with	 relevant	
information	in	relation	to	all	interests	at	play,	so	as	to	be	considered	before	the	
final	 decision.	The	 fact	 that	Natural	 England	 is	 a	 statutory	 consultee	 at	 the	
beginning	of	the	planning	process	is	crucial	for	the	implementation	of	adaptive	
collaborative	management.	Early	 communication	of	 the	 conservation	 issues	
arising	by	the	proposed	development	allows	for	Natural	England,	the	planning	
authorities,	 the	 developers,	 nature	 conservation	 organisations	 and	 anyone	
with	an	interest	to	the	site1082	–	at	the	discretion	of	the	planning	authority	-	to	
work	 together	 to	 secure	 a	 solution	 in	 order	 to	 accommodate	 as	 many	
competing	interests	possible.		
The	 National	 Planning	 Policy	 Framework	 sets	 out	 the	 government’s	
planning	 policy	 for	 England, 1083 	imposes	 a	 presumption	 in	 favour	 of	
sustainable	development1084	and	provides	for	the	integration	of	planning	and	
nature	 conservation. 1085 	In	 essence,	 the	 Framework	 seeks	 to	 help	 local	
																																																								
also	 require	 an	 environmental	 impact	 assessment	 under	 the	 Town	 and	 Country	 Planning	
(Environmental	 Impact	 Assessment)	 Regulations	 2011,	 SI	 2011/1804;	 See	 also	 ODPM	
Circular	 06/2005/DEFRA	 Circular	 01/2005	 Biodiversity	 and	 Geological	
Conservation	-	Statutory	Obligations	and	Their	Impact	Within	the	Planning	System.	
1081	WCA	1981,	S.28I;		
























The	 policy	 on	 SSSI	 development	 mirrors	 the	 Habitats	 Directive	
procedure	on	plans	and	projects	likely	to	affect	European	designations.1088	It	
exempts	SSSIs	from	development	likely	to	have	adverse	effects,	while	at	the	
same	 time	 recites	 circumstances	 when	 planning	 permission	 should	 be	
granted.	 Clearly,	 the	 NPPF	 is	 not	 legally	 binding,	 however,	 the	 planning	
authorities	 need	 to	 give	 proper	 regard	 as	 it	 reflects	 the	 government’s	
priorities;	 the	 NPPF	 seeks	 to	 guide	 planning	 authority	 with	 exercising	 its	
‘balancing’	duty,	by	attaching	more	weight	on	securing	the	integrity	of	SSSI.1089	
However,	 the	 fact	 remains	 that	 despite	 elevating	 the	 status	 of	













by	 the	NERC	2006,	s.40	general	biodiversity	duty,	 local	 authorities	are	also	
legally	bound	by	a	number	of	other	statutes	that	introduce	duties	more	than	
often	not	conflicting	with	conservation.1091	Therefore,	given	the	absence	of	a	
statutory	 ban	 of	 development	 within	 SSSI	 a	 judicial	 review	 against	 local	
authority	decision	has	a	very	limited	likelihood	of	success.1092	
It	 is	a	 fact	 that	 the	 legislature	wished	for	development,	even	when	 it	




are	 entrusted	 with	 planning	 decision-making.	 Arguably,	 development	
decisions	are	viewed	as	capable	of	affecting	a	greater	part	of	society	than	a	s.28	
OLD,	and	as	such	the	democratically	elected	local	authorities	are	the	‘arbiters	
of	 disputes’	 between	 the	 different	 interests	 involved. 1093 	During	 this	
‘balancing’	exercising	their	only	statutory	obligation	is	to	consider	all	material	



























will	 only	 intervene	 to	 quash	 a	 planning	 permission	 ‘if	 it	 appears	 “so	
unreasonable	that	no	reasonable	authority	could	ever	come	to	it”’.1095		
To	 conclude,	 the	 legal	 protection	 afforded	 to	 designated	 areas	 in	
relation	 to	 development	 is	 rather	weak.	1096	Planning	 authorities	 are	 left	 to	
















planning	 system	 offers	 two	 opportunities	 for	 trade-offs	 and	 adaptive	 co-




1096 	it’s	 worth	 mentioning	 that	 there	 would	 be	 some	 cases	 that	 law	 favours	 biodiversity	
interests	against	 that	of	development.	 If	within	 the	proposed	area	and	 irrespectively	of	 its	
status	as	designated	area,	there	are	individuals	belonging	to	species	protected	under	the	WCA	
1981	or	the	Habitats	and	Birds	Directives,	then	a	licence	from	Natural	England	is	required.	If	










Act	 that	 allows	 for	 conditional	 grant	 of	 permission.	 The	 local	 planning	
authorities	may	impose	such	conditions	‘as	they	seem	fit’	meaning	that	they	
can	 exercise	 discretion	 when	 deciding	 on	 conditions.	 Such	 discretion	 is	
nevertheless	 limited	 by	 ss.72	 and	 75	 and	 judicial	 control.1100	Although	 the	
statutory	guidance	in	ss.72	and	75	is	limited	and	relatively	insignificant,	legal	










control	 environmentally	 harmful	 activities,	 especially	 if	 not	 controlled	 by	
other	 regimes. 1103 	Hence,	 they	 provide	 a	 window	 of	 opportunity	 for	
negotiation	 to	 take	 place	 among	 Natural	 England,	 the	 developer	 and	 the	
planning	authority	 to	 formulate	 conditions	 that	would	mitigate	 the	harmful	
effect	of	the	proposed	development	and	allow	the	development	to	proceed.		
A	 second	opportunity	 is	 to	be	 found	 in	 s.106	of	 the	1990	Act.	which	





1102	ibid	 434,	 citing	Berkeley	 v.	 Secretary	 of	 State	 for	 the	Environment,	 Transport	 and	 the	
Regions	(n705).	
1103	ibid;	S.	Bell,	D.	McGillivray	and	O.	Pedersen	also	discuss	the	controversial	issue	of	using	















Biodiversity	 offsets	 are	 measurable	 conservation	 outcomes	 resulting	
from	 actions	 designed	 to	 compensate	 for	 significant	 residual	 adverse	
biodiversity	impacts	arising	from	project	development	after	appropriate	
prevention	 and	 mitigation	 measures	 have	 been	 taken.	 The	 goal	 of	
biodiversity	offsets	is	to	achieve	no	net	loss	and	preferably	a	net	gain	of	
biodiversity	on	the	ground	with	respect	to	species	composition,	habitat	
structure,	 ecosystem	 function	 and	 people’s	 use	 and	 cultural	 values	
associated	with	biodiversity.1108		
Biodiversity	 offsetting	 is	 increasingly	 recognised	 as	 a	way	 to	 ensure	


















offsetting. 1110 	Defra	 following	 the	 initiation	 of	 the	 offsetting	 pilot	 project,	
issued	and	placed	under	consultation	a	Green	Paper	on	biodiversity	offsetting	
and	 its	 integration	 into	 planning	 systems	 as	 a	means	 to	 bridge	 nature	 and	
development	 interests.1111 	Interestingly	 a	 vast	 majority	 of	 the	 responders,	
opted	for	making	biodiversity	offsetting	mandatory,	against	the	Government’s	
preference	over	voluntary	approach.1112	Defra	and	Natural	England	have	also	
published	 detailed	 Guidance	 for	 offset	 providers,	 developers	 and	 local	
authorities	in	the	pilot	areas.1113	
Certainly,	 although	 biodiversity	 offsets	 might	 seem	 a	 relatively	
straightforward	 and	 simple	 idea,	 they	 are	 more	 complicated	 in	 their	
implementation	and	their	effectiveness	has	been	brought	into	question	due	to	
practical	and	scientific	limitations,1114	while	they	have	also	attracted	criticism	
on	 moral	 and	 ethical	 grounds.1115	As	 with	 most	 flexible	 instruments,	 their	
contribution	 to	 nature	 conservation	 will	 depend	 on	 their	 implementation;	














Reese	Moritz,	 ‘Habitat	offset	and	bankong	 -will	 it	 save	our	nature’	 in	C.H.	Born	and	others	
(eds),	The	Habitats	Directive	in	Its	EU	Environmental	Law	Context:	European	Nature’s	Best	
Hope?	(Taylor	&	Francis	2014).	
1115	Christopher	 D.	 Ives	 and	 Sarah	 A.	 Bekessy,	 ‘The	 ethics	 of	 offsetting	 nature’	 (2015)	 13	
Frontiers	in	Ecology	and	the	Environment	568,	discussing	how	offsetting	is	unable	to	account	
for	 the	multiple	values	attached	 to	nature	as	well	as	 the	 implications	of	viewing	nature	as	
tradeable	commodity;	See	also	Karl	Mathiesen,	Is	Biodiversity	Offsetting	a	‘License	to	Trash	










environment,	 if	 for	 example	 the	 planning	 authority	 is	willing	 to	 permit	 the	
development	regardless	of	 its	potential	harm	to	biodiversity.	And	of	course,	






An	offsetting	 system	could	 significantly	 improve	 the	way	 the	planning	
system	 deals	 with	 biodiversity,	 but	 it	 could	 also	 make	 the	 situation	
considerably	 worse.	 We	 would	 support	 a	 new	 system	 that	 captures	
currently	unaddressed	small	-	scale	losses	of	biodiversity	and	turns	these	
into	strategic	gains	via	offsetting.	Conversely,	we	would	strongly	oppose	







to	 development	 affecting	 SSSIs.1117	However,	 it	would	 not	 be	 the	 first	 time	




















Chapter	 Four,	 in	 the	 context	 of	 the	 discussion	 of	 science-driven	















Like	 site	 designation,	 the	 AA	 is	 a	 scientific-based	 assessment	where	
social	and	economic	reasons	are	not	given	any	weight	in	the	final	judgement.	
A	permission	(or	consent	or	licence)1122	may	only	be	granted	if	the	competent	




















Notwithstanding	 the	 technocratic	 nature	 and	 stricter	 protection	 it	
affords	to	European	designations	in	comparison	to	the	one	applied	to	SSSIs,	
the	Habitats	Directive	is	far	from	one	rigid	and	cumbersome	regime.	On	the	




Truly,	 the	 precautionary	 interpretation	 of	 art.6(3)	 in	 Waddenzee	
resulted	 in	 what	 has	 been	 recognised	 ‘as	 one	 of	 the	 most	 stringent	
[restrictions]	 available	 to	 governmental	 or	 private	 objectors	 to	 plans	 or	
projects	 in	 the	 vicinity	 of	 European	 sites’.1128 	Nevertheless,	 socioeconomic	
																																																								
1123	See	supra	ch.4	s.4.2.2.1.2	
1124 	RSPB	 Defend	 nature.	 How	 the	 EU	 nature	 directives	 help	 restore	 our	 environment	
(Undated);	Following	an	announcement	by	the	EU	Commission	to	reform	the	Habitats	and	
Birds	 Directive,	 environmental	 NGOs	 launched	 the	 campaign	 ‘Defend	 Nature’	 against	 the	
proposed	reform.	In	 the	UK,	100	environmental	NGOs,	got	 together	 to	 submit	 the	UK	NGO	
sector’s	response	to	the	first	phase	of	the	Commission’s	Fitness	Check	consultation	supported	
by	 over	 500	 separate	 pieces	 of	 evidence.	 	 See	 Joint	 Links,	 Joint	 Links	 Position	 Statement:	
European	Commission	‘Fitness	Check’	of	the	Birds	and	Habitats	Directives	(2015)	available	at	















before	 the	 competent	 authority	 reaches	 the	 final	 decision	 on	 an	 approval	




in	 the	 absence	 of	 alternative	 solutions,	 a	 plan	 or	 project	 must	
nevertheless	 be	 carried	 out	 for	 imperative	 reasons	 of	 overriding	
public	 interest,	 including	 those	 of	 a	 social	 or	 economic	 nature,	 the	





those	 relating	 to	 human	 health	 or	 public	 safety,	 to	 beneficial	
consequences	of	primary	importance	for	the	environment	or,	further	
to	an	opinion	 from	the	Commission,	 to	other	 imperative	reasons	of	
overriding	public	interest.	
Before	proceeding	to	discuss	IROPI	and	the	ways	the	Habitats	Directive	
seeks	 to	 balance	 nature	 conservation	 with	 socioeconomic	 development,	 I	
would	like	to	make	some	observations	on	how	the	technocratic	nature	of	the	
Directive	is	being	watered	down	even	before	art.6(4)	derogations	come	into	





competent	 authority	 is	 but	 rather	 leaves	 the	 Member	 States	 to	 decide.	 In	
England,	 the	 AA	 process	 has	 been	 integrated	 into	 other	 decision-making	


















This	 is	 especially	 true	 for	 local	 authorities	 that	 are	expected	 to	provide	 for	
their	constituents	and	foster	the	growth	and	development	of	local	economies.		
Hence,	 socioeconomic	 development,	 which	 has	 traditionally	 been	
embedded	to	local	decision-making,	is	bound	to	influence	at	least	partially	and	
perhaps	unintentionally	 the	AA	process.	This	 is	particularly	 true	during	the	




authority	 itself.	 Even	 more	 problematic	 is	 the	 case	 when	 the	 competent	
authority	has	the	twin	role	of	being	the	one	applying	for	permission	or	consent	
																																																								
the	 consent	 process	 of	 operations	 requiring	 consent.Often	 in	 cases	 where	 jurisdictions	
overlap	 more	 than	 one	 authority	 might	 be	 responsible	 to	 make	 an	 assessment.	 Private	
companies	exercising	public	duties	can	also	be	‘competent	authorities’	under	the	meaning	of	
the	Habitats	Directive.	That	was	the	ruling	in	Akester	(n740)	[85]	where	Owen	J	held	that	


















considered	 during	 the	 AA	 process.	 Regulation	 61(6)	 allows	 mitigation	





One	 example	 of	 standardised	 mitigation	 measures	 is	 the	 Suitable	
Alternative	 Natural	 Greenspace	 (SANG)	 mechanism	 that	 was	 developed	 to	
provide	mitigation	for	the	potential	impact	of	residential	development	on	the	
Thames	 Basin	 Heaths	 SPA	 by	 preventing	 a	 potential	 increase	 in	 visitor	
pressure	on	the	SPA.1134	Essentially,	SANG	is	an	alternative	open	green	space	
that	seeks	to	attract	visitors	(mainly	dog	walkers)	and	divert	them	from	using	
the	 SPA	 to	 using	 the	 SANG.	 What	 is	 of	 great	 interest	 is	 the	 high	 level	 of	
cooperation	and	partnership	between	the	local	authorities	and	organisations	
involved	in	delivering	the	SANGs	project.	The	large	number	of	local	authorities	
involved 1135 	and	 the	 cumulative	 nature	 of	 the	 impacts	 (from	 individual	
housing	applications)	required	a	coordinated	approach	to	the	mitigation.	The	
Thames	Basin	Heaths	Joint	Strategic	Partnership	Board	(JSPB)	was	set	up	‘to	























mitigation	 rather	 than	 compensation	 measures.1137	SANGs	 seek	 to	 prevent	
loss	or	deterioration	of	 the	designated	area	which	continues	to	maintain	 its	
integrity.	Therefore,	in	principle	there	is	no	loss	to	compensate	for.	SANGs	is	a	
bright	 example	 of	 adaptive	 collaborative	 decision-making	 that	 seeks	 to	




















decision	 at	 the	 ‘screening	 stage’.1140	Thus,	 decision-making	 authorities	 can	





legislation	 and	 policy,	 in	 the	 end,	 much	 depends	 on	 the	 practical	
implementation.	Mitigation	measures	offer	a	great	opportunity	 for	adaptive	
management,	 but	 incorrect	 implementation	 might	 turn	 it	 to	 a	 ‘simple	 and	
convenient	 hoop-jumping	 exercise	 designed	 to	 circumvent	 the	 strict	
																																																								









High	 Court	 quashed	 the	 planning	 permission	 as	 it	 was	 not	 rationally	 possible	 to	 impose	
conditions	(mitigation	measures)	which	pointed	to	a	risk	of	contamination	while	reaching	to	
the	conclusion	there	was	no	relevant	risk	of	pollution:	‘These	conditions,	which	could	only	be	






Appropriate	 Assessment	 and	 an	 EIA	 to	 be	 obtained’.	 Nevertheless,	 the	 judgement	 was	
reversed	in	the	Court	of	Appeals	in	Champion	v	North	Fork	DC	[2013]	EWCA	Civ	1657	[2013]	
EWCA	Civ	1657	which	was	subsequently	affirmed	by	the	Supreme	Court	in	Champion.	
1141 	Stookes	 (n175)	 145	 argues	 in	 this	 regard:	 ‘The	 Court’s	 view	 in	 Hart	 that	 mitigation	
measures	may	reasonably	be	taken	into	account	as	part	of	the	initial	screening	process	is	of	
concern	and	sits	uncomfortably	with	the	fact	that	mitigation	measures	will	often	be	critical	
















Accordingly,	 art.	 6(3)	 establishes	 a	 general	 prohibition	 that	 benefits	
nature	 conservation.	 Article	 6(3)	 is	 however	 followed	 by	 art.6(4)	 which	




those	 of	 social	 or	 economic	 nature.	 If	 however	 the	 area	 in	 question	 hosts	
priority	habitats	or	species,	then	the	only	considerations	which	may	be	raised	
are	those	relating	to	human	health	or	public	safety,	to	beneficial	consequences	
of	primary	 importance	 for	 the	environment	or,	 further	 to	an	opinion	of	 the	
Commission,	 to	other	 imperative	 reasons	of	overriding	public	 interest.	This	
requirement	to	seek	the	Commission’s	Opinion	forms	an	additional	safeguard	
in	favour	of	conservation.	As	Krämer	notes,	the	Commission’s	Opinions	‘are	at	
the	 cross-point	 between	 ecological	 and	 economic/social	 considerations’1143	
that	 ensure	 the	 coherence	 of	 the	 system	of	protection	of	 European	Natural	
Heritage	across	Member	States.	
Article	6(4)	presents	another	example	of	the	familiar	pattern	of	nature	











treads	 the	 fine	 line	 between	 socioeconomic	 development	 and	 ecological	
interests.	On	the	one	hand	seeks	above	all	to	enforce	strident	environmental	
requirements	 and	 on	 the	 other	 give	 regard	 to	 the	 social	 aspect	 of	 the	
ecosystems.	 Ultimately,	 the	 balance	 is	 shifted	 towards	 socioeconomic	








that	 better	 respect	 the	 integrity	 of	 the	 site.1144	Alternative	 solutions	would	
normally	have	been	identified	and	considered	during	the	AA.1145	They	include	






solutions	 should	 take	 place	 before	 or	 after	 the	 IROPI	 consideration.	 The	 Commission’s	
guidance	 considers	 that	 to	 be	 the	 ‘first	 step’	 in	 applying	 art.6(4)	 derogation.	 The	 same	
approach	is	adopted	by	the	Habitats	Conservation	Regulations	2010.	However,	the	wording	of	
the	 Directive	 does	 not	 make	 it	 very	 clear.	 See	 in	 that	 respect	 Gerd	 Winter,	 ‘Balancing	
Environmental	Risks	and	Socio-Economic	Benefits	of	Alternatives:	A	General	Principle	and	its	
Application	 in	 Natura	 2000’	 in	 Backer	 I.L,	 Fauchald	 O.K	 and	 Voigt	 C.	 (eds),	 Pro	 Natura	 -	
Festskrift	til	Hans	Christian	Bugge	(Oslo,	Universitetsforlaget	2012).	
The	Defra	guidance	also	states	that,	while	they	are	separate	tests,	it	may	be	helpful	to	initially	


















the	 consideration	 of	 alternatives	 should	 be	 limited	 to	 options	 which	 are	
financially,	 legally	 and	 technically	 feasible. 1149 	However,	 the	 Government	
expects	for	an	alternative	not	to	be	ruled	out	simply	because	it	would	cause	
greater	 inconvenience	 or	 cost	 to	 the	 applicant	 but	 continues	 to	 stress	 that	
‘there	 would	 come	 a	 point	 where	 an	 alternative	 is	 so	 very	 expensive	 or	
technically	or	legally	difficult	 that	 it	would	be	unreasonable	to	consider	it	a	
feasible	alternative’.1150	The	competent	authority	will	be	the	one	making	this	









IROPI	 can	 allow	 public	 authorities	 to	 circumvent	 the	 provisions	 of	 the	
																																																								











Administrative	 discretion	 should	 be	 framed	 by	 the	 nature	 of	 art	 6(4)	 as	 a	
derogation	of	art.6(3).	As	such,	it	must	be	interpreted	in	a	way	as	to	allow	a	
plan	 or	 project	 to	 proceed	 regardless	 a	 negative	 assessment	 only	 in	
exceptional	cases.		
Notwithstanding	 the	 risk	 of	 discretion	 abuse,	 the	 combination	 of	
art.6(3)	protection	with	the	art.6(4)	IROPI	derogation	provides	a	very	good	




	The	 Court	 in	 Commission	 v	 Germany 1153 	(known	 as	 the	 Leybucht	
Dykes)		held	that	it	was	only	on	exceptional	grounds	that	a	Member	State	could	
reduce	 the	 size	 of	 a	 SPA.1154	These	 grounds	must	 correspond	 to	 a	 general	
interest	 superior	 to	 the	 general	 interest	 represented	 by	 the	 ecological	
objective	of	the	directive	and	that	economic	and	recreational	requirements	did	
not	meet	that	test.1155	Further	the	Court	found	that	taking	account	of	fishers’	
interests	 to	 provide	 fishing	 vessels	 access	 to	 the	 Harbour	was	 in	 principle	
incompatible	with	the	requirements	set	out	in	art.4(4)	of	the	Birds	Directive.		
This	 narrow	 interpretation	 of	 the	 Birds	 Directive	 sparked	 great	
controversies	 on	 behalf	 of	 the	 Member	 States	 impact	 on	 development	

























reasons	 of	 major	 importance	 could	 justify	 exceptions	 from	 its	 protective	
framework.1160	The	ruling	 in	Solvay	was	 in	 line	with	the	Advocate	General’s	
Opinion	in	Commission	v	Portugal,1161	who	indicated	that	IROPI	can	override	
site	 protection	 only	 where	 greater	 importance	 attaches	 to	 those	 reasons;	
when,	 under	 the	 principle	 of	 proportionality,	 damage	 caused	 by	 a	
development	is	not	disproportionate	to	the	benefits	it	aims	to	achieve:	
The	necessity	of	striking	a	balance	results	in	particular	from	the	concept	
of	 ‘override’,	 but	 also	 from	 the	 word	 ‘imperative’.	 Reasons	 of	 public	
interest	 can	 imperatively	 override	 the	 protection	 of	 a	 site	 only	 when	
greater	importance	attaches	to	 them.	This	 too	has	its	equivalent	 in	the	
test	 of	 proportionality,	 since	 under	 that	 principle	 the	 disadvantages	
caused	must	not	be	disproportionate	to	the	aims	pursued.	1162	
























situations	 where	 plans	 or	 projects	 envisaged	 prove	 to	 be	
indispensable:	
	













1164An	 Audi	 investment	 in	 Western	 Hungary	 that	 would	 secure	 10.000	 workplaces	 was	


















In	 practice,	 it	 has	 been	 interpreted	 broadly	 both	 by	 English	 public	
authorities1170	and	 the	 European	Commission.	1171	Looking	 at	 the	 published	
Commission	Opinions,	in	all	but	one,	the	Commission	gave	a	positive	opinion	
on	 the	 proposed	 derogation	 of	 art.6(4) 1172 	recognising	 as	 IROPIs	
considerations	such	as	the	creation	of	job	opportunities	and	the	facilitation	of	

























1173	See	Commission	Opinion	C(2003)	 1308	 of	 24	April	 2003	 referenced	and	discussed	 by	
Krämer,	in	Krämer,	‘The	European	Commission’s	Opinions	under	Article	6(4)	of	the	Habitats	












all	 the	 more	 necessary.	 However,	 compensation	 should	 not	 be	 used	
indiscriminately.	 As	 Clutten	 and	 Tafur	 rightly	 point	 out,	 ‘if,	 however,	









The	 last	 condition	 is	 that	 the	 Member	 State	 takes	 all	 compensatory	
measures	necessary	 to	ensure	 that	 the	overall	 coherence	of	Natura	2000	 is	
protected.	The	significance	of	this	provision	is	that	the	Habitats	Directive	and	






















The	 need	 for	 biodiversity	 compensation	 is	 laid	 down	 in	 reg.66	 of	 the	
Conservation	 of	 Habitats	 and	 Species	 Regulations	 2010.	 Balancing	 socio-
economic	and	conservation	interests	is	common	among		a	number	statutory	
instruments,	 but	 usually	 the	 procedure	 ends	with	 the	 competent	 authority	











The	 Directive	 does	 not	 provide	 with	 a	 definition	 for	 compensatory	
measures.	 The	 Commission’s	 Guidance	 provide	with	 a	 definition	 suggested	
through	the	experience	implementing	art.6(4):	
compensatory	measures	 sensu	 stricto:	 are	 independent	 of	 the	 project	
(including	 any	 associated	mitigation	measures).	 They	 are	 intended	 to	




1180	European	 Commission,	 Guidance	 document	 on	 Article	 6(4)	 of	 the	 'Habitats	 Directive'	
92/43/EEC.	 Clarification	 of	 the	 Concepts	 of:	 Alternative	 Solutions,	 Imperative	 Reasons	 of	






EU	 law	 in	 general.1181	The	 Guidance	 also	 lays	 down	 issues	 to	 include	 in	 a	
programme	of	compensatory	measures:	
● Tight	coordination	and	cooperation	between	Natura	2000	authorities,	
assessment	 authorities	 and	 the	 proponent	 of	 the	 compensatory	
programme	 (i.e.	 plan	 or	 project	 proponent	 and	 external	 consultants	
involved).		




● Analysis	 of	 the	 legal	 and/or	 financial	 feasibility	 of	 the	 measures	
according	to	the	timing	required.		





● Specific	 monitoring	 and	 reporting	 schedules	 based	 on	 progress	
indicators	according	to	the	conservation	objectives.		
● The	 appropriate	 budget	 programme	 approved	 during	 the	 suitable	
period	to	guarantee	the	success	of	the	measures.		
Additionally,	 any	 compensatory	 programme	 –	 and	 consequently	 the	
art.6(4)	derogation	-	should	be	implemented	as	an	option	of	last	resort	and	




There	are	 two	primary	points	 to	be	made	 in	 relation	 to	biodiversity	











might	 indeed	 found	 be	 non-compliant	 if	 national	 authorities	 abuse	 art.6(4)	





the	 way	 it	 is	 being	 practically	 implemented	 by	 the	 competent	 authorities.	
Looking	at	the	requirements	laid	down	in	the	Commission’s	Guidance,	it	can	
be	 argued	 that	 they	 reflect	 broad	 principles	 of	 both	 models	 of	 adaptive	
management,	 the	 one	 calling	 for	 scientific	 and	 technical	 expertise	 and	
continuous	 monitoring	 to	 address	 the	 uncertainties	 surrounding	 such	 a	




great	 ambiguity	 regarding	 its	 effectiveness.	Without	 prudent	 designing	 and	
planning,	 art.6(4)	 carries	 the	 inherent	 risk	 of	 becoming	 a	 means	 for	
developers	(and	perhaps	even	local	authorities)	to	escape	and	circumvent	the	





















As	 mentioned,	 neither	 the	 Directive	 nor	 the	 Regulation	 lay	 down	
procedural	requirements.		On	the	other	hand,	looking	at	the	DEFRA	Guidance	
it	 is	 evident	 that	 the	 Government’s	 approach	 is	 towards	 a	 rather	 ‘closed’	
procedure	between	the	planning	authority,	the	developer	and	to	an	extent	the	
conservation	 body. 1186 	Although	 nothing	 prevents	 LPAs	 taking	 a	 broader	
participatory	 approach,	 statutory	 procedural	 requirements	 or	 at	 least	 a	




If	 the	 legislator	 has	 prioritised	 conservation	 interests	 within	 the	
designated	areas,	by	implication,	we	need	to	assume	that	outside	those	areas,	
nature	 conservation	 interests	 do	 not	 carry	 enough	 weight	 to	 justify	
restrictions	 to	 property	 rights	 and	 economic	 development.	 In	 short,	 the	






designing	 and	 implementation	 of	 HCP	 is	 better	 articulated	 and	 defined	 than	 the	 art.6(4)	
compensation	 scheme,	 its	 implementation	 became	 problematic	 or	 as	 Camacho	 argues	
‘maladaptive’.	
1186	DEFRA,	Habitats	and	Wild	Birds	Directives:	guidance	on	the	application	of	article	6(4).	





are	 favoured.	 Hence,	 here	 tensions	 are	 likely	 to	 arise	 on	 behalf	 of	 the	
conservationist	 community	 rather	 than	 the	 agricultural	 or	 economic	
sector. 1187 	In	 non-designated	 areas	 any	 attempts	 to	 resolve	 conflict	 in	 an	




As	with	 tensions	within	 protected	 areas,	 conflicts	 in	 non-designated	
areas	arise	due	to	land	development	and	land	use	management.		However,	they	
are	 usually	 latent	 and	 more	 generalised	 (e.g.	 agriculture’s	 impacts	 on	 the	
natural	environmental)	due	to	the	absence	of	statutory	legislation	that	often	
works	as	a	trigger	of	conflict	within	designated	areas	(e.g.	when	an	activity	is	
restricted,	 or	 a	 development	 not	 allowed).	 As	 argued	 in	 the	 discussion	 on	
development	 control	within	SSSIs,	 the	wide	discretion	afforded	 to	planning	
authorities,	allows	for	the	introduction	of	mechanisms	(such	as	biodiversity	
offsetting)	 that	 seek	 to	 balance	 the	 impacts	 of	 development	 to	 the	 wider	
environment.	 As	 mentioned	 above, 1188 	only	 the	 Conservation	 Regulations	
2010	 establish	 a	 biodiversity	 compensation	 requirement	 for	 European	
Designations	as	the	last	resort,	as	they	need	to	comply	with	the	mandate	of	the	
Habitats	 Directive.	 Not	 even	 the	 Wildlife	 and	 Countryside	 Act	 1981	 set	 a	
similar	 requirement	 for	 SSSIs,	 which	 leads	 us	 to	 believe	 that	 introducing	














of	 English	 biodiversity	 is	 found	 in	 private	 agricultural	 non-designated	 land	
that	 has	 been	 intensively	managed	 for	 years,	 hence	 farmland	 conservation	
becomes	 a	 central	 focus	 of	 the	 conservation	 policy	 in	 the	 country.1190	The	




of	 fertilisers,	 pesticides,	 herbicides,	 supported	 by	 highly	 mechanised	
agricultural	units.	Traditional	farming	techniques	were	gradually	abandoned	
in	 favour	 of	 intensive	 farming	 with	 detrimental	 effects	 on	 the	 natural	
environment.1192	Certainly,	 pollution	 control	 legislation	 as	 well	 as	 laws	 on	










cattle.	 Reaching	 a	 proper	 balance,	 if	 feasible,	 between	 increasingly	
demanding	nature	conservation	objectives	and	the	regulation	of	the	















of	 a	 voluntarism–coercion	 spectrum.	 An	 adaptive	 approach	 would	 seek	 to	
engage	 landowners	with	 nature	 conservation	management	 through	 advice,	
partnership	and	negotiation	but	without	the	fallback	of	regulation.		
Looking	 at	 the	 regime	 governing	 land	 management	 in	 the	 wider	
countryside	and	in	areas	where	conflicts	are	likely	to	arise,	we	can	in	fact	trace	
elements	of	adaptive	management.	The	test	here	is	reversed	to	the	one	applied	
when	 looking	 at	 management	 in	 designated	 areas.	 When	 testing	 the	
designated	areas	management	regimes	for	opportunities	to	put	into	place	an	
adaptive	 approach,	 I	 sought	 to	 identify	 elements	 of	 flexibility	 and	
opportunities	 for	 socio-economic	 interests	 to	 enter	 the	 decision-making	





areas	 is	 partially	 administrative	 and	 partially	 contractual,	 where	 the	
conservation	 body	 is	 at	 the	 same	 time	 a	 regulator	 and	 an	 advisor, 1195	




found	 rather	 flexible	 and	 adaptive,	 on	 a	 closer	 observation,	 landscape	
management	 is	 more	 regulated	 than	 one	 would	 think.	 To	 begin	 with,	
countryside	 management	 takes	 place	 within	 the	 wider	 framework	 of	
environmental	 law	 and	 policy	 and	 more	 specifically,	 pollution	 control,	
planning	 legislation,	 the	 environmental	 impact	 assessment	 regulations,	 and	
the	general	biodiversity	duty	 introduced	by	NERC	2006	s.40.	 	On	 the	other	
hand,	 species	 protection	 legislation	 applies	 across	 designated	 and	 non-
designated	land.	As	a	result,	there	might	be	cases	where	the	licencing	system	










management	 of	 protected	 areas	 and	 providing	 opportunities	 for	 nature	
conservation	 considerations	 to	 be	 introduced	 and	 incorporated	 within	
agricultural	activities.	These	are	the	mechanisms	of	cross-compliance1197	and	
agri-environment	 schemes 1198 	introduced	 as	 part	 of	 the	 EU	 Common	
Agricultural	 Policy	 (CAP)	 to	 provide	 negative	 and	 positive	 incentives	 for	
nature	 conservation	 management.	 These	 mechanisms	 were	 introduced	
following	a	major	reform	of	CAP	that	took	place	in	2003,	in	response	to	the	




reform,1199 	to	 complement	 cross-compliance	 requirements,	 adding	 further	
obligations	to	farmers	as	conditions	to	any	type	of	direct	payments.	Tracing	
CAP	reform	changes	over	 the	years,	one	 can	notice	a	gradual	 shift	 towards	
more	 prescriptive	 management	 where	 vital	 financial	 incentives	 instead	 of	
legislation	 forms	a	 leverage	 for	active	nature	conservation	management.	An	
increasing	number	of	obligations	either	part	of	cross-compliance	or	greening	








1197 	For	 general	 information	 see	 <https://ec.europa.eu/agriculture/envir/cross-
compliance_en>accessed	January	2018	
1198	See	https://ec.europa.eu/agriculture/envir/measures_en	

















in	 CAP	 brought	 by	 the	 2003	 CAP	 reform	 which	 sought	 to	 integrate	
environmental	 concerns	 into	 agricultural	 policy.1203		 One	major	 innovation	





with	 regard	 to	 subsided	 activities	 damaging	 SSSIs	 and	 the	 Nature	
																																																								
1200	This	trend	made	some	farmers	insecure	about	what	the	future	holds	for	them	and	whether	
there	are	 limits	 to	introducing	more	and	more	baseline	requirements,	 Interview	with	NFU	
Environment	and	Land	Use	Adviser,	NFU	North	East	(York,	5	March	2014)	
1201	European	Parliament	and	Council	Regulation	(EU)	1307/2013	establishing	rules	for	direct	
payments	 to	 farmers	 under	 support	 schemes	 within	 the	 framework	 of	 the	 common	













Conservancy’s	 efforts	 to	offer	 payments	 for	 landowners	 in	 order	 to	 refrain	
from	damaging	activities	made	on	a	markedly	lower	budget	than	the	Ministry	
of	Agriculture’s.	The	Environmental	Committee	stressed:	
[the]	 illogicality	 of	 one	 part	 of	 government	 (…)	 offering	 financial	




With	 the	 introduction	 of	 the	 Single	 Farm	 Payment	 –	 now	 Basic	
Payments	 Scheme	 -	 the	 incentive	 of	 overproduction	 was	 removed,	 and	 all	
payments	 became	 subject	 to	 cross	 compliance	 requirements.	 In	 theory,	
complying	with	SMRs	will	not	add	net	conservation	gain.	SMRs	are	statutory	
requirements	that	are	legally	binding	regardless	of	whether	someone	receives	
agricultural	 subsidies.	 Of	 relevance	 to	 nature	 conservation	 are	 SMR2	 and	
SMR3	that	require	compliance	with	the	WCA	1981	and	the	Habitats	and	Birds	
Directives. 1206 	However,	 receiving	 the	 BPS	 might	 prove	 to	 be	 a	 stronger	
compliance	 incentive	 for	 a	 landowner,	 especially	when	 considering	Natural	





Northern	 Ireland	 and	 Scotland	 each	 define	 GAEC	 standards	 for	 their	 own	
region.	This	allows	for	special	consideration	of	the	diversity	in	landscape	and	
farming	practices	throughout	the	UK.	At	country	level	however,	the	GAECs	are	
rather	 standardised.	 Apart	 from	 a	 ‘derogation’	 process,	 similar	 to	 the	WCA	
																																																								












adaptation	 of	 GAECs	 that	 apply	 horizontally	 for	 anyone	 subject	 to	 cross-
compliance	rules.1208	
Being	subjected	to	cross-compliance	obligations,	in	particular	GAECs,	is	
not	mandatory.	 Technically,	 landowners	 are	 only	 voluntarily	 committed	 to	
conform	with	cross-compliance	mandates.	However,	effectually	GAECs	have	
great	weight	attached	to	them.	Certainly,	any	landowner	will	not	have	to	abide	
by	 cross-compliance	 requirements,	 if	 he	 or	 she	 does	 not	 apply	 for	 a	 CAP	
scheme.	However,	most	farms	are	not	viable	without	the	CAP	payment	and	as	
such	 farmers	 are	 bound	 to	 commit	 to	 cross-compliance	 requirements. 1209	
Non-compliance	 results	 to	 the	 imposition	 of	 gradually	 increasing	 penalties	
that	 depending	 on	 whether	 non-compliance	 is	 ‘negligence’	 or	 ‘intentional’	
range	 from	a	3%	reduction	 to	a	 complete	 cancellation	of	payments.1210	The	
practical	implication	is	that	for	the	farming	community,	the	cross-compliance	
effect	 is	 similar	 to	 those	of	 statutory	 legislation.	The	 threat	of	 reduction	or	




example	 of	 how	 policies	 along	 different	 sectors	merge	 together	 to	 address	
environmental	 concerns.	 It	 represents	 the	 EU’s	 and	 the	 Government’s	
appreciation	of	the	complexity	of	environmental	problems	and	the	need	for	a	
coherent	 and	 integrated	 approach	 not	 merely	 among	 the	 environmental	
sectorial	policies	but	also	policies	that	are	or	appear	to	be	competing.	In	this	
sense,	 cross-compliance	 reflects	 ecological	 complexity	 and	 dynamics	 in	 the	
legal	world.				
A	further	important	feature	of	cross-compliance	is	that	it	manages	to	









management	 agreements.	 In	 essence,	 the	 cross-compliance	 mechanism,	 by	
attaching	 terms	 and	 conditions	 to	 a	 very	 popular,	 existing	 scheme,	 takes	







Agricultural	 Policy. 1212 	The	 AESs	 offer	 landowners	 and	 farmers	 voluntary	
management	 agreements,	 while	 compensating	 them	 for	 income	 foregone	
resulting	 from	 applying	 environmentally	 friendly	 farming	 practices	 in	 line	
with	the	terms	of	agri-environment	contracts.1213		Similarly	to	the	WCA	1981	
statutory	 management	 agreements,	 they	 are	 contractual	 measures	
underpinned	by	financial	incentives	falling	into	the	wider	circle	of	payments	
for	 environmental	 services,	 with	 the	 state	 being	 the	 buyer	 and	 the	
landowner/farmer	 being	 the	 seller. 1214 		 Along	 the	 same	 lines	 as	 SSSI	
agreements,	 agri-environment	 payments	 seek	 to	 achieve	 additional	
conservation	 value	 through	 commitments	 that	 ‘go	 beyond	 the	 relevant	
mandatory	standards’	(statutory	or	cross-compliance).1215	
																																																								
1211	Regulation	 (EU)	 No	 1305/2013	 of	 the	 European	 Parliament	 and	 of	 the	 Council	 of	 17	
December	 2013	on	 support	 for	 rural	 development	 by	 the	European	Agricultural	 Fund	 for	
Rural	 Development	 (EAFRD)	 and	 repealing	 Council	 Regulation	 (EC)	 No	 1698/2005	 OJ	 L	
347/487	(Now	called	agri-environment-climate	schemes).	









1215		 Regulation	 (EU)	No	1305/2013	of	 the	European	Parliament	 and	 of	 the	 Council	 of	 17	
December	 2013	on	 support	 for	 rural	 development	 by	 the	European	Agricultural	 Fund	 for	
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This	 requirement	 reflects	 the	 Commission’s	 adherence	 to	 the	









AES	 schemes	have	 been	 changing	 throughout	 the	 years	 being	 under	
constant	revision	to	adapt	to	changes	of	policy	and	lessons	learnt	by	previous	
initiatives.1218		When	seen	in	combination	with	cross-compliance	and	the	most	
recent	 greening,	 the	 evolution	 of	 AES	 mirrors	 the	 evolution	 of	 nature	
conservation	 framework	 from	 prevention	 of	 further	 degradation	 to	
conservation	 and	 enhancement,	 with	 the	 focus	 shifted	 from	 protecting	
threatened	habitats	or	landscapes	in	order	to	prevent	further	loss	of	farmland	
biodiversity	 species,	 to	 improve	 and	 maintain	 ecosystems	 services. 1219	
Currently,	 given	 their	 wide	 spatial	 coverage,	 	 AESs	 	 constitute	 the	 main	
mechanism	to	provide	for	positive	management	and	delivering	conservation	






















effectiveness	 of	 AES	 has	 produced	mixed	 results	 regarding	 their	 ability	 to	
provide	 environmental	 benefits,1223 	while	 its	 contribution	 towards	 certain	












the	 focus	 has	 traditionally	 been	 nature	 conservation.	 See	 David	 Kleijn	 and	 William	 J.	
Sutherland,	 ‘How	 effective	 are	 European	 agri-environment	 schemes	 in	 conserving	 and	
promoting	biodiversity?’	(2003)	40	Journal	of	Applied	Ecology	947,	949.	Nevertheless,	there	
have	 been	 other	 objectives	 not	 directly	 linked	 to	 biodiversity	 including	 enhancement	 of	
historic	 environment,	 water	 resources,	 climate	 change	 mitigation	 and	 adaptation,	 flood	
management,	education	and	access	and	landscape	character.	See	Natural	England,	Entry	Level	
Stewardship.	 Environmental	 Stewardship	 Handbook;	 England,	 Countryside	 Stewardship:	
Mid-Tier	Manual.	
1223	Kleijn	and	Sutherland(n1221);	A.	P.	Hejnowicz,	M.	A.	Rudd	and	P.	C.	L.	White,	‘A	survey	









within	 land	 designated	 as	 ESA.	 ESA	was	 based	 on	 a	 very	 basic	 contractual	 model	 where	









	 Placing	 AES	 agreements	 on	 the	 spectrum	 between	 top-down	 and	
bottom-up	decision	making,	at	first	glance	might	seem	straightforward	but	is	









has	 no	 means,	 no	 statutory	 leverage,	 to	 impose	 AES	 agreements	 on	
landowners.		
	 However,	when	it	comes	to	setting	out	the	content	of	the	agreements,	
this	 is	 a	 more	 rigorous	 procedure.	 Contrary	 to	 statutory	 management	


















on	 management,	 no	 space	 to	 tailor	 the	 agreement	 to	 their	 specific	
requirements	and	needs	of	their	business.		
Nevertheless,	 at	 this	 stage,	 the	 balance	 is	 again	 shifted	 as	 they	 (the	
landowners)	 are	 the	 ones	who	determine	which	 of	 the	options	 are	 chosen.		
Certainly,	a	NE	advisor	must	be	happy	that	the	agreement	fits	well	within	the	
set	priorities	of	the	local	area	-meaning	that	it	contains	a	certain	number	of	




must	 fits	 well	 within	 the	 owner’s	 farming.1233 	In	 cases	 where	 the	 advisor	




The	 prescriptive	 nature	 of	 AES	 significantly	 limits	 the	 scope	 for	
negotiation	and	compromise	for	all	parties.	On	the	one	hand,	farmers	enter	the	
agreement	on	preset	defaults.	Usually,	they	tend	to	choose	the	management	
options	that	are	easier	 to	 implement,	have	 less	 implications	on	the	primary	
management	 focus	 of	 their	 land	 but	 do	 not	 have	 the	 greatest	 conservation	
potential. 1235 	On	 the	 other	 hand,	 Natural	 England’s	 power	 to	 influence	 a	




-	 especially	 when	 targeted	 -	 is	 not	 merely	 an	 application	 on	 behalf	 of	 the	









specifics	 of	 management	 delivery. 1236 	There	 is	 also	 some	 scope	 to	 tailor	
agreements	 to	 fit	 individual	 circumstances.	 But	 when	 compared	 to	 non-
prescriptive,	individually	negotiated	agreements	one	can	see	that	the	scope	to	
adapt	these	agreements	is	reduced.	The	pre-set	stipulations	make	it	difficult	to	
tailor	 the	management	agreement	to	 the	specific	needs	of	 local	biodiversity	
and	to	the	needs	of	the	landowners,	even	less	tailor	it	to	both.		
The	lack	of	flexibility	in	designing	management	objectives	and	options	




abilities	 and	 dedication	 of	 the	 advisor.1237 		 Furthermore,	 being	 a	 financial	






previous	 efforts	 being	 rather	 unavailing.	Therefore,	 as	 some	 commentators	
argue	altering	land	management	beliefs	is	paramount	to	achieving	long	term	
conservation	results.1240	This	entails	a	shift	in	the	way	people	value	different	

















legal	 framework	 pertaining	 to	 nature	 conservation,	 when	 considered	 as	 a	
whole,	 convey	 the	 image	of	 a	 flexible	 regime	 that	paves	 the	ground	 for	 the	
implementation	 of	 adaptive	 decision-making	 aimed	 at	 the	 resolution	 of	
conflicts	 arising	 between	 the	 conservation	 of	 biodiversity	 and	 traditional	
notions	 of	 property	 rights	 and	 socio-economic	 development.	 Such	 features	
that	attach	the	necessary	flexibility,	include	the	highly	decentralised	decision	
making	 and	 the	 wide	 range	 of	 instruments	 available	 to	 the	 regulatory	
authorities	 to	 create	 their	 own	 tailor-made	 regulatory	 mosaic,	 but	 most	
importantly	the	high	degree	of	delegation	and	the	wide	discretion	granted	to	




place	 or	 is	 just	 allowed	 to	 take	 place	 by.	 To	 be	 able	 to	 this,	 one	must	 look	
beyond	 the	 letter	 of	 the	 law.	 Given	 the	 wide	 discretion	 granted	 to	 the	
executive,	it	is	not	what	the	law	says	that	becomes	a	measure	for	flexibility	or	
rigidity	of	the	legal	framework,	but	how	the	law	is	applied.	Within	this	context,	
I	 discuss	 certain	 elements	 that	 reflect	 adaptive	 management	 and	 seek	 to	






a	 conflict	 resolution	 context.	 The	 preceding	 analysis	 points	 to	 a	 system	
oriented	to	care	 for	 local	and	 individual	circumstances,	a	system	seeking	to	
resolve	 conflicts	 through	 partnership	 and	 deliberate	 compliance	 than	
sanctioning	 and	 coercion.	 It	 is	 a	 set	 of	 substantive	 rules	 and	 procedural	
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safeguards	 that	 reflect	 a	 regime,	 which	 without	 being	 ‘toothless’	 retains	 a	
degree	 of	 flexibility	 to	 allow	 decision-making	 to	 adapt	 to	 different	
circumstances	and	different	interests.	However,	and	going	back	to	Berkes	et	
al’s	 ladder	 of	 co-management,	 the	 English	 law	 in	 its	 current	 form	 cannot	
support	decision	making	at	 the	 top	rungs	of	 the	 ladder	such	as	Community	
Control	 and	 Partnership. 1241 	Given	 the	 inherent	 technical	 nature	 of	
conservation	decision	making,	there	is	always	going	to	be	a	need	for	science-
driven	determination.	But	apart	from	this	practical	consideration	and	looking	




Stakeholder	 consultation	 is	 central	 and	can	be	 found	at	 all	 tiers	and	
levels	 of	 environmental	 decision-making	 from	 Natural	 England’s	
administration	 to	 the	 EU	 Commission. 1243 	Besides	 the	 cases	 where	
consultation	 is	 a	 statutory	 requirement, 1244 	both	 the	 legislative	 and	 the	
executive	 undertake	 consultations	 in	 order	 to	 gather	 information	 by	 those	
affected	or	 interested	 in	nature	conservation	 law	and	policy	or	 in	decisions	
that	might	have	an	impact	on	the	natural	environment.			







1243	See	 for	 instance	 the	wide	 consultation	 undertaken	 by	 the	 EU	 Commission	 during	 the	
fitness	check	of	the	Habitats	and	Birds	Directives.	The	evidence	gathering,	and	consultation	








reviewing	effectiveness	and	proposes	 reforms	to	 legislation.1245	In	a	 similar	
way,	DEFRA	and	the	statutory	bodies	hold	consultations	on	matters	of	policy	
and	the	same	applies	 for	local	authorities	when	for	 instance	designing	 local	
development	plans.1246		
Usually,	primary	stakeholders	are	 invited	to	consult	by	the	authority	
holding	 the	 consultation,	 but	 anyone	 is	 allowed	 to	 participate.	 Often	
consultations	 are	 not	 limited	 to	 written	 response	 but	 include	 a	 range	 of	
activities	 to	 engage	 stakeholders	 such	 as	 meetings,	 conferences	 and	
workshops.1247	Consultations	responses	are	thoroughly	considered	and	shape	


























spatial	 strategy	 and	 covers	 both	 strategic	 policies	 and	 allocations	 (previously	 the	 Core	
Strategy	 and	 Allocations	 Development	 Plan	 Document),	 alongside	 detailed	 development	
management	policies’.		





The	 end	 policy	 result	 will	 be	 the	 result	 of	 multiple-aspect,	 well-informed	
decision	making	with	reduced	likelihood	of	intense	future	confrontations.		
Nevertheless,	there	will	be	cases	where	consultations,	especially	at	the	








by	 statutory	 legislation,	 policy	 or	 is	 merely	 a	 means	 of	 fulfilling	 broader	
strategic	targets	in	relation	to	biodiversity,	the	approach	adopted	can	range	
from	 prescriptive	 to	 voluntary	 without	 however	 touching	 the	 spectrum’s	
edges	-	meaning	it	is	neither	entirely	prescriptive	nor	entirely	voluntary.1250	
The	 inherent	 flexibility	 of	 statutory	 legislation	 that	 was	 established	 as	 a	
primary	 feature	 of	 English	 nature	 conservation	 in	 the	 previous	 paragraphs	
allows	the	decision	makers	to	choose	to	implement	it	either	way,	traditional	
and	 prescriptive	 or	 flexible	 and	 adaptive.	 The	 preferred	 approach	 draws	
elements	 of	 both,	 combining	 regulation	 with	 flexibility;	 it	 is	 a	 regulated	
flexibility;	a	combination	of	a	top-down	and	bottom	up	approach.		
This	 is	 largely	 because	 of	 the	 Government’s	 commitment	 to	
partnership,	 co-operation	 and	 negotiation 1251 	that	 counterbalance	 the	
prescriptions	 of	 statutory	 legislation.	 In	 this	 context	 Natural	 England	





development	 control,	 pollution	 control,	 land	 designations	 other	 than	 nature	 conservation,	
restrictions	 or	 allowances	 due	 to	 property	 rights,	 that	would	 nevertheless	 create	 a	 loose	
framework	of	action	even	if	nature	conservation	law	and	policy	did	not	apply.	




conservation	 regulator. 1252 	Natural	 England’s	 dual	 role	 in	 relation	 to	
landowners/occupiers	 involves	 encouraging	 them	 to	 protect	 the	 area;	 and	
acting	on	infringements.1253		
In	 terms	 of	 SSSI	management	 DEFRA’s	 code	 of	 guidance	 stresses	 the	
importance	 of	 further	 developing	 ‘the	 constructive	 relationship	 between	
landowners	 and	managers	 and	 the	 officers	 of	 the	 conservation	 agencies	 in	
England	and	Wales’.	Owners	and	occupiers	of	SSSIs	are	considered	‘guardians	
of	 the	 SSSIs’ 1254 	who	 have	 a	 crucial	 role	 in	 safeguarding	 their	 integrity.	





bodies	 whose	 activities	 may	 affect	 SSSIs,	 to	 secure	 the	 positive	
management	of	these	sites.	1255	
Even	during	procedures	 that	 are	 inherently	scientific	 such	as	 the	SSSI	
notification,	with	no	obligation	set	to	Natural	England	to	consult	or	negotiate	
notification, 1256 		 ideally	 the	 conservation	 body	 will	 engage	 in	 informal	
meetings	 and	 discussions	 with	 the	 landowners	 to	 discuss	 potential	
management,	as	well	as	any	concerns	they	may	have.1257	 	
Information	and	advice	are	crucial	for	decision	on	management	actions.	
Recognising	 the	 central	 position	 of	 landowners	 in	 any	 nature	 conservation	
framework	and	the	importance	of	local	knowledge,	DEFRA’s	Guidance	expects	






1255	DEFRA,	 Sites	 of	 Special	 Scientific	 Interest:	 Encouraging	 positive	 partnerships.	 Code	 of	
guidance	(n558)	para.9.	
1256	The	only	statutory	obligation	is	to	publish	a	notification	in	at	least	one	local	newspaper	
and	 allow	 time	 for	 representation.	 There	 are	 no	 consultation	 requirements	 prior	 to	
notification.	
1257	DEFRA,	 Sites	 of	 Special	 Scientific	 Interest:	 Encouraging	 positive	 partnerships.	 Code	 of	
















staff,	 whose	 combined	 knowledge	 of	 environmental	 legislation	 and	
scheme	 rules	 with	 environmental	 expertise,	 knowledge	 of	 their	 local	









The	 support	 and	 expertise	 of	 NE	 advisers	 are	 highly	 appreciated	 by	
landowners	themselves.	Apart	from	their	technical	expertise,	NE	officers	offer	
advice	on	the	different	schemes	available	and	explain	how	the	intricate	system	






























it	 is	 a	 case	 of	 signing	 the	 management	 plan	 and	 the	 relationship	 is	




to	 legal	 means. 1263 	The	 commitment	 of	 Natural	 England	 to	 the	 voluntary	
principle	 is	 reflected	 in	 the	 rare	 use	 of	 enforcement	 measures	 granted	 by	
legislation.1264 	Again,	 discretion	 is	 crucial.	 Natural	 England	 is	 not	 under	 a	
statutory	 duty	 to	 enforce	 either	 the	 negative	 obligations	 or	 positive	
management.	 As	 is	 evident	 from	 the	 low	 rates	 of	 enforcement	 initiated	 by	
																																																								
1262 	Oral	 evidence	 by	 Andrew	 Clark,	 Head	 of	 Policy	 Services,	 National	 Farmers’	 Union,	 in	
Universities	Innovation,	Science	and	Skills	Committee,	Sites	of	Special	Scientific	Interest	(HC	
2008-2009,	717,	2008-2009),	Q18.	












Natural	 England	 and	 the	 rare	 use	 of	 management	 schemes	 and	 notices	 to	
impose	positive	management,	coercive	measures	are	the	last	resort.1265	This	
approach	seems	to	be	working	given	that	in	2010,	96.5%	of	SSSI	reached	target	
for	 good	 condition 1266 	and	 Natural	 England	 has	 established	 a	 good	
relationship	with	the	farmers’	community.1267	
Having	 said	 that,	 it	 does	 not	 come	 as	 a	 surprise	 that	 management	
agreements	 are	 the	 primary	 mechanism	 in	 pursuing	 nature	 conservation	
objectives.	Being	a	 flexible	mechanism	SSSI	agreements	 can	be	 individually	
negotiated	to	suit	the	needs	of	the	various	land-uses.	Interestingly	enough,	as	








designing	 and	 implementing	 conservation	management	 due	 to	 the	 powers	




infiltrate	 even	 what	 is	 supposed	 to	 be	 a	 voluntary	 flexible	 mechanism:	 as	
																																																								
1265	Natural	England,	Natural	England	Standard:	How	we	use	regulation	(2013)	
















Apart	 from	 issues	already	 identified	 in	 the	previous	paragraphs	 that	
reduce	the	scope	for	negotiation	and	compromise	such	as	the	limited	flexibility	
of	AESs	agreements,	there	are	two	main	limitations	of	the	current	legislative	
and	 regulatory	 approach	 that	 constrain	 –	 but	 do	 not	 prevent	 -	 the	
implementation	of	a	collaborative	version	of	adaptive	management	and	which	
I	would	like	to	draw	attention	to.	To	start,	adaptive	management	as	a	conflict	
resolution	mechanism	has	greater	potential	 at	 the	planning	 rather	 than	 the	
implementation	stage	of	management.	The	aim	should	be	to	identify	and	bring	
together	 to	 the	decision-making	 table	all	 interested	 stakeholders	and	 share	
policy	 making	 among	 those	 involved	 or	 likely	 to	 be	 involved	 with	 the	
management	of	a	given	area	(e.g.	 landowner,	developers,	public	authorities,	




planning	 allows	 for	 proactively	manage	 potential	 sources	of	 conflict	 before	
actual	conflict	arises.	Surely,	this	does	not	preclude	adaptive	decision	making	
at	 later	 stages.	 However,	 having	 agreed	 on	 set	 priorities	 and	 land	 uses	
beforehand	 certainly	 reduces	 the	 likelihood	 of	 future	 conflicts,	 since	 all	
involved	 are	 already	 aware	 and	 have	 agreed	 on	 the	 main	 management	
framework.	 	
Early	planning	also	allows	for	a	coherent	approach	that	is	time	and	cost	









set	 any	 requirements	 for	 management	 planning	 for	 nature	 conservation	
designations	 or	 the	 wider	 countryside.	 On	 the	 contrary,	 laws	 governing	
national	 parks,	 areas	 of	 outstanding	 natural	 beauty	 as	 well	 as	 the	 Water	
Framework	Directive	do	require	management	plans	to	be	designed	and	be	put	







an	 adaptive	 collaborative	 approach	 instead	 of	merely	 designing	 a	 plan	 and	
presenting	 it	 to	 the	regulated.	On	the	other	hand,	a	statutory	planning	duty	
means	more	funding	expectations.	Certainly,	the	fact	that	planning	is	still	not	
a	 legal	 requirement	 does	 not	 prevent	 administration	 from	 initiating	 the	






1268	There	 are	many	 examples	 such	 as	 the,	 cases	 of	 SSSI	 and	 European	 designations	with	
management	plans	into	place,	the	SAGNs	initiative	discussed	above.	Especially	for	European	
Designations,	 Natural	 England	 in	 partnership	 with	 the	 Environment	 Agency	 launched	 an	
Improvement	 Programme	 for	 England’s	 Natura	 2000	 sites	 funded	 by	 the	 EU	 nature	
conservation	 funding	 mechanism	 LIFE+.	 The	 Programme	 implements	 a	 model	 of	 nested	
collaborative/scientific	adaptive	management	from	the	planning	to	implementation	stage.	It	
is	 structured	 to	 include	 four	 main	 phases	 from	 broad	 scoping	 to	 site	 management	
implementation	plans:	programme	scoping	to	identify	issues	that	might	affect	Natura	2000	
sites	and	any	gaps	 in	knowledge,	development	of	 theme	plans	 through	collaboration	work	













It	 is	 a	 rather	 polarised	 approach	 that	 does	 not	 leave	 much	 room	 for	
multilateral	 agreements	 that	 would	 allow	 the	 accommodation	 of	 multiple	
interests	 and	 foster	 as	 a	 dispute-free	 ecosystem-based	 management	 as	
possible.	 	










conservation	 body	 could	 enter	 into	management	 agreements	with	multiple	
parties	 then	 neighbouring	 properties	 could	 set	 aside	 neighbouring	 parts	 of	
land	X/2	 that	 together	would	 form	 the	much-needed	 biodiversity	 spot,	 but	
with	 less	land	 loss	 for	each	of	 the	participants.	There	has	been	a	significant	
body	 of	 literature	 on	 the	 need	 to	 reinvent	 and	 reorient	 land	management	
schemes	 to	 provide	 incentives	 and	 promote	 collaborative	management.1270		
																																																								
1269	Ideally	this	would	include	interests	other	than	that	of	the	agricultural	community,	which	
might	however	contribute	 to	cumulative	 impacts	on	 the	 local	biodiversity	e.g	 industrial	or	
recreational	 operations.	 However,	 in	 this	 case	 AESs	 schemes	 given	 that	 they	 apply	 on	
agricultural	 land	would	 be	 unable	 to	 fund,	 at	 least	 entirely,	 such	 agreements.	 They	 could	
however	take	the	form	of	NERC	2006	s.7	agreements.	
1270	Ian	Hodge	 and	 Sandra	McNally,	 ‘Wetland	 restoration,	 collective	 action	 and	 the	 role	 of	




For	 instance,	 MacFarlane	 carried	 out	 a	 study	 on	 the	 Lake	 District	
Environmentally	Sensitive	Area	(ESA)	and	suggested	expanding	the	scheme	
with	a	higher	tier	 to	support	an	 integrated	approach	to	the	management	of	
land	 across	 ownership	 boundaries,	 with	 the	 additional	 benefit	 of	 reducing	
transaction	costs.1271	However,	no	changes	were	made	to	the	ESA	scheme	and	
with	a	 few	notable	exceptions,	neither	were	any	 changes	 incorporated	 into	
subsequent	schemes.1272	
As	 argued	 in	 the	 previous	 chapter,	 an	 adaptive	 approach	 does	 not	
																																																								
of	 Environmental	 Planning	 and	 Management	 575;	 Jeremy	 Franks,	 ‘A	 Blueprint	 for	 Green	
CoOperatives:	 Organisations	 for	 Coordinating	 Environmental	 Management	 Across	 Farm	
Holdings’	(2008)	4	Journal	of	International	Farm	Management	46.	
1271 	McFarlane	 ibid;	 On	 reducing	 transactional	 cost	 through	 collective	 management	
agreements	 see	 also	 Katherine	 Falconer,	 ‘Farm-level	 constraints	 on	 agri-environmental	
scheme	participation:	a	transactional	perspective’	(2000)	16	Journal	of	Rural	Studies	379	
1272	Joint-participation	into	environmental	management	agreements	remained	an	option	for	






a	 discussion	 of	 contractual	 issues’	 (2011)	 54	 Journal	 of	 Environmental	 Planning	 and	
Management	637,	637;		




The	 newest	 Countryside	 Stewardship	 Scheme	 recognising	 the	 importance	 of	 landscape	
management	provides	for	a	facilitation	fund	to	support	people	and	organisations	that	bring	


















an	 agreement	 is	 sought;	 when	 these	 interests	 completely	 diverge	 then	
considering	trade-offs	will	be	the	most	appropriate	course	of	action.	Given	the	
complexity	of	natural	systems	and	social	interests,	in	a	given	plan	it	is	likely	
that	 both	 approaches	 will	 be	 necessarily	 linked	 together.	 Flexible	 legal	
instruments	 to	 support	 adaptive	 management	 do	 exist:	 management	
agreements,	 financial	 incentives,	 biodiversity	 offsetting,	 together	 with	 the	
public	authorities’	discretion	to	attach	conditions	to	the	various	permits	and	
consents.	 Also,	 there	 has	 been	 a	 growing	 interest	 in	 using	 a	 range	 of	 non-
statutory	 instruments	 such	 as	 biodiversity	 covenants	 and	 self-regulatory	
instruments	 like	 eco-labelling,	 both	 of	 which	 can	 be	 used	 to	 implement	
management	decisions.		 	
Certainly,	collective	management	agreements	present	several	legal	and	
practical	 challenges.1273	The	 farming	 industry	 is	 very	 competitive,	 and	 it	 is	
unlikely	 that	 farmers	 would	 be	 willing	 to	 undertake	 shared	
responsibilities. 1274 	However,	 experiences	 abroad	 show	 that	 albeit	 not	
challenge	free,	collective	agreements	are	possible	to	implement.1275	There	is	
nothing	 in	 legislation	 that	 precludes	 it	 and	 as	 with	 most	 decisions,	 the	






1274Interview	with	 the	NFU	 Environment	 and	 Land	 Use	 Adviser,	NFU	North	 East	 (York,	 5	
March	2014).	
1275J.	 R.	 Franks	 and	A.	Mcgloin,	 ‘Environmental	 cooperatives	 as	 instruments	 for	 delivering	
across-farm	environmental	and	rural	policy	objectives:	Lessons	for	the	UK’	(2007)	23	Journal	
of	 Rural	 Studies	 472	 discussing	 the	 potential	 of	 environmental	 co-operatives	 (EC)	














Second,	 and	 related	 to	 first,	 it	 is	 not	 safe	 to	 draw	 any	 general	
conclusions	on	how	adaptive	the	decision-making	process	is	without	looking	
at	the	practical	implementation	of	nature	conservation	on	a	case	by	case	basis.	
The	 wide	 discretion	 granted	 to	 the	 administration	 allows	 for	 variable	
implementation.	There	 is	 a	 generalised	pattern	 towards	more	participatory	
decision	making,	but	it	is	yet	to	be	fully	institutionalised.1276	Establishing	legal	
requirements	 -	even	 if	only	procedural	 -	 for	large	scale	nature	conservation	
management	planning	could	contribute	significantly	in	the	gradual	adoption	
of	 a	 decision-making	 model	 based	 on	 adaptive	 management,	 as	 public	
authorities	would	be	bound	to	undertake	management	planning.	Additionally,	






these	 instruments	 are	 characterised	 by	 operational	 versatility.	 	 Hence,	 if	
applied	 collectively	 in	 an	 co-ordinated	 and	 complementary	 way	 by	 the	
administration,	 the	latter	exercising	 its	wide	discretion	can	make	full	use	of	
their	flexibility	and	align	them	to	the	commonly	agreed	objectives;	they	can	be	
adapted	 to	 serve	adaptive	 collaborative	management.	This	 interplay	among	
the	 various	 instruments	 and	 the	 authorities	 responsible	 for	 their	
																																																								
1276 	This	 for	 instance	 is	 the	 case	 with	 Local	 Nature	 Partnerships	 that	 reflect	 adaptive	






practical	 implementation	of	 nature	 conservation.	 It	 is	 the	 case	 study	 of	 the	
Nature	Improvement	Areas	initiative	in	Humberhead	Levels,	where	large	scale	
management	is	administered	by	stakeholder	Partnerships	and	management	is	










establish	 resilient	 systems.	 In	doing	so,	we	need	adaptability	which	 in	 turn	
requires	overlapping	interests	to	find	a	common	way	to	work	together.	This	
requires	 a	 framework	 that	 allows	 and	 promotes	 flexible	 adaptive	
management.	The	following	chapters	will	argue	that	the	Nature	Improvement	
Area	 (NIA)	 Scheme	 introduced	 by	 the	 DEFRA	 Natural	 Environment	White	
Paper	in	2011	recognises	and	provides	such	a	structure,	one	that		allows	for	
the	 implementation	 of	 an	 intertwined	 version	 of	 adaptive	 management	
models	 that	 were	 developed	 in	 Part	 II,	 also	 that	 the	 legal	 and	 regulatory	
framework	within	which	 it	operates	 is	 flexible	enough	–	albeit	not	without	
limitations	–	to	support	it.			
The	following	chapters	look	at	the	scheme	as	conceived	and	executed,	
designed	and	 implemented	 in	one	of	 the	original	12	NIAs,	 the	Humberhead	




The	 HHL	 NIA	 programme	 brings	 together	 and	 merges	 the	 two	 models.	
Identifying	boundaries	 is	difficult	 since	elements	of	both	 fade	 in	and	out	at	
different	stages	or	places	of	delivery.		
Science	 is	 central	 to	 the	 scheme;	 so	 is	 experimentation.	 From	 its	
conception	the	NIA	scheme	was	a	pilot	project;	a	big	learning	activity.	It	was	
designed	 to	 test	 different	 approaches	 especially	 in	 situations	 where	 the	











that	 it	 expands	 the	 network	 of	 people	 involved	 already	 since	 the	 land	
designation.	 In	a	 sense,	 the	 scheme	 is	 about	 conflict	 resolution	overlapping	
with	science	and	as	such	it	sits	at	the	intersection	of	the	two	models	of	adaptive	
management	introduced	before.	
The	 following	 chapters	 discuss	 the	 interaction	 of	 these	 two	models	
during	the	three-years	management	that	took	place	in	the	Humberhead	Levels	
NIA.	 In	 doing	 so,	 they	 seek	 to	 identify	 the	 core	 elements	 that	 characterise	
adaptive	management	models	extracted	earlier	in	the	thesis.	Chapter	7	is	an	
introductory	 chapter	providing	 the	background	on	 the	NIA	scheme	and	 the	
Humberhead	Levels.		In	chapter	8	continues	the	discussion	of	chapter	7	with	a	
detailed	 analysis	 that	 heads	 from	 the	 Lawton	 Review	 and	 the	 subsequent	
White	Paper	stating	the	vision	and	setting	the	objectives	of	the	scheme.	It	is	
important	 to	 examine	why	 Lawton	made	 these	 recommendations	 and	 how	
they	were	 taken	 forward.	 The	 Lawton	Review	 and	 the	White	 Paper	 set	 the	
course	 for	 the	 scheme.	 The	 vision	 and	 aims	 of	 the	 programme	 outline	 the	
framework	of	action	and	set	the	course	for	the	NIA	management.			
Chapter	9	looks	at	management	implementation	on	the	ground.	Using	
information	 provided	 by	 key	 individuals	 within	 the	 HHL	 NIA	 and	 through	
research	 in	 a	 series	 of	 documents	 and	 reports	 this	 chapter	 looks	 how	 and	
whether	 adaptive	 management	 works	 on	 the	 ground;	 whether	 the	
management	practices	applied	in	the	NIA	amount	to	what	the	theory	refers	to	




adherence	 to	 science	 as	 a	 primary	 driver	 of	 nature	 conservation	 decision	
making,	adherence	to	the	non-equilibrium	paradigm,	research,	 learning	and	
experimentation,	 flexibility	and	 iterative	decision	making	 for	science	driven	
adaptive	management	and	collaboration	as	a	way	to	bring	diverse	 interests	
together	thereby	reducing	(potential)	tensions	on	the	ground.		
	 Chapter	 9	 concludes	with	 an	 assessment	 of	 the	 legal	 and	 regulatory	
system	in	terms	of	its	flexibility	–or	lack	thereof-	to	allow	for	such	practices	to	
be	 effectively	 implemented.	 It	 broadly	 confirms	what	was	 suggested	 in	 the	
previous	 chapter:	 that	 the	 current	 framework	 and	 the	 way	 it	 is	 being	
implemented	by	those	applying	it,	 is	flexible	enough	to	allow	those	engaged	










Documentary	 research	 on	 the	 Humberhead	 Levels	 NIA	 and	 the	 NIA	








1279 	Kevin	 Bayes	 and	 Humberhead	 Levels	 Partnership,	 Humberhead	 Levels	 Nature	







is	 widely	 used	 in	 social	 research	 in	 particular	 as	 sources	 of	 background	
knowledge	 and	 for	 cross	 checking	 data	 collected	 through	 other	 methods.	
Documents	–	in	particular	public	documents–	usually	represent	data	which	are	
products	of	considerable	thought1282	and	in	the	case	of	the	HHL,	products	of	
research.	 Documentary	 research	 can	 provide	 with	 invaluable	 historical	
information	 but	with	 quantitative	 data	 given	 that	many	 of	 the	 reports	 and	
records	examined	contain	tables	and	graphs	with	a	vast	amount	of	information	
on	 land	management,	 habitats	 and	 species	 condition,	monitoring	 etc.1283	A	
variety	 of	 public	 documents	 were	 available	 and	 acquired	 online	 on	 the	
Internet;	some	had	to	be	accessed	through	a	Freedom	of	Information	request;	
others	(e.g	maps)	were	given	to	me	by	people	involved	in	the	scheme.	Among	
documentation	 that	was	 examined	was	 the	 Lawton	 Report,	 the	 NEWP,	 the	
Humberhead	Levels	business	plan	that	was	submitted	as	part	of	the	original	









quarterly	 progress	 reports	 from	 August	 2013	 to	 February	 2014;	 Humberhead	 Levels	
Partnership	 Humberhead	 Levels	 Progress	 Year	 2	 Report	 (1st	 quarter,	 August	 2014);	
Humberhead	Levels	Partnership	Nature	Improvement	Area:	Inspiring	landscapes	and	vibrant	
communities	in	a	changing	climate	2012-2015	(2005);		
Monitoring	 and	 Evaluation	 of	 Nature	 Improvement	 Areas:	 Year	 1	 Progress	 Report	 (n90);	
Collingwood	 Environmental	 Planning,	 Monitoring	 and	 Evaluation	 of	 Nature	 Improvement	
Areas:	 Year	 2	 (2013-14)	 Progress	 Report.	 (Defra	 Research	 Project	 WC1061,	 2014)	
















There	 are	 three	 major	 categories	 that	 are	 identified	 in	 literature	
depending	 on	 their	 structure	 –	 or	 the	 lack	 thereof	 –	 of	 the	 interviews:		
structured,	 unstructured	 or	 semi-structured	 interviews.	 Semi-structured	
interviews	 –	 the	 preferred	 method	 in	 this	 study-	 lay	 between	 the	 rigid	
structured	interviews	and	the	more	relaxed	unstructured	interviews	1288	and	













sociological	 methods	 (McGraw-Hill	 1978)115	 (refered	 to	 as	 nonscheduled	 standardizes	
inerview).	









Structured	 interviews	 –	 also	 standardized	 or	 formal	 interviews1290	–	 use	 a	
formally	structured	predetermined	set	of	questions.1291	Interviewers	do	not	
deviate	 from	 their	 established	question	 schedule;	 all	subjects	are	asked	 the	
same	 set	 of	 questions	 and	 usually	 have	 to	 choose	 from	 one	 fixed	 range	 of	
question	 (often	 called,	 closed,	 closed	 ended,	 pre-coded	or	 fixed	 choice).1292	










way	by	all	 subjects.1297	These	assumptions	have	 received	criticism	by	 some	




to	 interviewer	 variability. 1299 	However	 and	 especially	 since	 ‘non-real’	












1299 	A	 Bryman,	 Social	 Research	 Methods	 (OUP	 Oxford	 2012)	 210	 stresses	 that	 ‘the	
standardization	of	both	the	asking	of	questions	and	the	recording	of	answers	means	that	if	the	




clarification	 of	 answers	 through	 follow-up	 questions.	 Structured	 interviews	




At	 the	 other	 end	 of	 the	 continuum	 is	 the	 unstructured	 –	 or	





where	 interruptions	on	 the	 interviewer’s	 part	 are	 kept	 to	 a	minimum.	 It	 is	
usually	used	in	ethnographic	research.1301		
In	 between	 the	 two	 types	 mentioned	 above,	 we	 find	 this	 study’s	
preferred	 research	method,	 that	 is	 the	 semi-structured	 interview,	which	 as	
mentioned,	 is	often	regarded	as	genuine	qualitative	 interview.	A	qualitative	
interview	is	often	defined	as	a	purposeful	conversation.1302	Kvale	stresses	that	
‘the	 purpose	 of	 a	 qualitative	 research	 interview	 is	 to	 obtain	 a	 qualitative	
descriptions	of	the	life	world	of	the	subject	with	respect	to	interpretation	of	
their	meaning’.1303	Hence,	an	interview	is		a	conversation	between	at	least	two	
people:	 the	 interviewer	 and	 the	 interviewee	 but	 differs	 from	 everyday	
conversations	in	the	sense	that	it	has	a	structure	and	a	purpose.1304		














There	 is	 a	 set	of	pre-planned	 interview	questions	 that	 follow	certain	
themes	which	link	back	to	the	research	questions.	1306		The	interview	is	loosely	
structured	around	these	key	questions	which	allow	for	much	flexibility	but	at	
the	 same	 time	 for	 some	 degree	 of	 comparability.	 These	 key	 questions	 are	













c)	 research	 and	 learning	 and	 experimentation	 d)	 flexibility	 and	 iterative	
decision	 making	 e)	 stakeholder	 participation	 and	 collaboration).	
Consequently,	identifying	emerging	adaptive	management	themes	in	practical	
nature	 conservation	 management	 and	 in	 particular	 that	 of	 stakeholder	
participation	and	collaboration,	required	a	good	understanding	of	the	complex	
personal	interactions	that	occur	in	practice	between	those	involved	in	the	HHL	
and	 the	 lived	 experience	 of	 those	 with	 responsibility	 for	 practical	
implementation	 of	 conservation	 management.	 1309 Accordingly,	 semi-
																																																								
1306	ibid	131.	
















of	 an	empirical	 study.	 	 Simply	put,	 the	qualitative	data	 from	 the	 interviews	
provide	a	contemporary	snapshot	of	a	subjective	 interpretation	of	what	are	
personal	 and	 closed	 networks	 of	 actors.	 	 In	 other	 words,	 the	 data	 gained	
represented	 views	 from	 individual	 participants	 with	 all	 of	 the	 limitations,	
biases	and	partial	understanding	that	suggests.		Critically	however,	it	does	give	





of	 knowledgeable	 informants,	 1310 	that	 is	 a	 panel	 of	 knowledgeable	 and	
experienced	 individuals,	 each	of	which	 ‘would	be	 chosen	because	he	or	 she	
could	significantly	instruct	us’.1311	Also,	likely	to	be	included	in	such	panel	as	
respondents,	are	people	 ‘who	view	our	topic	 from	different	perspectives	or	
















Hence,	 all	 interviews	were	 carefully	 targeted	 to	a	 limited	number	of	
individuals	who	had	a	key	 role	 in	 implementing	 the	NIA	management	plan.			
Eleven	 people	 were	 interviewed	 in	 total,	 representing	 different	
organizations/agencies;	 each	 of	 them	 was	 better	 familiarised	 with	 certain	
aspects	 of	 the	 project	 related	 to	 their	 field	 of	 expertise,	 (e.g	 land	 advice,	
science-driven	 projects,	 organization	 and	 finance	 etc)	 but	 they	 all	 had	 a	
comprehensive	overlapping		knowledge	of	the	NIA	initiative:	all	but	one	were	
working	either	for	Natural	England,	the	nature	conservation	statutory	agency,	
also	 responsible	 for	 running	 the	 projects’	 finances	 and	 the	 only	 body	with	
regulatory	 powers	 (in	 terms	 of	 	 nature	 conservation);	 or	 for	 nature	
conservation	 NGOs	 and	 specifically	 the	 Royal	 Society	 for	 the	 Protection	 of	
Birds	 (RSPB),	 in	 charge	 of	 a	 number	 of	 projects	 within	 the	 NIA,	 and	 the	
Yorkshire	 Wildlife	 Trust	 which	 administers	 the	 entire	 initiative.	 One	
individual	however	represented	the	private	sector	and	more	specifically	the	
National	 Farmers’	 Union	 (NFU).	 Among	 them	 were	 the	 Chair	 and	 the	
Secretariat	 of	 the	 Humberhead	 Levels	 Partnership	 (NE),	 the	 programme	
manager	 (YWT),	 an	officer	 in	 charge	of	 landowners	engagement	 (YWT),	 an	












interviewer	 is	 a	miner	who	unearths	 the	 valuable	metal.	 Some	miners	











territory	or	with	maps,	 roaming	 freely	 around	 the	 territory	 [.	 .	 .]	 	 The	
interviewer	wanders	 along	with	 the	 local	 inhabit-	ants,	 asks	questions	
that	lead	the	subjects	to	tell	their	own	stories	of	their	lived	world.1316		
Hence,	the	miner	has	a	specific	target,	he	or	she	knows	exactly	what	to	






has	 been	 constructed	 interactively	 through	 the	 conversation	 with	 the	
respondents:	
The	 journey	 might	 instigate	 a	 process	 of	 reflection	 that	 leads	 the	





further	 explore	 the	 specific	 themes	 that	 linked	 back	 to	 my	 theory.	 It	 was	
similar	 to	 that	 of	 what	 Witzel	 and	 Reiter	 refer	 to	 as	 the	 ‘well	 informed	
traveller’:	
[…]	they	have	certain	priorities	and	expectations	and	start	the	journey	on	
the	basis	of	background	 information	obtained	beforehand.	Yet	 the	 trip	







depend	 on	 the	 people	 they	 meet	 on	 the	 road	 and	 on	 their	 insider	
knowledge.	By	talking	to	them	they	are	able	to	refine	their	assessment	of	
the	major	 sights	mentioned	 in	 the	 travel	 guide.	 Their	 guidebook	 only	
helped	 them	to	outline	 a	preliminary	 roadmap	and	 frame	of	 reference	









the	different	 theoretical	models	 in	practice,	 the	 interview	was	not	merely	a	
‘mining’	process.			The	high	degree	of	complexity	of	my	research	topic	required	




influence	 on	 the	 data	 gathered.	 1319 	A	 list	 of	 topics	 and	 some	 principal	
questions	were	prepared	to	be	covered	during	what	was	essentially,	a	natural	
conservation	between	two	people.1320	As	mentioned	above,	these	main	topics	















All	 interviewees	 were	 informed,	 in	 written	 prior	 to	 the	 day	 of	 the	
interview	and	verbally	during	a	briefing	before	the	beginning	of	the	interview,	
about	 the	 overall	 purpose	 of	 the	 study,	 the	main	 features	 of	 the	 interview	
design	 and	 the	 use	 (and	 potential	 future	 use)	 of	 data.	 They	 received	
information	 on	 confidentiality,	 who	 would	 have	 access	 to	 the	 interview	
material,	 the	 secure	 storage	 of	 data,	 the	 conditions	 of	 their	 participation	 –	
voluntary	participation	and	withdrawal	 from	the	research.	The	participants	
were	also	 informed	 that,	 as	 it	 is	often	 the	 case	with	qualitative	 studies	and	







on	 behalf	 of	 the	 participant. 1323 	On	 two	 occasions,	 two	 people	 were	
interviewed	together	at	the	participants’	suggestion.	All	interviews	but	three	
were	digitally	recorded	and	subsequently	transcribed.1324		
I	 began	 all	 interviews	 by	 asking	 general	 questions	 that	 were	 very	
similar	to	all	interviewees,	e.g	on	their	role	within	the	HHL	and	some	general	
information	on	the	initiative.	Then	adopting	a	funnel	type	approach,	I	moved	
















of	 research	 questions	 in	 order	 to	 allow	 for	 a	dynamic	 conversation1325	and	








more	 on	 certain	 aspects	 of	management.1326	Hence,	 interviews	with	 senior	
members	 of	 the	 HLP	 Board	 or	 the	 programme	 manager	 were	 generally	
broader	 and	 focused	 on	 the	 general	 organization	 and	 operation	 of	 the	





hours.	This	was	because	as	mentioned,	 I	wished	 to	be	a	 traveler	but	also	a	
miner.	 	Hence,	when	during	the	 interview	journey	I	encountered	something	





with	 qualitative	 interviewing	 and	 may	 affect	 the	 validity 1327 	–	 or	
trustworthiness 1328 	–	 and	 the	 objectivity	 –	 within	 a	 qualitative	 study	










potential	 biases	 that	 might	 invalidate	 qualitative	 observations	 and	
interpretations,	 relating	 to	 both	 the	 participants	 and	 the	 researcher	 and	
suggest	tactics	for	confirming	qualitative	findings1331		 	 	
		 Triangulation	 is	one	way	 to	address	participants’	bias	and	check	 the	
trustworthiness	of	information.	It	has	already	been	mentioned	that	in	this	case	
study	 interviews	 have	 not	 been	 the	 only	 research	 method	 employed,	 but	
served	 as	 an	 ‘auxiliary	 method,’ 1332 	used	 in	 conjunction	 with	 documents	
research.1333	Hence,	and	particular	in	relation	to	factual	information	such	as	
e.g	 the	 designation	 procedure	 or	 land	 management	 agreements,	 I	 sought	
confirmation	 by	 checking	 on	 management	 plans,	 reports	 and	 relevant	
























A	 recognized	 bias	 or	 subjective	 perspective	 may,	 however,	 come	 to	
highlight	 specific	 aspects	 of	 the	 phenomenon	 being	 investigated	 and	
bring	 new	 dimensions	 forward,	 contributing	 to	 a	 multi-perspectival	
construction	of	knowledge.1334	
As	 to	 the	 researcher	 bias,	 it	 needs	 to	 be	 recognised	 that	 I	 was	 looking	 for	
specific	themes	and	was	interested	in	how	the	participants	experience	linked	
to	 my	 theory.	 However,	 I	 minimised	 bias,	 by	 approaching	 the	 interview	
process	with	open	mind,	refraining	from	posing	leading	questions	that	might	
suggest	certain	responses	or	interpreting	data	to	confirm	my	hypothesis.		
As	 Miles	 and	 Huberman	 stress,	 ‘the	 problem	 of	 quality,	 of	
trustworthiness	 of	 authenticity	 of	 the	 findings	 will	 not	 go	 away’.1335		 That	
people’s	 perceptions	 of	 events	 and	 answers	 to	 interview	 questions	 are	




it	 happens.	 As	Miles	 and	 Huberman	 stress,	 “getting	 it	 alright”	might	 be	 an	


















management	 is	 taking	 place	 therein,	 is	 the	 government’s	 response	 to	 the	
concerns	raised	by	the	scientific	community	over	habitats	fragmentation	and	








The	 name	 ‘Humberhead	 Levels’	 is	 not	 a	 formal	 geographical	 or	
administrative	designation	but	was	introduced	by	the	Countryside	Agency	in	
a	 study	 of	 the	 English	 Landscape	 published	 in	 1999	 (figure	 8).1337	It	 later	
became	one	of	 the	159	National	Character	Areas	(NCAs),	a	Natural	England	
(NE)	 strategic	 policy	 project	 aimed	 at	 defining	 the	 diversity	 of	 landscape	
character	across	England,	to	give	a	context,	an	overview	of	each	area	and	set	




system.	 Each	 NCA	 is	 defined	 on	 the	 basis	 of	 a	 combination	 of	 landscape,	
biodiversity,	 geodiversity,	 cultural	 and	 economic	 activity.	 Their	 boundaries	
follow	natural	lines	 in	 the	 landscape	rather	than	administrative	boundaries,	
making	them	a	good	decision-making	framework	for	the	natural	environment.	
In	 2014,	 to	meet	 its	 commitment	made	 in	 the	 Natural	 Environment	White	
Paper	2011,	Natural	England	completed	a	major	revision	and	update	of	 the	
159	 NCA	 creating	 detailed	 profiles	 that	 bring	 together	 a	 wide	 range	 of	
information	 on	 the	 natural,	 socioeconomic	 and	 cultural	 environment.	 Each	
profile	 contains	 a	 set	 of	 data	 including	 geological	 and	 soil	 information,	
agriculture	 related	 data,	 the	 number	 of	 protected	 sites	 and	 other	 land	
designations	 and	 opportunities	 for	 conservation	 work,	 species	 closely	
associated	 with	 the	 area,	 historical	 information,	 even	 details	 on	 the	
tranquillity	and	remoteness	of	the	area.	These	comprehensive	profiles	can	be	
used	 in	 a	 wide	 range	 of	 situations	 such	 as	 to	 provide	 land	 use	 planning	
authorities	with	information	on	the	environmental	conditions	of	the	area	that	
can	be	crucial	to	the	development	of	local	land	use	plans,	in	developing	land	








Applications.	 They	 can	 also	 be	 used	 as	 a	 research	 and	 study	 resource	 in	
particular	to	monitor	change	across	the	landscape1339	and	as	a	local	data	index	







current	 key	 drivers	 for	 ongoing	 change,	 and	 a	 broad	 analysis	 of	 each	
area’s	 characteristics	 and	 ecosystem	 services.	 Statements	 of	
Environmental	Opportunity	 (SEOs)	 are	 suggested,	which	draw	on	 this	
integrated	 information.	The	SEOs	 offer	 guidance	on	 the	 critical	 issues,	














the	Southern	Magnesian	Limestone	and	 to	 the	east	by	 the	Yorkshire	Wolds	
																																																								



































farmed	 and	 has	 been	 historically	 drained	 to	 enable	 cultivation.	 High	 input	
cereals	and	root	crops	predominate	in	the	area	and	livestock	rearing	is	limited.	
Land	holdings	are	generally	large	with	24%	of	land	holdings	over	100Ha	which	





problematic	 when	 financial	 schemes	 are	 ‘ownership’	 rather	 than	 land	
oriented.	Hence,	the	existence	of	an	upper	limit	to	the	amount	of	funding	per	
person	might	mean	that	not	all	land	can	enter	these	schemes.1344	
The	 Humberhead	 Levels	 NCA	 contains	 a	 number	 of	 statutory	
designations.1345	There	are	5,722	ha.	designated	as	SSSI	(there	is	a	total	of	40	
sites	wholly	or	partly	within	the	NIA)	which	overlap	 to	a	great	 extent	with	
internationally	 important	 sites	 designated	 as	 Ramsar,	 SPA	 and	 SAC.	 These	




and	 as	 a	 Ramsar	 site.	 Given	 the	 number	 of	 rivers	 and	 watercourses,	 the	
Humberhead	Levels	NCA	 is	primarily	 characterised	by	wetland	ecosystems.	
The	 rivers	 and	 the	 network	 of	 drainage	 ditches	 and	 dykes	 form	 ecological	
corridors	to	link	the	Humber	Estuary	with	areas	upstream.	They	also	have	an	
important	 function	 as	 ecological	 networks	 that	 can	 facilitate	 species	
movement	in	response	to	climate	change.1346	









in	 England.	 They	 are	 of	 international	 ecological	 and	 historical	 importance.	
Lowland	raised	bog	 is	one	of	western	Europe's	 rarest	 and	most	 threatened	
habitats.	 The	 peatlands	 had	 been	 extensively	 worked	 in	 the	 past	 for	
commercial	 peat	 production	 leaving	 the	 remaining	 area	 with	 too	 varied	 a	
water	 table	 to	 allow	 peat	 formation.1347 	In	 particular	 the	 mechanical	 peat	
extraction	 and	 drainage	 that	 took	 place	 in	 the	 20th	 century	 threatened	 the	
integrity	of	the	bog	and	the	biodiversity	it	hosts.	Likely	enough,	such	works	
have	since	2004	been	halted	and	measures	taken	to	restore	the	damaged	peat	





One	of	 them,	 the	nocturnal,	 insect-feeding	night	 jar	was	 responsible	 for	 the	
area	being	designated	an	SPA	and	its	natural	habitat	for	it	being	designated	an	
SAC.	 The	 number	 of	 nesting	 nightjars	 in	 Humberhead	 Peatlands	 forms	 a	
significant	proportion	of	the	Western	Europe	population.1349	




scattered	 across	 the	 farmland	 landscape:	 isolated	 farmhouses	 and	 other	
traditional	 farm	 buildings	 and	 modern	 establishments	 that	 reflect	 the	
predominantly	 agricultural	 character	 of	 the	 area.	 The	 area	 has	 been	
systematically	drained	since	the	17th	century	with	large	scale	river	diversions	
and	 land	drainage.1351	The	 current	 landscape	has	been	 the	 result	of	 a	 long-












put	 pressure	 on	 the	 species	 and	 habitats	 and	 the	 integrity	 of	 the	 wetland	
ecosystem.		
Restoration	 of	 the	 wetlands	 and	 Humberhead	 Peatlands,	 as	 well	 as	
proper	 water	 management	 to	 address	 the	 increasing	 water	 demand	 for	
agriculture	 but	 also	 the	 needs	 of	 local	 biodiversity,	 were	 a	 priority	 in	 the	
Humberhead	 Levels	 NCA.	 	 Natural	 England’s	 revised	 profile	 of	 the	 area	
identified	 several	 ‘environmental	 opportunities,’	 1352an	 umbrella	 term	 that	
encompasses	 opportunities	 for	 the	 social	 and	 natural	 environment;	







initiative	 and	 a	 £17m	 DEFRA	 funding	 programme	 for	 the	 restoration	 and	
conservation	of	the	Humberhead	Peatlands.	1353	The	Partnership’s	main	agenda	was	




North	 Notts	 Water	 Level	 Man	 Board,	 the	 Shire	 Group	 Internal	 Drainage	
Boards,	 the	Environment	Agency	and	Natural	England),	Local	Governments	
(East	Riding	of	Yorks	Council,	Doncaster	MBC,	North	Lincolnshire	Council)	and	















The	 Partnership’s	 work	 is	 a	 manifestation	 of	 how	 research,	
collaboration	and	policy	overlap	as	well	as	how	essential	this	overlapping	is	
for	 nature	 conservation.	 The	 Partnership	 commissioned	 new	 studies	 to	
explore	 the	 concept	of	positive	water	management,	 the	potential	of	nature-
based	tourism	and	the	climate	change	impacts	on	the	preservation	of	lowland	
peatlands	 and	 food	 security.	 At	 the	 same	 time,	 it	 was	 responsible	 for	 the	
implementation	 of	 delivery	 schemes	 such	 as	 the	 Wetland	 Vision	 and	 the	
Nature	Improvement	Area	initiative.	




the	 Partnership	 could	 achieve	 delivering	 in	 four	 biodiversity	 opportunity	









about	creation	and	restoration	but	also	brought	 forward	the	 idea	of	 linking	
things	 together:	 nature	 conservation,	 water	 management	 and	 agricultural	






















focus	was	 directed	 onto	 four	 of	 them.	 Interview	with	 the	Humberhead	 Levels	 Partnership	
Secretariat	(NE)	(York,	1	April	2014).	
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Levels	 NIA	 by	 the	 HLP,	 the	 review	 of	 English	Wildlife	 Sites	 by	 a	 group	 of	
distinguished	experts	chaired	by	Sir	John	Lawton	came	along.	1358	The	‘Lawton	




The	 review	 concluded	 that	 although	 wildlife	 sites	 in	 England	 are	 highly		
valuable,	they	are	not	resilient	or	coherent	enough	to	allow	species	to	respond	
to	 climate	 change	 pressures.	 According	 to	 Sir	Lawton,	 the	 current	 sites	 are	
neither	 big	 enough,	 close	 enough,	 sufficiently	 linked	 or	 well	 managed	 to	
comprise	a	coherent	ecological	network	that	will	enable	biodiversity	to	cope	
with	 the	 challenges	 of	 climate	 change.	 Designated	 sites,	 even	 when	 well-
managed,	 are	 hidden	 jewels,	 scattered	 in	 landscapes,	 highly	 fragmented	 by	
intensive	agriculture	and	development	where	species	are	unable	to	move	or	
adapt	 quickly	 enough.	 Additionally,	 some	 of	 these	 sites	 are	 very	 small	 and	
although	they	allow	for	highly	intensive	management,	this	is	mere	gardening.	






























interface	 of	 science	 and	 policy	 and	 provided	 a	 framework	 for	 the	
implementation	 of	 intertwined	 adaptive	 management	 models.	 Certainly,	
scientific	expertise	was	necessary	to	guide	recreation	and	restoration	work,	
but	wide	 collaboration	 and	 not	merely	 state	 intervention	was	 vital	 for	 the	
scheme	to	operate	the	way	Professor	Lawton	envisaged	it:	
It	will	 require	 effective	 and	positive	 engagement	with	 the	 landowners	
and	 land	managers.	 And	 it	will	 need	 improved	 collaboration	 between	
local	 authorities,	 local	 communities,	 statutory	 agencies,	 the	 voluntary	




Lawton’s	 report	 and	 recommendations	 were	 welcomed	 by	 the	












Government’s	 commitment	 to	 effective	 consultation	 and	 ongoing	 dialogue	
with	the	public,	launched	a	discussion	document	on	the	Natural	Environment	
White	Paper	entitled	“An	invitation	to	shape	the	Nature	of	England”,	inviting	
comments	 and	 submissions	 by	 30	 October	 2010. 1364 	The	 response	 was	
overwhelming	with	more	than	15.000	people	and	organisations	sending	ideas,	
a	 record	 number	 for	 a	 DEFRA	 consultation.1365	Amongst	 those	 responding	
were	 conservation	 NGOs,	 scientific	 societies,	 local	 authorities,	 AONB	
partnerships	 and	 many	 individuals.	 As	 Stephanie	 Hilborne	 OBE,	 chief	
executive	 of	 The	 Wildlife	 Trusts,	 pointed	 out,	 the	 number	 of	 responses	
indicated	the	rapidly	increasing	awareness	of	the	public	on	issues	relating	to	
nature	conservation:	
“This	 overwhelming	 response	 provides	 a	 clear	 message	 to	 the	
Government	 that	 people	 care	 passionately	 about	 the	 natural	
environment	and	want	to	see	bold	and	ambitious	action	to	support	 its	
recovery.1366	
The	 outcome	 of	 the	 consultation	 was	 the	 publication	 of	 the	 Natural	
Environment	White	Paper	(NEWP)	entitled	‘The	Natural	Choice:	securing	the	
value	 of	 nature’	 in	 June	 2011.	This	 command	paper,	 the	 first	 of	 its	 kind	 in	
almost	20	years,	sets	out	the	Government’s	vision	for	natural	environment	for	
the	next	50	years.	The	paper’s	vision	is	not	confined	to	the	protection	of	the	















to	 leave	 the	 natural	 environment	 of	 England	 in	 a	 better	 state	 than	 it	
inherited’.1367	This,	it	proposes,	will	‘require	us	all	to	put	the	value	of	nature	at	
the	 heart	 of	 our	 decision-making	 –	 in	 Government,	 local	 communities	 and	
businesses’.		




collaborative	work	are	enriched	 in	 the	White	Paper	and	 reflect	 the	gradual	
recognition	in	policy	of	the	non-equilibrium	paradigm.	The	Paper	also	stresses	
the	need	for	more	flexible	and	innovative	approaches.1368	One	of	these,	is	the	
establishment	 of	 the	 Nature	 Improvement	 Areas	 following	 the	 Lawton	
recommendation	 for	 a	 competition	 on	 the	 establishment	 of	 Ecological	
Restoration	Zones.1369		
The	NIA	programme	aimed	to	create	bigger,	inter-connected	networks	





for	 focused	 areas	 (the	 NIAs)	 in	 which	 delivery	 mechanisms,	 policies	 and	
funding	that	affect	the	way	land	is	used	and	managed	would	be	coordinated	to	
achieve	optimal	results.		
	Partnership	 work,	 local	 knowledge,	 research	 and	 learning,	 and	
integration	 in	 decision	 making	 are	 key	 features	 of	 the	 NIA	 scheme	 as	











and	 networks	 that	 would	 be	 established	 and	 subsequently	 managed	 by	





provide	 a	 framework	 for	 adaptive	 management	 to	 operate.	 Concepts	 like	
constant	 learning	 and	 collaborative	 decision-making,	 the	 building	 blocks	 of	
the	adaptive	management	models	for	nature	conservation,	are	fundamental	to	
the	 proposed	 scheme.1370	Novel	 but	 certainly	 not	 alien	 to	 those	 practicing	
conservation	management	or	incompatible	to	the	English	nature	conservation	
framework	 as	 implemented	 to	 date	 by	 the	 administrative	 authorities,	 the	




The	 previous	 chapters	 demonstrated	 that	 the	 English	 legal	 and	 policy	






the	 change	 to	 a	 Government	 keen	 on	 showing	 that	 it	 was	 favouring	
conservation,	 all	 coincided	 with	 the	 HLP	 management	 delivery	 plan.	 The	
Partnership	already	had	a	delivery	plan,	they	had	prioritised	their	landscape	







Partnership	 to	 put	 into	practice	 their	 delivery	 plan.	Hence,	 the	 Partnership	
decided	 to	 submit	an	application	 for	a	Humberhead	Levels	NIA	and	draft	 a	
Business	Plan	which	was	a	requirement		
The	HLP	 found	 itself	 in	an	advantageous	position	given	 the	 fact	 that	
they	 were	 already	 an	 established	 Partnerships	 with	 great	 experience	 in	
partnership	working	and	project	delivery.	Having	successfully	delivered	the	
Wetland	 Vision	 scheme	 the	 Partnership	 had	 great	 experience	 in	 project	
management,	 human	 and	 financial	 resources	 management,	 had	 developed	
good	working	relationships	with	local	stakeholders	and	had	at	their	disposal	






not	 have	 anything	 already	 set	 and	 ready	 to	 go,	 would	 have	 found	 it	 very	
difficult	to	prepare	a	Business	Plan	that	could	show	potential	for	management	










































change	 in	 biodiversity	 delivery	 through	 an	 integrated	 approach	 to	
management	 that	 took	 place	 from	 April	 2012	 to	 April	 2015.	 The	 HHL	NIA	




1374	Humberhead	 Levels	 Partnership,	Nature	 Improvement	 Area:	 Inspiring	 landscapes	 and	


























models	 of	 adaptive	management	were	 previously	 identified:	 science	 driven	
decision-making,	 adherence	 to	 the	 non-equilibrium	 paradigm,	 advance	 of	
scientific	 research,	 experimentation	 and	 iterative	 learning	 for	 a	 scientific	
model	 of	 adaptive	 management,	 and	 stakeholder	 collaboration	 for	 the	
prevention	or	resolution	of	conflict.			
As	the	discussion	will	reveal,	the	NIA	scheme	provides	a	framework	for	
constant	 interactions	 of	 both	 models	 of	 adaptive	 management.	 It	 was	
mentioned	at	the	beginning	of	this	thesis	that	the	models	were	not	watertight	
and	the	distinction	was	made	for	 the	sake	of	 the	analysis.	As	 the	discussion	
moves	 towards	 the	 practical	 implementation	 of	 conservation	management,	
the	 distinction	 between	 these	 theoretical	 models	 gets	 more	 difficult	 to	
determine.	






























Looking	 at	 the	 NIA	 programme	 from	 its	 conception	 to	 its	
implementation,	 it	 can	 certainly	 be	 argued	 that	 science	 has	 a	 central	 role	
within	the	scheme.	To	begin	with,	it	is	a	group	of	experts	who	set	in	motion	the	
establishment	of	 the	NIAs	 in	 the	 first	place.	The	Lawton	Report	 is	 a	 largely	
scientific	evaluation	that	was	undertaken	by	a	group	of	experts	from	different	





ecological	 network	 capable	 of	 responding	 and	 adapting	 to	 the	 growing	
challenges	of	climate	change.1379	Hence,	the	evaluation	was	carried	out	on	the	








natural	 environment,	 it	 is	 essential	 wildlife	 sites	 in	 England	 represent	 an	
ecological	network.	The	panel	proposed	that	the	overarching	aim	for	England’s	
ecological	network	should	be:	
to	deliver	 a	natural	 environment	where:	Compared	 to	 the	 situation	 in	
2000,	 biodiversity	 is	 enhanced	 and	 the	 diversity,	 functioning	 and	
resilience	of	ecosystems	re-established	in	a	network	of	spaces	for	nature	
that	 can	 sustain	 these	 levels	 into	 the	 future,	 even	 given	 continuing	
environmental	change	and	human	pressures.1381		
This	 aim	 should	 be	 underpinned	 by	 three	 objectives	 that	 in	 their	
majority	refer	to	issues	falling	within	the	ambit	of	natural	sciences	





2) To	 restore	 and	 secure	 the	 long-term	 sustainability	 of	 the	
ecological	 and	 physical	  processes	 that	 underpin	 the	 way	
ecosystems	work,	thereby	enhancing	the	capacity	of	our	natural	
environment	to	provide	ecosystem	services	such	as	clean	water,	






In	 order	 to	 determine	 the	 extent	 to	 which	 these	 different	 sites	
separately	 and	 collectively	 comprised	 a	 coherent	 and	 resilient	 ecological	
network,	 the	 team	 tested	 a	 wide	 range	 of	 evidence	 gathered	 against	 five	
attributes	they	appointed	to	such	a	network:1383	
- The	network	will	support	the	full	range	of	England’s	biodiversity	and	









- The	network	and	 its	component	sites	will	be	of	adequate	size,	 taking	
account	of	 the	needs	of	 our	natural	 environment	 to	 adapt	 to	 climate	
change.	
- The	network	 sites	will	 receive	 long-term	protection	 and	appropriate	
management.	








panel	 by	more	 than	 45	 organizations	 that	 are	mentioned	 in	 annex	 2	 of	 the	
report.	 It	 is	not	surprising	that	 the	 larger	part	of	 literature	cited	belongs	to	
scientific	 disciplines	 and	 that	 the	 majority	 of	 organizations	 that	 submitted	




to	 climate	 change	pressure1385	followed	a	 series	of	24	recommendations	on	
how	to	establish	resilient	ecological	networks.	1386	






















over	 large,	 discrete	 areas	 within	 which	 significant	 enhancements	 of	




framework	 in	 England	 carried	 out	 by	 scientists,	 against	 aims	 decided	 by	
science	(sites	consisting	a	coherent	and	resilient	ecological	network)	and	on	
the	basis	of	scientific	criteria.		It	is	then	safe	to	assume	that	science	has	indeed	
a	 central	 role	 to	 play	 within	 the	 NIA	 scheme.	 This	 assumption	 is	 further	
confirmed	 when	 looking	 closely	 at	 the	 NIA	 Guidance	 Notes	 published	 by	
Natural	 England,	 following	 the	 announcement	 of	 the	 competition	 for	 the	
allocation	of	 funding	to	the	12	original	NIAs.	The	Guidance	Notes	contained	
several	 features	 that	 the	 authorities	 were	 looking	 out	 for	 in	 the	 NIA	







placing	 science	 at	 the	 heart	 of	management	 planning	 and	 delivery.	 Finally,	
although,	as	discussed	below,	the	initial	application	and	proposed	designation	


















face	 of	 an	 uncertain	 climate	 future’. 1391 	The	 NIA	 scheme	 is	 introduced	 to	
address	 such	 complexity	 with	 the	 creation	 of	 a	 coherent	 and	 resilient	
ecological	network.		
	 In	 the	preceding	 section,	 it	was	argued	 that	 science	 is	 central	 to	 the	
scheme	 and	 that	 scientific	 criteria	 are	 employed	 in	 the	 selection	 process.	
However,	 they	differ	substantially	 from	the	ones	applied	on	SSSIs.	They	are	
wider	and	not	 strictly	 confined	 to	 ‘special	 interest	by	 reason	of	 [any	of]	 its	
flora,	 fauna,	 or	 geological	 or	physiographical	features’. 1392 	Certainly,	
demonstrating	opportunities	for	projects	that	would	enhance	biodiversity	was	
vital.	However,	the	scheme	took	account	of	and	emphasized	features	that	fit	
nicely	 within	 the	 non-equilibrium	 paradigm	 and	 are	 largely	 ignored	 by	 a	
system	 that	 has	 traditionally	 been	 endangered-species/habitats	 centred.	
These	features	include	opportunities	to	enhance	the	functioning	of	ecological	


















growth	 are	 likely	 to	 lead	 to	 an	 increased	 demand	 for	 housing	 and	 food	
production.1394	
	 	 This	 is	 not	 to	 say	 that	 the	 human	 element	 is	 overlooked	 on	English	
traditional	conservation	designations.	It	has	already	been	discussed	in	detail	
that	 the	 legal	 framework,	 although	 strict,	 is	 not	 intended	 to	 raise	 walls	
between	the	natural	and	human	elements	but,	when	possible,	seeks	to	bring	
them	together.	The	NIA	scheme	however	brings	this	interrelationship	between	




















determine	 boundaries.	 Also,	 the	 need	 to	 revise	 their	 conservation	
objectives	to	respond	to	the	effects	of	climate	change.1396	
	
● The	 need	 to	 reconnect	 people	 with	 nature	 by	 enhancing	 ecological	
networks	in	urban	environments1397	
	




● The	 need	 to	 include	 people	 who	 work	 in	 the	 field	 by	 providing	
incentives	and	appropriate	advice	to	undertake	conservation	work.1399	
Without	 underestimating	 the	 importance	 of	 legal	 protection	 of	
biodiversity,	Professor	Lawton	and	his	team	recognise	the	Higher	Level	
Environmental	Stewardship	Scheme	as	‘the	single	most	important	tool	
for	maintaining	 and	 expanding	 the	most	 significant	 areas	 of	 priority	
habitats	and	priority	species’.1400		Equally	important	are	stewardship	
schemes	 to	 be	 employed	 towards	 the	 creation	 and	 enhancement	 of	
buffer	 sites,	 stepping	 stones	 and	 ecological	 corridors.	 	 The	 review	
further	points	out	the	need	for	a	more	coherent	and	tailored	application	





















provide	 better	 places	 for	 wildlife,	 to	 improve	 the	 natural	 environment	 for	
people,	and	to	unite	local	communities,	 landowners	and	business	through	a	







central	 concepts.	Monitoring	 requirements	were	 already	 in	 place	 since	 the	
announcement	of	the	competition.	
The	White	Paper	states:		






society	 and	 others	 need	 to	 have	 easy	 access	 to	 information	 and	
advice	about	 the	natural	environment	where	they	 live	and	work.	
The	 Government’s	 environmental	 bodies	 are	 reforming	 the	 way	
																																																								






they	 work	 together, to	 provide	 more	 coherent	 advice	 to	 local	
partners.	 This	 means	 sharing	 informationto	 help	 practitioners	
prioritise	action	basedon	environmental	risks	and	opportunities.	
In	support	of	 this,	Natural	England	 is	producing	maps	that	show	










NIA	 scheme	 is	 equally	 designed	 to	 inform	 future	 management	 decisions.	











NIAs.	 Innovative	 approaches	 such	 as	 biodiversity	 offsetting	 are	 strongly	
																																																								
1404	ibid,	2.31.	








encouraged	 to	be	put	 into	practice.1408	Experimentation	 can	also	 take	place	
within	the	NIA	on	a	project-basis	implementation.		
	 	 To	 ensure	 that	 shared	 learning	 and	 knowledge	 dissemination	 aims	
would	be	fulfilled,	the	monitoring	was	embedded	in	the	NIA	programme	from	
its	 conception. 1409 	Successful	 Partnerships	 had	 to	 comply	 with	 standard	













Evaluation	 was	 carried	 out	 with	 respect	 to	 individual	 projects,	
individual	 NIAs	 and	 collectively	 at	 programme	 level.	 The	 steering	 group	
responsible	for	the	establishment	of	the	original	NIAs	would	meet	every	six	





1409 	Natural	 England,	 Nature	 Improvement	 Areas:	 Competitive	 Grant	 Scheme	 General	
Guidance	Notes	(n96)	23.	
1410	ibid	12.	
1411 	DEFRA	 and	 Natural	 England,	 Nature	 Improvement	 Areas	 Monitoring	 and	 Evaluation	
Framework	(July	2012).	
1412 	An	 updated	 version	 was	 published	 in	 2014,	 Collingwood	 Environmental	 Planning,	
Updated	Monitoring	and	Evaluation	Framework	for	Nature	Improvement	Areas	(Collingwood	
Environmental	Planning	Ltd,	London,	2014).	




results	 for	 the	 annual	 Monitoring	 and	 Evaluation	 report	 of	 the	 entire	
scheme.1414		
Reflecting	the	innovative	approach	of	focusing	on	ecological	processes	










For	 each	 of	 these	 themes,	 several	 indicators	 were	 developed	 and	
attached	to	every	theme/sub-theme.	Some	of	them	were	core	indicators.	For	
core	 indicators,	 the	 submission	 of	 monitoring	 results	 to	 by	 the	 NIAs	 was	
mandatory.	Other	indicators	were	just	optional.	Looking	at	the	themes,	sub-
themes	 and	 indicators,	 one	 can	 appreciate	 the	 innovative	 character	 of	 the	
scheme:	assessment	was	requested	to	be	carried	out	on	topics	such	as	habitat	
connectivity,	 ecosystem	 services	 and	 social	 and	 economic	 benefits	 and	
wellbeing.		
The	crucial	role	of	monitoring	for	the	success	of	the	scheme	and	its	vital	
role	 to	 the	 fulfilment	 of	 its	 objectives	 was	 also	 reflected	 in	 the	 fact	 that	 a	
workshop	 was	 organised	 in	 November	 2011	 to	 introduce	 NIA	 partners	 to	














allowed	 everyone	 involved	 with	 conservation	 to	 contribute	 data	 and	
information	 with	 regard	 to	 action	 plans	 and	 record	 progress	 towards	 the	
targets	 and	 actions	of	 the	 plan.1417	It	 also	 held	 an	 accessible	 database	with	
information	widely	accessible	by	the	public	on	species,	habitats,	actions	and	
activities.	







baseline	 information	 for	 all	 these	 different	 things	 the	 framework	 was	






this	 issue	 when	 looking	 specifically	 at	 the	 Humberhead	 Levels	 NIA	


















Lying	 at	 the	 heart	 of	 any	 conflict	 resolution	 model	 is	 collaborative	











aim	 and	 objectives,	 has	 a	 different	 composition	 to	 the	 NIA	 Delivery	
Partnership,	and	in	turn	there	is	different	membership	when	it	comes	to	the	
various	 working	 groups,	 etc. 1420 	In	 a	 slight	 analogy	 to	 the	
designation/management	decision	making	on	statutory	legislation	but	always	
within	the	context	of	the	NIA	partnership	centred	approach,	the	Humberhead	





delivery	 partners	 also	 included	 private	 landowners	 and	 local	 businesses	







The	 element	 of	 collaboration	 is	 deeply	 embedded	 in	 the	 NIA	





biodiversity	 are	 complex	 and	 require	 a	 range	 of	 coordinated	 measures	
generally	involving	multiple	actors’.1423	The	rationale	is	therefore	twofold	and	
captures	both	aspects	of	 complexity	 relating	 to	nature	 conservation:	on	 the	
one	 hand,	 the	 need	 to	 bring	 diverse	 interests	 together	 to	meet	 everyone’s	
expectations	 in	order	to	address	the	social	dimension	of	complexity;	on	the	
other,	 the	 complexity	 of	 ecological	 processes	 and	 biodiversity	 problems	
require	 as	 many	 sources	 of	 information,	 experience	 and	 co-ordination	 as	
possible.	 A	 partnership	 approach	 expands	 the	 network	 of	 participants	 and	
allows	 for	 both	 aspects	 of	 complexity	 to	 be	 addressed.	 Hence,	 although	
collaboration	 and	 partnership	 is	 an	 essential	 and	 defining	 element	 of	 a	




Partnerships	were	eligible	 to	apply	 for	 the	NIA	 funding.	 In	order	 to	ensure	
pluralism	 in	 the	 NIA	 management,	 the	 Natural	 England	 Guidance	 Notes	
excluded	individuals	and	sole	organizations	from	the	bidding	procedure	and	











Given	 the	 experimental	 and	 flexible	 nature	 of	 the	 scheme,	 the	 NIA	
partnerships	 vary	 significantly	 in	 terms	 of	 partners’	 number	 and	structure.	
Certainly,	 the	 number	 of	members	 and	 the	 composition	 of	 the	 Partnership	
correlated	 with	 the	 representation	 of	 the	 various	 interests.	 Hence,	 a	
Partnership	 of	 ‘significant	 landowners’	 and	 the	 ‘private	 sector’	 and	 ‘social	
enterprises’	would	be	substantially	different	to	one	of	conservation	NGOs	and	
statutory	agencies	such	as	Natural	England	and	the	Environment	Agency	or	
the	Forest	Commission.	 In	 the	 first	 case,	 it	 could	be	 reasonably	expected	 to	
concentrate	more	on	social	and	private	interests	while	in	the	second	case	it	
would	be	expected	that	emphasis	would	be	put	on	biodiversity.		




presence	 of	 organizations	 and	 bodies	 traditionally	 working	 in	 favour	 of	
conservation	interests	should	not	surprise	us	given	the	fact	that	it	is	a	‘Nature	




Partnership	 established	 specifically	 for	 the	 NIA	 delivery. 1427 	Organizations	
such	as	the	Wildlife	Trusts,	RSPB	and	Natural	England	have	vast	experience	














Delivery	 partners	 in	 the	 Business	 Plan),	 then	 at	 p.39	 lists	 10	 partners	
(Yorkshire	 Wildlife	 Trust,	Natural	 England,	Environment	
Agency,		Lincolnshire	WLT,	Ouse	and	Humber	 IDB,	RSPB	(Newcastle),	North	




steering	and	working	groups	attached	 to	 the	HHL	NIA.1428	The	next	 section	
focusing	on	adaptive	management	 in	 the	HHL	NIA	will	discuss	 in	detail	 the	










the	 two	 models	 of	 adaptive	 management,	 referring	 to	 science,	 knowledge	




unite	 local	 communities,	 landowners	 and	 business	 through	 a	 shared	
vision.	 They	 will	 try	 out	 different	 approaches,	 and	 the	 variety	 of	
objectives,	 issues	and	partnerships	seen	across	 the	NIAs	 is	part	of	 this	
purpose.	 Nevertheless,	 a	 consistent	 approach	 for	 monitoring	 and	







several	 concepts	 where	 the	 practical	 use	 of	 science	 is	 still	 contested	
and/or	 developing,	 for	 example	 relating	 to	 restoration	 of	 habitat	
connectivity	and	ecosystem	services.	 Implementation	of	 such	new	and	





The	 establishment	 of	 NIAs	 represents	 a	 significant	 new	 approach	 to	
conservation	 of	 biodiversity	 and	 restoration	 of	 ecosystem	 services	 in	
England	 operating	 at	 a	 landscape	 scale.	 It	 aims	 to	 build	 on	 existing	
information,	 knowledge	 and	 practical	 experience	 of	 landscape-scale	
initiatives,	 but	 place	 partnerships	 with	 local	 communities	 and	 civil	
society	at	its	heart.	It	is	also	intended	to	provide	an	opportunity	for	the	
NIA	partnerships	to	embed	public	dialogue	for	decision	making	in	their	
areas,	 and	 contribute	 to	 future	 national	 development	 of	 biodiversity,	
landscape	 and	 ecosystem	 policy.	 Each	 NIA	 has	 developed	 their	 own	
Business	 Plan	 which	 set	 out	 locally	 determined	 priorities	 and	 action	





NIA	 scheme	 in	 the	 Humberhead	 Levels	 and	 examines	 the	 overlap	 and	
interrelationship	between	the	two	models.	What	needs	to	be	kept	in	mind	is	
that	out	of	49,869	ha	only	7,276.6	ha	are	designated	as	SSSIs.	This	means	that	
across	 the	 majority	 of	 the	 land	 covered,	 laws	 and	 regulations	 –	 or	 more	
precisely	the	lack	thereof	-	prioritise	private	interests	instead	of	that	of	nature,	
or	more	precisely,	 a	 scientific	depiction	of	nature.	 In	 these	 cases,	while	 the	
status	quo	and	the	use	of	land	primarily	for	agriculture	is	being	maintained,	
conflict	 is	 likely	 to	 be	 latent,	 in	 the	 sense	 that	 there	 is	 no	 expressed	
dissatisfaction	 by	 the	 farming	 community;	 however,	 the	 use	 of	 land	 and	








As	 Sir	 Lawton	 said,	 the	NIAs	 are	 ‘consortia	of	 the	willing’.1430	Collaborative	
adaptive	management	enters	the	scene	both	at	the	planning	stage	and	at	the	
implementation	 stage	as	subsidiary	 to	a	more	 science-driven	 target	 setting.	
The	interests	of	a	range	of	stakeholders	are	accounted	for	during	the	decision-
making	process	-	either	directly	through	their	participation	and	collaboration,	















of	 the	 NIA;	 and	 the	 implementation	 and	 the	 monitoring	 of	 management	
results. 1431 	However,	 the	 influence	 of	 science	 in	 shaping	 decisions	 varies	
among	the	different	stages	whereas	in	contrast	e.g.	to	the	SSSI	regime,	there	is	
no	 stage	 of	 decision-making	where	 science	 has	 been	 the	 only	 factor	 to	 be	
considered.		
To	begin	with,	looking	at	the	membership	of	the	Humberhead	Levels	
Partnership	and	 the	main	actors	of	 the	NIA,	one	 cannot	help	but	notice	 the	
prominent	role	of	science.	Many	of	the	partners	are	either	conservation	NGOs	
(with	traditional	links	to	research	and	scientific	expertise)	or	expert	agencies	
such	 as	 Natural	 England	 and	 Environment	 Agency. 1432 	These	 are	 either	
representatives	of	the	public	sector	(statutory	agencies)	or	the	interests	of	the	
natural	environment	(NGOs).	Furthermore,	members	of	scientific	teams	of	the	
partner	 organisations,	 particularly	 the	 NGOs,	 had	 a	 crucial	 role	 to	 play	 in	
designing	 and	 implementing	 several	 projects1433	and	 many	 scientists	 were	
positioned	in	key	roles	at	the	NIA,	first	and	foremost	being	the	NIA	programme	
manager.		
Recruiting	 or	 allocating	 scientists	 to	 deliver	 NIA	 projects	was	 to	 be	











together	with	 the	 projects	 to	 deliver	 them.	More	 specifically	 the	NIA	 had	 a	
vision1434	and	five	key	aims	that	would	deliver	the	vision.	It	also	had	a	set	of	
objectives	 and	 then	 some	 projects	 that	 would	 deliver	 those	 objectives	 to	









the	 mixed	 nature	 of	 socio-ecological	 aims	 and	 objectives,	 others	 to	 more	
pragmatic	 reasons	 relating	 to	 the	 well-known	 issue	 of	 conflict	 and	 its	









terms	 but	 also	 valued	 for	 aesthetic	 or	 cultural	 reasons.	 At	 the	 same	 time,	
although	the	NIA	scheme	is	a	‘nature	improvement’	initiative,	human	societies	










SSSI/SAC/SPA	 designations	 with	 the	 aesthetic	 and	 cultural	 grounds	 of	




The	 vision	 is	 to	 return	 existing	 wetlands	 to	 favourable	 condition,	




farmland	 to	 wildlife	 movement.	 This	 will	 be	 by	 better,	 integrated	
management	which	benefits	wildlife	and	maintains	the	economic	value	of	




Therefore,	 it	 is	 arguable	 that	 the	 NIA	 initiative	 was	 not	 a	 purely	
scientific	initiative	but	rather	a	diverse	multi-layered	programme	combining	
aims	and	objectives	–	and	consequently	tasks	–	of	a	scientific	nature	with	aims	
































major	 role	 in	 shaping	management	 planning;	 habitats	 creation,	 sustainable	






For	 instance,	 the	 Broomfleet	 Washland	 project	 sought	 to	 create	 an	
additional	key	site	of	39	ha	of	wet	grassland,	reedbed	and	wet	fen	plus	a	small	
amount	 of	wet	woodland.	 The	 neighbouring	 project	 Broomfleet	 Pits	would	
also	deliver	another	10	ha	of	wet	grassland	and	reedbed.	Together,	 the	two	
projects	created	habitat	opportunities	for	a	number	of	BAP	species	including	
Bittern,	 Lapwing,	 Hairy	 Dragonfly,	 Water	 Vole,	 Otter	 and	 Great	 Water	
Parsnip1439	but	along	with	promoting	the	interests	of	biodiversity,	Broomfleet	























	 	 Certainly,	 some	 criteria	were	 scientific	 and	 related	 to	 the	 ecological	
links	 between	 the	 Peatlands	 (designated	 NNR,	 SACs	 and	 SPAs)	 and	 the	
Humber	Estuary	(designated	Ramsar	Site),	the	existence	of	a	complex	network	
of	rivers	and	drains	that	connect	North	Nottinghamshire	to	the	Humber,	the	
existence	 of	 peaty	 soils,	 statutory	 designations	 etc,	 (figure	 13,	 table	 2).	
However,	there	were	also	a	number	of	non-scientific	reasons,	some	of	them	
related	 to	 specific	 requirements	 set	 by	 Natural	 England	 for	 NIAs,	 some	 to	
practical	 aspects	 of	 implementation	 and	 some	 to	 the	 non-science-driven	
objectives	of	the	HHL	NIA.		
	 	 To	 begin	 with,	 there	 was	 an	 upper	 designation	 limit	 of	 50,000	 ha	
constraining	the	Partnership	who	put	 together	the	application	and	business	
plan,	limiting	how	much	land	they	could	include	in	the	scheme.	Second,	there	
was	 a	 very	 tight	 time	 schedule	 for	 the	 completion	 process.	 As	 mentioned,	
																																																								
1441	Interview	with	the	Humberhead	Levels	Partnership	Secretariat	(NE)	(York,	1	April	2014);	












partners	 in	 the	 four	 HHL	 NCA	 Biodiversity	 Opportunity	 Areas	 (figure	 10)	
which	were	set	at	 the	centre	of	 the	designation	process.1443	This	started	the	
shape	 heading	 downwards	 from	 the	 Inner	 Humber	 and	 the	 Humberhead	










local	 biodiversity.	 Hence,	 Far	 Ings	 and	 Idle	 valley	 at	 the	 bottom	 end	 were	
included	because	of	their	visitor	facilities,	which	enabled	the	Partners	to	‘[…]	











































1446 	Map	 generated	 using	 ‘Magic’	 authoritative	 geographic	 information	 website	 at	
<http://magic.defra.gov.uk/home.htm	>.	
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and	 financial	 resources	were	 to	be	 confined	 to	areas	with	real	 and	 realistic	
opportunities	for	conservation	work.1447	In	this	respect,	the	rules	and	criteria	






possibility	 of	 pursuing	 opportunities	 for	 management	 favouring	 nature	
conservation	and	promoting	NIA	objectives.	Even	within	these	areas,	wetland	
advisors1448	would	 seize	 the	opportunity	 to	work	together	with	any	willing	
landowner,	 inform	 them	 about	 the	 NIA	 scheme	 and	 introduce	 them	 to	 the	
concept	of	environmental	stewardship.1449		
Moving	 from	 boundary	 designation	 to	 actual	 management	
implementation,	it	stands	to	reason	that	science	would	inform	the	decisions	
on	the	management	interventions	needed	to	achieve	the	objectives.	In	fact,	like	
most	 science-driven	 projects,	 those	 on	 habitat	 creation	 and	 ecological	
connectivity	were	led	by	the	conservation	trusts	and	their	scientific	staff.	But,	
as	I	have	stressed	before,	the	NIA	was	a	‘consortium	of	the	willing’	and	because	
of	 this,	 the	 ‘adaptive’	 in	 adaptive	 management	 not	 only	 refers	 to	 active,	
scientific,	even	a	little	experimental	management	but	also	to	joining	people	of	
opposing	interests	together	through	negotiation	and	collaboration.	It	is	true	
that	 project	 design	was	 largely	 a	 scientific	 process.	 Project	 implementation	
however	was	more	open,	involving	a	wider	network	of	participants.	Without	










science-driven	 collaborative	 adaptive	 management	 project,	 10	 ha	 of	 wet	
grassland	and	reedbed	were	created	as	a	result	of	partnership	work	between	
the	 RSPB	 and	 a	 local	 mineral	 extractor.	 They	 also	 improved	 and	 created	
habitat	for	wetland	birds,	in	particular	the	bittern.	Likewise,	the	lead	partner,	
the	Ouse	and	Humber	Drainage	Board	(O	&	H	IDB)	in	collaboration	with	the	
RSPB	 and	 Natural	 England	 have	 supported	 a	 HLS	 Agreement	 with	 the	
washland’s	tenant	farmer.	As	a	result,	currently,	the	washlands	extend	to	some	
39	ha	of	wet	grassland	and	reed	bed	and	are	managed	for	the	double	purpose	
of	 enhanced	 flood	 storage	 and	 habitat	 protection. 1450 	This	 habitat	
management	 work	 was	 undertaken	 with	 careful	 regard	 for	 the	 site’s	 land	
drainage	 function,	 ecological	 processes	 and	 private	 interests	 reflecting	 the	
interaction	 between	 scientific	 and	 collaborative	 decision-making	 and	










objectives	 and	 recommendations,	 for	 instance,	 when	 seeking	 to	 restore	 or	
create	new	habitats	like	the	case	of	Broomfleet	Washlands	described	above.	
The	 tendencies	 reflect	 the	 interrelationship	 between	 the	 scientific	 and	
collaborative	 adaptive	management	models.	 Collaborative	management	 can	
																																																								









contrast	 to	 the	preceding	Wetland	Vision	project,	 there	had	been	 little	 land	
acquisition	no	land	acquisition	took	place	while	additionally	the	NIA	managed	
not	 only	 to	 stay	within	 budget	 but	 also	demonstrated	 a	 4.5x	 return	on	 the	
original	DEFRA	NIA	grant.1452	Additionally,	if	we	give	‘collaboration’	a	wider	
meaning	 beyond	 that	 of	 directly	 interested	 stakeholders	 but	 everyone	
involved	in	the	scheme,	the	HHL	NIA	had	46,000	volunteer	hours	contributed	
across	 projects	 and	 reserves	worth	 over	 £246,000.1453		Hence,	 the	 value	 of	
collaboration	extends	beyond	 the	resolution	of	 conflict.	 In	practice,	without	
working	together	with	volunteers	as	well	as	landowners	willing	to	‘sacrifice’	
part	of	 their	 land	for	conservation	purposes,	 it	 is	doubtful	 that	 the	delivery	






to	 be	 made	 between	 ‘partners’	 and	 ‘people’	 as	 these	 two	 concepts	 differ	
significantly.	 Partners	 were	 usually	 (and	 as	 far	 as	 the	 HLP	 is	 concerned	
exclusively)	 organisations,	 local	 authorities,	 statutory	 agencies	 and	 private	
companies	but	rarely	 individuals.	These	Partners	would	appoint	more	 than	




1452	Humberhead	Levels	NIA	 Final	Report	 (2012-2015)	 (n1281)	 3,	 34.	 The	wetland	Vision	
Project	was	strongly	based	on	land	acquisition	projects	while	the	HHL	NIA	was	more	advice,	





was	 equally	 important	 to	who	 the	 Partners	were	 and	which	 interests	 they	
represented.		
The	 importance	 of	 engaging	 qualified	 and	 skilled	 individuals	 in	 the	
collaborative	 management	 of	 ecosystems	 was	 stressed	 in	 the	 previous	
chapters.	 In	HHL	NIA	 it	 is	 a	 common	understanding	among	 those	engaging	
with	projects	delivery	therein,	 that	working	 in	such	a	scheme	requires	 ‘soft	
partnership	skills’.1454	Ability	to	interact,	communicate,	gain	others	trust	and	
develop	 working	 relationships	 was	 seen	 as	 essential	 to	 the	 success	 of	 the	
programme.	 For	 instance,	 the	 personal	 networks	 of	 the	 NIA	 partners’	 staff	
were	instrumental	in	widening	the	NIA	network	and	engaging	the	right	people	
in	 the	 NIA	 activities. 1455 	This	 is	 particularly	 true	 in	 projects	 such	 as	 the	
Wetland	 Advisor	 and	 Connect	 that	 sought	 to	 engage	 a	 large	 number	 of	
individuals	 (landowners	 and	 local	 communities	 respectively).	 Equally	
important	was	the	experience	and	knowledge	of	the	NIA	staff	of	the	area,	both	
in	 terms	 of	 its	 ecological	 and	 social	 aspects.	 The	 area	 covered	 area	 was	
significant	and	the	scheme	was	set	up	relatively	quickly,	which	is	why	working	
together	with	people	such	as	the	NE	land	advisors	who	had	long	experience	in	
the	area	was	crucial.1456	These	 individuals	were	 familiar	with	both	the	 local	
























scheme.1460	However,	 due	 to	 staff	 changes	 among	 the	 partners,	 the	 people	
who	knew	the	project	from	its	outset	at	2011	were	not	working	on	it	three	
years	 later.1461 	This,	 as	 would	 be	 expected,	 had	 a	 negative	 impact	 on	 the	
smooth	running	of	the	programme.1462	Hence,	maintaining	consistency	in	the	
network	 was	 crucial	 not	 only	 in	 terms	 of	 representing	 the	 wide	 range	 of	
‘stakeholder	 interests’	 but	 also	 in	 terms	 of	 the	 individuals	 selected	 and	
allocated	to	get	the	job	done.		
The	following	paragraphs	discuss	the	collaborative	management	that	
took	 place	 in	 the	 HHL	 and	 the	 quantitative	 and	 qualitative	 changes	 to	 the	
network	 of	 people	 involved	 at	 different	 levels	 and	 stages	 of	management.	
Analysing	who	was	involved,	and	in	what	capacity,	will	help	us	to	determine	
how	scientific	and/or	collaborative	the	management	of	HHL	NIA	was.	As	the	
diagram	 below	 shows,	 at	 the	 top	 tier	 to	 the	 far	 left	 we	 find	 the	 Executive	
Board,	which	has	a	membership	of	15.	Moving	to	the	right,	the	diagram	shows	
three	 steering	 groups	 representing	 the	 NIA,	 Funding	 and	
Communications.1463		The	NIA,	being	a	delivery	scheme,	has	several	working	
																																																								
1458 	This	 could	 have	 been	 either	 by	 appointing	 existing	 members	 of	 staff	 or	 recruit	 staff	
specifically	for	the	NIA.	As	to	the	HHL	NIA	the	Business	Plan	indicated	that	there	would	be	a	











































vision,	 aims	 and	 objectives	 and	 for	 designing	 the	 projects	 set	 out	 in	 the	
Business	Plan.	The	NIA	had	 to	 report	back	 to	 the	Executive	Board	whether	
these	 projects	 were	 actually	 delivering	 these	 objectives	 and	 aims	 and	
vision.1469	This	was	the	task	of	the	NIA	Programme	Manager	representing	the	
scheme.	 1470 The	 Programme	 Manager	 had	 to	 participate	 in	 the	 Board’s	






the	 issue	 in	 the	 Board,	 in	 the	 presence	 of	 the	 Partner	 against	 whom	 the	
complaint	was	raised.1472		
Certainly,	 setting	 mutually	 accepted	 aims	 and	 objectives	 is	 a	























In	 the	case	of	 the	HLP,	 the	Partners	had	already	designed	a	 ten-year	
delivery	plan,	a	long-term	vision	for	the	entire	Humberhead	Levels	NCA,	and	
the	NIA	scheme	emerged	just	in	time	to	help	realise	this	plan.		
Although	 sharing	 a	 common	 vision	 –	 nature	 improvement	 -	 the	 fact	
remains	that	the	different	partners	represent	different	interests,	which	means	
there	are	bound	to	be	multiple	interest	overlaps	as	well	as	conflicts.	But	this	is	






HLP.	 Its	main	 priority	 is	 to	 realise	 government	 policy	 (Biodiversity	
2020	 and	 the	White	 Paper)	 and	work	with	 Partners	 to	 ensure	 that	
there	 is	 a	 joined-up	 approach	 to	 delivering	 those	 objectives.	 As	 the	
competent	 authority	 for	 nature	 conservation,	 NE	 is	 bound	 by	 a	
biodiversity	duty	and	its	primary	focus	falls	on	the	SSSIs	and	NNRs.1474	
NE	benefits	 from	the	NIA,	as	 the	scheme	helps	them	to	deliver	 their	
commitment	to	maintaining	SSSIs.	The	NIA	funding	allowed	for	land	
























NE	 refrained	 from	 exercising	 tight	 control	 over	 funding	 allocation,	
they	nevertheless	had	to	ensure	that	money	was	spent	in	accordance	
with	 Treasury	 Rules	 and	 that	 there	 was	 rational	 utilization	 of	 the	
available	funds.1479	
	For	 this	 reason,	 the	 Programme	 Manager	 had	 to	 submit	 a	
claims	 report	 to	 NE	 each	 quarter.	 This	 was	 essentially	 a	 progress	












Natural	England	also	played	an	additional,	 supportive	 role	 in	
the	NIA	liaising	between	the	Programme	Manager	and	DEFRA.	So,	for	







Natural	 England	 was	 also	 acting	 as	 an	 informal	








NE	 also	 had	 a	 national	 coordinator’s	 role	 in	 the	 scheme,	
supervising	all	12	NIAs	and	assessing	 the	programme	progress	as	a	
whole.1484	A	NE	appointed	programme	manager	was	supervising	the	
NIA	 scheme	 implementation	 and	was	 responsible	 for	 assessing	 the	
funding	claims	of	the	12	NIAs.	The	NE	HLP	representative	acted	as	a	
liaison	between	the	HHL	NIA	Programme	Manager	and	the	NIA	scheme	










teleconferences	with	 the	national	 team	 to	discuss	and	compare	any	
common	issues	that	arose	among	the	NIAs	as	well	as	potential	ways	to	
address	these.1486	
Finally,	 beyond	 this	 supportive/advisory	 role,	 having	 NE	 as	 a	
partner	 enabled	 the	 HLP	 to	 share	 NE’s	 extensive	 knowledge	 and	
experience	of	both	the	natural	and	social	environment	of	the	local	area.	
It	was	NE	that	produced	the	Biodiversity	Opportunity	Areas	maps	for	
everyone	 to	 use.	 Additionally,	 NE	 have	 at	 their	 disposal	 extensive	
research	 carried	out	by	 themselves	and	 their	predecessors	 (English	
Nature	 and	 Nature	 Conservancy	 Council).	 Furthermore,	 Natural	
England	 staff	 had	 been	 working	 in	 the	 area	 for	 years	 and	 had	
developed	 very	 strong	 relationships	with	 the	 local	 landowners	 and	
farmers.	 The	 latter	were	more	 likely	 to	 trust	 their	 local	 advisor	 or	
someone	working	with	their	local	advisor,	than	an	NIA	member	of	staff	




informed	 suggestions	 e.g	 that	 NIA	 funding	 be	 offered	 to	 the	
neighbouring	farm	to	complement	work	already	being	done,	and	they	
also	 knew	which	 landowners	were	 unlikely	 to	 co-operate	 and	 thus	
better	avoided.		
What	 is	 crucial	 though	 is	 NE’s	 competence	 as	 an	 administrative	
authority.	 It	 needs	 to	 be	 stressed	 that	 the	 Partnership	 was	 not	
delegated	 any	 decision-making	 powers	 and	 could	 not	 replace	 the	
administration	in	cases	where	the	latter	was	required	by	law	to	issue	
e.g	 a	 permit	 or	 licence,	 or	was	willing	 to	 enter	 into	 a	management	














undertook	 was	 ultimately	 subject	 to	 the	 competent	 authority’s	
decision.	 Hence,	 having	 the	 decision-making	 authority	 as	 a	 Partner	









it	 is	 the	 competent	authority	 for	water	management	 in	England.1490	
The	 Environment	 Agency	 is	 the	 principal	 flood	 risk	
management	operating	 authority	 and	 manages	 flood	 risk	 from	
designated	main	 rivers,	 reservoirs,	 estuaries	and	 the	sea.1491	The	EA	
manages	the	use	and	conservation	of	water	through	the	issue	of	water	






















EA	nevertheless	has	 a	wider	 agenda1492	and	 therefore	 less	 common	
ground	 with	 Biodiversity	 2020	 and	 the	 NEWP,	 which	 means	 that	
conservation	interests	did	not	necessarily,	coincide	with	EA	ambitions	
for	 and	 views	 about	 an	 area.	 This	 is	 yet	 another	 example	 of	 the	

































and	 related	 infrastructure	 such	 as	 pumping	 stations,	 weirs,	 sluices,	
culverts	 and	 embankments	 within	 their	 drainage	 districts.	 What	 is	
noteworthy	is	that	the	IDBs’	area	of	responsibility	is	not	determined	
by	administrative	boundaries	but	by	water	catchment	areas	within	a	
given	 region.	 An	 IDB’s	 consent	 is	 required	 for	 works	 related	 to	
obstruction	 of	waters	 such	 the	 construction	 or	 alteration	 of	 a	weir,	
bridge,	 embankment	 prior	 to	 such	work	 taking	 place.	 IDBs	 are	 also	
non-statutory	 consultee	 for	 planning	 applications1494	and	 similar	 to	
the	 EA	 are	 bound	 by	 a	 duty	 to	 further	 the	 conservation	 and	
enhancement	of	all	statutory	designated	sites	within	their	districts.	It	
follows	 that	 much	 like	 work	 undertaken	 by	 the	 EA,	 water	 level	
management	by	IDBs	was	an	essential	component	to	fulfilling	NIA	aim	
of	sustainable	water	management	and	an	increase	in	the	hydrological	
integrity	 of	 the	 area.	 It	 was	 also	 to	 be	 expected	 that	 certain	works	





they	 maintain	 a	 close	 connection	 to	 the	 private	 interests	 of	 their	
catchment	area	 thereby	making	 them	 the	HLP	partner	 representing	
landowners’	 interest	 in	 the	 HLP	 Executive. 1495 	IDB	 work	 is	 mainly	
funded	by	the	local	beneficiaries	of	the	water	level	management	work	
																																																								








the	 levy-paying	 landowners	 in	 the	 area	 together	 with	 members	




Local	 Authorities:	 Three	 local	 authorities	 are	 members	 of	 the	
HLP. 1498 	Local	 authorities	 represent	 the	 interests	 of	 the	 wider	
community	 but	 are	 also	 the	 competent	 authorities	 for	 a	 number	 of	
licensing	 and	 permitting	 procedures	 and	 primarily	 for	 granting	





alignment	 between	 conservation	 interests	 and	 the	 development	 of	
local	 plans,	 for	 example.	 It	 also	 allows	 for	 collaboration	 and	
coordination	of	development	across	an	area	covered	by	different	local	
authorities.	 Much	 of	 the	 work	 undertaken	 by	 the	 NIA	 required	
planning	permission,	which	remained	within	the	competence	of	local	
planning	 authorities.	 Having	 local	 authorities	 on	 the	 table	 would	
ideally	 facilitate	 this	 process	 and	 allow	projects	 to	 be	 implemented	
without	delays.		
	










contribution	to	the	HLP	and	the	HHL	NIA	 is	crucial	and	vital	 for	 the	
programme’s	 success,	 for	 a	 number	 of	 reasons.	 First	 and	 foremost,	
nature	 conservation	 is	 their	main	 objective.	 These	 are	 the	 partners	
exclusively	representing	nature	interests	within	the	Partnership	and	
whose	 mandate	 shares	 a	 great	 deal	 of	 common	 ground	 with	 the	
Biodiversity	2020	and	the	NEWP	objectives.	Their	work	concentrates	
on	 promoting	 biodiversity	 conservation	 through	 raising	 public	
awareness,	 campaigns	 and	 petitions	 but	 also	 actual	 practical	
conservation	 work	 within	 and	 outside	 their	 natural	 reserves.	 They	
have	also	traditionally	been	a	major	pressure	group	in	the	UK	policy	








dimensions.	More	 specifically,	 the	 conservation	NGOs	are	 staffed	by	
scientific	personnel	in	charge	of	project	design	and	the	management	of	
the	reserves.	The	RSPB	in	particular	operates	a	centre	for	conservation	
science	whose	 aim	 is	 to	 develop	 practical	 solutions	 to	 21st	 century	

















the	 charitable	 trusts.	 Both	 the	 RSPB	 and	 the	Wildlife	 Trusts	 attach	
great	 importance	 to	 building	 relationships	 of	 goodwill,	 trust	 and	
understanding	with	the	landowners	that	manage	land	adjacent	to	their	
reserves	and	between	 landowners	and	 the	 land	considered	 to	be	of	
high	biodiversity	value.	Hence,	in	spite	of	not	having	the	armoury	of	
NE	(the	ability	to	enforce	the	law	and/or	provide	financial	incentives	





Wildlife	 Trust	 have	 a	 very	 large	 membership 1505 	and	 are	 also	
recipients	of	substantial	donations	and	legacies.	Therefore,	they	have	
their	 own	 income	 to	 fund	 the	 management	 of	 their	 reserves	 and	
purchase	land	of	biodiversity	value.		Add	to	that	their	very	own	army	
of	volunteers,	who	contribute	hundreds	of	hours	of	their	time	on	the	
field	 and	 we	 may	 well	 see	 that	 their	 contribution	 to	 practical	
conservation	work	is	indeed	essential.	
In	particular	the	YWT	had	a	central	role	to	play	in	the	NIA	as	it	was	
appointed	 lead	 Partner.	 It	 took	 over	 some	 responsibilities	 from	NE	



























since	 the	 HLP	 and	 the	 NIA	 have	 an	 active	 role	 in	 both	 designing	 and	
implementation,	but	no	management	plan	or	decision	 they	make	 is	binding	
and	 they	 had	 definitely	 not	 been	 delegated	 any	 administrative	 decision-
making	power.	Any	operations	that	needed	a	licence,	permit	or	consent	had	to	
go	through	the	usual	channels	of	approval,	hence	a	distinction	between	the	






















at	 the	 interest	 of	 biodiversity,	 etc.	 And	 if	 there	 is	 some	 common	 ground	
between	NE	and	the	relevant	charitable	trust,	on	the	other	hand,	partners	such	
as	 the	 IDBs	 have	 other	 things	 to	 concentrate	 on.	 And	 this	 is	 where	 the	
challenge	 of	 the	 Partnership	 lies:	 to	 align	 interests	 and	 manage	 to	 bring	





These	 groups	 focus	 on	 management	 implementation	 and	 project	 delivery	
rather	 than	project	design.	They	do	however	 report	back	 to	HLP.1511	At	 the	
same	 time,	 there	 are	 individuals	 who	 participate	 in	 more	 than	 one	 group,	
which	allows	for	 information	 flow	across	several	groups	to	ensure	constant	




and	main	 themes	had	 long-term	experience	 in	working	 in	partnership	with	
landowners	 and	 farmers.1512 	Furthermore,	 a	 consultation	 with	 the	 private	
sector	(NFU	and	CBLA)	did	take	place	during	the	preparation	of	the	Business	








delivery. 1513 	Ultimately,	 the	 HHL	 management	 plan	 was	 the	 combined	
outcome	of	partners’	input	on	viable	projects,	collaboration	opportunities	on	
the	 ground	 and	 areas	 where	 any	 work	 would	 be	 very	 limited	 if	 not	 zero,	
together	with	information	gathered	through	meetings	with	stakeholders.	1514	
Finally,	a	last	remark	would	be	the	previous	success	of	the	HLP	in	delivering	























Information	was	 flowing	 from	 and	 to	 the	 steering	 group	 from	both	




group.	 1516 The	 steering	 group	 was	 the	 one	 to	 approve	 projects	
proposed	 by	 the	 working	 groups,	 allocate	 money	 from	 the	 Small	
Capital	Fund1517	and	ensure	that	all	work	done,	and	all	money	spent	





would	 ask	 the	 partner	 to	 do	 a	 presentation.	1519However,	 often	 this	














presentation	 on	 the	 project’s	 progress	 and	 ended	 up	 using	 half	 the	
meeting	 time.1520	The	 steering	 group	would	 also	discuss	 issues	 that	




to	 encourage	 broader	 participation.	 However,	 ‘broader’	 should	 be	
interpreted	 strictly	 to	 include	 the	Wetland	 Advisors,1522	the	 project	
officers,	 and	 the	 two	 universities	 participating	 in	 project	 delivery.	




NIA	 governance	 was	 slightly	 limited	 and	 restricted	 to	 a	 narrow	
audience.1524	However	this	does	not	mean	that	the	network	of	people	
engaged	with	the	work	of	the	NIA	was	not	wide	enough	or	that	their	
interests	would	not	be	 considered,	 as	 the	NIA	had	 its	own	 informal	
ways	of	engaging	the	wider	landowners’	community	and	aligning	their	
interests	to	nature	conservation.	








and	 their	 businesses.	 In	 these	 cases,	 the	 partner	 experiencing	 problems	 e.g	 tensions	with	





























farming	 business,	 or	 any	 business	 for	 that	 matter,	 would	 stop	
ploughing	their	fields	to	participate	in	a	nature	conservation	meeting	













in	 order	 to	 decide	 to	 spend	 some	 of	 their	 valuable	 time	 getting	
involved	 with	 NIA	 meetings.	 Nevertheless,	 there	 were	 cases	 of	
agriculture	 companies	 that	 have	 units	 specially	 set-up	 for	 similar	
purposes	 –	 sustainable	 and	 environmentally	 friendly	 management.	
However,	often	 these	units	 are	not	based	close	enough	 to	allow	 the	
personnel	 to	attend	 regular	meetings.	Also,	what	was	mentioned	by	
many	interviewees	–	the	NFU	included	-	and	which	is	often	overlooked	



























Having	 individual	 farmers	 participating	 in	 decision-making	 groups	
and	providing	input	on	developing	criteria	for	spending	a	grant	would	
give	 them	 an	 unfair	 advantage	 over	 those	 who	 did	 not	 participate.	






























Working	Groups:	 At	 the	 bottom	of	 the	HHL	 tiered	 system	of	
governance	 we	 find	 several	 working	 groups	 established	 to	 provide	
specific	 expertise	 on	 larger	 scale	 projects	 (Community	 Engagement	
‘CONNECT’	project,	Monitoring	and	Evaluation,	 and	Land	Advisory).		
Participation	 in	 these	 groups	was	 at	 once	 more	 restricted	 but	 also	




group	of	 individuals.	Hence,	 at	 the	CONNECT	group	you	might	have	
had	one	or	 two	members	of	 the	 community	who	had	been	 involved	
with	it,	e.g	a	volunteer	together	with	the	CONNECT	project	officers,	or	
at	 the	 Land	 Advisory	 group	 you	 would	 have	 the	 projects	 officers,	
wetland	advisors	but	also	the	NE	HLS	advisors;	the	latter	to	provide	
details	 on	 landowners	 engagement	with	 the	HLS	 scheme	 and	 share	
their	 local	 knowledge	 and	 experience.	 The	 working	 groups,	 in	
particular	the	Land	Advisory	and	CONNECT,	were	the	liaison	between	
work	on	the	ground	and	the	higher	tiers	of	NIA	governance.	 	For	the	
purpose	 of	 this	 discussion,	 I	 will	 focus	more	 on	 the	 Land	 Advisory	
group,	which	was	entrusted	with	the	challenging	work	of	introducing	
biodiversity	management	 to	 the	wider	 farming	 community,	 the	 aim	
being	to	achieve	ecological	connectivity	and	address	the	ongoing	issue	
of	habitat	fragmentation.	As	I	discuss	in	detail	below,	this	group	–	like	





difficult	 to	materialize	 in	 practice,	 especially	 in	 terms	of	 a	 delivery	 scheme	






often	asserted	 in	 literature,	having	a	wide	spectrum	of	 individuals	sitting	 in	
key	positions	of	the	NIA	decision-making	groups	could	provide	valuable	input	
that	would	allow	for	 less	conflict	at	 the	stage	of	 implementation	or	a	 larger	
number	 of	 actively	 involved	 farmers	 and	 landowners.	Moreover,	 given	 that	






is	 unlikely	 to	work	 in	 practice.	 Even	 for	 the	 Partners’	 staff	 and	 the	 project	
officer,	participation	in	all	these	groups	is	challenging.	Also	getting	the	right	
people	 to	 participate	 in	 order	 to	 make	 full	 use	 of	 the	 opportunities	 this	
Partnership	approach	offers	is	challenging.	There	are	only	a	few	people	who	
can	attend	these	meetings;	some	need	to	attend	more	than	one	group.	Surely	
there	 is	 a	 difference	 in	 information	 flow	 when,	 for	 instance,	 the	 NE	
representative	is	the	same	individual	in	the	HLP,	the	steering	group	and	the	
stakeholder	group?	In	this	case	they	would	have	first-hand	knowledge	of	what	




to	 the	wider	 farming	 community	 and	 if	 it	 really	wanted	 farmers	 to	 attend,	
those	 groups	 would	 have	 to	 come	 together	 outside	 working	 hours,	 in	 the	
evenings	which	in	turn	would	mean	that	the	Partners’	staff	would	have	to	be	
paid	 overtime.1533	But	 how	would	 the	 NIA	 resource	 that?	Wouldn’t	 it	 have	
been	preferable	to	invest	these	resources	in	actual	conservation	work,	even	if	

























of	 people	 that	 the	 partners	 had	 to	 motivate	 to	 undertake	 conservation	
management.	 The	 area	 is	 predominantly	 agricultural	 and	 contained	
productive	farmland	and	hard-working	people	who	were	often	suspicious	of	
nature	 conservation	 or	 very	 hesitant	 to	 change	 their	 long-term,	 traditional	















non-statutory	 nature	 reserves	 managed	 by	 the	 charitable	 trusts,	 were	
becoming	isolated	and	therefore	vulnerable.	The	idea	was	to	move	away	from	






linking	 key	 sites	 via	 rivers	 and	 drains,	with	 additional	 blocks	 of	 habitat	 as	
stepping	stones.1536	Several	BAP	species	would	benefit	 from	the	project	and	





The	 project	was	 not	 an	 entirely	 novel	 idea	 but	was	mapped	 on	 the	
successful	Wetland	Vision,	a	pilot	programme	that	preceded	the	NIA	scheme.	
Building	 on	 lessons	 learnt,	 experience	 and	 good	working	 relationships	 that	















trusts.	To	an	extent	 this	was	 to	be	expected,	 given	 that	most	projects	were	
already	underway	by	the	respective	agencies/NGOs	before	being	added	to	the	
NIA	 agenda	 and	 hence	were	 being	 implemented	 in	 land	 -	 primarily	 nature	
reserves	-	owned	or	managed	by	them.	1539	
However,	the	very	nature	of	the	Wetland	Advice	project,	which	sought	





with	 production;	 and	 that	 foreshadows	 tensions,	 because	 for	 the	 farming	
community	this	land	is	their	business,	their	revenue.	The	lack	of	statutory	legal	
obligations	 favouring	 biodiversity	 management	 outside	 SSSIs,	 implied	 that	
voluntary	landowner	engagement	was	the	only	way	the	partners	could	give	
effect	to	their	objectives.		

















But	 to	 reiterate,	 the	 NIA	 scheme	 was	 not	 about	 imposing	 any	
obligations	 on	 the	 private	 sector;	 the	 NIA	 designation	 itself	 conferred	 no	
special	 powers	 on	 any	 authority	 to	 impose	 any	 restrictions.	 It	 was	 as	 Sir	
Lawton	said	a	‘consortium	of	the	willing’,	of	those	willing	to	work	together	to	





Advice,	 negotiation	 and	 collaboration	 were	 thus	 the	 armoury	 of	 the	 NIA	
throughout	 the	 three	 years	 of	 implantation.	 The	 priority	was	 to	work	with	




This	was	 the	 reason	why	 compromises	were	 sometimes	 possible	when	
negotiation	 techniques	 and	 private	 sector	 engagement	 were	 not	 able	 to	
resolve	issues.1544	Hence,	there	would	be	cases	that	the	NIA	would	not	get	to	
pick	up	sites	offering	the	most	opportunities	for	biodiversity	and	the	creation	



























small-scale	 capital	 work	 and	 some	 limited	 access	 to	 environmental	
stewardship.		
	
● The	 NIA	 Landowners/Farmers	 working	 group	 (land	 management	
group)	
The	 land	 management-working	 group,	 originally	 set	 up	 during	 the	






small	 capital	 fund	 to	 finance	 projects	 with	 landowners	 and	 ensure	
coordination	across	partners	and	projects.		
The	land	management	group	were	the	people	working	on	the	ground,	

















sites	 could	 be	 aligned	with	 the	 sites	 out	 of	 NE’s	 direct	 control,	 that	 is	 the	
Partners’	wildlife	sites	that	would	function	as	stepping-stones	or	satellite	sites.	
The	YWT	when	working	on	Living	Landscapes	had	done	 studies	on	how	 to	
improve	 habitats	 between	 these	 sites	 and	 connect	 them	 together,	mapping	


























decisions	 on	what	 to	 do	 and	where	 to	 do	 it.	 In	 a	 sense,	 the	 projects	were	
roughly	designed	in	that	group	and	built	along	the	way	following	discussions	








top	 priority.	 	 This	 brings	 us	 to	 the	 second	 challenge:	 persuade	 farmers	 to	
undertake	conservation	work.	The	NIA	had	to	provide	 in	 the	right	way,	 the	
right	incentives	to	persuade	farmers	to	do	small	capital	works	such	as	digging	
ponds,	creating	and	restoring	hedgerows,	reseeding,	etc.	













After	 the	 initial	 targeting	 stage,	 the	 NIA	 advisors	 closely	 working	






Approaching	 landowners	would	 usually	 start	with	 a	 phone	 call.	 For	




Another	 way	 was	 through	 Partners’	 connections.	 Most	 of	 the	 NIA	
partners	like	the	EA,	NE,	RSPB	had	their	own	network	of	landowners.	The	NIA	
advisor	would	then	ask	them	to	distribute	a	letter	that	contained	information	
on	 the	 scheme	 and	 an	 invitation	 to	 apply	 for	 NIA	 funding.	 Due	 to	 data	
protection	issues,	the	advisor	was	not	able	to	get	the	details	directly	from	the	
Partners	and	thus	would	ask	them	to	distribute	the	letter.1556	Another	way	to	
engage	 people	 was	 through	 workshops	 and	 a	 series	 of	 training	 events	 to	
introduce	 the	scheme	and	how	 it	worked,	 to	 raise	awareness	of	 the	NIA	by	
inviting	 people	 to	 come	 along	 and	 learn	more.	Word	 of	mouth	 also	works,	
especially	among	peers;	if	it	worked	well	for	a	neighbour	and	did	not	cost	or	
lose	them	any	money,	then	this	is	a	very	good	motivation	for	others	to	take	























land	advisors	 cold	 call.1559	In	most	 cases	 the	 farmers	 that	were	approached	
had	 previous	 experience	 in	 working	 jointly	 with	 the	 partners	 on	 several	
projects	 or	were	 already	 involved	with	AES.	 It	was	 really	 unlikely	 that	 the	
advisors	would	approach	someone	entirely	new	or	someone	who	they	knew	
was	unlikely	to	be	willing	to	engage	to	the	project.1560	They	already	had	a	good	
































































the	 grant	 scheme.	 It	was	 a	 blanket	 cover	 box-ticking	 document	 that	would	
ensure	ongoing	management	rather	than	capital	works	and	in	principle	would	
not	 necessarily	 and	 directly	 promote	 NIA	 objectives.	 Another	 complication	
was	that	while	the	NIA	funding	was	allocated	through	the	YWT	for	the	NIA,	the	
HLS	agreements	would	 still	have	 to	go	via	 the	 local	NE	advisor.	This	 is	 the	
reason	why	having	NE	HLS	advisors	in	the	Working	Group	was	very	important;	
it	helped	aligned	environmental	stewardship	to	the	NIA	objectives.	
In	general,	 farmers	would	be	keener	 to	 join	stewardship	 schemes	as	































pro-conservation. 1569 	Furthermore,	 within	 the	 HHL	 there	 was	 a	 growing	
organic	vegetable	market.	Hence,	some	farmers	were	very	keen	to	be	part	of	
the	 NIA	 project	 network	 and	 thus	 grow	 an	 ‘environmentally	 friendly’	
reputation	 that	would	 attract	more	 customers,	 ultimately	 outweighing	 any	
cost	incurred	by	the	business.	










business.	 All	 the	 interviewees	 confirmed	 that	 building	 good	 working	
interpersonal	 relationships	 and	mutual	 trust	were	 vital,	 a	 sine	 qua	 non	 to	
landowner	 engagement.	 The	 farmers	 had	 to	 feel	 that	 they	 were	 being	














































In	 contrast	 and	 reflecting	 the	 very	 essence	 of	 the	 adaptive	 co-management	
model,	flexibility	was	the	key;	interviews	shared	the	idea	that	the	process	was	
and	had	to	be	a	constructive	dialogue	aimed	at	reaching	a	commonly	accepted	



























prepared	 to	 compromise.	 Often	 farming	 was	 a	 family	 business	 going	 back	
many	 generations.	 Land	 advisors	 were	 therefore	 dealing	 people	 who	 had	
owned	and	managed	their	land	for	years	and	considered	themselves	‘experts’	











































































completion	of	works	with	no	available	 funding,	was	 the	 contribution	of	 the	
































cost	 of	 ongoing	 management.	 However,	 the	 alternative,	 attaching	 some	
measure	of	formality	especially	in	the	absence	of	further	funding	after	the	end	
of	the	three-year	programme,	would	have	a	deterrent	effect	on	them	joining	in	
the	 first	place.	This	 is	why	volunteers	had	a	pivotal	role	 to	play	 in	ensuring	
some	form	of	continuity.	
Nevertheless,	 armed	 with	 goodwill	 on	 behalf	 of	 both	 parties	 this	
informal	 flexible	 approach	 seemed	 to	 be	 working,	 certainly	 within	 its	
limitations.	 Financial	 incentives,	 good	 reputation,	 positive	 impact	 on	 the	
business	or	merely	being	naturally	pro-conservation	and	enjoy	having	a	pretty	



























1581	See	 ‘lessons	 learnt’	 in	Monitoring	 and	Evaluation	 of	Nature	 Improvement	Areas:	Final	
Report	(n97)	118ff	referring	among	others	to	the	importance	of	a	shared	vision,	partnership-













The	 exploration	 into	 the	 NIA’s	 implementation	 suggests	 that,	 in	
practice,	nature	conservation	management	can	be	different	than	it	is	on	paper.	
In	some	cases,	it	might	be	easier	and	less	complicated	than	one	would	think	




and	 the	 work	 in	 utterly	 informal	 way,	 even	 without	 the	 use	 of	 financial	
incentives,	but	nevertheless	with	significant	benefits	to	wildlife.		
In	some	cases,	however,	 things	get	more	complicated	and	 in	practice	
more	 difficult	 to	 realize	 than	 originally	 thought	 by	 those	 designing	











in	 general	 is	 flexible	 enough	 to	 accommodate	 an	 adaptive	 approach	 to	
conservation	management,	to	allow	this	network	of	people	to	work	together,	












Partnership	 from	 reaching	 its	 full	 potential.	 Having	 said	 that,	 as	 explained	
below,	the	system	is	flexible	enough	to	address	these	issues.	Administrative	
discretion	 is	 the	 key	 feature	 of	 the	 English	 legal	 system	 allowing	 for	
experimentation,	learning	and	collaboration	to	occur.	
It	 is	 widely	 understood	 by	 those	 who	 work	 to	 realize	 the	 NIA’s	
objectives	that	flexibility	is	the	key;	that	formalities	might	be	very	restrictive	
when	 it	 comes	 to	 making	 things	 happen	 on	 the	 ground.	 Equally,	 no	 one	
suggested	 that	 there	 is	 no	 place	 for	 legally	 enforceable	 rules	 in	 nature	
conservation	management,	which	has	to	take	place	within	limits	enforceable	
by	 statutory	 legislation	 that	 maps	 out	 the	 framework	 in	 which	 flexible	





















their	 implementation	 by	 the	 decision-making	 authorities	 set	 on	 the	
Partnership’s	 efforts	 for	 optimal	 outcomes	within	 the	 HHL	NIA	 ecosystem.	
There	were	three	main	sources	of	difficulties	the	Partnership	was	faced	with.	
The	 first	was	 related	 to	 state	 aid	 rules	 and	 the	 limitations	 set	 by	 the	way	
funding	was	allocated	to	the	landowners.	The	second	related	to	the	decision-
making	 process	 of	 public	 authorities	whose	 approval	was	 required	 for	 the	






conservation	or	 environmental	 legal	 framework	 but	 also	 the	wider	 English	
legal	order.	Hence,	every	decision	made	needs	to	be	made	in	conformity	with	
the	 entire	 body	 of	 legislation.	 State	 aid	 regulations	 challenged	 the	
implementation	of	projects	 that	sought	 to	 combine	 the	enhancement	of	 the	





Small	 Capital	 Fund. 1584 	The	 NIA	 could	 only	 give	 up	 to	 £6,000	 to	 each	





















One	 of	 common	 issue	 arising	 was	 that	 certain	 projects	 required	
planning	permission	by	local	planning	authorities.	This,	as	expected,	slowed	
down	–	if	not	prevented	-	the	implementation	of	certain	projects.	Although	it	
was	 often	 the	 case	 that	 works	 such	 as	 pond	 creation	 were	 carried	 out	 by	
landowners	without	planning	permission,1586	as	soon	as	the	NIA	was	funding	
such	 work	 the	 Partnership	 had	 to	 follow	 best	 practice	 and	 apply	 for	 all	
permission	 needed. 1587 	This	 complicated	 matters	 as	 there	 were	 cases	 of	
landowners	who,	even	though	consenting	to	 the	work	taking	place	on	their	
land,	were	not	willing	to	spend	time	going	through	the	planning	permission	
process; 1588 	In	 addition,	 to	 make	 things	 even	 more	 problematic,	 planning	
permission	would	differ	depending	on	the	planning	authority,	or	there	could	
be	 projects	 which	 required	 planning	 permission	 from	 different	 planning	
authorities.			



















mean	 that	 the	 people	 participating	 in	 meetings	 worked	 for	 the	 planning	
department.	 Local	 authorities	 have	 many	 departments	 and	 due	 to	 staff	



































It	 follows	 that	 on	 a	 day-to-day	 basis,	 communication	 will	 very	 much	
depend	on	the	 individuals	who	are	 involved	and	on	practical	 issues	such	as	





















grant	 a	 water	 abstraction	 permit,	 which	 led	 to	 the	 abandonment	 and	
cancellation	of	a	very	promising	and	aspirational	project,	the	Idle	Washlands,	
led	by	the	RSPB.1592	The	RSPB	was	going	to	work	in	collaboration	with	a	major	





at	 the	 same	 time	 of	 benefit	 to	 agricultural	 production,	 a	 product	 of	 closed	
collaboration	 between	 a	 conservation	NGO,	 the	 Environment	Agency	 and	 a	
major	landowner	
The	project	was	financed	by	the	Water	Framework	Directive	and	NIA	












water	 needs	 and	 biodiversity	 objectives.	 If	 the	 project	 proceeded	 and	 the	
storage	reservoir	was	constructed,	the	EA	would	be	in	charge	of	monitoring	
and	 evaluating	 the	 project’s	 benefits	 to	 the	 WFD	 and	 the	 landowner	
																																																								








However,	 ninth	 months	 into	 the	 NIA	 it	 was	 found	 that	 there	 was	
actually	regulation	on	water	abstraction	control	on	the	river	catchment	and	
that	 the	 EA	was	 not	 going	 to	 issue	 the	 necessary	 license	 for	 the	 project	 to	





		 The	 Idle	 Washlands	 project	 case	 allows	 certain	 observations	 to	 be	









it	 would	 be	 the	 NGOs	 and	 statutory	 agencies	 representing	 biodiversity	




decision-making	 authority.	 Hence,	 in	 the	 case	 of	 Idle	 Washlands,	 the	 EA	










































HHL	 NIA	 generally	 delivered	 the	 expected	 outputs	 and	 was	 a	 successful	
initiative	 within	 its	 limitations;1597 	as	 the	 analysis	 on	 the	 Wetland	 Advice	






NIA	 projects.	 	 What	 needs	 to	 be	 reconsidered	 is	 how	 the	 NIA	 Partnership	
operated	and	communicated	 its	 ambitions	 to	 the	administrative	authorities	
and	vice	versa.	In	the	Idle	Washlands	case,	the	conflict	with	the	EA	might	have	
been	 avoided	 or	 resolved	 with	 wider	 representation	 of	 the	 agency	
departments	 within	 the	 NIA	 decision-making	 groups	 and/or	 with	 better	
communication	of	NIA	projects	to	the	EA	staff	on	the	ground	who	have	the	final	
say	when	it	comes	to	granting	licenses.1598			
Collaborative	 adaptive	 management	 is	 not	 about	 the	 size	 of	 the	
network	but	its	consistency;	that	is	to	say,	it	requires	carefully	choosing	which	
individuals	–	not	just	organizations	or	agencies	-	to	include	in	order	to	realize	
the	 seamless	 implementation	 of	 projects.	 Hence,	 in	 the	 case	 of	 the	 Idle	



















rights,	 for	 certain	 projects	 deemed	 part	 of	 the	 NIA	 planning	 phase.	 Hence,	
instead	of	having	to	get	individual	planning	permission	for	every	pond,	general	
permits	for	all	ponds	that	need	to	be	created	to	promote	NIA	objectives	could	
be	 issued.	 It	 could	 be	 suggested	 to	 give	 the	 HLP	 development	 control	 or	
licensing	 powers	 e.g	 similar	 to	 the	 National	 Park	 Authorities	 for	 the	 areas	













respective	 public	 authorities	 but	 be	 considered,	 at	 least	 in	 general	 terms,	
during	the	planning	stage	instead	of	that	of	implementation.	The	success	of	the	
HLP	was	that	it	had	sitting	on	its	Board	representatives	of	most	of	the	relevant	














instrument	 in	 the	 armoury	 of	 nature	 conservation.	 Notwithstanding	 its	
valuable	contribution	to	biodiversity	objectives	outside	protected	areas,	 the	
ES	schemes	at	the	time	of	the	NIA	implementation	lacked	flexibility	to	adapt	to	




the	 shortcomings	 of	 environmental	 stewardship	 that	 prevented	 the	
Partnership	from	using	AES	to	implement	NIA	projects	to	their	full	potential.	
Some	 of	 the	 difficulties	 in	 using	 AES	 had	 to	 do	 with	 the	 way	 AES	 is	
administered;	these	issues	are	easier	to	address	with	better	communication	
between	 NE	 and	 the	 NIA	 Partnership,	 better	 temporal	 alignment	 of	 the	
environmental	stewardship	and	NIA	projects	and	more	strategic	use	of		agri-
environment	schemes.	The	use	of	AES	was	however	further	limited	due	to	the	








contribution	 to	 improving	 the	 connectivity	 of	 the	 wider	 landscape	 and	
complemented	capital	works	funded	by	the	small	capital	grant.	But	given	that	
most	 of	 the	 agreements	 pre-existed	 the	 NIA	 they	 did	 so	 by	 operating	 in	 a	
parallel	rather	than	strategic	comprehensive	way	with	NIA	projects.			
Another	issue	was	that	management	agreements	were	administered	by	
NE	 and	 their	 compliance	 was	 ensured	 through	 inspections	 by	 the	 Rural	




way	 they	 allocated	 funding	 from	 the	 small	 capital	 grant.	 HLS	 agreement	
followed	a	different	process	through	NE;	a	negotiation	process	between	the	
landowner	 and	 the	 NE	 advisor	 that	 would	 result	 in	 a	 mutually	 acceptable	
agreement.	 It	 should	 be	 expected	 that	 when	 entering	 and	 shaping	 the	
agreement	NE	would	first	and	foremost	consider	how	it	would	serve	their	own	
priorities.	 Hence,	 it	 is	 likely	 they	 would	 prefer	 to	 offer	 agreements	 to	
landowners	with	agreements	about	to	expire;	if	there	was	no	continuation	of	
money	all	 the	hard	work	and	any	benefits	 from	it	were	going	to	be	 lost.1599	
Additionally,	 given	 that	 environmental	 stewardship	 is	 a	 national	 scheme,	
Natural	 England	 would	 prefer	 to	 refrain	 from	 showing	 any	 favouritism	
towards	specific	landowners	by	having	farms	accepted	into	the	stewardship	
only	because	they	would	undertake	management	tied	to	the	NIA	priorities.		
Then	 there	 are	 limitations	 related	 to	 the	 way	 environmental	
stewardship	 is	 designed	 to	 operate.	 Could	 AES	 actually	 fund	 the	 type	 of	
management	 the	 NIA	 projects	 required?	 As	 mentioned,	 the	 AES	 were	 not	
individually	negotiated	agreements;	or	more	precisely,	there	was	some	scope	
for	negotiation,	which	was	nevertheless	limited	by	the	pre-set	management	
options	 that	 the	 scheme	offered.1600	Having	 said	 that,	 in	no	 case	 should	 the	
contribution	of	the	AES	not	be	appreciated,	neither	does	it	imply	that	the	pre-
set	 options	 based	 scheme	 is	 extremely	 rigid	 and	 over-restrictive	 to	 the	
implementation	of	 an	adaptive	 approach.	 	The	discussion	with	 the	NE	 land	
advisor	responsible	for	the	environmental	stewardship	in	the	wider	area1601	
reveals	that	there	was	a	degree	of	flexibility;	it	also	confirms	what	was	stressed	
in	 Chapter	 Six	 about	 a	 partnership	 approach	 based	 on	 negotiation	 and	
cooperation	being	central	to	the	way	nature	conservation	operates.	In	the	end,	
































































needs.	 1605What	 further	 constrained	 the	 flexibility	 was	 the	 HLS	 ten-year	
commitment	 period.	 On	 the	 one	 hand,	 setting	 agreements	 of	 ten	 years’	




























ecological	 but	 also	 the	 socioeconomic	 conditions.	 In	 this	 respect,	 the	 HLS	



























them	more	 appealing	 to	 private	 interests.	 The	 terms/management	 options	






year	 commitment	 on	 the	 selected	 fixed	 options	 of	 the	 latter	 would	 have	
prevented	it.	At	the	same	time,	the	amount	of	payment	the	landowners	were	
to	receive	would	have	been	the	same	regardless	of	whether	they	were	giving	





multiple	 landowners	 (e.g.	 in	 water	 course	 wetland	 improvements).	 But	 as	
discussed,	 in	 practical	 terms,	 even	 if	 the	AES	 or	 any	 other	 funding	 scheme	
allowed	for	multipartite	agreements	it	was	very	difficult	to	find	landowners	
who	 were	 willing	 to	 work	 with	 each	 other.	 To	 return	 to	 environmental	







together	 as	 a	 group.1609	They	would	 still	 need	 to	 sign	 separate	 agreements	
since	they	would	get	separate	payments,	but	it	would	be	more	strategic.	Such	
an	agreement	presupposed	that	the	wider	area	was	under	the	responsibility	
of	one	person	or	at	 least	 a	 single	group	of	 advisors,	with	knowledge	of	 the	



















To	conclude,	 the	case	study	confirmed	the	 issues	that	were	raised	 in	
Chapter	 Six	 in	 terms	 of	 the	 AES	 flexibility.	 The	 NIA	 or	 any	 similar	 future	
scheme	could	be	the	opportunity	for	more	strategic	use	of	the	AES	to	provide	









to	 changed	conditions	or	new	information	requires	 it.	A	more	 targeted	and	
flexible	AES	would	also	allow	or	at	 least	 facilitate	coordinated	management	
among	different	landowners.		
On	 the	 other	 hand,	 it	 should	 not	 be	 overlooked	 that	 having	 a	 fixed	




















conclusion,	 the	 management	 that	 took	 place	 therein	 was	 in	 key	 aspects	
adaptive	and	incorporated	elements	of	both	models	of	adaptive	management	
that	 were	 developed	 earlier	 in	 this	 thesis.	 Experimentation	 and	 iterative	
learning	were	central	-	the	scheme	itself	was	a	pilot	programme	-	and	science	
was	a	key	driver	of	decision-making,	especially	in	the	planning	stage.	However,	
conservation	 and	 nature	 improvement	 were	 addressed	 in	 their	 socio-
ecological	 context,	 hence	 socioeconomic	 objectives	 were	 added	 to	 the	 NIA	
priorities.	 Collaboration	 was	 vital	 in	 all	 stages	 from	 planning	 to	
implementation,	 either	 as	 a	 means	 to	 implement	 science-driven	
decisions/projects	or	 to	design	management	projects	with	multiple	benefits	
(ecological,	social,	economic	cultural).	
The	 truth	 is	 that	 nature	 conservation	 management	 system	 in	 its	
entirety,	 from	 a	 legal/regulatory	 and	 practical	 perspective,	 was	 ripe	 to	
incorporate	Lawton’s	recommendation	for	the	NIA	establishment.	The	idea	of	
landscape	conservation	was	was	already	gaining	ground	among	the	RSPB	and	
the	 Wildlife	 Trusts,	 which	 had	 already	 set	 their	 own	 large-scale	 projects,	
‘working	 in	partnership’	had	been	central	 to	 the	administrative	authorities’	
policy	and	 the	NGOs	and	been	working	 in	 the	area	 for	years,	building	good	
relationships,	 advancing	 science	 and	 having	 a	 large	 number	 of	 volunteers	
ready	 to	 do	 practical	 conservation	 work	 that	would	 have	 otherwise	 never	
happened	due	to	funding	limitations.	
	 Second,	the	theoretical	models	of	participation	and	co-decision	among	
multiple	 parties	 along	 an	 extensive	 network	 of	 people,	 will	 not	 work	 in	
practice,	 in	 real	 life,	 where	 decisions	 need	 to	 be	 made	 within	 strict	 time	
constraints.	A	tier-system	of	governance	and	decision-making,	with	seamless	
information	and	communication	 flow	across	all	 levels,	 is	more	 realistic	 and	
thus	more	effective.	This	leads	us	to	the	next	observation,	which	is	the	lack	of	
non-essential	 formalities.	 In	 terms	 of	 large-scale	 projects	 that	 require	 the	
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broad	 cooperation	 of	 the	 farming	 community,	 an	 informal	 flexible	 system	
seems	to	have	worked	well;	on	the	contrary	there	were	concerns	that	making	








	 Furthermore,	 although	 the	 interviewees	 agreed	 that	 flexibility	 is	
essential	 for	 the	 implementation	 of	 these	 type	 of	 programmes,	 they	 also	
considered	legislation	important	to	shape	a	framework	for	that	flexibility	to	
operate	but	underpinned	by	the	requisite	degree	of	security.	
	 Finally,	 the	 case	 study	 revealed	 that	 while	 in	 general	 terms	 the	
legislative	 and	 regulatory	 framework	 were	 able	 to	 accommodate	 adaptive	
decision	making,	 there	were	 nevertheless	 cases	were	 laws	 and	 regulations	
and/or	the	application	thereof	raised	barriers	to	the	implementation	of	certain	
projects.	However,	what	 needs	 to	 be	 stressed	 is	 that	most	of	 the	 problems	
were	not	due	to	primary	legislation.	Indeed,	the	English	legal	system	proved	
to	 be	 flexible	 enough,	 mainly	 due	 to	 the	 wide	 discretion	 it	 allows	 for	
administration.	 Hence,	 in	 the	 majority	 of	 cases	 better	 communication	 and	
planning	would	 resolve	 some	 of	 these	 issues;	 for	 others	 (e.g	 the	AES)	 it	 is	






This	 thesis	 sought	 to	 address	 social-ecological	 complexity	 in	 the	
context	of	the	English	nature	conservation	legal	and	regulatory	framework.	It	
focused	 on	 ecological	 uncertainty	 and	 nature	 conservation	 conflicts	 that	
challenge	the	implementation	of	day	to	day	nature	conservation	management.	
It	suggests	that	downwards	biodiversity	trends	continue,	because	of	the	
law’s	 failure	 to	 address	 biodiversity	 loss	 in	 its	 dynamic	 social-ecological	
context.	 Nature	 conservation	 decision-making	 operates	 on	 a	 mosaic	 of	
complexity:	 unpredictable	 ecosystem	 responses,	 scientific	 uncertainty,	
constantly	changing	and	diverse	values,	views	and	perspectives.	As	a	result,	
nature	conservation	is	faced	with	uncertainty	and	conflict.		
In	 response,	 the	 thesis	 argued	 that	 the	most	 recent	 understanding	 of	
ecosystems	 as	 social-ecological	 systems	 requires	 policy	 makers	 to	 explore	
more	 dynamic	 and	 less	 adversarial	 approaches	 to	 address	 ecological	
complexity	 and	 conservation	 conflicts.	 Such	 an	 approach	 is	 one	 based	 on	
adaptive	management,	 seen	 through	 two	different	 lenses:	one	as	a	 science-
driven	 mechanism	 emphasizing	 iterative	 decision	 making,	 aimed	 at	
addressing	 ecosystem	 uncertainty	 and	 unpredictability;	 and	 a	 second,	 as	 a	
framework	for	collaboration	among	interested	stakeholders	who	despite	their	
diverse	interests	share	a	common	objective	of	nature	conservation.		
A	 science-driven	 model	 of	 adaptive	 management	 is	 a	 structured,	
iterative	 process	 that	 allows	 for	 robust	 decision	 making	 in	 the	 face	 of	
uncertainty.	 Decisions	 are	 constantly	 evaluated	 on	 the	 basis	 of	 continuous	
monitoring	 and	 adjusted	 on	 the	 basis	 of	 lessons	 learnt	 so	 as	 to	 reach	 the	









legal	 framework	 that	 delineates	what	 can	 and	 cannot	 be	 done.	 This	 thesis	




plans	 but	 to	 identify	 certain	 features	 in	 the	 law	 that	 collectively	 reflect	 an	
adaptive	 mentality.	 The	 analysis	 showed	 that,	 overall,	 the	 English	 nature	
conservation	 framework	 is	 not	 a	 rigid,	 cumbersome	 regime	 and	 although	
adaptive	management	is	not	prescribed	in	law	as	such	-	although	occasionally	







course	 of	 action.	 Law	 sets	 a	 framework	 for	 action	 and	 leaves	 its	
implementation	 to	 the	 competent	 authorities.	 The	 wide	 administrative	
discretion	combined	with	increased	judicial	deference	enhances	freedom	and	
decision-making	 power	 in	 the	 implementation	 phase	 of	 legislation.	 The	
administration	 enjoys	 a	margin	 of	 appreciation	 from	 granting	 permits	 and	
consents	to	prosecute	SSSI	related	offences.	
As	 a	 result,	 for	 the	 most	 part,	 conservation	 management	 can	 be	 as	




them	 through	 negotiation	 and	 consensus	 building.	 To	 this	 end,	 the	
administration	has	at	its	disposal	a	rich	regulatory	toolbox	of	instruments	that	
it	 can	 choose	 to	 use	 in	 varied	 combinations	 and	 ideally	 converge	 to	 reach	
desirable	outcomes.	Central	 to	 this,	 is	 the	power	to	enter	 into	more	 flexible	
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(comparing	 to	 conventional	 legislation)	 contractual	 agreements	 that	 in	
principle	 allow	management	 decisions	 to	 be	 tailored	 to	 the	 needs	 of	 local	
biodiversity,	 the	 adjustment	 of	 decisions	 and	 the	 use	 of	 collaborative	
management	 log-rolling	 techniques	 for	 balancing	 interests	 and	 preventing	
conflict.	
The	thesis	further	showed	that	the	administration’s	policy	is	to	opt	for	
negotiation	 and	 consensus	 building	 instead	 of	 coercion.	 Looking	 at	 the	
guidance	 documents	 from	 both	 DEFRA	 and	 Natural	 England	 laying	 down	
administrative	 practice	 confirms	 this.	 Natural	 England	 officers	 act	 as	 both	
regulators	and	advisors,	trying	to	reach	acceptable	solutions,	recognising	that	
positive	management	can	only	be	achieved	through	genuine	cooperation	with	
private	 land	 managers.	 However,	 that	 flexible	 tools	 and	 procedures	 are	
preferred	does	not	mean	the	system	does	not	have	any	safeguards	to	secure	a	
baseline	 of	 protection	 but	 also	 positive	 management.	 Any	 negotiation	 will	
always	 take	 place	 against	 the	 fallback	 of	 enforceable	 legislation/regulation	
(for	 designated	 areas)	 or	 the	 equally	 deterrent	 cancellation	 of	 agricultural	
subsidies.		
In	relation	to	development,	instruments	such	as	biodiversity	offsetting	







	One	 remark	 made	 was	 that	 the	 agri-environment	 schemes	 as	 they	
currently	stand	 -	based	on	pre-set	options	 -	 limit	 the	 scope	 for	 tailor-made	
decision	 making	 and	 thus	 restrict	 adaptability,	 both	 to	 local	 biodiversity	
special	 needs	 and	 local	 social	 conditions	 especially.1611 	Additionally,	 being	
																																																								




ownership	 rather	 than	ecosystem	oriented	 they	are	not	very	well	 suited	 to	
underpin	large	scale	ecosystem	management,	which	is	considered	essential	for	
biodiversity	 conservation.	 Introducing	 the	 opportunity	 for	 individually	
negotiated,	 multiparty	 management	 agreements	 would	 help	 nature	
conservation	 to	 move	 away	 from	 ownership-based	 decision-making	 and	
facilitate	multipartite	trade-offs.	
A	 second	 remark	 was	 that	 statutory	 requirements	 for	 continuous	
monitoring	should	be	introduced	-	at	least	with	regard	to	designated	sites	-	as	
this	 would	 allow	 valuable	 quantitative	 and	 qualitative	 information	 on	 site	
biodiversity	 to	 be	 generated,	 as	 well	 as	 increase	 the	 ability	 of	 the	 law	 to	




Furthermore,	 it	 was	 suggested	 that	 it	 would	 be	 appropriate	 to	
introduce	statutory	requirements	for	public	participation	during	the	Habitats	
Directive	art6(4)	appropriate	assessment	-	the	current	framework	allows	the	
competent	 authority	 to	make	wider	 inquires	but	 does	 not	mandate	 it.	 This	
would	 allow	 a	 wider	 range	 of	 information	 to	 reach	 the	 decision-making	
authority,	 which	 in	 turn	 would	 not	 only	 contribute	 to	 better	 informed	





A	 fourth	 remark	 was	 the	 potential	 introduction	 of	 a	 statutory	
biodiversity	 offsetting	 requirement,	 at	 least	 for	 development	 affecting	
domestic	designations.	This	would	 fit	 very	well	within	 the	 current	National	









Finally,	 introducing	 statutory	 requirements	 for	 management	 plans	
similar	to	the	ones	required	for	National	Parks,	at	least	for	designated	areas,	
will	bind	 the	administrative	authorities	 to	design	 them.1613	This,	 apart	 from	
the	 practical	 implication	 of	 requesting	 adequate	 state	 funding	 for	 both	 its	
design	 and	 implementation	 would	 offer	 the	 opportunity	 for	 well-designed	
experimental	 and/or	 collaborative	 adaptive	 management	 plans.	 The	
competent	authorities	would	have	(or	seek	to	have)	at	their	disposal,	from	the	
outset,	all	necessary	scientific	data	and	 information	of	social	conditions	and	
potential	 conflict	 and	 allow	 stakeholder	 consultations	 and	 collaboration	
throughout	 the	 process.	 The	WCA	 1981	management	 scheme	 -	 not	 as	 it	 is	
usually	presented	 in	 the	 literature	and	policy	documents	as	a	deterrent	 for	
reaching	agreements	but	as	a	collaborative	process	-	could	potentially	provide	
such	an	opportunity.		
Further	 research	 would	 be	 needed	 to	 assess	 the	 potential	 of	 these	
recommendations	and	whether	they	could	be	easily	introduced	in	the	current	
framework.	Having	said	that,	 I	would	 like	to	draw	attention	to	the	 fact	 that	
none	 of	 these	 suggestions	 runs	 counter	 to	 the	 current	 legislation.	 On	 the	
contrary,	it	is	at	the	discretion	of	the	administration	to	effectuate	all	of	them,	
with	 or	 without	 amendments	 to	 the	 legal	 framework	 or	 redesign	 of	 AES	


























flexible	 enough	 to	 support	 such	 large	 scale	 experimental	 management	
initiatives,	as	sometimes	they	were	unable	to	be	tailored	to	serve	the	NIA’s	
objectives.			
This	 also	 demonstrated	 the	 importance	 of	 having	 well-designed	
management	 plans,	 supporting	 the	 argument	 in	 favour	 of	 making	 them	 a	





A	 further	 observation	 is	 that	 in	 large	 scale	 initiatives	 like	 this	wide	
collaboration	is	not	possible.	On	the	one	hand,	farmers	are	unlikely	to	attend	
stakeholder	 groups	 and	 on	 the	 other,	 data	 protection	 issues	 necessitate	














The	 answer	 to	 this	 is	 definitely	 ‘yes’.	 Past	 experience	 with	 voluntarism	
confirms	 it.	Besides,	 the	 fact	 that	environmental	 legislation	 in	general	relies	
less	and	less	on	traditional	forms	of	legal	intervention	does	not	mean	there	is	
no	 place	 for	 it,	 or	 even	 more,	 for	 law	 in	 general.	 The	 complexity	 of	
environmental	 problems	 led	 lawyers	 to	 develop	 new	 and	 innovative	 legal	
measures	to	build	up	a	rich	toolbox	to	address	them;	the	more,	the	merrier	(in	
qualitative	 terms),	 considering	 that	 the	 fight	 against	 environmental	
degradation	needs	to	be	waged	on	many	fronts.	But	there	is	still	room	for	the	
‘administrative	state’.	There	is	much	grey	in	nature	conservation	but	there	is	
also	 some	 black	 and	 white.	 Law	 has	 managed	 to	 strike	 a	 certain	 balance	
between	 being	 adaptive	 but	 also	 providing	 for	 a	 structural	 mechanism	
outlining	 limits	 that	 cannot	 be	 crossed.	 These	 are	 the	 limits	 within	 which	
adaptive	decision	making	in	any	form	can	safely	happen	without	undermining	
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